The End of Liberalism , published by Michael Huemer, written by Jonathan Anomaly ---Liberalism and Evolution are exact opposites. and biology will always win when pitted against ideology

 Revolutions are hard to predict. Place a box of matches near a flame and eventually one of them will catch fire. With enough tinder the fire will spread, even if it spreads in unpredictable ways. Mass migration in the West is a potent form of tinder.

In August of 2024 spontaneous riots erupted in England and Ireland in response to the murder of children by African migrants. Violent crime has become commonplace in the capitals of Europe, and everyone knows why. But sometimes the brutality of the crime, the dishonesty of the media, and the apathy of the government strikes a nerve. A critical mass of people notice patterns, and they react.

When the data indicates that African migrants commit crime in vastly disproportionate numbers, the response of liberal journalists is to hide the identity of the perpetrators. The response of politicians is to pass new “hate speech” laws making it a crime to notice patterns and talk about the issues openly. We are witnessing the death throes of an ideology – one that was doomed to fail from the beginning.

Liberalism originated in part as a rejection of the unequal application of laws and social privileges to different people. So it is no surprise that liberals prize freedom and equality above hierarchy and tradition.

The liberal ideals of private property, free trade, and religious liberty took root in the United States and France through two bloody revolutions. After a century of conflict and two world wars, most European countries adopted liberal institutions. Other countries followed suit under the pressure of international institutions created after 1945.

In the decades following the second world war, liberal countries in the West enjoyed relative peace and prosperity, along with scientific and social innovation. But disaffection in liberal countries is growing. Even progressive liberals are beginning to take notice that trust in the post-war international order is collapsing.

In a newly published paper, we argue that liberalism is unsustainable – that recent trends toward low social trust, inter-group conflict, and falling fertility stem from liberal institutions and the social norms they tend to produce. While liberal institutions may not be solely responsible for these problems, they are ill-equipped to address them effectively. Liberalism is an evolutionary dead end, even if it fosters opportunities for wealth and innovation in the short run.

Immigration and Social Trust

Liberals treat freedom of movement as a moral default. The core liberal commitment to openness – to the free movement of people capital – tends to break down borders, and incentivize companies and political parties to import far more immigrants than citizens of liberal democracies want.

Large corporations support mass immigration because it brings in skilled workers that increase innovation, and unskilled workers that bring manufacturing costs down. Progressive political parties have incentives to import low-skilled people who are more likely to vote for a party that offers generous welfare benefits. Progressive intellectuals seem to support mass immigration because they believe that diversity is more important than group cohesion.

In this sense, liberal democracies tend to foster mass migration – via powerful interest groups – even if majorities of citizens within those countries oppose it. As this process proceeds, social trust tends to fall. A large meta-study recently showed that more ethnic diversity leads to lower social trust.

As social trust erodes, people volunteer less, and governments spend increasing sums of money supplying public goods with the machinery of the state rather than relying on people to do so through charity and social expectations. Low social trust also predicts higher levels of political corruption, less compliance with government mandates, and more distrust between ethnic groups that inhabit a country.

Once this process starts, liberal societies have few resources to deal with the consequences since, by definition, they are committed to remaining neutral on whether any comprehensive moral doctrine or set of social norms should prevail. Non-liberal regimes, by contrast, can use the power of the state to seal off the borders, deport unwanted immigrants, and curb the power of corporations and political parties who contravene the interests of political leaders or the preferences of citizens.

Fertility and Stability

A core commitment of liberalism is that the state must remain neutral on matters related to community and family. Liberal governments cannot privilege one lifestyle or religion over another without giving up their basic commitments.

But in an era in which fertility is falling around the world, this kind of political neutrality may be self-defeating. People who are more religious and more politically conservative have more children within countries. And the same holds true between countries – those that are more religious and conservative have more children than those that are more liberal and secular.

If liberal institutions and the attitudes these institutions shape speed up the rate at which fertility falls, they will be replaced with other institutions and attitudes. And if mass immigration continues, it is likely that this process will accelerate. Within those countries, the religious and conservative citizens will outbreed secular progressives.

Indeed, if current trends continue, Muslims from Africa and the Middle East will become the majority population in many European countries over the next century.

Of course, these trends are not baked in. Things change. Revolutions happen. Societies collapse. Ideologies mutate. And countries go to war – with outsiders or between different groups living within a country. We predict that the current century will see liberalism in retreat, and that governments that call themselves “liberal” will become increasingly illiberal in how they respond to challenges posed by the free movement of people and capital, and the crisis of falling birth rates.

Religion and nationalism are powerful forces. They can lead to conflict within and between groups. But they also seem to promote fertility and social cohesion better than liberal polities do. Ultimately, the winners in the evolutionary game of life are those who reproduce the most, not merely those who accrue power or resources at a particular moment in time.

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Jonathan Anomaly 

MY OWN  comment on this was written years ago. Liberalism and  Evolution are exact opposites. and biology will always win when pitted against ideology, With evolution  all men are created unequal.

 za24 midi   

[same piece in nwc format] 

the notes are in nwc but you can open midi and convert the sound to notes--but without the details.

if you  convert this to mp3, be aware that the instruments have to be changed. what works for midi does not work for mp3,   --example strings at the end of the piece can not work for mp3. they would have to be changed to cello in the bass and many other adjustments. [i would be happy to do this myself but have no access to any mp3 program]

 za23midi  

 za23 nwc 

I share this for anyone to upload and share with others.    

za22 midi   

za22 nwc format

The question on the Rambam from Yevamot 30a is more severe than is generally known. The problem is the mishna brings the case when a the erva falls to yibum first. The Mishna say if the brother did maamar on her, then her zara [the not related wife] requires halitza. Then Rav Nahman says that according to the opinion there is zika, even just zika will cause the non related wife to require halitza. We hold that there is zika, and so it should be clear  that in this case the non related wife is forbidden even without maamar. Yet the Rambam decided the law opposite from what the gemara states. He writes the non related woman requires halitza if mamar was done on the sister.

Then the next mishna brings the case when the non related wife falls to yibum first, and then  she and the sister of the wife fall to yibum together. In that case the Rambam writes even if the non related woman fell to yibum only by means of zika, she requires halitza. However the mishna there states only if maamar was done on her, then she requires halitza. Again the Rambam is deciding the law not like the mishna which says only maamar causes the non related wife to be forbidden

yevamot page 30 side A and side B.  There is a difference in law between to different kinds of cases. One case is where a unrelated woman is has fallen to be required in yibum by means of zika. The other case is when the sister of the wife of the brother has fallen to yibum by zika. The second case is lite [to Rashi and Rambam,] and forbidden only if maamar [a statement of kidushin is made on her.--But if all that occurred is zika, then the unrelated woman is permitted]. But the first case is more severe. When it is the unrelated woman that has fallen to yibum by zika then she is certainly forbidden to Rashi and Rambam. And Rav Isar Meltzer brings down the commentary on the Mishna of Rambam who suggests that she might be forbidden even from the Torah.[But to the Rashba she is forbidden only if maamar was done on her--i.e., the second brother asked her to marry him.]

I would like here to explain the two cases in more detail. Case one. Three brothers. Two are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman. The last one died, and so the unrelated woman is now  required to have yibum by means of zika. [Zika is like a magnetic force that pulls on her to either of the remaining brothers]. Then the second brother died. She is totally forbidden to the remaining brother --maybe even from the Torah.  [To Rashi Rambam, not Rashba]. The other case. Three brothers. Two of them are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman. One of the brothers married to a sister died. Now that sister has fallen to yibum to the brother married to the unrelated woman. If that brother did maamar on her [i.e., asked her to marry him] and then died, the third brother cannot marry her. But if the second brother did nothing and said nothing, and then died, then the third brother can marry the unrelated woman.   

To Rav Shach the difference is because Zika is not marriage even from the words of the sofrim. And the only reason the zara of the erva by means of zika is forbidden is a special gezera on her because she can be mixed up with an zarat Erva. The question that comes to mind here is: Why assume there is any gezera at all? If the Gemara nor geonim bring such a gezera, why assume it exists [as in fact the Rashba says]? I mean to say the Rashba holds the zara of the erva by zika is permitted. Only if Maamar was done is she permitted.]

the way rav isar meltzer answer this question on the rambam is that the rambam holds that our subject on pg 30 is not according to rava on pg 96 that a yavam does yibum when the wife falls to him from one brother, not two. so our case of the non related wife should clearly forbidden since she has fallen from two brothers. however rav shach points out that that applies only when maamar was done on by both brothers, not just zika as he shows from pg 43b

The way Rav Shach understands this Rambam is that he takes the question on why when the erva falls to yibum first and then she forbids her zara to be forbidden only by maamar is the more relevant question. The reason is that the question on why when the zara falls first, she is forbidden even if only by zika, because the gemara implies that that should be so by the statement of rav nahman. The question is rather why the Rambam holds that when the erva falls first, she causes her zara to be forbidden only by maamar. That is openly against the statement of Rav Nahman. The answer Rav Shach gives is zika can forbid a zara only by means of absolute marriage, as if the case when the non related woman falls by zika to an erva who is absolutely married. But when the erva comes to forbid her zara by means of zika alone, then she does not have enough power to do so. The question on this is that this is directly in contraction to Rav Nahman who says in this exact case that the erva can cause her zara to be forbidden even when she fall only by zika. To try to answer this it is possible to suggest that there are two kinds of zika, one from the Torah and the other from the words of the scribe. Thus, Rav Nahman  might mean that the Mishna comes to exclude  that the more severe type of  zika. However on further thought, this can not be so because Rav Nahman said that by the fact that the Mishna forbids only the case when maamar was done on the erva, we see the mishna holds that there is no such thing as zika. That has to exclude also zika derabanan because otherwise the mishna would say also by zika  the erva forbid the non related woman. Thus I think the Keseph Mishna was right that the Rambam meant that zarat erva bezika is forbidden in both  cases and mention this only in one case knowing that the other case could be learned from it by means on an ''all the more so'' kind of logic. That is : if the non related wife falls first and she could be married to either of the brothers married with the sisters, you say if one brother died, she is forbidden in yibum because of the zika, all the more so when the erva falls first and could have yibum with only one brother, then if he dies she can forbid the non related wife to be forbidden by her zika.       

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 There is a difference in law between to different kinds of cases. One case is where a unrelated woman [נכרית] is has fallen to be required in יבום by means of זיקה. The other case is when the sister wife of the brother has fallen to יבום by זיקה. The second case is קל [to רש''י and רמב''ם,] and forbidden only if מאמר [a statement of קידושין is made on her. But if ONLY זיקה occurred , then the נכרית is permitted]. But the first case is more severe. When it is the נכרית that has fallen to יבום by זיקה, then she is certainly forbidden to רש''י and רמב''ם. And רב איסר מלצר brings down the commentary on the משנה of רמב''ם who suggests that she might be forbidden even דאורייתא. [But to the רשב''א she is forbidden only if מאמר was done on her, i.e., the second brother asked her to marry him.] I would like here to explain the two cases in more detail. Case one. Three brothers. Two are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman (נכרית). The last one died, and so the נכרית is now  required to have יבום by means of זיקה. [זיקה is like a magnetic force that pulls on her to either of the remaining brothers]. Then the second brother died. She is totally forbidden to the remaining brother, maybe even אורייתא.  [To רש''י רמב''ם, not רשב''א]. The other case. Three brothers. Two of them are married to two sisters, and one to an נכרית. One of the brothers married to a sister died. Now that sister has fallen to יבום to the brother married to the נכרית. If that brother did מאמר on her [i.e., asked her to marry him] and then died, the third brother cannot marry her. But if the second brother did nothing and said nothing, and then died, then the third brother can marry the נכרית.

The question on the רמב''ם from יבמות ל' ע''א  30  is more severe than is generally known. The problem is the משנה brings the case when a the ערווה falls to יבום first. The משנה say if the brother did מאמר on her, then her צרה [the not related wife נכריתה] requires חליצה. Then רב נחמן says that according to the opinion there is זיקה, even just זיקה will cause the non related wife to require חליצה. We hold that there is זיקה, and so it should be clear  that in this case, the non related wife is forbidden even without מאמר. Yet the רמב''ם decided the law opposite from what the גמרא states. He writes the non related woman requires חליצה if מאמר was done on the sister.

Then the next משנה brings the case when the non related wife falls to יבום first, and then  she and the sister of the wife fall to יבום together. In that case the רמב''ם writes even if the non related woman fell to יבום only by means of זיקה, she requires חליצה. However the משנה there states only if מאמר was done on her, then she requires חליצה.  the רמב''ם is deciding the law not like the משנה which says only מאמר causes the non related wife to be forbidden

The way איסר מלצר answer this question on the רמב''ם is that the רמב''ם holds that our subject on  page 30 is not according to רבא on page צ''ו that a יבם  does יבום only when the wife falls to him from one brother, not two. So our case of the non related wife should clearly forbidden since she has fallen from two brothers. However רב שך points out that that applies only when מאמר was done on by both brothers, not just זיקה  as he shows from מ''ג ע''ב

The way רב שך understands this רמב''ם is that he takes the question on why when the ערוה falls to יבום first and then she forbids her צרה to be forbidden only by מאמר is the more relevant question. The reason is that the question on why when the נכרית  falls first, she is forbidden even if only by זיקה, because the גמרא implies that that should be so by the statement of רב נחמן. The question is rather why the רמב''ם holds that when the ערוה falls first, she causes her צרה to be forbidden only by מאמר. That is openly against the statement of רב נחמן. The answer רב שך gives is זיקה can forbid a צרה only by means of absolute marriage, as if the case when the non related woman falls by זיקה to an ערוה who is absolutely married. But when the ערוה comes to forbid her צרה by means of זיקה alone, then she does not have enough power to do so. The question on this is that this is directly in contraction to רב נחמן who says in this exact case that the ערוה can cause her צרה to be forbidden even when she fall only by זיקה. To try to answer this it is possible to suggest that there are two kinds of זיקה, one from the תורה and the other from the words of the סופרים. Thus, רב נחמן  might mean that the משנה comes to exclude  that the more חמור סוג of  זיקה. However on further thought, this can not be so because רב נחמן said that by the fact that the משנה forbids only the case when מאמר was done on the ערוה, we see the משנה holds that there is no such thing as זיקה. That has to exclude also זיקה דרבנן because otherwise the משנה would say also by זיקה  the ערוה forbid the non related woman. Thus I think the כסף משנה was right that the רמב''ם meant that צרת ערוה בזיקה is forbidden in both  cases, and mention this only in one case knowing that the other case could be learned from it by means on an ''קל וחומר'' kind of logic. That is : if the נכרית falls first and she could be married to either of the brothers married with the sisters, you say if one brother died, she is forbidden in יבום because of the זיקה, all the more so when the ערוה falls first and could have יבום with only one brother, then if he dies, she can forbid the non related wife to be forbidden by her זיקה.       

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השאלה ברמב''ם ביבמות ל' ע''א  חמורה מהידוע. הבעיה היא שהמשנה מביאה את המקרה כאשר הערווה נופלת ליבום ראשונה. המשנה אומרת אם האח עשה עליה מאמר, הרי צרה שלה חייבת חליצה. ואז רב נחמן אומר שלפי הדעה יש זיקה, אפילו רק זיקה תגרום לאישה הלא קרובה לדרוש חליצה. אנו קובעים שיש זיקה, ולכן צריך להיות ברור שבמקרה זה, האישה הלא קרובה אסורה גם בלי מאמר. אולם הרמב''ם הכריע את הדין הפוך ממה שקובע הגמרא. הוא כותב שהאישה שאינה קשורה דורשת חליצה ​​אם מאמר נעשה על האחות. ואז המשנה הבאה מביאה את המקרה שבו האישה הלא קרובה נופלת ליבום ראשונה, ואז היא ואחותה של האישה נופלות ליבום ביחד. במקרה כזה כותב הרמב''ם גם אם האישה הלא קרובה נפלה ליבום רק באמצעות זיקה, היא דרושה חליצה. אולם המשנה שם קובעת רק אם מאמר נעשה עליה, אז היא דרושה חליצה. הרמב''ם פוסק את הדין לא כמו המשנה שאומרת שרק מאמר גורם לאישה הלא קרובה לאיסור

יש הבדל בחוק בין מקרים לסוגים שונים. מקרה אחד הוא שבו אישה שאינה קרובה [נכרית] היא נאלצה להידרש ביבום באמצעות זיקה. המקרה הנוסף הוא כאשר אחות אחותו של האח נפלה לידי ייבום על ידי זיקה. המקרה השני קל [לרש''י ורמב''ם,] ואסור רק אם מאמר. אבל אם רק זיקה התרחשה, אז הנכרית מותרת]. אבל המקרה הראשון חמור יותר. כשזו הנכרית שנפלה יבום על ידי זיקה, אזי ודאי אסורה לרש''י ורמב''ם. ורב איסר מלצר מוריד את פירוש המשנה של רמב''ם המציע שאולי אסורה אפילו דאורייתא. [אבל לרשב''א אסורה רק אם נעשה בה מאמר, כלומר ביקש ממנה האח השני להינשא לו.] אבקש כאן להסביר את שני המקרים ביתר פירוט. מקרה ראשון. שלושה אחים. שניים נשואים לשתי אחיות, ואחת לאישה לא קרובה (נכרית). האחרון מת, ולכן נדרשת כעת הנכרית לקבל ייבום באמצעות זיקה. [זיקה היא כמו כוח מגנטי שמושך אותה לכל אחד מהאחים הנותרים]. ואז האח השני מת. היא אסורה לחלוטין לאח הנותר, אולי אפילו אורייתא. [לרש''י רמב''ם, לא רשב''א]. המקרה השני. שלושה אחים. שתיים מהן נשואות לשתי אחיות ואחת לנכרית. אחד האחים הנשוי לאחות נפטר. עכשיו האחות הזאת נפלה ייבום לאח הנשוי לנכרית. אם האח ההוא אמר עליה [כלומר ביקש ממנה להינשא לו] ואחר כך מת, האח השלישי לא יכול להתחתן איתה. אבל אם האח השני לא עשה כלום ולא אמר כלום, ואז מת, אז האח השלישי יכול להתחתן עם הנכרית



רב שך מסביר ההבל בין אם הערוה זקוקה (שאסורה רק עם מאמר) או הנכרית זקוקה (שאסורה אפילו ע''י זיקה, שזיקה אינה קידושין דרבנן אלא קל ממנה. והוא מביא שסיבת איסורה של נכרית זקוקה היא גזירה מיוחדת שלא יתבלבלו עם צרת ערווה.) הקושיה שיש בזה היא שהרמב''ם המביא בפירוש המשנה שהגמרא והגאונים לא הסבירו מה דינה במצב שהנכרית היא זקוקת הערוה. אם כן למה לנו לחדש גזירה שלא מובא בש''ס? אולי יותר טוב לומר שהרשב''א צדק שהיא אסורה רק אם האח השני עשה מאמר?




הדרך שבה רב איסר מלצר עונה על שאלה זו ברמב''ם היא שהרמב''ם גורס שהנושא שלנו בעמוד ל' אינו לפי רבא בעמוד צ''ו שבם עושה יבום רק כשהאשה נופלת לו מאח אחד, לא שניים. אז יש לאסור בבירור את המקרה שלנו של האישה הלא קרובה, כי היא נפלה משני אחים. אולם רב שך מציין שזה חל רק כאשר מאמר נעשה על ידי שני האחים, לא רק זיקה כפי שהוא מראה מ''ג ע''ב

הדרך שבה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם הזה הוא שהוא לוקח את השאלה למה כשהערוה נופלת יבום תחילה ואז היא אוסרת את צרה שלה ליאסר רק על ידי המאמר היא השאלה היותר רלוונטית. הסיבה היא שהשאלה מדוע כשהנכרית נופלת תחילה היא אסורה ולו רק על ידי זיקה, משום שהגמרא רומז שכך צריך להיות על ידי אמירת רב נחמן. השאלה היא דווקא מדוע הרמב''ם סובר שכאשר נופלת הערוה ראשון, היא גורמת לאיסור צרה רק על ידי המאמר. זה נוגד בגלוי את דבריו של רב נחמן. התשובה שרב שך נותן היא זיקה יכולה לאסור על שרה רק באמצעות נישואים מוחלטים, כאילו במקרה שבו האישה הלא קרובה נופלת על ידי זיקה לערוה שנשואה לחלוטין. אבל כשהערוה באה לאסור עליה את צרה באמצעות זיקה בלבד, אז אין לה די כוח לעשות כן. השאלה על זה היא שזה ישר כנגד לרב נחמן שאומר בדיוק במקרה הזה שהערוה יכולה לגרום לאסור לה לצרה גם כשתיפול רק על ידי זיקה. כדי לנסות לענות על זה אפשר להציע שיש שני סוגים של זיקה, האחד מהתורה והשני מדברי הסופרים. לכן, רב נחמן עשוי להתכוון לכך שהמשנה בא להוציא את הסוג החמור יותר של זיקה. אולם במחשבה נוספת, זה לא יכול להיות כך, כי רב נחמן אמר שבעובדה שהמשנה אוסרת רק את המקרה כאשר המאמר נעשה על הערוה, אנו רואים את המשנה גורס שאין דבר כזה זיקה. זה חייב להוציא גם את זיקה דרבנן כי אחרת המשנה תאמר גם על ידי זיקת הערוה אסורה הנכרת (האישה שאינה קרובה). לפיכך אני חושב שהכסף משנה צדק שהרמב''ם התכוון שצרת ערוה בזיקה אסורה בשני המקרים, ומזכיר זאת רק במקרה אחד מתוך ידיעה שאפשר ללמוד ממנו את המקרה השני באמצעות ''קל וחומר'' סוג של היגיון. כלומר: אם נפלה הנכרית תחילה ויכלה להינשא לכל אחד מהאחים הנשואים עם האחיות, אתה אומר אם מת אח אחד אסורה ביבום מחמת הזיקה, על אחת כמה וכמה כשנופל הערוה תחילה ויכולה להיות יבום עם אח אחד בלבד, אז אם הוא ימות, היא יכולה לאסור על האישה הלא קרובה להיות אסורה על ידי זיקה שלה.

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 Yevamot 3b. The Gemara derives from ''on her'' that yibum is permitted only with the wife of one's brother. That is from the two verses, "You shall not take the sister of your wife upon her in her lifetime," and the verse "If one's brother dies without children, the remaining brother shall marry his wife (shall come upon her)  to establish his name in Israel."

The gemara asks perhaps we should use the gezera shava of the double use of the word ''upon her'' to tell us just like yibum is permitted with the brother's wife, so should it be permitted with the other forbidden relations if one's brother who is married with them dies without seed.  The gemara answers that we would think they are permitted anyway even without a verse because a positive command overrides a negative command. {Yibum should override their prohibition.} So why does the Torah add the word ''upon her''. It must be to tell us that only the brother's wife is permitted, not any of the other fifteen types of forbidden relations. The old Tosphot asks on this that now that we know a positive command does not override a negative command that has karet, therefore we already know all the other fifteen type of forbidden relations are forbidden. So we should be forced to use the word "upon her" to tell us  that they are permitted in yibum.

It occurred to me according to the Rashba that the brother's wife is permitted in yibum because the time of her prohibition has a limit. That limit is when the brother dies without children. Then she is permitted because there is no prohibition, not because a positive command overrides a negative command. But the Torah only sets this time limit for the prohibition of the brothers wife, not for the prohibition of any of the other fifteen types of forbidden relations. Therefore the question of Tosphot remains valid. That is that now that we know all the other fifteen types of forbidden relations are prohibited, the only possible use of the word ""upon her" would be to permit them in a place of yibum.

[rav shach brings this idea of the rashba in forbidden relations chapter 2 halacha 1 ]

 i think that for some of these reasons i have mentioned here that, david bronson in uman suggested to me that the words ''upon here''might be a ''what do we find'' [מה מצינו], not a gezera shava

 

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 יבמות ג' ע''ב. The גמרא derives from ''עליה'' that יבום is permitted only with the wife of one's brother. That is from the two verses "You shall not take the sister of your wife on her in her lifetime," and the verse "If one's brother dies without children, the remaining brother must marry his wife (shall come upon her)  to establish his name in Israel."

The גמרא asks perhaps we should use the גזרה שווה of the double use of the word ''עליה'' to tell us just like יבום is permitted with the brother's wife, so should it be permitted with the other עריות if ones brother who is married with them dies without seed.  The גמרא answers that we would think they are permitted anyway (even without a verse) because a positive command overrides a negative command. {יבום should override their prohibition.} So why does the תורה add the word ''עליה''. It must be to tell us that only the brother's wife is permitted, not any of the other fifteen types of עריות. The תוספות ישנים asks on this that now that we know a positive command does not override a negative command that has כרת, therefore we already know all the other fifteen types of עריות are forbidden. So we should be forced to use the word "עליה" to tell us  that they are permitted in יבום.

It occurred to me according to the רשב''א that the brother's wife is permitted in יבום because the time of her prohibition has a limit. That limit is when the brother dies without children. Then she is permitted because there is no prohibition, not because a positive command overrides a negative command. But the תורה only sets this time limit for the prohibition of the brothers wife, not for the prohibition of any of the other fifteen types of עריות. Therefore the question of תוספות remains valid. That is that now that we know all the other fifteen types of עריות are prohibited, the only possible use of the word ""עליה" would be to permit them in a place of יבום. 

 i think that for some of these reasons חברותא שלי  הציע, that the word ''עליה ''might be a מה מצינו, not a גזירה שווה

יבמות ג' ע''ב. הגמרא לומדת מ''עליה'' שיבום מותר רק עם אשת אחיו. כלומר משני הפסוקים "לא תקח עליה את אחות אשתך בחייה", והפסוק "אם ימות אחיו בלי ילדים, חייב האח הנותר לשאת את אשתו (יבוא עליה) להקים את שמו בישראל. הגמרא שואלת אולי צריך להשתמש בגזרה שווה (השימוש הכפול במילה ''עליה'') כדי לומר לנו בדיוק כמו יבום מותר עם אשת האח, כך יש להתיר עם שאר העריות אם אחיו שנשוי איתם מת בלי זרע. הגמרא עונה שהיינו חושבים שהם מותרים בכל מקרה (גם בלי פסוק) כי ציווי חיובי גובר על ציווי שלילי. {יבום צריך לבטל את האיסור שלהם.} אז למה התורה מוסיפה את המילה 'עליה''. צריך לומר לנו שרק אשת האח מותרת, לא כל אחד מחמש עשרה סוגי העריות האחרים. התוספות ישנים שואלות על זה שעכשיו כשאנחנו יודעים פקודה חיובית לא עוקף פקודה שלילית שיש לה כרת, לכן אנחנו כבר יודעים שכל חמישה עשר סוגי העריות האחרים אסורים. אז זה צריך להכריח אותנו להשתמש במילה "עליה" כדי לומר לנו שהם מותרים ביבום. עלה בדעתי שלדעת הרשב''א שאשת האח מותרת ביבום משום שלזמן איסורה יש גבול. הגבול הזה הוא כשהאח מת בלי ילדים. ואז היא מותרת כי אין איסור, לא כי ציווי חיובי גובר על ציווי שלילי. אבל התורה קובעת רק מגבלת זמן זו לאיסור אשת האחים, ולא לאיסור של אף אחד מחמשה עשר סוגי העריות האחרים. לכן שאלת התוספות נשארת בתוקף. כלומר שכעת, כשידוע לנו שכל שאר חמשה עשר סוגי העריות אסורים, השימוש היחיד האפשרי במילה "עליה" יהיה להתיר אותם במקום יבום

אני חושב שמכמה מהסיבות האלה חברותא שלי הציע, שהמילה "עליה" עשויה להיות מה מצינו, לא גזירה שווה.

Friesian School --All 20th Century Philosophy is a futile attempt to escape from under the shadow of Kant and Hegel

 I have been thinking about philosophy and over time I have seen the wisdom of the Friesian School with some reservation. The reasons for my reservations  are that it seems incomplete. It builds on Kant but Fries saw that the categories could not be derived from Aristotelian Logic but rather needed an internal source -not based on   what is "out there".Thus came the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge. But the revival of this school of thought  did not fare well when relativity came along and knocked a few black holes in Newtonian Space. So Bernays [a disciple of Leonard Nelson] the founder of the second Friesian School  saw that something needed to be corrected. Then came Dr Kelley Ross with his web site advocating for the Friesian approach. There the most important part of that site is the PhD Thesis. He lays out there a modification and development of the Friesian approach.

Philosophy is not absurd even though it tends to lead very smart people into very odd conclusions. It is best to take a limited idea of how far reason can go. Brouwer (the discoverer of the fixed point theorem) after he proved this very important theorem discovered "Philosophy" and decided that "Philosophy" would frown on his proof. [He had been persuaded that anything that can not be measured empirically can not have meaning.] It is amazing what nonsense, smart people can be convinced of.   

But the most recent and powerful voice for intuitive non immediate knowledge spends time knocking Hegel from a political point of view.  But later Hegel made a lot of  sense in his Encyclopedia.

All 20th Century Philosophy is a futile attempt to escape from under the shadow of Kant and Hegel  

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 za4 nwc This nwc file is in case anyone wants to see the notes with the instruments. But you need a nwc format to see them. The next file--the midi is to hear, but it also can be used to see the notes. [I did not post any music for  along time because of a tragedy that occurred.]

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 za8 midi      za8 nwc    [somewhat edited towards the end.]

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za10 =a midi music file and the nwc version with notes

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the reason for the za designation is i started naming music files with a1 to a100 then b1 to b100  to z1 to z100. then stopped until a short time ago when i started again [do not ask where all the files went. i do not know. some were posted on the internet. ] . i did very little writing of music except in high school and only started again in the 1990's

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 za15 midi  za15 nwc  [The nwc file has the notes.]

2 music files

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za11 nwc n za11 midi not editedot edited

 An ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time][note 2] is obligated in half damages. To R. Akiva half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox (note 1), it is sanctified. [Bava Kama 33a]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain, he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, --he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it, but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court, even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [Tosphot bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that day, but on a different day even months  before that time so and so killed. The false witnesses are killed because even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. Makot pg 5a. Tosphot is difficult to understand here, but the Tosphot Shantz makes the intention clear.] And the question is even stronger according to the approach of Rabainu Chananel and the Rambam that the ox itself is not owned by the owner of the wounded cow until standing in court. You can see this in the Rambam by the fact that he holds that if the ox went up in value by itself, the owner of the cow does not receive any more money than the half damages. Laws of Damages 7:12  

This seems like an obvious question, but I bring it up just in case. I still have to see the great Litvak sages who deal with this subject and I suspect that Rav Shach might very well bring this up. Besides him, I see there are a few other important Litvak sages that have written on Bava Kama [Rav Nachum of the Mir, Rav Shmuel of Ponovitch, and the Even Haazel by R. Isar Meltzer. bli neder, i will try to see what they write on this difficult subject   [Sadly the roshei yeshiva at the Mir in NY did little or no writing. At least they made tapes of Reb Shmuel Berenbaum's last seven years of classes,-- but it would take a massive amount of effort to get them into readable Hebrew.--all classes were in Yiddish.]

Possible answer: Rambam laws of vows 12:10 if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, hametz and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the sages made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. so here in our case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. the cases are different, still I think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.

Another possible answer is that perhaps this Gemara is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the Gemara that says that R.Akiva holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the Gemara would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty, and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court ) I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the gemara is like the opinion that 1/2 damages is monetary so to R Akiva the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it. 

I noticed in Rav Shach laws of buying and selling 22 law12 that the Rambam and Tosphot hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it, he only needs to own the animal and so our gemara here might hold that way.--later after writing this blog i noticed the Tosphot Rabbainu Peretz brings up this issue    

     

(note 1) This means that  a person says, "This object is dedicated to the Temple". Sometimes this might  mean he sanctifies an animal as a sacrifice. But it can mean the object is given to the Temple. Then the people in charge of the Temple can use the object or they can sell it and use the money for the upkeep of the Temple/   

note 2 exodus 21; verse 35

later note: I saw today the Rosh brings up this issue in Tosphot HaRosh. He brings from Rav Meir Halevi that the sanctification goes back in time,-  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as Tosphot points out) that is like Abyee (in Pesachim page 30), not like Rava. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like Rava and thus against the halacha (established rule).

Later note the Rambam brings this gemara straight even though in our Gemara the question being asked and answered is according to R Ishmael. [laws of damages chapter 8 law 6 ] So the Rambam understands this is coming according to R. Akiva. Thus when the gemara says the ox is an collateral [apotiki] that would answer my question since the law of an collateral [apotiki] is that it is in the domain of the lender. So in our case the animal is considered to be in the domain of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the Rambam considers the collateral [apotiki] to be in the domain of the lender? Answer The Rambam writes the law of the collateral [apotiki] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. [laws of lender and borrower 21:10] But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it. The case came before Rav and Rav said "Go pay the planter, and the planter gets the least amount whether the expense or profit." (Later Rav changed his mind, but this was the first decision).Now the field there was in the domain of its owner, and the Rav said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [apotiki] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his domain. /

Now I see that Rav Shach also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at Rav Shach laws of loans 21 law 10 I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the improvement, and only pays for the expense. But when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its expense, and its improvement," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the improvement, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend. on what the lender wants. If the case is that of ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the expense and gets the improvement. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the improvement. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of Rav Shach here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the Rambam about an apotiki] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why does the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a lender comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the Rambam himself holds that the borrower does not have to pay back future fields improvement or expense unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so.[laws of loans 18:1 ] The Rambam holds that even though lack of writing shiabud is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the cost of the field. But for future acquisitions improvement and expense, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the borrower wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

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 an ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time] is obligated in half damages. To ר'  עקיבא half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox, it is sanctified. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [תוספות bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that, but on a different day [even months  before that time] so and so killed. the false witnesses are killed. Even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. מכות ה' ע''א

Answer. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, חמץ and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the חכמים made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. So here in A case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. Even though this is a stretch, i think i might answer my question 

the cases are different, still i think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.      

Another possible answer is that perhaps this גמרא is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the גמרא that says that ר' עקיבא holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the גמרא would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty (קנס) and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court) .I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the גמרא is like the opinion that חצי נזק  is monetary so to ר' עקיבא the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it.     

I noticed in רב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב  that the רמב''ם and תוספות hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it. He only needs to own the animal.  Our גמרא here might hold that way.

Later note: I saw today the רא''ש brings up this issue in תוספות הרא''ש. He brings from רב מאיר הלוי that the sanctification goes back in time,  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as תוספות points out) that is like אביי (in פסחים ל'), not like רבא. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like רבא and thus against the הלכה (established rule).

     

Later note. The רמב''ם brings this גמרא straight even though in our גמרא the question being asked and answered is according to ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. So the רמב''ם understands this is coming according to ר' עקיבא. Thus when the גמרא says the ox is an collateral אפותיקי that would answer my question, since the law of an collateral [אפותיקי] is that it is in the רשות of the מלווה. So in our case, the animal is considered to be in the רשות of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the  רמב''ם  considers the collateral אפותיקי to be in the רשות of the lender? Answer: The רמב''ם writes the law of collateral [אפותיקי] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. The מגיד משנה on the רמב''ם did not find a source for this. But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it (bava mezia 101a ). The case came before רב and רב said "Go pay the planter and the planter gets the least amount," (whether the expense or profit). (Later רב changed him mind, but this was the first decision). Now the field there was in the domain of its owner and  רב said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [אפותיקי] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his רשות. [It might be that רב changed his mind because the case there was that the field was owned and set aside for planting , so רב decided the owner had more of an obligation than  regular collateralץ   ]

Now I see that רב שך also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at רב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י. I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the שבח, and only pays for the הוצאה. But when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its הוצאות, and its שבח," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the שבח, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend on what the lender wants. If the case is that of  ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the הוצאות and gets the שבח. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the שבח. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.-

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of רב שך here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the רמב''ם about an אפותיקי] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why doe the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a מלווה comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the רמב''ם himself holds that the לווה does not have to pay back these future acquisition unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so. The רמב''ם holds that even though lack of writing שיעבוד is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the fields that he owns at the time of the loan. But for future fields, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the לווה wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

שור שנגח פרה [וזו פעם ראשונה] חייב בחצי נזק. לר' עקיבא חצי השור כבר שייך לבעל הפרה אז אם הבעלים הזה מקדש 1/2 מהשור, הוא מקודש. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. השאלה שלי כאן היא העיקרון שאם יש לאדם חפץ שאינו בתחום שלו הוא לא יכול לקדש אותו. [המקרה הרגיל כזה הוא שאדם נתן חפץ לחברו כדי לשמור, והחבר מכחיש אותו, הוא לא יכול לקדשו כי הוא אינו ברשותו. הוא הבעלים שלו, אבל זה לא בתחום שלו.] השאלה כאן נראית חזקה כי תוספות אומר שבעל השור אינו חייב בפועל עד שיעמוד בבית דין אף על פי שחצי השור שייך לניזוק. [תוספות מבססים את זה על עדי שקר האומרים כך וכך הרגו ביום ראשון. עדים אחרים אומרים להם שלא יכולתם לראות את זה כי הייתם איתנו ביום זה, אלא ביום אחר [אפילו חודשים לפני הזמן הזה] כך וכך הרגו. עדי השקר נהרגים. למרות שהאירוע כבר קרה, והרוצח הרג, עדיין הוא לא הובא לבית המשפט. אז עדי השקר נהרגים. מכות ה' ע''א

והשאלה עוד יותר חזקה לפי גישת ר' חננאל והרמב''ם שהשור עצמו אינו בבעלותו של בעל הפרה עד שעומד בבית דין. אתה יכול לראות זאת ברמב''ם בכך שהוא קובע שאם השור עלה בשווי ממילא, אין בעל הפרה מקבל יותר כסף מחצי הנזק. בהלכות נזקי ממון ז' הלכה י''ב

תשובה. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' אם אשה אומרת לבעלה מקודשת מעשה ידיה למי שעשה אותן, עדיין יוכל להפיק תועלת מעבודת ידיה כי הן חייבות לו. כך אף על פי ששחרור עבד, חמץ והקדש גוברים על חיוב ממון, אבל החכמים עשו את החיוב לבעל להיות חזק יותר. אז כאן במקרה של שור הגורם נזק, בעל הפרה צריך להיות מסוגל לקדש את השור כי השור לפחות מחויב עליו ולכן קידוש השור צריך לעקוף את בעלות בעל השור.

המקרים שונים, אבל עדיין אני חושב שזו יכולה להיות התשובה. [ענין האישה הוא שהיא בעלת ידיה אבל הן מחויבות לבעלה ולכן הקדש שלהן צריך להיות חזק יותר מאשר במקרה שלנו שבעל הפרה הוא בעל השור אבל זה לא ברשותו

תשובה אפשרית נוספת היא שאולי הגמרא הזו הולכת כמו הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי. וזה ישתלב טוב יותר עם לשון הגמרא האומר שר' עקיבא מחזיק בעלי השור והפרה שותפים, וקשה לומר שדבר שבבעלות שותפים יחד אינו ברשות אחד מהם. . הגמרא כפי הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי ולכן לר' עקיבא יכול בעל הפרה הפצועה לקדש את השור.

שמתי לב ברב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב שהרמב''ם והתוספות מחזיקים לקדושת הגוף, אין הבהמה צריכה להיות ברשות המקדש אותה, הוא רק צריך בעלות. הגמרא שלנו כאן עשויה להחזיק כך..

היינו שהגמרא מכוונת לקדושת הגוף וזה לפי רב אשי בכתובות נ''ט שמסיק רב אשי שם קונמות קא אמרת שאני קונמות שקדושת הגוף נינהוא וכן משמע בתוספות קידושין ס''ג ד''ה וידיים וכן פסק הרמב''ם בנדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' לפי פירוש הכסף משנה

הערה בהמשך: ראיתי היום שהרא"ש מעלה את הנושא הזה בתוספות הרא"ש. הוא מביא מהרב מאיר הלוי שהקדשה חוזרת אחורה בזמן,- מרגע שהוא רוכש את הבהמה חזרה להקדשה. אבל (כפי שמציינים תוספות) שזה כמו אביי (בפסחים דף ל'), לא כמו רבא. וקשה לומר שכל הנושא שלנו כאן בא לא כמו רבא ובכך נגד ההלכה (הלכה קבע)

הערה מאוחרת יותר. הרמב''ם מביא את הגמרא הזה ישר למרות שבגמרא שלנו השאלה הנשאלת והתשובה היא לפי ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. אז הרמב''ם מבין שזה בא לפי ר' עקיבא. לפיכך כשהגמרא אומר שהשור הוא אפותיקי זה יענה על שאלתי, כיון שדין בטחונות הוא שהוא ברשות המלווה. אז במקרה שלנו, השור תם נחשב ברשותו של האדם שבבעלותו הפרה החבולה. איך אני יודע שהרמב''ם רואה את (הבטחונות) אפותיקי ברשות המלווה? תשובה: הרמב''ם כותב את דין ה אפותיקי שהמלווה צריך לשלם לקונה את הסכום הנמוך ביותר, בין ההוצאות ובין ההשבחה. (הלכות מלווה ולווה כ''א הלכה י') המגיד משנה ברמב''ם לא מצא מקור לכך. אבל לי זה נראה פשוט שזה בא מהחוק של מי שנכנס לשדה של מישהו אחר ונוטע אותו בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א. הגיע המקרה לפני רב ורב אמר לו "לך תשלם את הנוטע, והנוטע יקבל את הסכום הכי פחות", (בין אם ההוצאה או הרווח). (מאוחר יותר שינה אותו רב, אבל זו הייתה ההחלטה הראשונה). עתה השדה שם היה ברשות בעליו ואמר רב לשלם את המינימום. אז גם כאן, בעל הפרה החבולה הוא בעל השור שהוא משכון [אפותיקי] ולכן הוא יכול לקדש את השור כיון שהוא ברשותו. [יכול להיות שרב שינה את דעתו כי המקרה שם היה שהשדה בבעלותו ומופרש לנטיעה, ולכן החליט רב שלבעלים יש יותר חובה מאשר בטחונות רגילים]

עכשיו אני רואה שרב שך מביא גם את אותה גמרא בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א כמקור לרמב"ם אבל לאחר עיון ברב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י', אני חושב שיש איזשהו היבט בתשובה שלו שם שקשה להבין. הוא אומר כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהשדה שייך לו, ולכן הוא מקבל את כל השבח, ומשלם רק עבור הוצאה. אבל כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהמלווה כתב, ''מה שאקנה, ומלווה יגבה, אני אשלם על זה, ועל הסכום שלו, והשבח שלו", ולרוכש השדה ולמלווה יש תביעה שווה על השבח. אז הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא שהחוק לא צריך להיות תלוי במה שהמלווה רוצה. אם השדה שלו, אז זה הוא זה, והוא משלם את ההוצאות ומקבל את השבח. אם המקרה מגיע מהחוק בבבא מציעא ק''א ע''א , אז שם זה לא תלוי במה שהבעלים רוצה.

יש עוד שאלה שאפשר להעלות על תשובת רב שך כאן. [כְּלוֹמַר. התשובה שהוא מביא להכרעת הרמב''ם על אפותיקי] כלומר: במקרה שהשבחת השדה קטנה מההוצאה והמלוה מקבל את כל ההשבחה אבל מחזיר חצי לקונה, מדוע הלווה לא צריך להחזיר את ההוצאה? הרי הוא כותב "אחזיר להם את מחירם והשבחתם והוצאה אם ​​יבוא מלווה לגבות את השדה." התשובה לשאלה זו יכולה להיות  שהרמב''ם בעצמו גורס שהלווה אינו חייב להחזיר את קניינים עתידים אלא אם כן כתב כן. הרמב''ם גורס שלמרות שחוסר כתיבה שיעבוד הוא טעות של הסופר, עדיין זה מתייחס רק  לשדה שכבר יש לו. לכן יכול להיות  שלמען שיפור והוצאות על אפותיקי, אלה צריכים להיכתב בגלוי. אז לענייננו, אם הלווה כתב שיחזיר את אלו, אז בסדר. הוא יעשה זאת. אבל אם לא, אז לא

Paying people to learn Torah, or to teach Torah, or to judge according to the law of the Torah is all against the Torah

 I have not been able to see why the State of Israel should give money to yeshivot, nor to religious judges. I think the main reason for this fact is that one of the first tractates I ever learned was Ketuboth. So when I got to the last chapter [page 105B], I got the idea that paying people to learn Torah, or to teach Torah, or to judge according to the law of the Torah was all against the Torah. [Even though that Gemara deals with judges, I was aware of other places where the prohibition of learning or teaching for pay is forbidden. bava batra chap. 1] If you look at that Gemara in ketuboth ,you will see that even taking money from public funds is forbidden. The only two cases of permission are payment for taking time off one' regular work. The first kind of permission is when it is payment for work that is not obvious,-  and the second is payment for work that is obvious. But in both cases, it has to be a case where one has some other kind of work, and then people come and want him to judge a case. [It can not be for hypothetical work.]The obvious type is when one has a fixed salary. The non obvious type is for example one its in a store, and the amount he would get per hour is not clear.

There is a Rambam [Shekalim] which brings that there can be judges that receive money from the temple funds [לישכת הגזית] to judge cases of robbery, but that has to be understood in accord with the other place where the Rambam says a person that receives money to judge--all his judgements  are null and void. There [in laws of shekalim] the Rambam is only dealing with the question from where their payment would come from -in a case where paying them would be permitted--ie שכר בטלה הניכר. 

    I admit I was part of the kollel system until I got to Israel and then the contradiction between what the Torah says and the kollel system became too much for me so I dropped out and depended on trust in God. Then my trust in God ran out,  and I decided to work, and then things went south. But getting back to trust in God never worked again, so that is when I decided that I already needed to find a decent wholesome way of making a living and that is when I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU.  so i feel at this point that it makes sense to dispose of a system that claims to be learning and teaching Torah in direct contradiction to what the torah says

Thus I think if people need charity because of being poor, that is fine. But not if they say, ''It is because of learning Torah.'' That just makes Torah into a mode of making money  If people lie about Torah, can they really have any respect for Torah? Or rather perhaps they have found it a convenient way to get money?  

00ךשאקר later note, someone showed to me a beit yoseph that does bring a wider sense of שכר בטלה for people learning torah--that is if you look inside the tur and beit yoseph it does look that payment for not doing one's regular work, might have a wider sense for people sitting a learning torah than for a judge. i mean for a judge it i clear that any kind of a salary is totally forbidden. he has to have a different occupation. but for learning torah it could be that restrictin might be lessened. 

 One of the major points of the Gra that I think is important to emphasize is that every word of Torah weighs a much as all the other commandments.  Mainly that means the Old Testament the two Talmuds plus the Midrash. But in a certain sense it would include commentaries in so far as the commentaries   help in understanding even if they are not in fact part of the Oral and Written Law.

But this category of what explains the Law comes the Gemara itself according to the Rambam in  Laws of Learning Torah chapter 3 and that includes Physics and Metaphysics as he explains in the introduction of the Guide for the Perplexed.

I would to bring here the importance of a great book I have been looking at recently,-- the Even ha'Azel by Rav Isar Meltzer --a friend of Rav Shach. So when I say to get through the two Talmuds I mean with Tosphot [and Rashi when needed] Maharasha and the basic Litvak sages that bring to light very important aspects in the Gemara. [I do not mean just to run through it, except in the afternoon period which should be set aside for ''bekiut''. Fast learning is important as Rav Nahman of Breslov said in the Conversations of Rav Nahman 76 and which Rav Shick made a whole booklet out of. Fast learning is mentioned in the gemara Avoda Zara page 19.But that is for the afternoon period. The morning hours ought to go for preparation for the class of the Rosh Yeshiva your own study in the Avi Ezri, or the Hidushei HaRambam by Reb Haim of Brisk ]

i would like to mention here a subject i saw in the even haazel. let us say an ox gores a cow. there is paid 1/2 the ox and 1/2 the cow as it says somewhere in exodus. if the owner of the ox raises the value of the ox all the increase goes to him. but if the owner of the cow increased the value of the ox or it went upin value by itself, the tur writes the increase goes to him. but the rambam writes the owner of the cow gets only 1/2 damages from the cow even if it went up in value.  i have not written about this for a while because rav shach doe not bring up this issue and r. isar meltzer has a very long and difficult section on it which i am barely scratching the surface of. rav isar melzar says the reason for the rambam i that to r. akiva [whom we poskin like] the damaged person does not gain possession of the ox until after standing in court. this of course is a perfect answer however i seem to recall that rav shach said somewhere that the damaged person gains possession right away--but that might have been where he was explaining the raavad, so i am not sure if there is any difficulty, untili can recallwhat rav shach wrote. 

   When the Rambam mentions learning physics and metaphysics my feeling is that even though he says he is referring to how these subjects were understood in ancient Greece, I think you have to expand the definition to refer to Modern Physics and Metaphysics. But the later is harder to know. When the Rambam refers to Metaphysics that refers to the collected lectures in the book of Aristotle by that title. But nowadays I think you would have to include Kant and Leonard Nelson. Nelson started the new  Friesian-.SCHOOL; but even that needs modification as Bernays [one of his disciples] pointed out. 

[personally, I think it is a tragedy that Leonard Nelson is unknown.]

  Nelson was ignored, not from lack of quality, but from academic philosophy falling into the mud of analytic philosophy. They ignored real quality. 

  The fallacy of Analytic Philosophy is that analyzing language can not tell us anything about reality. It is hard to know smart people could fall into that. Analytic Philosophy is about as deep as a mud puddle. some people think that there are other approaches in philosophy after Kant that can replace Kant but i do not think that is right. 

I know there are people that think one ought to learn Torah alone, but that is more along the lines of the rishonim who held that way. But that is not the opinion of the Rambam or the Chovot Levavot.

[In Physics I suggest trying to get through every basic step from Newton until Einstein, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Susskind in the sense of "Bekiut" i.e. saying the words in order until you finish each book at least four times, and also listen to the lectures.

 my basic idea  about learning is different than that of universities in the USA. in the USA and the west in general there is an emphasis on finding what you are good at and have natural talent towards. and while i can see the justification in that approach, i have to say  that it does not seem very much geared towards the kind of goals that is have in mind in learning. to me there are things that one must learn whether he is talented or not. and there are things one must not learn whether talented or not.

 for example pseudo sciences like psychology, one must not learn even if they draw one in by their poison's sweetness. one the other hand there are things one must learn whether they appeal to one or not, like learning Torah. that is the old testament and the two talmuds with tosphot maharsha and the basic achronim like rav shach, rav isar meltzer, and the other gedolai Lita. plus two things the rambam emphasized--physics and metaphysics as you can see he mentions in the mishna torah and the guide. but since these are hard to understand i recommend the fast kind of learning  brought in the talmud--always one should be  גורס i.e. just say the words in order even if one forgets and even if one does not even know what one is saying.

I am sure my grandparents were relived that my dad was working on the  ultra secretive B-29in the USA rather than going over with the ground troops on D-Day. Even so I am sure their prayers for his safety never ceased until the end of the war. At least i can be proud that the B-29 Enola Gay is the airplane that ended the war. He remained in top secret  USA projects until around the 1970,s--like the U-2 and SDI  

''All who add to the mitzvot subtracts from them.'' ''כל המוסיף גורע''

 Even though there is some reason for a woman to wait seven  clean days, but that this depends on a  custom  brought in the Gemara that ''the daughters of Israel wait seven clean days even for a drop like a mustard seed'' is not really a good reason-- because to the Bach that means the color of mustard. A different reason would be like the  the Rambam that  straight nida blood [mentral cycle] and ziva [blood seen not at the regular time of seeing.]blood depend on an order of days that starts from the first time she sees blood-i.e. 7-11, 7--11,etc. But that  is not the way most Rishonim count the days. To most Rishonim each time a woman sees blood starts the start of day of nida. [That means the way to count is thus. Seeing blood on one day after a regular time since the last time is the start of days of nida. And days of nida are only seven days. If she see once or twice or the whole seven days makes no difference; she goes into a natural body of water the night after the seventh day. But if she sees on the eight day, that is a small zava-- i.e., she waits one day and goes into a natural body of water. If she sees again, that is still a small zava. But if she see three times during the 11 day  stretch of time after that seven starting time means she is a large zava and needs to count seven clean days.] And my general approach is that there is no reason to look for extra restrictions. If someone wants to be extra strict, that is fine. But they ought not make that seem like an obligation for everyone. [See the Ramban quoted in the Tur who counts the days in this way..] 

boys are made of snips, snails and puppy dog tails

For a man to call himself a woman can not change his molecular structure.  Since boys are made of snips, snails etc., while girls are made of sucrose and spice, that that DNA molecular structure can not be changed by calling it a different name. It would take a great deal of effort to turn a snail into sugar or spice. Even the basic elements are different.

reference: What are little boys made of?

What are little boys made of?
  Snips, snails
  And puppy-dogs' tails
That's what little boys are made of

What are little girls made of?
What are little girls made of?
  Sugar and spice
  And everything nice [or "all things nice"]
That's what little girls are made of

 A case of doubt about 4 or five damages (five oxen for one ox and five sheep for one sheep ) is an argument between the Rambam and the Raavad. The argument is if the owner of the injured ox has grabbed the ox that caused the damage. To the Rambam [laws of theft 2. law 12] he can keep what he grabbed, but the Raavad has several questions on that. It is more than what he damaged, and there is a doubt so no court that has authority to decide. The answer to the first question,  Rav Shach suggests that only half damages we say if he grabbed  he can keep [which is an open gemara- a person that grabs half damages can keep it until the court convenes and decides the case ], but in our case of four or five damages not. 

so rav shach seems to be saying that  in our case  of 4 or 5 times the damage would the raavad hold you take away the ox if it has been grabbed==even if not a doubt. only if it is a case of half damages that you do not take away the grabbed object. i mean to say that rav shach does not refer to the aspect that our case is one of doubt.  

For some reason, Rav Isar Meltzer did not suggest this answer, but rather refers this subject to an argument between the Rosh and Rabbainu Yona in Ketuboth pg 20. [paragraph 13 in the Rosh]-

Also he mentioned to look at the Rosh in Bava Kama 15 [paragraph 20 in the Rosh]. The Rosh brings there Rav Meir HaLevi who held תופס חצי נזק אין מוציאים מידו ( We do not take half damages away from one who grabs them) except for 1/2 damages-- which would work fine here for the Raavad except for the fact that the Raavad elsewhere in the Rambam holds we do not take half damages away from one who grabs them in general. So Isar Meltzer says the Raavad holds only in a case of doubt do we take away the  half damages because it is like a guarantee for a loan. and in the case of doubt for a guarantee for a loan we would hold  we do not take  away from one who grabs them. But here its is a ''kenas'' punishment for the damages, not monetary.

 The Litvak yeshiva world i have complaints about but also deep respect. The Torah Greats were of course all from the Litvaks--Reb Chaim of Brisk, Rav Shach, Rav Kinyevsky. But there is a general ignorance of the signature of the Gra on the famous letter of excommunication.-- Plus there is a lot of disrespect towards the State of Israel. There is also a sort of ''super-organizim'' complex about it, a kind of group mentality which I tend to dismiss as not being in accord with the Torah. we are all Jews and all of u are obligated in all the commandments=especially learning Torah--the Written and Oral Torah. There is no subdivision in Israel except that some keep some commandments and others keep others. The obligations between man and man is the are where fry Yidden do best. Learning and keeping the obligations between man and God is where the Litvaks do best. There is no aspect of moral or mental superiority by which group one is born into. Everything depends on one' personal commitment and free will to do God's s Will. Even being born Jewish means nothing but having to keep more commandments. You might note that the entire book of Nahum was a prophecy given to Ninve--the capital city of the Assyrian Empire--a sworn enemy of Israel. 

Trying to introduce Socialism into Western Democracies

 The Fabian society took the approach of trying to introduce Socialism into Western Democracies slowly and also by stealth. This stealth approach is the reason people need to have certain values that they will not compromise on in any circumstances. In general, a balanced approach with compromise is the way to go. But there also need to be values and principles that you will not compromise on in any circumstances-what so ever. [I personally try to take the basic path of my parents and the Gra as providing the most essential principles that I try not to compromise on.]

 I have gone recently into a local beit midrash that has books from some of the recent great Litvak sages. I have a lot of respect for the depth and thoroughness of their thought. But I am not convinced about the general negative approach they had towards the State of Israel. The so called ''Hareidi'' world still goes with that approach refusing to serve in the IDF and continuing  their constant slander against fry yidden [secular Jews] in the privacy of Shabat meals while pretending ''we are all one happy family'' when they need money from fry yidden.

And I have been looking at some of the halachic decisions of Rav Elyashiv, and the Chazon Ish. I am impressed, but not to the degree of thinking of them as infallible, or innocent of biases--conscious or otherwise,-- certainly nothing approaching of what in common jargon could be called ''Daat Torah''.

And perhaps here I should include my own bias which is totally ''רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה'' [''Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the ability to make a halachic decision.''] [That is brought down in the Gemara]. So after Ravina and Rav Ashi [around 500 A.D.] there is no such thing as a ''posek''-- except in the sense of trying to figure out what the Gemara would hold on any legal decision. Of course, some of the final conclusions are already written in the Gemara,  and rules of how to decide are written there. The difficulty is that sometimes these rules contradict. Just for an example in Eruvin, you have the order of which Tana to go by when they argue. In Sanhedrin and Bechorot you have the idea of when a Beit Din makes a mistake when they decide against a ''stam sugia''--subject where the Gemara takes one opinion as a given. The list goes on and on, and it is hard to know of all the rules, which ones the Gemara holds override the others. 

 I have never heard of an idea that because one ii learning Torah, that he is not obligated in some commandment. From where the idea comes from that because some people learn  Torah all the time, therefore they have no responsibility to guard their own lives.  Rather I think this is a smoke screen. The religious simply despise  fry yidden [secular Jews] and would rather see them die, than to serve in the IDF.    it would be different if at least they would be honest. Let them just say they refuse to be anywhere near fry yidden because [according to them] they are all apikorsim/heretics. At least they would be honest. But to lie about what the Torah holds is the most despicable thing to do. That is one of the things that one has no portion in the next world מורה שלא כהלכה to lie about what the Torah holds on purpose.

the above paragraph was written not in an academic style, but for now let me add that i am aware that one who learns torah all the time is not obligated in the three daily prayers, and that in general there is an over arching principle one who is involved in one mitzvah is not obligated in another. however this later  principle only applies to Torah when there is someone else that can do the mitzvah. And in fact I think many people that were learning Torah thought privately that that is the reason  they decided not togo into the Israeli Defense Force. 

there is a ort of problem with pride- that the religious believe they are morally superior to fry yidden. that of course  absurd by reason of how we see them act every single day.  

 I was in a study hall [beit midrash] today and someone asked a question about a woman who became a convert while pregnant. The question was if her daughter can marry a [cohen] priest.  I have no idea why he asked me this question, but it just so happened  that the previous day I was looking at a book containing questions and answers of Rav Elyashiv that happened to have that very question.    It was about a woman that had converted and was pregnant and had lost her documents and then came to Israel and had to convert again. It was clear from the answer of Rav Elyashiv that that daughter is allowed to marry a Cohen [since she was born by a regular Jewish woman].But in another place I noticed Rav Elyashiv bring up this issue in terms of a question if a fetus is part of the mother. Does this depend on that question?     

The issue here is that there are a few types of women that a priest can not marry, e.g. a convert, a woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to her [zona], or a woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to the priesthood, or a divorced woman. 

בבא קמא ל''ד ע''א בבא מציעא ט''ו bava kama page 34. bava mezia pg 15 rav shach laws of robbery chapter 9 law 8. Rav Isar Melzer in laws of theft 7 law 12

 Both Rav Shach in laws of robbery 9 law 8 and Rav Isar Melzer in laws of theft 7 law 12 hold in four places the ''shevach'' [profit, or what grows on the ground] that comes about by effort belongs to the one who did the effort. This Rav Isar Meltzer shows the Rambam holds this way in four places robbery theft, inheritance, loans. My question on this comes from the gemara that one who went into the field of his friend without permission and planted crops. The gemara holds the owner pays only the expense, not profit in afield that is not set aside for planting. Rav Shach answers this that in that case the owner can say my field had a part in the profit. but if so that should apply in all the other four cases that Rav Melzer brings.

[i am being a bit short here. rav isar meltzer goes into great detail about this subject in a few places but the place i brought here is where he delves into this at length. only later did i notice that rav shach says the same sort of principle in the other place i brought here.     ]

 Both רב שך  in הלכות גזילה פרק ט' הלכה ח' and רב איסר מלצר in הלכות גניבה פרק ז הלכה י''ב hold in four places the שבח profit, or what grows on the ground that comes about by effort belongs to the one who did the effort. This רב איסר מלצר shows the רמב''ם holds this way in four places robbery theft, inheritance, loans. My question on this comes from the גמרא that one who went into the field of his friend without permission and planted crops. The גמרא holds the owner pays only the expense, not profit in a field that is not set aside for planting. רב שך answers this that in that case the owner can say my field had a part in the profit. but if so that should apply in all the other four cases that רב איסר מלצר brings.

גם רב שך בהלכות גזילה פרק ט' הלכה ח' וגם רב איסר מלצר בהלכות גניבה פרק ז' הלכה י''ב מחזיקים בארבעה מקומות את הרווח השבח, או מה שצומח על הקרקע שבא במאמץ שייך למי שעשה את המאמץ. רב איסר מלצר מראה שהרמב''ם מחזיק כך בארבעה מקומות שוד גניבה, ירושה, הלוואות. שאלתי על כך באה מהגמרא שאדם הלך לשדה של חברו בלא רשות ושתל יבולים. הגמרא גורסת שהבעלים משלם רק את ההוצאה, לא רווח בשדה שאינו מופרש לנטיעה. רב שך עונה על זה שבמקרה כזה הבעלים יכול לומר שלקרקע שלי היה חלק ברווח. אבל אם כן זה אמור לחול בכל ארבעת המקרים האחרים שמביא רב איסר מלצר

Maybe there is a fine thin line that one crosses from learning Torah for its own sake

 How could learning Torah have become a money making profession? I assume I am not the only one who has noticed the Mishna in Pirkei Avot about not making Torah into a shovel to dig with or an ax to chop with. In fact, my experience with most people that use Torah to make their living tend to use Torah as an ax to chop people with.  It might be that what I am not seeing here is the fact that everything has its proper measure.  SO we find the Kesef Mishna defending giving money to yeshivot on that very same place in the Rambam where the Rambam brings the prohibition of learning Torah in order to get charity. Maybe there is some subtle distinction that I am not seeing. Maybe there is a fine thin line that one crosses from learning Torah for its own sake and then from lack of options one is forced to depend on charity in order to continue learning -- between that and one who sets out on purpose to use Torah in order to gain a paid position/[The reason for this is any sizable population in Israel can form a political party, and no government  can be formed without 61 seats in the Kneset. So to get the religious parties to join, they get offered money. And besides that there is also the automatic funds that the government gives to yeshivot. If that money would be going only to places that actually learn Torah like Ponovitch i would have no complaints, but 90% of yeshivot were made in the first place in order to get a ''ptur' [release] from serving in the army, not to learn Torah.'

My feeling about this is that somewhere a line has been crossed to make learning Torah or teaching it for the sake of making money seem legitimate. In Israel, there are political parties whose sole purpose is to get money out of the government budget. Judges get money in spite of  the halacha '' כל דיין שנוטל שכר לדון בל דיניו בטילים'',  ''Any judge who receives pay to judge, all of his judgements are null and void.''

Just for the sake of clarity let me admit I was part of the kollel of the Mir Yeshiva in NY for years and I probably would have been happy to continue learning Torah in the Kollel of Rav Ernster in Safed until the problem of using Torah to make money started to bother my conscious and stopped. Then for some years I went with bitachon/TRUST IN GOD--just trust in God. and that was fine for about 7 years until I fell from trust in GOD and decided to seek out a way to make a living. But I did  not want the old way of using Torah for money, so went to major in Physics at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. In the meantime other things  came up--like a possibility to go to Uman for Rosh Hashanah--so I ended up in Uman for years learning Gemara with my learning partner David Bronson. --eventually getting back to Israel --still doing Physics and Gemara and Rav Shach's Avi Ezri..  

[I have mentioned before that I consider the herem of the Gra to be valid, and yet I do not think that Rav Nahman would be included. This I concluded after looking at the several letters of excommunication issued in Vilna. The Signature of the Gra is on the top of the second one. ]

 I would like to mention here a great book I have been looking at recently,- the Even haAzel אבן האזל  by ר' איסר מלצר Rav Isar Meltzer who was a friend of Rav Shach. This book fills in a lot of details which you might not get in the Avi Ezri. For instance, I have been looking at chap 7 halacha 12 of Monetary Damages. I think it is clear  that Rav Shach goes into some of these details in laws of Robbery, but the book of Rav Meltzer goes into greater  detail. [In Laws of Robbery 9 , halacha 8 Rav Shach comes to the same sort of basic principles that Rav Isar Melzer arrives at.   ]

I think that there is a lot of quite amazing ideas in the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov, but the fact that his name is associated with Breslov ruins the effect. Rav Nahman himself must have been aware of this problem when he wrote to his followers in Breslov in one of his five letters ''קצתי בישיבת ברסלב'' I have become disgusted with yeshivat breslov'' [or perhaps it could be translated ''I am disgusted with dwelling in breslov.] 

FOR his ideas really do not work well unless taken in a straight Litvak yeshiva atmosphere of straight Torah. but outside of that context, they tend to take people off into insane tangents. 

I found the approach to learning in Conversations of R.Nahman chap. 76 the most helpful, i.e., learning fast-- saying the words and going on. This helped a lot when I went to Polytechnic Institute of NY University.  

 I grew up in an area that was WASP and have believed ever since then about the importance of white Anglo Saxon Protestant civilization. The problem nowadays is most white Anglo Saxons Protestants  do not believe in themselves anymore. the problem of course is exactly what Saadia Gaon wrote: the trinity and nullification of the commandments. the positive aspect is paying attention and believing in the words of a tzadik.  

THE problem with the Trinity is to equate Jesus with God. The problem is  not ascribing ''divinity'' to him. The reason is that it is common  in the Ari/ Isaac Luria to ascribe divinity to certain Biblical figures: Abraham, Isaac Jacob, Moses, Aaron, Josef, David, Cain Hevel, Seth,.-- that is to say their souls are from Emanation which is totally divine. That is that Emanation is different from the worlds of Creation, Formation, and the physical universe which are not divine.