The right balance between faith and reason. Sinai and Athens.

 There was a great deal of effort during the Middle Ages to strike the right balance between faith and reason. Sinai and Athens. But after Kant, it seems that balance would have to find a different sort of synthesis.  In spite of the Rambam's noble efforts in the Guide for the Perplexed,  it is clear that that sort of balance is unsatisfying. (You might notice that when you read it.) This left me in a state of bewilderment until I discovered Leonard Nelson [founder of the second Kant-Friesian School]  and Kelley Ross.  The issue is that there are a great deal of questions in faith that do not get answers based on reason, nor on empirical evidence. Some seems answerable if you go with Rav Isaac Luria. That is if you put the simple explanation of the Torah into the world of Emanation and let this world be a poor shadow of that perfect world. But that still needs justification for it very existence. And justification that grasping it is possible by means other than reason or sense perception. And that is possible through the Kant Friesian School.  See the paper by Peter Sperber

I have been thinking about Hegel and Jacob Fries for a few days. I think both have been sadlly neglected.

The reasons I think for Hegel are that he was clear that he was in a middle position between the Left {progressives} and the Right - Throne Evangelicals. And the middle is always a hard position to hold onto since it can easily be construed and  tilted to one side or the other by those that do not want to understand.

The major new idea  of Fries of non intuitive immediate knowledge was neglected for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of that approach. For this idea gives a basis for the categories of Kant that otherwise  have weak justification. [And this can be expanded into faith. This is a better justification for faith than Kant's somewhat weak making room for it.] And it is better than Hegel's also since  faith really is not the same kind of thing as logical deductions. Hegel however was right that he did not think feelings were a good justification. [As many thought so in Berlin at the time. To those Hegel directed his criticism.] So that leaves us with  knowledge that is not based on reason and not on the senses--i.e. faith  

If I had more patience I would explain this at length, but for now I just wanted to make a short note of my question on Rav Josef Karo and Rav Shach in their answer for the Rambam.

 The מלאכה of a wife is owned by her husband. So this leaves me wondering a bit about the רמב''ם in Laws of Vows 12 law 10. The גמרא כתובות נ''ט itself I do not have with me, but from what I recall it goes more or less like this: A wife takes a vow to forbid the work of her hands to her husband. The husband should nullify the vow since he might divorce her and then not be able to remarry her. The גמרא asks: "Is it not a thing which has not yet come into her possession? (דבר שלא בא לעולם) THEN רב יוסף answers that saying she does not need to own that which she forbids, but אביי refutes his answer. For one can not forbid that which one does not own to someone else.  The גמרא then answers the original question saying she sanctifies the work of her hands [and her hands are in her possession.] Then the גמרא asks: "But her hands are under obligation to her husband." Answers רב אשי מתרץ : רבא said that Vows קונמות can override the obligation to her husband. So he only needs to nullify the נדר in case he divorces her. 

The רמב''ם says if a wife sanctifies her hands or vows the work of her hands, her husband should nullify the vow in case in the future he might divorce her, and the vow would become valid at that point, and then he could not remarry her. This at first glance looks to be in direct contradiction to the גמרא which said the vow does not even start on the work of her hands because it is a thing which has not yet come into her possession. The כסף משנה and רב שך  answer this elegantly, but in spite of that I am still left wondering.  

The כסף משנה says the point of רב אשי goes back on the original question of the גמרא, not just on the question that immediately precedes his statement. רב שך [Laws of buying and selling 22 law 9] shows that this means a vow  [קדושת הגוף, not קדושת דמים can come on something that is not in ones domain, but it needs at least to be owned by that person.] This is really a very powerful and beautiful answer. (If she says her hands are made holy that means the work of her hands goes to the בית המקדש. That is קדושת ממון. But when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that is קדושת הגוף. And that is the case that רב שך is saying the vow is valid because it is owned by her, but not in her רשות. But not being in her רשות is not a עיכוב to the vow as רב אשי says.) But I am still wondering this: At the time of the vow, she does not own the work of her hands. I mean to say this: we have retracted the original idea that the work of her hands is a thing that has not yet come into this world. It is owned by her and the only thing that might stop the vow is that it is not in her domain. To that רב אשי answers that  a vow that relates to קדושת הגוף, it does not need to be in her רשות. But again I am still wondering the מלאכה itself might very well be דבר שבא לעולם thing that has  come into existence, but even so who owns it? Not her, rather it is her husband. So again we come back to the original question: how could the vow be valid in the first place? 

There is an answer for רב שך. That is this: a woman can renounce her right to certain benefits she gets from her husband, and by doing so her husband is not required to provide those benefits and does not get certain rights that he has. One of those rights is the ownership of the work of her hands. So, in our case in laws of נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה  , she might not be saying openly that she will not get benefits from her husband. But by the very act of forbidding the work of her hands to her husband, she automatically does not get those benefits (מזונות support for food). At that point, in fact, the work of her hands does belong to her, and she can make a vow to forbid it since it is a thing that is in her possession.

 And I think that רב שך answer for the Rambam has to be true because in other places in the Rambam we find that for a נדר to be valid, the object does need to be owned by  person making the vow, but it does not need to be in their domain at the time of the vow.

The most well-known examples are the case a person owns an object that is being guarded by another person and that other person has denied the fact that the first own the object. In that case, the first person cannot sell that object because even though he owns it, it is not in his רשות. But in the seventh year [shemita] people that own fruit of the fourth year can put aside money in case that fruit is picked (unknowingly), that the holiness of the fourth year fruit will come onto that money. This is the case even though at the time it is picked, it is no longer in the domain of the owner. [Of course, the money has only קדושת דמים, but the point is that the holiness of the fruit can come on it even though the fruit is no longer in the רשות of the owner.]

 

Still there is one curious fact here that the גמרא holds the hands of the wife are under obligation to the husband [and that is the source of their question on the case when she says "ידי מקודשות לעושיהן"]. For this in itself is an argument on page כתובות נ''ח between רב הונא and ריש לקיש. And if she can say "I will not work and will not receive מזונות [food]," that is going according to רב הונא that her hands are not under obligation to her husband. But this is not a question on רב שך. It simply means that the סוגיא concerning נדרים is going like ריש לקיש  and in that case when the גמרא answers that קונמות (vows) can override obligation that means in our case that when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that means at that very second she owns the work of her hands and her husband is not obligated to support her. If we had been going to רב הונא she could have accomplished this same thing by simply saying "I will not get support and I will not work." But with ריש לקיש she needs to accomplish this by means of a vow.

________________________________________________________________________________

 [The work of a wife is owned by her husband. So this leaves me wondering a bit about the Rambam in Laws of Vows 12. 

The Gemara [Ketuboth] itself I do not have with me but from what I recall it goes more or less like this: A wife takes a vow to forbid the work of her hands to her husband. The husband should nullify the vow since he might divorce her and then not be able to remarry her. The Gemara asks is it not a thing which has not yet come into her possession? Rav Josef answers that saying she does not need to own that which she forbids, but Abyee refutes his answer. For one can not forbid that which one does not own to someone else.  The Gemara then answers the original question saying she sanctifies the work of her hands [and her hands are in her possession.] Then the gemara asks but her hands are under obligation to her husband. Answers Rav Ashi: Rava said that Vows can override the obligation to her husband. So he only needs to nullify the vow in case he divorces her.

The Rambam says if a wife sanctifies her hands or vows the work of her hands her husband should nullify the vow in case in the future he might divorce her and the vow would become valid at that point and then he could not remarry her. 

This at first glance looks to be in direct contradiction to the Gemara which said the vow does not even start on the work of her hands because it is a thing which has not yet come into her possession. The Kesepf Mishna and Rav Shach answer this elegantly, but in spite of that I am still left wondering.  The Kesef Mishna says the point of Rav Ashi goes back on the original question of the Gemara, not just on the question that immediately precedes his statement. Rav Shach [Laws of buying and selling 22]shows that this means a vow  [holiness of the body, not holiness of monetary value can come on something that is not in ones domain but it needs at least to be owned by that person.] This is really a very powerful and beautiful answer. (If she says her hands are made holy that means the work of her hands goes to the Temple. That is holiness of monetary value. But when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that is holiness  of body, not money. And that is the case that Rav Shach is saying the vow is valid because it is owned by her but not in her domain. But not being in her domain is not a stop to the vow as Rav Ashi says.)But I am still wondering this: At the time of the vow she does not own the work of her hands. I mean to say this: we have retracted the original idea that the work of her hands is a thing that has not yet come into this world. It is owned by her and the only thing that might stop the vow is that it is not in her domain. To that Rav Ashi answers that or a vow that relates to holiness of body, it does not need to be in her domain. But again I am still wondering the work itself might very well be דבר שבא לעולם thing that has not yet come into existence, but even so who owns it? Not her, rather it is her husband. So again we come back to the original question: how could the vow be valid in the first place? I did not think of this question at the sea shore but it just occurred to me at fleeting moment her and there. Sometimes at the sea and sometimes just day dreaming.

There is an answer for Rav Shach. [I thought of this a few days after I wrote the above essay.] That is this: a woman can renounce her right to certain benefits she gets from her husband and by doing her husband is not required to provide those benefits and does not get certain rights that he has. One of those rights is the ownership of the work of her hands. So, in our case in laws of Nedarim 12 halacha 10, she might not be saying openly that she will not get benefits from her husband. But by the very act of forbidding the work of her hands to her husband she automatically does not get those benefits (mezonot support for food). At that point, in fact, the work of her hands does belong to her, and she can make a vow to forbid it since it is a thing that is in her possession.

 And I think that Rav Shach's answer for the Rambam has to be true because in other places in the Rambam we find that for a neder vow to be valid the object does need to be owned by the person making the vow but it does not need to be in their domain at the time of the vow.

The most well-known examples are the case a person owns an object that is being guarded by another person and that other person has denied the fact that the first own the object. In that case the first person cannot sell that object because even though he owns it, it is not in his domain [reshut]. But in the seventh year [shemita] people that own fruit of the fourth year can put aside money in case that fruit is picked unknowingly that the holiness of the fourth year fruit will come onto that money. This is the case even though at the time it is picked, it is no longer in the domain of the owner. [Of course, the money has only holiness of money, but the point is that the holiness of the fruit can come on it even though the fruit is no longer in the domain of the owner.]

 

Still there is one curious fact here that the gemara holds the hands of the wife are und obligation to the husband [and that is the source of their question on the case when she says her hands are sanctified]. For this in itself is a argument on page 58 of Ketuboth between Rav Huna and Resih Lakish. And if she can say "I will not work and will not receive mezonot [food]," that is going according to Rav Huna that her hands are not under obligation to her husband. But this is not a question on Rav Shach. It simply means that the sugia concerning nedarim is going like Reish Lakish and in that case when the Gemara answers that Konamot vows can override obligation that means in our case that when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that means at that very second she owns the work of her hands and her husband is not obligated to support her. If we had been going to Rav Huna she could have accomplished this same thing by simply saying I will not get support and I will not work. But with Reish Lakish she needs to accomplish this by means of a vow.

]

________________________________________________________________________________

המלאכה של אישה היא בבעלות בעלה. אז זה משאיר אותי לתהות קצת על הרמב''ם בהלכות נדרים יב. את הגמרא כתובות נ''ט עצמו אין לי איתי אבל ממה שאני זוכר זה הולך פחות או יותר כך: אשה לוקחת  נדרה לאסור את עבודת ידיה לבעלה. הבעל צריך לבטל את הנדר כי הוא עלול לגרש אותה ואז לא יוכל להינשא לה שוב. שואלת הגמרא: "האין זה דבר שעדיין לא הגיע לרשותה? (דבר שלא בא לעולם) אז רב יוסף עונה שאינה צריכה להחזיק את מה שהיא אוסרת, אבל אביי מפריך את תשובתו. לא יכול לאסור את מה שאין לו למישהו אחר. אז הגמרא עונה על השאלה המקורית ואומרת שהיא מקדשת את ידיה [וידיה ברשותה] ואז שואלת הגמרא: "אבל ידיה מחויבות [משועבדות] לבעלה."  רב אשי מתרץ: רבא אמר [נדרים] קונמות יכולים לעקוף את החיוב לבעלה. אז הוא צריך רק לבטל את הנדר במקרה שיגרש אותה. הרמב"ם אומר אם אישה מקדשת את ידיה או נדרה מעשה ידיה מבעלה צריך לבטל את הנדר למקרה שבעתיד יגרש אותה והנדר יקבל תוקף באותה נקודה ואז הוא לא יוכל להינשא לה בשנית. זה במבט ראשון נראה כסתירה ישירה לחוק הגמרא שאמר הנדר אינו מתחיל על עבודת ידיה כי זה דבר שעדיין לא הגיע לרשותה. הכסף משנה ורב שך עונים על זה באלגנטיות, אבל למרות זאת אני עדיין תוהה. הכסף משנה אומר שהנקודה של רב אשי חוזרת על השאלה המקורית של הגמרא, לא רק על השאלה שקודמת מיד להצהרתו. רב שך [הלכות מכירה 22] מראה שזה אומר שנדר [קדושת הגוף, לא קדושת דמים יכול לבוא על משהו שאינו בתחום של האדם, אבל הוא צריך לפחות להיות בבעלותו של אותו אדם.] זה באמת תשובה מאוד חזקה ויפה.(אם היא אומרת ידיה מקודשות זאת אומרת מעשה ידיה הולך לבית המקדש. כלומר  זה קדושת ממון. אבל כשאומרת מלאכת ידיה אסורה לבעלה בנדר זה קדושת הגוף.  שהרי רב שך אומר שהנדר תקף כי הוא בבעלותה אך לא ברשותה. אבל אי היותה ברשותה אינו עיכוב לנדר כדברי רב אשי. אבל אני עדיין תוהה זאת: בשעת הנדר אין לה מעשה ידיה. אני מתכוון לומר זאת: חזרנו מהרעיון המקורי שעבודת ידיה היא דבר שעדיין לא בא לעולם. זה בבעלותה והדבר היחיד שעשוי לעצור את הנדר הוא שזה לא בתחום שלה. על כך עונה רב אשי שנדר המתייחס לקדושת הגוף, אינו צריך להיות ברשותה. אבל שוב אני עדיין תוהה שהמלאכה עצמה עשויה בהחלט להיות דבר שבא לעולם דבר שהתקיים, אבל למרות זאת מי הבעלים שלו? לא היא, אלא זה בעלה. אז שוב אנחנו חוזרים לשאלה המקורית: איך יכול להיות שהנדר תקף מלכתחילה

יש תשובה לרב שך. כלומר, אישה יכולה לוותר על זכותה להטבות מסוימות שהיא מקבלת מבעלה ועל ידי כך בעלה אינו נדרש לספק את ההטבות הללו ואינו מקבל זכויות מסוימות שיש לו. אחת מאותן זכויות היא הבעלות על מעשה ידיה. לכן, במקרה שלנו בהלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י', ייתכן שהיא לא אומרת בגלוי שהיא לא תקבל הטבות מבעלה. אך מעצם איסור עבודת ידיה על בעלה, היא אוטומטית אינה זוכה להטבות אלו (מזונות, תמיכה באוכל). באותה נקודה, למעשה, מעשה ידיה אכן שייך לה, והיא יכולה לנדור ולאסור שכן מדובר בדבר שברשותה. ואני חושב שתשובת רב שך לרמב"ם צריכה להיות אמת כי במקומות אחרים ברמב"ם אנו מוצאים שכדי שנדר יהיה תקף, החפץ צריך להיות בבעלותו של אדם הנודר אבל הוא לא צריך להיות ברשותו בזמן הנדר. הדוגמאות הידועות ביותר הן המקרה של אדם בבעלותו חפץ הנשמר על ידי אדם אחר ואותו אדם אחר הכחיש את העובדה שהראשון הוא בעל החפץ. במקרה כזה האדם הראשון לא יכול למכור את החפץ הזה כי למרות שהוא הבעלים שלו, זה לא ברשות שלו. אבל בשנה השביעית [שמיטה] אנשים שבבעלותם פירות של שנה ד' [נטע רבעי] יכולים לשים בצד כסף למקרה שהפרי נקטף מבלי לדעת שקדושת פירות השנה הרביעית תבוא על הכסף הזה. זה המצב למרות שבזמן בו הוא נבחר, זה כבר לא ברשות הבעלים. [כמובן שלכסף יש רק קדושת דמים, אבל העניין הוא שקדושת הפרי יכולה לבוא עליו למרות שהפרי כבר לא ברשות הבעלים.] ובכל זאת יש כאן עובדה קשה שהגמרא מחזיקה שידי האישה משועבדות כלפי הבעל [וזה מקור שאלתם על המקרה כשהיא אומרת "ידי מקודשות לעושיהן"]. לכך כשלעצמו יש ויכוח בדף כתובות נ''ח בין רב הונא לריש לקיש אם תוכל לומר "לא אעבוד ולא אקבל מזונות". כלומר, לפי רב הונא, אין ידיה חייבות לבעלה. אבל זו לא שאלה על רב שך. זה פשוט אומר שהסוגיא לגבי נדרים הולך כמו ריש לקיש ובמקרה כזה כשהגמרא עונה שקונמות (נדרים) יכולים לעקוף שיעבוד,- זה אומר בענייננו שכאשר היא אומרת מלאכת ידיה אסורה לבעלה ע"י נדר זה אומר שבאותה שנייה היא הבעלים של מעשה ידיה ובעלה אינו מחויב לפרנס אותה. אם היינו הולכים לרב הונא היא הייתה יכולה להשיג את אותו הדבר על ידי כך פשוט לומר "לא אקבל תמיכה ולא אעבוד". אבל עם ריש לקיש היא צריכה להשיג זאת באמצעות נדר

 Hegel consciously built om previous philosophers. He took the good and disregarded what he considered to be mistakes. And that is what I try to do.

I am not saying everything in the Talmud is all right. I am looking for objective morality.

 

You might find things in the Talmud or even in the Old Testament that are you might object to. If possible I try to reconcile these things to reason. But if that is not possible. I disregard them. 

However morality based only on Reason I also find to be problematic. There are those who think Marxism is the most rational of all moral and political systems.  And if we would go by pure logic, they might be right. But when I was growing up it was considered an axiom that in Physics or any subject, if one's theory is perfectly logical, but the results of experiment show it to be wrong, then it is wrong. And Communism is a good example of that. The millions of those murdered under Stalin and Mao show that somewhere the logic of Communism went haywire.

So that might not show any system to be perfect. But it is best to start with the Medieval Approach of Faith with Reason. [And just to add a little substance to my claim here I would like to mention the modified Kantian approach of Leonard Nelson the founder of the second Friesian School where you have this idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge- i.e., knowledge not based on reason nor on sense perception. This mainly refers to the categories  of Kant but can also be understood as faith.]

 Even though learning fast is clearly indicated in the Conversations of Rav Nahman שיחות הר''ן סימן ע''ו I noticed today the LeM I:74 ליקוטי מוהר''ן חלק א פרק ע''ד where learning with understanding is emphasized. This indicates the sort of compromise that you have in the Litvak world of half the day spent on learning in depth and the second half to be spent on fast learning.

 I do not really hold that marriage is a very good thing anymore. Nor do i see it to be in accord or contrary to holiness. Even though the Rambam held the idea of  concubine פילגש was only for kings, most rishonim disagree. 

And if you want to see this in the Old Testament itself, see Chronicles chapter 2 verse 46 concerning Caleb ben Yefuna. And  Caleb ben Yefuna was not a king, and yet had a few concubines. [And he was righteous as it says in the Book of  Numbers after he returned with Joshua--he went totally with God. וימלא אחרי השם ] So have girl friends and even having children with them does not reduce ones righteousness

Marriage nowadays is like being in an airplane that is losing power, and you are handed a parachute. The flight attendant that hands you the chute tells you that it has a 50/50 percent chance of opening.  

 It has been suggested that Clarence Thomas is the life blood and soul of the Supreme Court. After all no one can imagine Roberts to have the kind of influence that Thomas has. And that means the laws that were supposedly protected by the 14th ammendment will be held under scrutiny. [I.e. homosexual "marriage"? is next on the list of things to e noted that are not mentioned in the 14th ammendment.]

 I did not make it my business, but over the years I became aware of  some of the issues revolving around the Shatz. My conclusions were that most of the major doctrines of the Shatz got accepted into the religious world. So you might have noted that I think the religious world is not based on Torah except for show. The real source is the Shaz. But to go into this subject seems to me to be a waste of time and quite distasteful. But it came up while I was today in Breslov, so I thought to mention it here in case anyone needs some direction if they want to do research into this subject.

 There issue of Christianity I thought was in Avoda Zara but today I was at the near by Na Nach Breslov place and saw a book by the son of Rav Odaviah Yoseph [about using medicine on Shabat]]and hebrought up the fact that Muslims are not idol worshipers and the mentioned that famous Tosphot about Christianity and "Shituf" {joining}.  He brings in from Sanhedrin page 63 and the Rema {Moshe Iserles} in the Shulchan Aruch in Orach Haim chapter 156.

{I did not look these up but I guess I was wrong about the location of that Tosphot.}

 

 I am wondering why Leonard Nelson does not come up in philosophy. There might be one reason that Husserl accused him of psychologism. But I think that was not accurate. It might be we look into our minds to see first principles [empirically], but these first principles we know not from empirical evidence but non intuitive immediate knowledge. 

Especially after Husserl himself does not seem so great. [As Michael Sugrue pointed out.] And in fact most of "Analytic Philosophy" seems to be off track as Robert Hanna has pointed out. I only read some of one of his books about  how "Analytic Philosophy" is ready for the trash bin. But his arguments are very convincing.

The only exception I have to Nelson [who is based on Fries] is the complete dismissal of Hegel which I think is too much based on Hegel's politics which was in reaction to the French Revolution.]

Just as a side note I should add here why I think Nelson is important. Part of the reason is public--that is this: There are problems in Kant that I think Fries and Nelson do the best job in answering. I mean even if we would agree with Robert Hanna about "Forward to Kant," those problems would remain. So you can do some modification and that would be with the Friesian school. 

Another reason is personal--while in Safed in Israel I had what many people in history have had- this sort of "Enlightenment" kind of experience. This indicated a whole new dimension of reality that is not available to empirical knowledge nor to Reason. So it made sense to me to see that there is a different source of knowledge besides pure reason or the senses--immediate non-intuitive knowledge.

 I do not know if this is good advice for other but I have found reviewing a Torah lesson in the major book of Rav Nahman  forty days in a row to be helpful to solving problems that are mentioned in that particular Torah lesson. This advice was first suggested  to me concerning the  lesson LeM II;:44 and II:86 about not seeking extra restrictions. Then LeM I:61 concerning the need for clarity when two different directions are open to one. Then LeM I:6 about finding one's proper spouse. (That did not really work after forty days, but rather I figured that I had been without a wife or girl friend for so many years, that I would just keep on learning that Torah lesson  daily until some sort of breakthrough would occur. And that actually worked. But I had read that Torah lesson daily for almost a year until it did.) Now I am hoping to learn LeM I:72 about how to avoid evil thoughts. 

 Since it seems unlikely that Putin will accept a treaty that would require him to give up already conquered territory it makes sense to allow Ukraine to join NATO already.  After all there is no reason to think they can fight without help. And Russia does seem to be  a threat at this point to the Western Alliance.

Besides that, at this point it is Russia, China, Iran in an alliance against the USA. It makes no sense to let them succeed.

Perhaps I should add that I found the people of the Ukraine to be in general extremely good hearted people. [The problem is the small minority of criminal elements.] 

And I should add here that once the Ukraine is encircled  which is almost the case already, it will be hard to defend. So to join NATO would be the only means that I can see of protection.

 It is interesting to note that in Deuteronomy chapters 3 and 4 there are many lessons to learn. One is about pictures. On one hand in the Talmud we find the main prohibition is three dimensions,  not two. Still the prohibition of idolatry can be applied to anything. And it is also remarkable that verses there specifically mention not to make a picture of a male or female. If the Torah wanted to make it more explicit it is hard to know what else it could have written. Do not make pictures of males or females.

Also, I wonder why did the children of Reuben and Gad return to their lands? Was not the oath of Moses such that they would not return until the entire land of Israel was conquered? And that never happened until Jerusalem was conquered in the days of King David. 

Also it is noticeable the verse, "You were shown to know that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him." The context there does not imply that nothing exists besides God, but rather that God alone is the true God who has power to redeem and take out one nation from another.  See the context.

Last but not least in chapter 4 verse 2 is the statement not to add or subtract from the Law. That already nullifies a lot of nonsense.

  

 I am happy that Roe and Wade was overturned because I was once a fetus.

But on a broader note: I like the Constitution and I think it is what has made the USA to be the great country it is. So getting back to it makes me happy. [I am also very surprised that someone started noticing that document. ]

The justices rightfully noted the issue is not in the Constitution. And they noted the 2nd ammendment is! What a surprising week this has been.

people get upset with the secular world and look for some place of refugee a religious community

 A dynamic you see is that people get upset with the secular world and look for some place of refugee a religious community that they think is better. The problem is often the solution is a million times worse than the problem. The religious are just better at hiding the corruption. And they depend on good PR to cover it up. 

So in secular places where you are aware of the problems because of free press and free speech are often many times better than the religious.

 

Here is a few older music files [After writing them, it is common that I forget about them and do not share them. But yesterday I looked at a few and it seems they are worth sharing]

 r32  w39 x19 x77 x78 x98 x100

[r32 in midi]  [w39 in midi]  [x19 midi] [x77 in midi]  [x98 in midi]  [x100 midi]

za13midi  za13 nwc

Bava Metzia 16. בבא מציעא דף ט''ז. Rav Shach brings this subject in Laws of Sale 22:1 The argument between Tosphot and the Ramban about R. Meir holds that a person can buy and cause to by owned by another person something that has not yet come into the world,

חזרתי הבוקר מהים ועלה בדעתי שיש שאלה אם רב מחזיק מר' מאיר לגמרי או רק בחצי הדרך ושהשאלה הזו היא באמת מקור הוויכוח בין תוספות לרמב''ן. (רב משה בן נחמן). כוונתי לומר זאת: ר' מאיר מחזיק אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם ורב אמר אם כותב שטר לחברו "כשאקנה את השדה הזה, הוא יהיה בבעלותך מעתה (מעכשיו)". והגמרא אמרה,"זה מראה שרב הסכים עם ר' מאיר." ואז תוספות שואלים, למה רב מוסיף "מעכשיו?" תוספות עונה כי אם המסמך נשרף לפני הקנייה, המכירה יוצאת לפועל רק אם אמר "מעכשיו". אבל בכל מקרה (אם מוסיף "מעכשיו" או לא,) הוא יכול לשנות את דעתו. הרמב''ן מחזיק בהיפך. הוא לא יכול לשנות את דעתו אם הוא אמר "מעכשיו". אבל אם המסמך נשרף לפני המכירה, המכירה אינה תקפה בין אם אמר מעכשיו  ובין לאו.

 אז לתוספות, רב לא מסכים עם ר' מאיר במלואו, כי לר' מאיר בין אם המסמך עדיין קיים או לא, החבר יהיה בעל השדה, אבל זה לא יהיה כך לרב. לרב השדה לא מועבר לחבר אלא אם המסמך עדיין קיים. אבל לתוספות, לרב הוא יכול לשנות את דעתו, ואולי ר' מאיר חולק על כך או אולי לא. אנחנו לא יודעים. כי לא אחד, לא רב ולא ר' מאיר, עושים כל הבחנה במקרה של שינוי דעת אם אמר "מעכשיו". 

לרמב''ן יוצא שרב מסכים עם ר' מאיר גם רק בחצי הדרך, אבל בחצי אחר. אז הוא לא יכול לשנות את דעתו אם אמר "מעתה", אבל המכירה לא תקפה אם אין מסמך בזמן שהוא קונה את השדה. הרשב''א מביא הר''י (רבינו יצחק הזקן[קידושין ס''ג]) שמחזיק שאם אמר מעכשיו הקניין תקף והוא לא יכול לשנות את דעתו וגם אם אמר מעכשיו הקניין תקף גם אם המסמך לא קיים אז. זה מראה שהר''י סבור שרב  מסכים עם ר' מאיר רק באפן חלקי. יכול להיו שהקניין תקף גם בלי שאמר מעכשיו אבל רק בתנאי שלא יבוא איזה עיכוב 

כמובן שאני רק עוסק כאן ברמת פני השטח של הנושא הזה. עדיין ייקח לי זמן להבין איך רב שך מבין את הוויכוח בין תוספות, הר''י והרמב''ן. ואז בנקודה הזאת אולי יהיה לי רעיון איך זה יהיה שונה מר' מאיר. אני מתכוון לומר שבפשטות זה נראה כאילו ר' מאיר מחזיק אדם יכול לקנות או למכור את מה שעדיין לא הגיע לרשותו. לא צריך "מעכשיו" בכלל. אבל תלוי איך אתה מבין את רב באיזה תחום צריך "מעכשיו", אתה יכול להגיד שר' מאיר פשוט לא מסכים עם זה באותו תחום, אבל באחר אולי לא. אז ברור שהנושא הזה ייקח הרבה יותר חשיבה עד שאוכל להגיע למסקנות ברורות כלשהן.

Of course I am just dealing here with the surface level of this subject. It still will take time for me to understand how Rav Shach is understanding the argument between  Tosphot, the Ri, and the Ramban.  and then at that point I might have an an idea of how thi would differ from R. Meir. I mean to say that simply speaking it looks like R Meir holds a person can buy or sell that which has not yet come into his possession. Not need for "from now " at all. But depending on how you understand Rav in what area one needs "from now", you might say that R Meir just disagrees with that in that one area, but in the other maybe not. So clearly this subject will take a lot more thinking until I can reach any clear conclusions.   

_____________________________________________________________________________

I was walking back from the sea this morning and it occurred to me that there is a question if רב holds from ר' מאיר completely or only half way and that this question is really the source of the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ן (רב משה בן נחמן).

I mean to say this: ר' מאיר holds אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם and רב said If one writes a שטר to his friend "When I buy this field, it will be owned by you from now." And הגמרא said "This shows that רב agreed with ר' מאיר.

THEN תוספות asks why does רב add "from now?" תוספות answers because if the doc is burned before the purchase, the sale goes through only if he said "from now". But in either case (if he adds "from now" or not,) he can change his mind.

The רמב''ן holds the opposite. He can not change his mind if he said "from now". But if the document is burned before the sale, the sale does not go through whether he said from now or not.

So to תוספות  it comes out that Rav is  not agreeing with ר' מאיר in full because to ר' מאיר whether the document still exists or not the friend would own the field, but this would not be so to רב.

To the רמב''ן, רב is agreeing with ר' מאיר also only half way, but in a different half. So he can not change his mind if he said from now, but the sale is not valid if there is no document at the time he buy the field.

The רשב''א brings ר''י (רבינו יצחק הזקן) that holds the קניין always goes through and he can not change his mind and it is valid even if the מסמך does not exist then. That shows ר''י hold that רב is agreeing with ר' מאיר רק במצב שאמר מעכשיו.

Of course I am just dealing here with the surface level of this subject. It still will take time for me to understand how רב שך is understanding the argument between  תוספות, the ר''י, and the רמב''ן.  and then at that point I might have an an idea of how this would differ from ר' מאיר. I mean to say that simply speaking it looks like ר' מאיר holds a person can buy or sell that which has not yet come into his possession. Not need for "מעכשיו " at all. But depending on how you understand רב in what area one needs "מעכשיו", you might say that ר' מאיר just disagrees with that in that one area, but in the other maybe not. So clearly this subject will take a lot more thinking until I can reach any clear conclusions.   

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

R. Meir holds that a person can buy and cause to by owned by another person something that has not yet come into the world,[note 1] and Rav said If one writes a doc to his friend "When I buy this field, it will be owned by you from now." And the Gemara said "This shows that Rav agreed with R Meir.

Tosphot asks why does Rav add "from now?" Tosphot answers because if the doc is burned before the purchase, the sale goes through only if he said "from now". But in either case (if he adds "from now" or not,) he can change his mind.

The Ramban [R Moshe ben Nahman] holds the opposite. He can not change his mind if he said "from now". But if the doc is burned before the sale, the sale does not go through whether he said from now or not.

So to Tosphot, Rav is  not agreeing with R Meir in full because to R Meir whether the doc still exists or not the friend would own the field, but this would not be so to Rav.

To the Ramban, Rav is agreeing with R Meir also only half way, but in a different half. So he can not change his mind if he said from now but the sale is not valid if there is no doc at the time he buy the field.

The Rashba [Kidushin page 63]brings Rabbainu Isaac that holds  if he said "from now" and he can not change his mind and it is valid even if the document does not exist then. That shows R Isaac hold that Rav is agreeing with R Meir also only partially. That is: it could be the sale is valid even if he did not say "from now", but only on condition that no obstacle   arises. 

Of course I am just dealing here with the surface level of this subject. It still will take time for me to understand how Rav Shach is understanding the argument between  Tosphot, the Ri, and the Ramban.  and then at that point I might have an an idea of how this would differ from R. Meir. I mean to say that simply speaking it looks like R Meir holds a person can buy or sell that which has not yet come into his possession. Not need for "from now " at all. But depending on how you understand Rav in what area one needs "from now", you might say that R Meir just disagrees with that in that one area, but in the other maybe not. So clearly this subject will take a lot more thinking until I can reach any clear conclusions.   

[note 1] For example I go to buy a field. But before I buy it I give a doc to my friend that says when i buy it  the filed will be owned by you. To R Meir this later doc is valid.

 

 I can see why a lot of companies exported their jobs to China. The situation in the US was such that unions were crushing business. They did not care how much money the actual business had. They would simply make demands and more and more and more. If the business owner tried to explain he did not have the money to pay for that , the unions did not care.  Go take a look at the history of the unions in the USA if you do not believe me. The end result certainly was to strengthen China, but what was a business owner supposed to do? 

 

Russia, China and Iran are forming an alliance against the USA. The New World Disorder.

 Russia, China and Iran are forming an alliance against the USA. This is a period of a new world disorder. I would not worry if not for the black element in the US which is determined on bring down the USA.  It would be hard for the USA to fight against three formidable opponents while at the same time having to deal with a enemies at home that are just waiting to stab the USA in the back. [And all the more so when those enemies are now in the White House and in control of Congress.]]

Other democracies might come to the aid of the USA, but that will not matter as long as you have an enemy within the gates. The black problem is the one most lethal problem that the USA has-mainly because it can not be acknowledged.  If the USA can not admit it has a problem, then finding a solution is impossible.

 The answer: Learn Torah.That is mainly Gemara with Tosphot and Rav Shach. But also with STEM..

You can not change a child's sex. That is simply called castration.  If one tries to drive out Nature, it comes back with a  vengeance.

ליקוטי מוהר''ן חלק א' פרק ע''ב

One thing Rav Nahman said was that when one prays often thoughts come that mess up one's prayer. Often you find people tht shake their head and do all kinds of odd motions to get rid of evil thoughts. He said that does not help and in fact just the opposite. The more one fights against them the more they get stronger. The only advice is to ignore them completely and just continue in one's service. I find this advice to be helping me in other situations besides prayer, for example learning.

ליקוטי מוהר''ן חלק א' פרק ע''ב

The LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov vol I chapter 72 

It is a fact that King Asa was blamed in the Bible for going to doctors instead of God. In the verses it looks like an "either or ,-but not both" function. This ("Shtims") parallels well with what the mishna says טוב שברופאים לגיהינום. [The best of doctors is destined for Hell]. 

It is well known that Rav Nahman of Breslov also warned against doctors. 

So the whole Covid hoax and vaccination poisons have not seemed to me to be worth paying any attention to. But I have not protested or gotten into arguments about them.

Ad I do not want here either to go into this subject. it is well known that psychology is pseudoscience and even what is thought to be regular medicine. However in Breslov it was the custom to go to doctors anyway--just the best ones. And from what I can understand from my parents is that once a procedure has been well established for  over 50 years (at minimum), then it can be thought to be more or less reliable.

I might add that while I was in Uman in Ukraine God granted to me that i had great doctors when i needed them. the care I received was astounding--but I was nervous because for example  in the same trauma unit where I had an operation there had been in the time of the USSR a doctors who was a butcher.. I knew a girl that was crippled for life after being operated on by him. So I should say that my good experiences were all after Ukraine gained independence. And I should add that the good doctors were very conservative in that they would never use new medicines nor new procedures. 

Besides that I should admit I owe a lot of gratitude to people in Uman for other reasons. When I needed help, may there were there to help.

 

z43 

 I can see where the West keeps on giving out gender studies degrees and China keeps producing STEM mathematicians physicists, and mechanical engineers who is on the rise and who is failing. Even when I was in Polytechnic Institute of NYU the best students were from China.

The USA made war on fathers and now is harvesting the whirlwind.

I was in the Na Nach place today (on the name of Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman) and listening. One thing Rav Nahman said was not to pray with the intensions of the Ari {Rav Isaac Luria} because for those who are on that level it is just the plain meaning of the words and for those that are not on that level it is like forbidden magic.

This gets to a subject that is hard to figure out in the Ari. On one hand he had great insights, but on the other hand  people that get involved in that seem to get sidetracked. And it is not clear why. Maybe it is like is usually said in the Litvak world that it is only for people that have learned Shas many times.

Further as to what Rav Nahman said it is only for those for whom the intensions are the simple explanation of the words, I have to admit I do not see any explanation of the Torah that makes sense to me except  the Ari. Just to give a simple example--the flood of Noah. How can you understand that expect that it refers to מים נוקבין (the female waters)? Or the basic time line of Genesis? How can you understand that except by the Ari? It is not as if the time line is ambiguous.  It does not come out to be 13 billion years. It comes out to be a very specific number of years are 7000 [counting the years of life of all those people from Adam until Abraham and from him until Moses and from him until the first Temple.]] Unless you explain the Seven Days of Creation as referring to the seven lower sepherot, it makes no sense at all.

So what I suggest is in fact to pray with the intensions of the Ari in the Sidur HaReshash.  Now there are two sidurim of the Reshash. The three volume small one I think is not any more well established than the large one from the grandson of the Reshash. It is called on the name of the Reshash, but was actually put together by students of the Reshash. I think the large one [five volumes] is better. 

But I agree with the Litvak world that all this is only if one has gone through Shas a few times.

The World's Smartest Students

 

 I also found women in the USA to be difficult. The reason I think has to do with up bringing. In the "old days" women would try to find a good man and start a family together by working together. Nowadays some women see themselves in in opposition to men. Almost as enemies--or at least someone to use and then expel.

Job interview with the new generation.

 

Bava Metzia 100a. Ketuboth 15. Rambam 20. Halachot 14, 15

בבא מציעא ק' ע''א כתובות ט''ו. רמב''ם כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו.

אני חושב שאתה יכול להסביר את הרמב''ם באמצעות התוספות בנידה ב' ע''ב שחזקת השתא ביחד עם עוד חזקה יכולה לנצח חזקה מעיקרא (מצב נוכחי יחד עם סטטוס אחר יכול להביס סטטוס קודם). בנידה יש ​​לך סטטוס נוכחי ביחד עם סטטוס אחר מביס סטטוס קודם למרות שבאופן כללי סטטוס קודם חזק יותר מסטטוס נוכחי. זה יעזור לרמב''ם. שהרי יש ויכוח בין רוב ראשונים לרמב''ם על מקרה של אחד שמחליף את פרתו עם חמור. והפרה הייתה איתו באותה עת, אבל אז הוא הולך להביא את החמור ומגלה שהוא לא חי. לרוב ראשונים הבעלים של הפרה צריכים להביא הוכחה שהחמור לא היה בחיים בזמן ביצוע ההחלפה. אולם הרמב''ם מחזיק בעלים של החמור צריכים להביא הוכחה שהחמור היה בחיים. אז אתה רואה שהרמב''ם פה מחזיק כיוון שהחמור לא חי עכשיו, לכן אנחנו דוחפים את הזמן אחורה ואומרים שהוא לא היה חי כמה שיותר רחוק עד לזמן שאנחנו יודעים שהוא היה חי. האופן שבו רמב''ם הזה יכול להגיב (על שאלה של חזקה מעיקרא יותר תקפה מחזקת השתא) הוא באמצעות אותה תוספות בנידה ב' ע''ב. כלומר, בעלים של הפרה יש לו חזקת מרא קמא. רב שך מביא גם את הרמב''ם הזה ומציע סיבה אחרת לכך. כלומר, שהשלמת ההחלפה היא תנאי להחלפה. אבל זה לא סותר את ההצעה שלי. וחוץ מזה, קשה להבין למה בדיוק מתכוון רב שך. לדבריו, מדובר במכירה בתנאי שהנכס שהתקבל הוא הנכס שהיה במצב שבו נקנה. בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי שזה אותו דבר כמכירת טעות, מקח טעות רגילה. ושום מכירה בטעות אינה תקפה. אז מה שונה כאן מכל מכירה אחרת? ברור שעת ההחלפה. אבל אם כן, אין תנאי ישנה. אם החמור היה בחיים בזמן המכירה, אז המכירה תקפה. אז בכל מקרה, הנושא הוא שעת ההחלפה ולשם כך יש לנו את הסטטוס הנוכחי. אבל אפילו עם התשובה שלי, נראה שיש בעיה. כי "כאן נמצא כאן היה" לא אומר שום דבר על חזקה בהווה. זה לא אומר כלום על חזקה  עם חזקה אחרת. למשל, אותו עיקרון חל על חיה שנמצא מחט בבטנה. לא מוזכר שם שום דבר על חזקא.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 בבא מציעא ק' ע''א  כתובות ט''ו. רמב''ם כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו. 

I think you can explain the רמב''ם by means of the תוספות in נידה ב' ע''ב that חזקת השתא ביחד עם עוד חזקה יכולה לנצח חזקה מעיקרא A present situation together with some other status can defeat a prior status. In נידה you have a present status along with another status defeats a prior status even though in general a prior status is stronger than a present status.

This would help the רמב''ם. For there is an argument between most ראשונים and the רמב''ם concerning the case where one exchanges his cow with a חמור. And he had the cow with him at the time. But then he goes to get the חמור and finds it is not alive. To most ראשונים the owner or the cow has to bring a proof that the ass was not alive at the time the exchange was made. However the רמב''ם holds the owner of the חמור has to bring a proof that the חמור was alive. So you see the רמב''ם here is holding since the חמור is not alive now, therefore we push the time backwards and say it was not alive as far back as possible until a time we know it was alive. The way this רמב''ם can make sense is by means of that תוספות in נידה ב' ע''ב.That is, the owner of the cow is the prior owner of the cow so he has חזקת מרא קמא 

רב שך also brings this רמב''ם and suggests a different reason for it. That is, that a completion of the exchange is a condition of the exchange.  But it does not contradict my suggestion. And besides that, it is hard to understand exactly what רב שך means.  He says this is sale on condition that the property received is the property that was in the condition that it was bought as. On the way back from the sea, it occurred to me that this is the same thing as a normal מקח טעות mistaken sale. And no mistaken sale is valid. So what is different here than any other sale? Obviously the time of the exchange. But if so the no condition would make  a difference. If the חמור was alive at the time of the sale, then the sale is valid. So in any case, the issue is the time of the exchange and for that we have the present status. But even with my answer, there seems to be an issue. For כאן נמצא כאן היה is not saying anything about a present חזקה. Not does it say anything about a present  חזקה with another  חזקה. For instance, the same principle applies to an animal that a needle was found in its stomach. There is not mentioned there anything about חזקא.

However I am thinking that Rav Shach must be getting at something other than a regular case of a mistaken sale.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Bava Metzia 100a. Ketuboth 15. Rambam 20. Halachot 14, 15

I think you can explain the Rambam by means of the Tosphot in Nida page 2b that חזקת השתא ביחד עם עוד חזקה יכולה לנצח חזקה מעיקרא A present situation together with some other status can defeat a prior status. In Nida you have a present status along with another status defeats a prior status even though in general a prior status is stronger than a present status.

This would help the Rambam. For there is an argument between most Rishonim and the Rambam concerning the case where one exchanges his cow wth an ass. And he had the cow with him at the time. But then he goes to get the ass and finds it is not alive. To most Rishonim the owner or the cow has to bring a proof that the ass was not alive at the time the exchange was made. However the Rambam holds the owner of the ass has to bring a proof that the ass was alive. So you see the Rambam here is holding since the ass is not alive now, therefore we push the time backwards and say it was not alive as far back as possible until a time we know it was alive. The way this Rambam can make sense is by means of that Tosphot in Nida.  That is, the owner of the cow is the prior owner of the cow so he has חזקת מרא קמא 

Rav Shach also brings this Rambam and suggests a different reason for it. That is, that a completion of the exchange is a condition of the exchange.  But it does not contradict my suggestion. And besides that, it is hard to understand exactly what Rav Shach means.  He says this is sale on condition that the property received is the property that was in the condition that it was bought as. On the way back from the sea, it occurred to me that this is the same thing as a normal מקח טעות mistaken sale. And no mistaken sale is valid. So what is different here than any other sale? Obviously the time of the exchange. But if so the no condition would make  a difference. If the ass was alive at the time of the sale, then the sale is valid. So in any case, the issue is the time of the exchange and for that we have the present status. But even with my answer, there seems to be an issue. For כאן נמצא כאן היה is not saying anything about a present status. Not does it say anything about a present status with another status. For instance, the same principle applies to an animal that a needle was found in its stomach. There is not mentioned there anything about status.

  

 There is an argument to be made that the nature of Anglo American society in the 1950's was a result of DNA plus a Constitution that fit the nature of the people. For my grandparents (owned property in Newark NJ) but when it was clear that certain elements were moving in they gave away their property. They did not sell, but gave away since they realized that even owning property in such an area was a liability.  In a similar way I recall Camden NJ where the sister of my mother used to live. And we visited there every summer. It was wholesome and clean. Now it has become an extremely  violent city. Same reason.

The moral is clear. The South was right. 

 

 

 

 

 The argument for learning Musar is that it is hard to know what is "Daat Torah" without it. [That is to say that the idea of learning Musar depends a lot on the idea that the Rishonim [Mediaeval Authorities] understood Torah better than we do. And this principle to me seems clear even though it sees to be in danger of being forgotten.

And even if you have learned much of Shas {the whole Gemara} and Poskim [the mediaeval authorities that dealt with the Halacha] still to understand the world view of Torah can be difficult.

To me this all seems simple, but I have a hard time of conveying this message to people. I often go to the Na Nach place nearby and I can see the importance of Rav Nachman,  but why is it that some people do not see or at least emphasize the fact that Rav Nachman himself is building on the Rishonim? He is not coming up with a new Torah but rather deepening our understanding of Torah. (But to learn the books of Rav Nachman without Musar seems to me to bring about misunderstandings.)

 

 

 

 Rav Nahman of Breslov warned about doctors in the Conversations of Rav Nahman  and this theme comes up in the LeM (his major work) also. So it did not occur to me to listen to doctors about the vax. I start out with the assumption that what ever in on the market should not be trusted until 5 years have passed and all the quirks have been ironed out.

 I have thought about the Mirrer Yeshiva in NY and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway and realized that it is highly  unlikely I would have come to any understanding of Torah without hearing classes from the great roshei yeshiva in these two places.[Rav Shmuel Berenbaum and Naphtali Yeager] since I can see the same thing when I learn Physics. There is only so much I can get by reading. Without hearing from an expert is like trying to learn how to play the violin from a textbook.

And in the Middle Ages this was also understood--that for any discipline, whether shoe making, or painting or boat making, one needed to learn from an expert.

So what was the question of the Gra about the creation of a "yeshiva" as a seperate institution from the rav of a city? I can imagine the issue was that he saw the future abuse that this would cause. Still, one way or the other it is clear that Rav Chaim of Voloshin decided that it is important --even if we do not know if the Gra agreed or not. [There are two versions of the story.]     

 

 

baali teshuva

 I can see that problems that arise for baali teshuva are a result of the Patrician Plebian dynamic. That is they think that they are accepted into the religious world as equals [because of the love bombing and Shabat table façade], but then are treated as disposables to be disregarded when no longer of use. [For clarity: baali teshuva means newly religious.]

 There is a sort of depth in Tosphot which I feel is being forgotten in even the great Litvak yeshivot like Ponovitch or the Mir. The reason is that the emphasis in in depth learning has gone in the direction of Rav Chaim of Brisk. While that in itself is worthy and great, still the effect I think is to lose sight of Tosphot.

And one thing I can definite say about Tosphot: it is hard. It is nothing like the Rambam while at least in a  superficial reading you can get the idea. And even if you learn it with the commentaries and even Rav Chaim of Brisjk, you can still get the idea more or less. That is totally different than Tosphot where the depth clear since even to get the basic idea takes tremendous work. And it is not clear how to penetrate into the depth of Tosphot anyway. Unless you have a learning partner with a genius IQ like I had for awhile in David Bronson. Or you have a rosh yeshiva like I had in Shar Yashuv, Naftali Yegear. Otherwise what can one do? The only approach that I found to be workable is to review that same Tosphot every day word for word for about 40 days in a row. Eventually with that I found the depths of Tosphot began to be revealed.

 z48  z48 nwc