Shavuot

In the Talmud in Shavuot [page 44a]

 The question is that the Gemara concludes like Rav  Joseph and that is how the Rambam decides. The question is what does the Rambam do with the Gemara in Bava Metzia in which Rav Nachman says about a משכון [collateral for  a loan] that even though one can use it he is not liable in אונסים [armed robbers].

I also wanted to point out why the Rif in our Gemara in Shavuot says the law straightforwards that the lender that loses the pledge is like a שומר שכר paid guard, and in a case of armed robbers, he loses only the amount of the collateral not the whole loan. The reason is quite elegant. It comes out of the steady progression of the Gemara itself to reach that point.
The Mishna says in an argument about a case when the pledge was lost  that the lender loses only the amount the pledge was worth. Shmuel said he loses the whole loan. [he was talking about when the borrower said so openly.] R Eliezer says the lender does not lose anything and R Akiva says he loses the loan. If the pledge is worth the entire amount then why would R Eliezer disagree? So everyone disagrees with Shmuel. Their argument is about R. Isaac that the lender owns the pledge. But if it was taken not at the time of the loan everyone agrees with R Isaac. So it is at the time of the loan and the disagreement is if a guard of a lost object is considered to be paid or not. But that is only if he needs to pledge. If you follow the logic of the Gemara here you can see why the Rif (Isaac Alfasi) says that nothing matters the lender that loses the pledge loses only the amount it was worth. I can't go into it this minute but by following the logic of the Talmud you can see how he was led to this conclusion step by step.

The key is to remember that if we don't hold by Shmuel then it does not matter if the borrower said it is against the  loan or not. And if it is at the time of the loan of not also makes no difference since we go by R Akiva against R Eliezer. And even if the lender needs the pledge we still consider he is doing a mitzvah and so gets the coin of Rav Joseph and so is  a שומר שכר

There is one question I have even though I have not even gotten to learn Tosphot properly yet. The Rif does as I say take all the divisions and throws them out, and most of this you can see in the Gemara itself. The last division though I find difficult. If they all hold by R. Isaac that the pledge is owned when it was taken not at the time of the loan, and their argument is at the time of the loan and it goes by the debate between Raba and Rav Joseph, then there is a difference! A pledge taken not at the time of the loan  is owned, and for a pledge taken at the time of the loan, the lender is only a שומר שכר [paid guard]. So why does the Rif say for a pledge taken even not at the time of the loan he is a שומר שכר. He should say if taken not at time of loan he owns it and if taken at time of loan he is a paid guard.

From what I can tell Rashi answers this question in Bava Metzia. [That is he explains the Gemara there in a way that can help us understand the Rif in Shavuot--that is we can say perhaps the Rif was learning like Rashi.] He says on pg 84 that the pledge is owned completely only until the loan is paid. He says openly that what Rabbi Isaac means is that the lender is not a paid nor unpaid guard. He is an owner. But the ownership only exists until the second the borrower comes to pay back the loan. So this is not what I wrote in my ideas in Bava Metzia and I am sad to say I have to go back and correct my mistake. I was thinking around page that the lender owns the object completely.

Does this help us? Maybe. But still it looks like we still end up that for the pledge taken not at the time of the loan he is more than a paid guard--he owns it and thus is liable even in a case it was stolen by force. That is  a case the paid guard would not have to  pay for. So we still are in a mess concerning the Rif.

 That is to him when the pledge was taken not at the time of the loan the lender is a paid guard. This seems not like Rabbi Isaac. The only thing I can think might help is the Gemara in Bava Metzia 104 about דורשין לשון הדיוט that is he would own it but the language of the document brings him down one notch.  Because in Shavuot 43b the whole argument of R Akiva and R Eliezer does not apply to when there is a document. That is because everyone agrees then he is a paid guard.
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 שבועות מ''ד ע''א
 The question is that the גמרא concludes like רב יוסף and that is how the רמב''ם decides. The question is what does the רמב''ם do with the גמרא in בבא מציעא in which רב נחמן says about a משכון  that even though one can use it he is not liable in אונסים.

I also wanted to point out why the רי''ף in our גמרא in שבועות says the law that the lender that loses the משכון is like a שומר שכר paid guard, and in a case of armed robbers, he loses only the amount of the משכון, not the whole loan. The reason is quite elegant. It comes out of the steady progression of the גמרא itself to reach that point.

The משנה says in an argument about a case when the משכון was lost  that the מלווה loses only the amount the משכון was worth. שמואל said he loses the whole loan. He was talking about when the לווה said so openly. רבי אליעזר says the מלווה does not lose anything and רבי עקיבא says he loses the loan. If the משכון is worth the entire amount, then why would רבי אליעזר disagree? So everyone disagrees with שמואל. Their argument is about רבי יצחק that the מלווה owns the משכון. But if it was taken not at the time of the loan everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. So it is at the time of the loan and the disagreement is if a שומר of a lost object is considered to be paid or not. But that is only if he needs to משכון. If you follow the logic of the גמרא here you can see why the רי''ף  says that nothing matters the מלווה that loses the משכון loses only the amount it was worth.
The key is to remember that if we don't hold by שמואל then it does not matter if the borrower פירש  it is against the  הלוואה or not. And if it is at the time of the הלוואה or not also makes no difference since we go by רבי עקיבא against רבי אליעזר. And even if the מלווה needs the pledge we still consider he is doing a מצווה and so gets the פרוטה of רב יוסף and so is  a שומר שכר


 The רי''ף does as I say take all the divisions and throws them out, and most of this you can see in the גמרא itself. The last division though I find difficult. If they all hold by רבי יצחק that the משכון is owned when it was taken not at the time of the הלוואה, and their argument is at the time of the loan and it goes by the debate between רבה and רב יוסף, then there is a difference! A משכון taken not at the time of the loan  is owned, and for a משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה, the מלווה is only a שומר שכר . So why does the רי''ף say for a משכון taken even not at the time of the loan he is a שומר שכר. He should say if taken not at time of הלוואה he owns it, and if taken at time of loan he is a שומר שכר.

Maybe רש''י answers this question in בבא מציעא. That is he explains the גמרא there in a way that can help us understand the רי''ף in שבועות. That is we can say perhaps the רי''ף was learning like רש''י. He says on דף 84 that the משכון is owned completely only until the הלוואה is paid. He says openly that what רבי יצחק means is that the מלווה is not a שומר שכר nor שומר חינם. He is an owner. But the ownership only exists until the second the לווה comes to pay back the הלוואה.


Does this help us? Maybe. But still it looks like we still end up that for the משכון taken not at the time of the loan he is more than a שומר שכר. He owns it and thus is liable even in a case it was stolen by force. That is  a case the שומר שכר would not have to  pay for. So we still are in a mess concerning the רי''ף.



 That is to him when the משכון was taken not at the time of the loan the lender is a paid guard. This seems not like רבי יצחק. The only thing I can think might help is the גמרא in בבא מציעא  ק''ד about דורשין לשון הדיוט that is he would own it but the language of the document brings him down one notch.  Because in שבועות מג ע''ב the whole argument of רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר does not apply to when there is a document. That is because everyone agrees then he is a paid guard.
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שבועות מ''ד ע''א השאלה היא שהגמרא מסכמת כמו רב יוסף וכך הרמב''ם מחליט. השאלה היא מה עושה הרמב''ם עם הגמרא בבא מציעא שרב נחמן אומר על משכון כי למרות שניתן להשתמש בו הוא אינו אחראי באונסים. אני גם רוצה לציין מדוע הרי''ף   על הגמרא בשבועות אומר החוק כי המלווה שמאבד משכון הוא כמו שומר שכר, ובמקרה של שודדים חמושים, הוא מאבד רק את הסכום של המשכון, לא כל ההלוואה. הסיבה לכך היא די אלגנטית. הוא יוצא מההתקדמות יציבה של הגמרא עצמה.  המשנה אומרת בויכוח על מקרה שבו המשכון אבד והמלווה מאבד רק את הסכום שהמשכון היה שווה. שמואל אמר שהוא מאבד את כל ההלוואה. הוא מדבר  כשהלווה אמר זאת בגלוי. רבי אליעזר אומר מלווה לא מאבד שום דבר. ורבי עקיבא אומר שהוא מאבד את ההלוואה. אם המשכון שווה את כל הסכום, אז למה רבי אליעזר אינו מסכים? אז כולם מסכים עם שמואל. הטענות שלהם הן  בדיון של רבי יצחק שלמלווה יש בעלות מלאה במשכון. אבל אם המשכון לא נלקח בזמן ההלוואה כולם מסכים עם רבי יצחק. אז זה בזמן ההלוואה והמחלוקת היא אם שומר על אבידה שאיבד אותה נחשב שומר חנם או שומר שכר. אבל זה רק אם הוא צריך את המשכון.  כאן אתה יכול לראות למה הרי''ף אומר  שמלווה שמאבד את המשכון מאבד רק את הסכום שזה היה שווה. המפתח הוא לזכור שאם אנחנו לא מחזיקים עם שמואל, אז זה לא משנה אם הלווה פרש שזה נגד ההלוואה או לא. ואם זה בעת ההלוואה או לא גם לא משנה מאחר שאנחנו הולכים על לפי רבי עקיבא נגד רבי אליעזר. וגם אם מלווה צריך המשכון אנחנו עדיין רואים שהוא עושה מצווה וכך מקבל פרוטה של רב יוסף וכך הוא שומר שכר.  רי''ף עושה מה שאני אומר לקחת את כל חילוקים וזורק אותם, וזה אתה יכול לראות בגמרא עצמה. אבל את החלוקה האחרונה אני מוצא קשה. אם כל מה שהם מחזיקים ברבי יצחק שהמשכון נמצא בבעלות כאשר הוא נלקח לא בזמן ההלוואה, והטענה שלהם היא שמצב שהמשכון נלקח בעת ההלוואה וזה תלוי בוויכוח בין רבה ורב יוסף, אז יש הֶבדֵל! משכון שנלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה הינו בבעלות המלווה, ומשכון שנלקח בזמן של ההלוואה, המלווה הוא רק שומר שכר. אז למה הרי''ף אומר משכון שנלקח אפילו לא בזמן של ההלוואה הוא שומר שכר. הוא צריך לומר אם נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה הוא בבעלותו של המלווה, ואם נלקח בזמן של הלוואה הוא שומר שכר. אולי רש''י עוזר על שאלה זו בבא מציעא.  הוא מסביר גמרא שם באופן שיכול לעזור לנו להבין את רי''ף בשבועות.  אולי הרי''ף למד כמו רש''י. לדבריו, בדף פ''ד המשכון נמצא בבעלות המלווה לחלוטין רק עד ההלוואה משולמת. הוא אומר בגלוי כי מה שרבי יצחק פירש שהמלווה אינו שומר שכר ולא שומר חינם, הוא בעל. אבל הבעלות קיימת רק עד השניה שהלווה מגיע כדי להחזיר את ההלוואה. האם זה יעזור לנו? אולי. אבל עדיין זה נראה קשה  שעדיין בסופו של דבר המשכון נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה והמלווה יותר משומר שכר. הוא מחזיק אותה ובכך עלול גם במקרה שזה נגנב בכוח. זה מקרה ששומר שכר לא יצטרך לשלם עבור זה. אז אנחנו עדיין נמצאים צריך עיון בנוגע לרי''ף.


 כלומר להרי''ף כאשר המשכון נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה המלווה הוא שומר שכר. זה נראה לא כמו רבי יצחק. הדבר היחיד שאני יכול לחשוב עשוי לעזור הוא הגמרא בבא מציעא ק''ד על דורשין לשון ההדיוט שהוא היה בבעלותו, אבל השפה של המסמך מורידה אותו החריץ אחד. כי בשבועות מ''ג ע''ב כל הטיעון של הרבי עקיבא ורבי אליעזר אינו חל על כאשר יש מסמך. זאת משום שכולם מסכים שאז הוא שומר שכר.

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English




What I wanted to add is this. In Bava Metzia page 104 we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The Gemara there understands this to mean we can't take a pledge that has a larger value than the loan itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the pledge out of the category of being a pledge to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the Gemara in Shavuot in which the pledge if taken not at the time of loan is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the pledge taken at the time of the loan that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about and we go by Rabbi Akiva that he is considered a paid guard. And the Rif says in all cases he is a paid guard. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the loan taken at the time of the loan and consider it owned and not just as a pledge. I mean that even Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the lender pays back the loan. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal pledge which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a pledge that the lender is just a paid guard for. This last way  fits the Rif in Shavuot. But it does not fit the Gemara in Bava Metzia

English and Hebrew

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What I wanted to add is this. In בבא מציעא דף ק''ד we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The גמרא there understands this to mean we can't take a  משכון that has a larger value than the הלוואה itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the משכון out of the category of being a משכון to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the גמרא in שבועות in which the משכון if taken not at the time of הלוואה is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה that רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבא disagree about and we go by רבי עקיבא that he is considered a שומר שכר. And the רי''ף says in all cases he is a שומר שכר. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the הלוואה taken at the time of the הלוואה and consider it owned and not just as a משכון. I mean that even רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the לווה pays back the חוב. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal משכון which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a משכון that the מלווה is just a שומר שכר for. This last way  fits the רי''ף in שבועות. But it does not fit the גמרא in בבא מציעא

If Germany does not want more jihad, it should probably not invite jihadists in.

jihad in Germany  Germany is simple. People get into certain habits of thought and then continue with them even after it becomes clear that they have crossed some line. It is the way people are. Germany has wanted to be the good Samaritan for decades by letting in people in times of need. And that is praiseworthy. But at what point does this become imprudent?

If Germany does not want more jihad, it should probably not invite jihadists in.  I admit however that I do not understand why they let it so many jihadists already. There must be something I am not seeing here.

How to form a government has been a question for a long time. People did not always live in dictatorships. The founding fathers of the USA were aware of the problems of democracy. Their way of solving the problems of democracy was by setting the powers of government one against the other. This had been in Europe during the Middle Ages the way society was operating with  the Secular power opposite the power of the church. This had been a effective method for Jewish people also.  There was even in the Talmud, a secular head and a religious leader.[ריש גלותא the head of the exiles was the secular leader in Babylonia.] This aspect of balance of powers is not effective in the USA today when all government powers are have joined with the  executive branch to effectively subjugate and silence the American people.

Herodotus brings down that Darius [the king that caused the Second Temple to be built] argued against democracy because the wicked form alliances while the good hard working people remain unconnected  individuals. This critique is certainly true in the USA. The Left wing anti God Democrats are organized and dynamic. All their energy and religious fervor goes into trying to destroy God. No wonder they love Islam and its anti God (Allah).

The right wing that is for Judeo-Christian values is not just disorganized, but there is no fervor or emotional commitment towards politics.

Dihydrogen Monoxide can cause severe burns and even death. Should it be banned? [This was an  question in a survey. 30% of those asked answered yes. ]  [Water can be heated and cause severe burns. People can drown in it also.] People can be dumb. So rule of the people has limitations. Democracy has limitations, and that is the reason the Constitution was made--to guard against these kinds of problems. So the best solution is to keep and safeguard the Constitution of the USA.  

Yoke of Torah

The whole idea of the yoke of Torah in the way I understand it is if one accepts it then other kinds of problems do not come to one. That is I think the actual idea of the Chapters of the Fathers: "From one who accepts on himself the yoke of Torah, there is removed the yoke of government and work."

That is [in the way I understand it] sometimes people have problems that stem from work or the government. And they try to solve these problems in different ways that are related to the problem at hand. But what is being suggested here in the Mishna is that there is a better approach to solving one's problems. That is to accept the yoke of Torah.

I am not saying I know how to accomplish this in a practical sense.
But this idea resonates with me from another thing I learned once when I was at the Mir in NY.
When I was there they had a "Musar Seder"--a set time for learning books on ethics. And it was in one of those books that I saw quoted a Gemara in Shabat "there are no troubles without sin."
The actual Gemara there in tractate Shabat has an argument if there is death without sin and if there are problems without sin. I forget the whole discussion, but the conclusion of the Gemara is, "There is death without sin, but there are no problems without sin."

This statement made a profound effect on me. Ever since I saw that I have assumed as a basic premise that any problem I am going through is always my own fault because of some character flaw in me.

Putting this all together is this: when I go through problems like I am today, one thing I can do is seek a direct solution. But sometimes no direct solution presents itself- because that is the nature of things that I and most other people go through. We find ourselves in some kind of problem that if we turn right we make things worse, -and if we turn left, we make them doubly worse. What to do in such a case, I think at least for myself, is to begin to accept the yoke of Torah.

And this is not just in theory. In fact there was a period of my life that things were going well and it just so happens --perhaps not by coincidence that that was a period that I was in fact learning and keeping the Torah as well as humanly possible according to my own level at the time.

That is the end of this essay, but just for some background to explain what this means: Yoke of Torah mainly means to be learning Torah and keeping it. That is the basic idea but how this applies to each person in practice is a very hard question for me. The most basic starting place is the Ten Commandments. Next step is the basic works of Ethics that are well known: Duties of the Heart, Paths of the Righteous, etc. That is the basic Musar collection.

One thing you see in books of Musar is the main thing the Torah is strict about is obligations between man and his fellow man. So when I see things going wrong in my life my first reaction is to look and see what I am doing wrong in my interactions with people. Have I said a lie? Have I taken something that does not belong to me? Are there things I should have done to help someone in need that I did not do? These are the types of questions I ask myself.

Reb Yaakov Abuchatzeira and his more well known grandson Bava Sali

Reb Yaakov Abuchatzeira  and his more well known grandson Bava Sali pretty well defined by their lives the basic approach of Torah. That is they were themselves fasting a lot and spending all their  days in Torah study. But they were not expecting the people in their cities to be doing the same. That is they were expecting nothing more or less than keeping the Torah in the most simple basic way possible without adding or subtracting any doctrines of beliefs or tikunim.  It is hard to explain the simplicity of their way when in the modern world often people pick up on some basic doctrine or practice to emphasize and forget everything else.
In Morocco every city had one חכם-wise man that was the religious leader and there the religious leader was usually in fact a פרוש  a person that  separated himself from this world and spent his time in learning and prayer and fasting.

I discovered myself the existence of Bava Sali a drop too late. But I did get to know his family to some extent. This family is still populated by very special individuals. And if you have one nearby I recommend going to any one of them and getting a blessing. It is worth the time and effort even if you do not see instant results.

Litvak {Lithuanian} yeshivas are important

The main reason that Litvak {Lithuanian} yeshivas are important is to improve character. They  are as far as intention goes doing the same thing that boy scouts were supposed to be doing before they fell into the dark side. That is it they are not just for learning Torah. This in part is connected with learning Musar. But that is not all it is. It is because there is an awareness that people are not automatically good. They need to be taught good character.

It occurred to me that there is a whole list of problems that are removed from one when he or she accepts the yoke of Torah

כל המקבל על עצמו עול תורה מעבירים ממנו עול מלכות ועול דרך ארץ from anyone who accepts on himself the yoke of Torah there is taken the yoke of the government and the yoke of the way of the world.

It occurred to me that this includes a whole list of problems that are removed from one when he or she accepts the yoke of Torah. And thinking about my divided thoughts about what course of action to take in my very bad situation would be included in the list.
But how does one go about ''accepting the yoke of Torah'' seems like a very difficult question. Most yeshivas that I am aware of do not let in people after the age of 24. So in any case, I would have to figure out how to increase my own learning time of Talmud. Plus there are the basic laws of the Torah related to being married. That clearly is not an area dependent on myself alone.
So I decided even this very simple thing--accepting the yoke of Torah requires prayer to merit to do it.

[The way yeshivas are run is problematic, but that reflects on the nature of people, not the nature of Torah. It takes a special kind of person to run a yeshiva in a kosher way. But that is not my problem. My problem is regardless of how any institutions are run, how can I accept the yoke of Torah?]

The only kind of yeshiva that is directed towards character improvement are Lithuanian types where Musar is learned. The other types have the opposite effect.


The truth be told even at yeshiva age this is not an easy question. Does accepting the yoke of Torah mean only learning Torah and forgetting about learning a vocation? Even though I decided to concentrate on Torah alone it seems to me today that learning a vocation is a part of accepting the yoke of Torah.

Next besides learning Torah is how to keep the Torah. This is even more confusing than the first question. I could say over my basic approach to halacha but that might not be much help for some people. My own approach to halacha is to learn the subject in the Talmud itself.