Virtue and knowledge are identical and thus in theory possible to teach. I would like to suggest a  three pronged approach. Musar, Hashkafa world view, outdoor survival skills.

The first idea in that of Israel Salanter. It deals mainly with study of the type of character traits the Torah requires of us. There is a promise of Isaac Blasser that by this study one is cured of physical and spiritual sickness.
The second deals with the study of what kind of world view the Torah has. That started mainly from Saadia Gaon, Ibn Gavirol and included the Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam, and goes up until Joseph Albo, and Cresas. these were the major rigorous thinkers along these lines. The idea here is that the Torah is not an empty vessel that one can put any ideas into it that he wants. It has a specific world view. Agree with it or not, one has to know it. The problems that began with people putting their delusions into the Torah and dressing them up in verses has continued until this day and shows no sign of abating.
The third is outdoor skills. I am thinking of what the Boy Scouts and Girls Scouts used to be doing. That is the idea of instilling good values by means of action, not just words. honor, loyalty, team work, hard work, cleanliness trustworthiness. etc

Lithuanian path

Can you teach virtue? This seems to be the basic idea of what we call "learning Torah." This is something that is dealt with in a Platonic dialogue. On one hand it seems it can't be taught. On the other hand Socrates thought virtue and knowledge are one. And so it can be taught. An at least we can see religions that teach evil and we can see that people in them in fact learn evil.

But this is a delicate question. On one hand you know what you will be learning if you go into electrical engineering or if you go to become a blacksmith or car repair man. This was the whole point of Socrates. Learning and teaching virtue is not the same thing. He concluded that he knew of no one that knew what virtue is or who could teach it. I am in a similar situation. The closest thing that I saw was the basic path of my parents. "Menschlichkeit" .
That is to the idea of striving to be  a whole and moral decent human. That is the Ten Commandments.

 A close approximation to this is the Litvak [Lithuanian] yeshiva path.

But the Lithuanian path has a kind of problem that I can't exactly put my finger on. But the problems seem to be the copycats that try to pretend they are real yeshivas but are certainly not learning the Holy Torah but bags of delusions.

The problem is simple. Cults. "Learning Torah" is just a code word for cults that are trying to get your children..

Virtue seems to be what you learn when you learn a vocation. But institutions that are supposed to be dealing with mental and spiritual health seem to be traps for the innocent. Psychiatrists's expertise seems to be in making people mentally ill, and religious organizations seem to excel in making sick, religious fanatics.

The Mishna in Bava Metzia 100a Tosphot "demain eved"

The Mishna in Bava Metzia 100a says when you have a seller and a buyer of a slave and they are both sure of their pleas then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. When both are unsure then they divide. The Gemara asks but we don't take an oath on slaves? Rav answered the money of  a slave. Shmuel said a slave in his garment. Tosphot asks on the opinion of Rav how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא! In my notes on this {Ideas in Bava Metzia chs 8 and 9} I mentioned that this question of Tosphot does not like the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia. Rather Tosphot is going like the Gemara in Bava Batra. I mean to say that Tosphot here is saying that Sumchus would not say to divide unless it is a case of דררא דממונא. This is like the Gemara in Bava Batra. But in the beginning of Bava Metzia the Gemara concludes that if Sumchus said his din in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so would he say so in a case that is not דררא דממונא

This question had been bothering me for years. So I was very happy when I realized what Tosphot was doing.  

So fine Tosphot then finds a way to show the case of Rav is one of דררא דממונא. There were witnesses that heard the agreement and saw money exchanged but did not see how much money was exchanged.

But then we get to Shmuel. I asked where is the דררא דממונא in the case of Shmuel. No money was exchanged. For that is the whole point of Shmuel.

What I wanted to say today was simply that Shmuel is going like the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia in which holds the opinion that Sumchus said his din in both cases--whether there is דררא דממונא or not.  That is to say that Rav and Shmuel are disagreeing about the opinion of Sumchus. And this disagreement is reflected in these two opposing Gemaras, one in Bava Metzia and the other in Bava Batra.

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The משנה in בבא מציעא דף ק' ע''אsays when you have a seller and a buyer of a slave and they are both sure of their pleas then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. When both are unsure then they divide. The גמרא asks but we don't take an oath on slaves? רב answered the money of  a slave. שמואל said a slave in his garment. תוספות asks on the opinion of רב how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא! In my notes on this I mentioned that this question of תוספות is not like the גמרא in the beginning of בבא מציעא. Rather תוספות is going like the גמרא in בבא בתרא. I mean to say that תוספות here is saying that סומכוס would not say to divide unless it is a case of דררא דממונא. This is like the גמרא in בבא בתרא. But in the beginning of בבא מציעא the גמרא concludes that if סומכוס said his דין in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so would he say so in a case that is not דררא דממונא

This question had been bothering me for years. So I was very happy when I realized what תוספות was doing.  

So fine תוספות then finds a way to show the case of רב is one of דררא דממונא. There were witnesses that heard the agreement and saw money exchanged but did not see how much money was exchanged.

But then we get to שמואל. I asked where is the דררא דממונא in the case of שמואל. No money was exchanged. For that is the whole point of שמואל.

What I wanted to say today was simply that שמואל is going like the גמרא in the beginning of בבא מציעא in which holds the opinion that סומכוס said his din in both cases--whether there is דררא דממונא or not.  That is to say that רב and שמואל are disagreeing about the opinion of סומכוס. And this disagreement is reflected in these two opposing גמרות, one in בבא מציעא and the other in בבא בתרא.


) ב''מ ק: יש לשאול: שמואל צריך לעבור דרך כל ארבע בבות האלה של המשנה, היינו (1) ברי וברי, (2) שמא וברי, (3) ברי ושמא, (4) שמא ושמא. אז מה הוא עושה עם שמא ושמא? כסף לא נתחלף. רק שני גברים נכנסים לבית דין עם ספק על בגד עם חלק נוסף,- אם החלק הנוסף גם היה מוכל במחירה. איפה הדררא דממונא (כמו שתוספות ניסו למצוא תירוץ לרב)? תשאיר את החלק איפה שהוא. למה חולקים?

המשנה בבבא מציעא דף ק' ע''א אומרת כשיש  מוכר וקונה של עבד והם שניהם בטוחים על הטיעונים שלהם אז המוכר לוקח שבועה כי הוא מכר את העבד הקטן. כאשר הם לא בטוחים אז הם מחלקים את כסף שיש ספק בו. הגמרא שואלת אבל אנחנו לא נשבעים על עבדים? רב ענה דנים על שיווי הכספי של עבד. שמואל אמר עבד בבגדו. תוספות שואלים על חוות דעת של רב איך הם יכולים לחלק? זה לא דררא דממונא! שאלה זו של תוספות לא כמו הגמרא בתחילת בבא מציעא. במקום זה תוספות הולכים כמו הגמרא בבא בתרא בחזקת הבתים. אני מתכוון לומר כי תוספות כאן אומרים כי סומכוס לא הייה אומר לחלק אלא אם כן הוא מקרה של דררא דממונא. זה כמו הגמרא בבא בתרא. אבל בתחילה של בבא מציעא ב: הגמרא מסכמת שאם סומכוס אמר הדין שלו במקרה של דררא דממונא, אז על אחת כמה וכמה היה אומר את דינו כאשר המצב אינו דררא דממונא.   ואז תוספות מוצאים דרך להראות שהמקרה של  רב  הוא כן דררא דממונא. היינו שהיו עדים ששמעו את ההסכם וראו כסף הוחלף, אבל לא ראו כמה כסף הוחלף. אבל אז מגיעים לשמואל. שאלתי איפה הוא דררא דממונא במקרה של שמואל. אין כסף שהוחלף.  זה כל העניין של שמואל. מה שאני רוצה לומר  פשוט כי שמואל הוא הולך כמו הגמרא בתחילה בבא מציעא  המחזיקה בדעה שסומכוס אמר את הדין שלו בשני מקרים - אם יש דררא דממונא או שלא. כלומר רב  שמואל הם חולקים על דעתו של סומכוס. חילוקי דעות אלה משתקפים בשתי גמרות אלה המנוגדות, אחת בבבא מציעא והשניה בבבא בתרא

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There are still problems. Problem 1: In my notes I mention that the gemara here is depending on the gemara on page 97. This brings to mind the fact that even the gemara there is problematic. The Gemara there suggests perhaps the reason for the mishna is because certainty and doubt certainty is better.  But the amazing question is that certainty and doubt certainty wins the case with no oath and the mishna says on 97 and also page 100 certainty wins with an oath! That is not the same thing!
Another stark problem is Tosphot Demai Eved. Tosphot asks "but it is not Drara DeManona?" The fact is that Tosphot is asking on Rav. That seems to mean that on the Mishna itself Tosphot would not have asked their question. That means Tosphot in OK if the question had been a large slave or a small slave.That apparently Tosphot would have accepted that it is Drara DeMamona. Only because Rav said the price of the slave is the question did Tosphot then ask "But it is not Drara Demmona."

Besides all that I looked over my notes on that Tosohot and this page of Gemara and I wrote things that today I do not understand. What did I mean "by dividing there is no difference between Sumchos and the Sages?" Was I referring to the idea of the Rashbam that when it is in one person's domain everyone agrees?
I also wrote on the question what about Shmuel? Tosphot answers the question where is the Drara DeMamona by Rav but never even raises the question by Shmuel. I answered this cryptic phrase maybe Tosphot would answer like they answered for Rav. But what ever I was thinking when I wrote that seems to be impossible. What ever Tosphot answered for Rav was because Rav was talking about an exchange of cash. You can not answer that Samuel is also talking about an exchange on currency because that is not the answer of Shmuel. [It might be that Tosphot is thinking that as long as the question is about physical objects like a garment of slave that that is Drara Demamona. Only the fact that Rav says the mishna refers to an exchange on money then the question comes up where is the Drara Demamina?] Or was I referring to the debate if Sumchus said his law in the case of both  certainly and doubt or just one on page 100a?
In any case it is safe to say that I have not even begun to scratch the surface of this Tosphot and this page of Gemara.

I would like to recommend the general path of the Gra of straight Torah. But I see that for some reason the Gra was ignored then and now. If not for the idolatry aspects of the group that he excommunicated it would be enough the sexual child abuse that almost every child undergoes in their institutions. Why this is still ignored today is a mystery to me.

This is always swept up and covered but it is  areal phenomenon. The arrests and police records are public for anyone who wants to investigate.

Male bees mate once with the queen and die within seconds of mating. The semen goes into the queen bee with explosive force. [You can hear it if you are standing nearby.] The penis and associated abdominal tissue is left inside the queen. What a way to go!



That is their whole function. They do not do a drop of work but sit around all say watching TV or supposedly learning Torah when in fact they are simply talking and chatting.
My feeling is that humans are not very far from this paradigm.
I am some sympathy for men as I am one myself. There is some kind of paradigm shift going on.

There are still talented men. But as a rule it is the females nowadays that are reliable to get a job done not the men.

Thus even though girls are not allowed to learn Talmud, still Jewish Philosophy I think should be top priority for them. Because they need awareness of what the Torah actually holds and not listen to the idiotic men who simply don't know but think they know. [A short list: That means Saadia Gaon's [אמונות ודעות, מורה נבוכים, אברבנל, יוסף אלבו, קרסקס, אבן גבירול]

WHAT should I say?
—Since Faith is dead,
And Truth away
From you is fled?
Should I be led
With doubleness?
Nay! nay! mistress.

I promised you,
And you promised me,
To be as true
As I would be.
But since I see
Your double heart,
Farewell my part!

Thought for to take
‘Tis not my mind;
But to forsake
One so unkind;
And as I find
So will I trust.
Farewell, unjust!

Can ye say nay
But that you said
That I alway
Should be obeyed?
And—thus betrayed
Or that I wist!
Farewell, unkist!

Sir Thomas Wyatt, d. 1524

r6 i1 i3 i6 i8 i15  i20  l26   CHS Some of these might need editing but I think there are probably Ok for right now. e8  e72 e71