I always had a kind of conflict between learning fast as I wanted to do{as I saw in a few books] in Shar Yashuv and the fact that Rav Friefeld and his son Moti were always recommending review.

So what I did was this kind of compromise that I would do the actual paragraph of the gemara twice with Rashi and also one time the English translation in the Soncino.

The idea of a sort of minimal review seemed to help me then and later on also when I was in university learning Physics I also had this kind of minimal review approach. That is one time to review the page or paragraph and go on.

This is not exactly the way of Rav Nahman that was to read the words i.e. say them in a whisper or out loud, and go on without review until you reach the end of the book and then review. But neither was it was Rav Freifeld was.


In Shar Yashuv [a Litvak yeshiva that went more or less along the path of the Gra.] They were doing Gemara in a deep way that was different from the Mir where I went later on. In Shar Yashuv the way was kind of what is called in Israel" To calculate the sugia" that is intense analysis ofg the actual words of the Gemara and Tosphot. Later in the Mir and especially with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum I saw a different approach that was based on Rav Haim Soloveichik which was global--and not concentrated on that one page in front of you. I benefited from both approaches but again as I mentioned up above when it came to personal; learning I found this kind of method of review of the paragraph twice and going on to be the thing that worked for me best. 

The basic background in Bava Mezia 101a as far as I can recall is this:
The Mishna brings the law that a renter of a field in Israel from an non Jew, takes maasar (tithe) and then pays the non Jew (probably Arab). The reason is that you can not pay your debts with tevel (produce that has not had tithes taken from it). R. Yehuda adds "also a sharecropper must take tithes and then pay." The Gemara says at first it looks like a gentile has no possesion in such a way that the crops are not obligated in tithe and a sharecropper is like a renter.

Then the Gemara brings a braita that says that R Yehuda said his law only in the case of a gentile that took the ground without paying for it. That is he stole it.  So the Gemara concludes that there is possesion and a sharecropper is not like a renter.


Sharecropping is when the worker shares some percent of the crops like Frank Hamer used to do before he became a Texas Ranger and brought down Bonnie and Clyde. 

Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

__________________________________________________________________________________




The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

I think that Rav Nahman was not in the category of the excommunication of the Gra however I do think the excommunication was valid.
The reason is something I saw in a commentary of the Rambam Mishna LaMeleh in the beginning of laws of vows [Nedarim] where he brings the Beit Yoseph who brings the Tashbaz that a herem has a category of both a vow and an oath. There the ML himself disagrees and says it only has the category of a vow. Still the point is it is valid.
That is just like one can forbid the use of a loaf of bread on another by saying this loaf of bread is a korban [sanctified for the altar] to you"--so a herem excommunication also has that same kind of validity.

The reason this is relevant to me even though others ignore this issue is that I am horrified by how the Dark Side has taken over the religious world in Israel. I wish that the Gra and Rav Shach would have been listened to. 

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of being more strict than the letter of the law.

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of "Chumrot" which is to say being more strict than the letter of the law. I was in the same Na Nach Breslov place and they were learning the beginning of Rav Nahman's book the LM vol 1:8. He does not mention this idea there but he does go into the idea that is related. The actual place is in LM vol 2 around chapter 44 I think and also around 82.
There Rav Nahman does bring up the problem of religious authorities that are demonic for the first time -and that is a recurring theme in the LM.
I was reminded of this by reading the Commentary of Rav Joseph Karo on the Rambam where he brings the case of Shmuel the amora telling one person that he must use the oil of gentiles or he would declare him a zaken mamre rebellious elder.

I was at the Na Nach Nachma Nachman from Uman [in Israel]  place today and did some learning. Then I went to take a nap and when I woke up I had an idea that might help R. Shimshon [a grandson of Rashi].
The question that the Radvaz raised on R Shimshon was that if in the grain stack there is half tithes and half secular grain then how can one take a tithe for it. The answer is that he takes double and calls a name only on a half.
That is like this. In the Mishna in Trume 4 we have a mishna that goes like  this: המפריש מקצת ת''ום מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר One who separates only a part of truma or tithe [maisar] takes out truma from it but not to another place. RS [R. Shimshon] says the idea is that the separation is valid but he needs to complete the amount.
The is the basic background. Now the question is let's say that now the stack is half tevel and half secular. So how can he take tithe? [This question is of the Radvaz.]
The answer is this. Let's say that you have 100lbs of grain and one takes 5 lbs for tithe instead of ten. So now the stack is half tevel and half hulin. So what to do is to separate another 10 lbs and to say: "the five lbs of tevel in this ten lbs is now tithe for the rest of the 50 lbs of tevel that are in the stack." Then the stack is now completely  taken care of. but your ten lbs is now half tithe and half secular. Then you could give the whole thing to a Levi. You would lose a little bit of your own grain but tehstack would be okay.

This answer clearly helps R. Shimshon. However there is still the Rambam left to try to answer for. The problem in the Rambam is the exact same one that comes up in R Shimshon but the answer I gave for RS does not work for the Rambam. The issue is this. In Truma 3 law 7 the Rambam brings that same mishna but holds the separation is not valid at all.  But in law 6 he says one who intends to separate 1/60 but instead took 1/61 --the separation is valid but he finishes the required amount. As Rav Shach points out in the Avi Ezri we see that the difference between law 6 and law 7 is that is law 6 he intends to finish the amount. In law 7 he does not. So in law 7 the separation is not valid.
The answer for the Rambam I think is that here he talks about truma alone and in that there is no problem of amounts. If he continues the process it is valid even if he takes just 1/60-1/61. And in fact in laws of tithe the Rambam does not bring up the issue of when he intends to take more. So in that case as far as I can see he would say the same thing as I wrote up above for R Shimshon.

[The police still have my computer so I am still borrowing. I am not upset with the police because they easily could have put me away for ten years if they had wanted to. Instead they had compassion on me and that same night I was arrested, the officer Moshe Cohen asked me two questions. One was to make a search and the other he mentioned perhaps my son would be willing to sign for me. So we all went (about ten police officers) and the police actually did not search because Moshe my son answered the door and said there was nothing to search for and then they asked if he would be willing to come and sign for me and he said yes. That was one of the greatest moments in my life when I heard my son willing to stand up for. me. Still I am sad that I have not written any music or ideas in Torah.]

I had a thought also about something that Rav Shach [on laws of Truma ] I know does talk about in the Avi Ezri. [I do not recall what he said].
The mishna says one who takes only a fraction of the truma or tithe takes out truma from it but not to a different place. R. Meir said also to a different place. R. Shimshon says the idea is it is truma or tithe but he needs to finish. Example: 100 lbs tevel. He takes 5 lbs tithe. It is tithe but he takes another 5 lbs. The idea is to R Shimshon that the original stack is mixed with tevel and hulin but when he takes more tithe we says he is taking from the tevel.
 Rashi says something similar on a different topic in Gitin 47b.   Jew and gentile own crops together. Tevel and hulin are mixed to R. Yehuda Hanasi. Rashi says you take a tithe and assume you are taking tevel.

The answer for R Shimshon at this point is unclear. I tried last night to think about it but came up with nothing. I ought to mention the person that asks on R Shimshon is the Radvaz. Sometimes it takes a long time for me to come up with an acceptable answer for the baali Hatosfot.

Bava Mezia 101a

I have had a few ideas that I have not written down in Talmud. Most I forget but at least for now I would like to write down a few things.[Most of the ideas were written in Uman.]
I think i had some idea in bava Kama but I forget it.]
Bava Mezia 101a.  My idea here last night as I was drifting off to sleep was that the Ri [R. Isaac the grandson of Rashi] can answer a very obvious and essential question in the Gemara that I think both Rashi and the Rambam would have a lot of trouble answering. The question is this: why change R. Yehuda? He said the serf would have to give a tithe for any field in Israel and then for seemingly no reason the Gemara changes it to only a field that he once owned and then sold (to the Rambam) or was simply stolen (to Rashi).  While the Gemara was right to change to "there is possession" but that gives no reason to the Rambam or Rashi to change the opinion of R Yehudah.

I assume either Rav Shach or Rav Chaim Soloveitchik answer this somewhere but as far as I can see right now, the Ri is more sensible. {Anyway as D. Bronson always told me "Tosphot is always right."]

Just for background information: The Mishna says that a renter from a gentile in Israel has to take the tithe and then pay the rent. He can not pay the rent with un-tithed fruit. R. Yehuda adds a serf also. The Gemara starts out thinking like Rabah that a gentile has possession and a serf is like a renter. Then it changes both. The Ri says it changes both because one depends on the other. But the Rambam and Rashi hold those are independent variables.

I already wrote something about this in my little booklet on Bava Mezia but this idea I think is new.

I have more time but my back is hurting. So to be short let me just mention that that rambam hold "there is no possession" and yet hold like the Gemara's conclusion in Bava Mezia 101 about R Yehuda and so clearly he holds like Rashi that the conclusion of the Gemara does not depend on whether there is or there is not possession.

about Ukraine

My basic feeling about Ukraine is that things were better under the rule of the USSR. There seems to be a kind of inherent anti semitism  which was held in check during the time of the Soviets but has recently come to the surface. In the last place I was staying there there was a tunnel dug for the sake of immediate escape that the Jewish family that owned the house had dug. If you have ever been to the Ukraine you can imagine how hard that must have been since the levels under the ground are mainly made of hard solid granite. That tunnel was a mile long (from the river Ostashivka until some escape route towards  the town center.) and was still standing a hundred years later. So the pogroms before the soviets took power were serious enough for that Jewish family to be really terrified.
[To this day I still have no idea how that family could have dug that tunnel without electricity. and only with shovels.]
So when I read Hobhouse and his critique of the Hegelian State, I take it with a grain of salt. I realize that there are times and places where a strong central government is needed.

Frankly I have to admit I was also terrified when I was there. The attacks on me were getting more and more frequent and violent.

[Besides that there was the odd fact that almost every person that I asked in Uman how things were during the time of the USSR, every single one told me things were better. You can ask anyone in Uman that lived during the time of the USSR and all of them will tell you the same exact words "Things were better then."]

[Because I still have no computer I have to be short. And to be fair L.T. Hobhouse realizes himself that the balance between government and the individual is a hard problem to solve. And he also realizes that all social questions come about because some kind of problem has arisen.

The trouble to me seems to be that Wasps in the USA assume everyone is like them. They think importing an American kind of democracy into the Ukraine would make everything hunky dory.
They ought to try renting a room for a while there and then find out what things are really like.

My feeling about Tora

My feeling about Tora is that the basic approach of the Gra and Rav Shach is correct.--and to a large degree I feel it would have made a lot of sense to stick with their basic ideas of learning Torah in depth and trust in God. However I did get involved in Breslov. That helped in many ways, but it also seems to have gotten me off track. It would be nice to find a kind of middle path in which one could partake of the great insights of Rav Nahman, and yet stay within the context of the straight Lithuanian Yeshiva world.

So nowadays I try to find the path of balance- Gemara Tosphot, Rav Shach's Avi Ezri, Math, Physics and exercise. That seems to work for me.

The path of balance certainly was the approach of some Rishonim-- as you can see in some of the Musar books of that period.

As for the actual fact that sometimes the right path is unclear -I go with Kant-- that reason has a limit. When it gets into areas of values (dinge an sich) it gets into contradictions. In any case, as far as I can I would like to get back to the straight Torah path of the Gra and Rav Shach. Besides that I have no idea why they both have been ignored to a large extent except to pay lip service to them.
And for some reason my efforts to get back into striaght Tora have always been foiled. Maaybe I simply do not have the merit to be able to sit and learn Torah? Or is there some deeper reason?

Side note --if you go by the actual new moon, then passover falls on April 18 at night. That is the first day is April 19)

My feeling about Philosophy is that Dr Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer are simply not that far apart. If it is a matter of reason knowing things (as per the Kant Fries school) of Reason recognizing things like universals (as per Michael Huemer) I just do not see the difference as it applies to me. I can see however in philosophy itself there is a big difference. but not so much in practical application.

That is reason recognizes universals. Among universals are objective moral values that do not depend on the observer.[Even though as one of the critics of Michale Huemer pointed out [Danny Frederick] there is a difference between universals as predicates and universals as laws of either math or morals. Still it seems to be both schools of though as very close.[ That is the Kant Fries and the Intuitionists.]

Daughter of an Am Haaretz.

I noticed in the Rambam on the mishna [Sanhedrin chapter 9]that he says it is a sin to marry the daughter of an Am Haaretz [person ignorant of Mishna and Talmud.] I had thought that it is simply not advisable.

I wonder if I had taken this advice how things might have turned out differently.
For when I was discussing marriage with my future wife she asked what would happen if there would be no parnasa [money]? And I said I would go and find a job. [The background here is that I was in the Mir Yeshiva in NY at the time and we were planning on my continuing to learn Torah.]
This might very well be the reason that in fact later things fell apart. I might have answered like the sages said in the Chapters of the Fathers one who accepts on himself the yoke of Torah there is removed from him the yoke of the government and of making a living. I might have said if there is no money then I am not learning Torah hard enough and thus I should work harder on learning.

I am not saying eveything about the Litvak world that revolves on the Gra is right. I realize there is an array of values. But what I am saying is that I had found the one thing that worked for me. Learning Torah at the Mir. It seems to me that it was a failure on my part not to be committed to this approach at all cost.

[Nowdays I have a wider constalation of values but for me to list them here would make no sense since many of them apparanetly conflict one with the other. My question is how to resolve this conflict? ]

The dialect of Hegel unfolds in time.

 I want to consider the possibility that the dialect of Hegel unfolds in time. This clearly is not like McTaggart, but I think that it makes sense. That is the basic process is really what you see in the Neo Platonic school of Plotinus. But with Plotinus is is logos which is bringing things about. But in any case the idea is this whole vast process of Hegel is unfolding in time. And this helps a lot. It helps to understand the main problem of this generation of disappointment. For example me. I went very deeply into the Litvak Torah world, but as is usual with the process of thesis anti thesis I found things not perfect. So what needs to be done is to get to the synthesis that finds what is right is both the thesis and antithesis.

The Mishna in Bava kama 36

The law of the Torah is an ox that has not yet considered  to be expected to gore only pays half damages. An ox gores 4 other oxen one after the other but still remains "tam". Each one was worth 200. [It perhaps did it not one after the other exactly] R Meir says the last one gets the whole amount and if anything is left over it goes the one before that etc. R. Shimon says the order is 100/100. The next time the division is 100/50/50. The next time 100/50/25/25.

In another case R. Ishmael considered the damaged ox to be a debtor.But R Akiva thinks the owners of each ox become partners with the owner.

The problem our Gemara brings up on page 36 is who is R. Meir going like? It concludes like R Ishmael. [I would expand on this but I have no computer and and just borrowing a friends for a few minutes.] The next opinion of RS is like R Akiva.

But if it is like RI then the first owner of the first damaged ox should get the whole sum, not the last. The Gemara says each owner of the subsequent ox grabbed the ox to hold it until he gets paid.

The Rif says R Shimon agrees if he grabs it he is a paid guard and he agrees with RM.
Both R. Ephraim and Rav Zarahia the Baal Hamaor degree with the Rif. As you can easily see why. If he would be right then there was no reason to say the opinion of RM is like RI. It could be R Akiva also.

The answer that I think makes sense here is the debate in Pesahim 30. A lender is not paid back on time so he gets some property of the borrower. So when is he considered to own that property? This is a debate over there but the Rif must be thinking that our gemara over here in Bava Kama is like the opinion the lender owns the property only after he collects it. But the Rif is thinking that the ox is different. It becomes a pledge and is owned from the time of the goring and if so then there would be no difference between R Akiva and R Ishmael and so in truth R Shimon who is like R akiva in our case is talking about a different case than R Meir.
Sorry I can not explain this in more detail. If you look it up it will be more clear. Anyway you can see this idea of mine in Tosphot Bava kama pg 33. where Tosphot brings it for a different reason.

The Rambam uses every opportunity to say that one should not use Torah to make money. So why has it become such a bussiness? I am not sure but today i met a girl from Brazil who recently arrived in Israel who mentioned that a lot of people in Israel are having trouble with making ends meet. [making enough to get by.] So the fact that a lot of people do not work but rather use Torah to make money makes little sense.

One thing I saw in my first yeshiva in Far Rockaway was the opinion of the Gra that every word of Torah is worth more that all the other commandments of Torah.He brings this from the Yerushalmi Talmud. And that fact sunk deeply into me. The only thing that has changed much is that because of the opinion of Maimonides and other rishonim is that I include Physics and math in the category of Torah.

When it come to Torah I try to spend time in the local Na Nach (Breslov) group's place. That seems to be the only place I can learn Torah.

But if I could I would try to have a balance between these separate areas of study.
But when it comes to Physics i try to use the approach of Rav Nahman of just saying the words as fast as possible and going on. I would try to show this from Rav Nahman's main books but I have to go since i have no computer and I am just borrowing a friend's.



[Maimonides also includes the Metaphysics of Aristotle in the category of learning Torah but I have not been able to spend much time in that area. And modern philosophy seems to have gotten off track in that area.]

Where you see clearly the approach of Maimonides about the importance of Physics is in the story brought in the very last chapter of a volume in the Guide [I forget which]. Where the people around the palace of the King are the people that learn Talmud and the people in the palace are the physicists.and philosophers.

I myself had never even noticed this until I saw it quouted in a book by David Hartman

Rav Nachman emphasized not to masturbate but this can be taken too far in that people think this is worse than actual things that are forbidden in the Torah.Even though Rav Nahman was certainly right that it needs a correction to say the ten Psalms [16,32, 41, 42, 59, 77,90, 105 137, 150.] but still it is not an actual prohibition in the Torah.

The way to learn Torah is to say the words and go on.

The way Rav Nahman said to learn Torah was to say the words and go on. [See Conversations of Rav Nahman 76. Also there are places like the Le.M I perek 12 which indicate the same idea::דע כי על ידי אמצעות הדיבור יכולים לבוא לתבונות התורה לעומקה. The LeM is the major work of Rav Nahman. 

This approach I found to be the only way I could learn Physics and Math also.

But it took me a long time until I stated applying this method to Physics. My parents had always been very pleased when I showed interest in Physics, but until I saw this in the חובות לבבות and also Maimonides the message did not really sink into me.

 But I should add the idea of review ten times as away of doing one's in depth sessions. This I heard in Shar Yashuv by Rav Freifeld. And the in depth session should be in the morning and the fast sessions in the afternoon as they do in all Litvak yeshivot.

I have found it best to learn in the local Na Nach synagogue. I tried a Litvack place for a while but that did not work out very well. [Na Nach is agroup of Breslov people that follow Rav Nachman from Uman.]

the mishna in Bava Kama the beginning of chapter 4.
The basic order is this you keep on dividing the amount by half. But instead of it going to the last one it always goes to the first one. In that way each Nizak (person that was damaged) keeps slipping down one notch.

[Just for background information the mishna says if an ox gores another ox then they divide [as it says in the Torah] the sum of the goring ox. So if both were 200 and the gored ox is now worth nothing, then each gets 100. If it gores again then the last one gets 100 and the two early ones get 50 each. If it gores again the last one gets 100, the earlier one50 and the last two 25 each.

The problem I think there is with philosophy is that it got involved in trivial questions. It nowadays asks how do we know stuff  epistemology and metaphysics It denies completely.
Originally it was asking what is the meaning of it all?

One thing that always turned me off to philosophy is when they start talking about language. The reason I see this as a waste of time is that there is a serious difference between language and real facts.The difference is this: real facts are objective. They exist even if there were no people around to notice them. Language on the other hand is completely and absolutely subjective. The words one says and that one hears have no meaning at all except for what people attach to them. There is nothing objective about it at all.

Still there are nowadays some real remarkable thinkers in philosophy.  Kelley Ross and Michael Huemer.

Hegel and Heidegger were certainly thinking about the big picture but besides Heidigger, twentieth century philosophy got to be a real wasteland of triviality.

Rav Shmuel Berenbaum once gave a talk in the Mir in NY that when one marries a woman there are two kinds of acquisition that happen. One is marriage and the other is monetary acquisitions.
He used this idea to asnwer some questions that I forgot. However I had a few thoughts about this. One is that this idea actually comes from the Gemara in Ketuboth itself between Abyee and Rava.

The other thought I had is to ask how can this fit with the Rambam who holds that when two people make an agreement to make partnership and have witness and sign an document that nothing happens since there is nothing upon which the acquisition can occur. אין קנין חל על דבר שלא בא לעולםץ So for a while I thought Rav Shmuel was only talking according to the opinion of the Raavad. But then it occurred to me that there are obligations that happen just because of a persons status.

I am rushing to write this so I am being too short I know. Anyway I think that the Rambam was only talking about a partnership in which there is no physical acquisitions. But with marriage there is on someone upon whom the obligations occur. It is a case of קנין דקל לפירותיו

I had a lot of thoughts about this but I have no time to write. But I did want to add just one short thought: that all the things that the husband acquires are all rabbinical laws --see Ketubotthis chapter 4 and 5. Not that this makes any difference but it is a point because perhaps one can say that  kind of acquisition can occur by means of a Torah kind of Acquisition.

Bava Metzia 115. Tosphot first words "widow" on page 115.

I have an idea on a way to answer the question the Maharasha asks on the Maharshal. The main idea is based on the statement of Shmuel on page 113 that a messenger of the court can not go into the house of the borrower to take a pledge when the time to repay the loan has come and the borrower has not yet paid. Rav Joseph asks on Shmuel from two verses about a widow and a mill stone that one can not take either and it uses the word לא תחבול "do not take the pledge of a widow". The word implies going into the house. The Gemara answers for the widow and millstone the messenger of the court transgress two prohibitions while for any other borrower only one prohibition.

The Tosphot asks why does the Gemara not ask from the mishna on pg 115? and they answer that the answer would be the same as it gives for the question of Rav Joseph.
The Maharshal says Rav Joseph is asking from two braitot. The maharsha says the question of Tosphot is not like the Maharshal thought to be on Rav Joseph but on the later Gemara that does ask from two braitot.

As you know I have no computer to be able to spend time writing this so I can only write in short my basic idea. My idea is this. That we can answer for the Maharshal thus: the Gemara would not have wanted to ask from the Mishna after the question of Rav Joseph from two verses because in fact the answer would have been the same as the answer for Rav Joseph while the question that the Gemara in fact asks later from a braita the Gemara makes progress--it discovers that there is an argumentbetween the Tenaim about the opinion of Shmuel. Therefore it makes more sense to say the question obn Tosphot is in fact on Rav josph himself.

Sorry if this is not clear enough but if you look up the Maharsha you will see easily my point here.

book of Esther

In the book of Esther it never says to people that live in walled cities to make Purim on the 15th. All it says is Jews that live in unwalled cities make it on the 14th and then right away goes on to say that Mordecai sent letters throughout Peria to make Purim on the 14 and the 15th. It says nothing about Jews that live in walled cities. This might account for the fact that Rav Nahman of Breslov said that Shushan Purim is also Purim.

[The way I noticed this is because right after the verse saying that Jews in un-walled cities make Purim on 14th you expect it to say something about Jews in walled cities. But instead it simply skips the subject.]

[a wife that refuses her husband] is not well known Mishna Ketuboth פרק אף על פי

The law of a מורדת [a wife that refuses sex to her husband] is not well known so I thought to bring some of the details.[Even though there is a lot of things in this subject that are confusing to me.] In the Mishna itself you only get the bare outlines of the subject. But in the Tur and the Shulhan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo you get a lot more details--surprising details in fact.
The first thing that is a surprise is that this law applies to a woman that wants a divorce.
So since I have little time and no computer [except on borrowed time from a friend] I would like to write the basic ideas.
The first category is a woman that refuses her husband but wants her ketubah. and she says מאיס עלי.[That is she claims she is not able to live with him anymore because he is wasting all his money or that she simply can not have sex with him because of disgust.]
That category gets the regular law of a rebellious wife that loses her ketubah. [There is a announcement in the local synagogue that she is a rebellious wife and she will lose her ketubah for four weeks. then after 4 weeks some say she loses her whole ketubah right away and some say only after 12 months.
The next category is she does not ask for the ketubah. She still get the same law but she does not have to live with him. In the first category she is forced to work for him.

In any case this is certainly one of those areas that are sensitive and sadlly no very well known.


[During those four weeks there seems to be a degree of confusion how much she loses of her ketunah every week. Or at least I can not figure it out. It seems to be 7 dinars [a dinar equals silver of the weight of 12 barley beans. That is a dinar in the time of the Talmud. But a dinar of the Torah is 8 times more. But it seems that everyone agrees it is a dinar of the Talmud period. The problem that I am having here is the next opinion in the mishna that says she loses a "tarpik" and the Rav of Bartenura explains that to be a tarpik of the Torah. So I can not figure of if he is thinking the dinar also is of the Torah of not.]

[I had to go through this kind of thing myself and the sad thing is that my wife was talked into getting rid of me by the religious leaders that present themselves as being pro family values. So I saw first hand what a lot of people say about the Jewish religious world--that it is evil and insane and just the opposite of Torah values. Rav Nahman of Brslov already said as much but I simply did not pay attention to him until the facts presented themselves to me in the most harsh way possible. The religious make a big show of righteousness but the facts are very different.]

When I was growing up you never saw a book by Hegel or any of the German idealists around in libraries of in bookstores. Never. In my high school library I recall there was some side writings by Kant but not any of the three Critiques.

But lots of the post modern garbage was out there. Lots.

Thinking back to it I think people were blaming Kant and Hegel  for WWI and WWII.

Why I mention this is that even though Hegel has problems still I think that McTaggart deals with a lot of them very well. And as for Kant I think that there also are plenty of problems but I think Leonard Nelson and the Friesian School of Kelley Ross deals with them very well.

Possession by the dark side from a biological perspective

The problem of possession by the Dark Side is not something that people think much about nowadays. And even when Rav Nahman from Breslov mentions the problem with religious leaders as being in general possessed by the Dark Side, few people really connect the dots.

I also would not think much about it except I saw recently a book by Daniel Defoe that goes into this problem and as I was thinking about it I was reminded about Howard Bloom's The Lucifer Principle.
And then it occurred to me the whole thing about toxo-Plasmosis.That even in the physical realm there is such a thing.If I would have a computer and be able to blog I might have written about this but now since I can's I simply am recommending that people pay a bit more attention to what Rav Nahman [Breslov and Uman] was saying because it has a strong basis in evidence and also makes sense beyond what it seems like at first.

To see the idea of possession by the dark side from a biological perspective see the lectures of Sapolsky at Stanford.

Howard Bloom approaches the subject from a different angle--that of the super-organism.
In the Middle Ages this was also a large subject. Even in Rouen where the trial of Joan [Jeene] of Arc was there were multiple trials on the issue at the same time. How can you tell if someone's visions are from the realm of hiliness or not?

I feel that sometimes you see in  life that everything is going well for a good long time and then everything falls apart. You can see this with Joan of Arc who had astounding success --for a while. A 17 year old girl declared war on the one of the  powerful Empires in the world and won. She said she would raise raise the seige of Orleans--and did so. She said she would have Charles VII crowned King in Reims and led him through enemy territory and had him crowned King of all France. And then she was captured and burnt at the stake. But somehow even in her fall there was something astounding. The trial was recorded almost word for word. Without that all there would be today would be an unconfirmed legend.

Now I do not think that I or anyone else can compare ourselves to Joan of Arc but still there is a lesson to learn from all that--that things can go great for sometime and then suddenly stop. But even in that time of fall there is still the compassion of God and helps in hidden ways.

an idea from the Ramban [Rav Moshe ben Nachman]

I hope that someone that has learn authentic Torah will start a blog. I am clocking out of blogging out of force of circumstances.I have no computer is it is only on rare occasions I can borrow from a friend.

Even if the police decide to give me back my computer, that does not mean I will be able to go back to writing music or ideas in Torah like I used to do in Uman. I realized even before I got to Israel that it was likely that things would be hard here. But to have my own daughter making false allegations against me was not expected.

In any case since I have a few minutes here I would like to take the opportunity to write an idea from the Ramban and a question I have about his idea.

In Bava Metzia there is a case of a person that loses an object and before he gives up on it someone else picks it up with intent to keep it. That is he decides to steal it. But then later after the owner has given up on it he decides to give it back to the owner. The Gemara says at that pointy he is simply giving back a present-. not fixing the original sin of theft.
The Baal HaMeor asks on this that the Torah holds there is a way to fix theft -and that is to give backthe object. השב תשיבם לאחיך.
The Ramban answers that that is only on regular theft. But here it is a case of an object that has been lost and then taken in theft. The difference is that theft is not owned by the thief if the owner gives up on it. But my question is that I am not sure why that makes a difference.[ The Ramban is saying the fixing of theft by giving it back is only as long the act is continued. But here the act is over so the is no correction.]

Dr Michael Hueemer has a tremendous amount of great ideas non his site. However I have not been able to see his point about no state having any authority.  A British philosopher Danny Frederick also has criticized this idea of Dr Huemer. The idea of government being a contract also has brought both of their critiques. But looking at the war between Sparta and Athens I can see that contract theory  and agreement to follow a certain form of government makes a big difference.  

Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo. I can see why my learning partner did not think to learn it unless one knows the Gemara. [It was written to be a review of the Tur and Beit Yoseph which brings the Gemara and Rishonim.]

I have been seeing interesting things in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo recently. I can see why my learning partner did not think to learn it unless one knows the Gemara but I have been seeing that there is a lot of interesting things there even when one has not leaned the Gemara. For example a few days ago I noticed the question is there is such a thing as giving up an obligation like a loan? This is brought in Choshen Mishpat 164 in the Taz and the Ketzot HaChoshen that are arguing about the law that the Rema brings there that there is such a thing as giving up on a loan--not forgiving it but giving up. The Rema brings a case that a Jewish town made a loan to the prince and the prince promised to reduce the taxes in return. In the end he did not reduce the taxes and the town gave up on the loan. Then the prince much later died and his son paid back the loan. I was not going to write about this but the subject is certainly interesting but also complicated and I have no had time to delve into it. 

If one has crops that he has not taken any tithe from and he puts let's say wine in a jar and closes it and calls it maasar sheni [the second maasar] then the jar itself becomes maasar sheni. [Tractate maasar sheni 3. mishna 12]

Both the Mishna Rishona [a commentary by a person named Ephraim Isaac] and the Tiferet Israel ask on this from tracatate Msaasar sheni 1 mishna 4 and 5. There it says if you buy a closed jar of wine of maasar sheni in Jerusalem the jar goes out from the category of the second maasar to become secular.

To me it seems there is a difference between calling a name of maasar sheni to crops that have not been tithed yet and buying something with maasar Sheni. So I do not see any question in the first place.

The Tiferet Israel answers this question from the mishna in which one sells closed jars in a place where one usually buys open jars, but that answer depends on there being some connection between calling a name and buying.
 

[The problem that the Tiferet Israel deals with is why are the jars not consecrated? But to me it seems the reason is the same that when buys a animal with the money of the second tithe that the leather is not consecrated.] 

There is something I noticed in Ketuboth. I had done Ketuboth as well as I could when I was in Shar Yashuv [That is Rav Friefeld's yeshiva in Far Rockaway.] Though I was just a beginner then, I still did it with most of the Tosphot and Tosphot HaRosh and some Tur Shulchan Aruch along with it. So when I got to Israel and discovered that courts were awarding מזונות ]alimony to divorced women it seemed strange to   me. There is on one hand an award of money to a widow until she collects the Ketubah. But from everything I recalled in Ketuboth that does not apply to a divorced woman. She gets the Ketubah and that is all.

A woman gets married. Her מעשה ידיה [money she makes by working] and any objects she finds go to the husband.

A woman gets married. Her מעשה ידיה [money she makes by working] and any objects she finds go to the husband. So why does the Rashba in Ketuboth in the chapter that starts האשה שנפלו say what she finds is נכסי מלוג? [Or at least that is how the Tosphot Yom Tov quotes the Rashba].

 נכסי מלוג is property she owns before the marriage. The husband gets the profits of the property, but she retains the title.

A woman owns property she brings into the marriage, but not wat money she makes while married nor any portion of her husband's. The reason a woman wants a  divorce is supposed to be that she no longer wants a connection with her husband. But nowadays the opposite is the case. She gets a divorce in order to hurt her husband as much a possible through children, money and any other means necessary.

[I wish this was clear to people. There are three kinds of property. Property the woman owns as she comes into the marriage but is not written into the ketubah. The husband can use it. Or if it is property that one gets rent from, that is owned by the husband.  But the property itself is owned by the woman. If the marriage ends, she gets that property. The same thing applies for property written into the ketubah, except that if it goes down in value, and the marriage ends, the husband has to make up for that loss in value. The third type of property  is what a woman makes while married. That is owned by the husband in full.

Obviously she does not magically own her husbands property just by the fact of being married to him.

Even though Dr Kelley Ross is very critical of Hegel, still in his comments he made a very important remark about what Hegel was trying to do--to finish what Socrates had started. [I only have a few minutes on this friend's computer so I can not expand but to me it seems crystal clear]. Dr Ross [the Kant Fries School] would not have put it in that way but I am sure that is what he meant.


Since i seem to have a few more minutes let me just add that Socrates was expert in finding the hidden contradictions in every single position offered by the people he was talking with. But not in a systematic way.  But he did have a system --or at least that is what we see in the dialogues of Plato. So Hegel was making Socrates into a system and also certainly held from the Neo Platonic View in which the Good emanates the Logos which emanates Nature.[It is the same system as the Arizal except the Ari goes into more details.

Another thing about Bava Kama. An ox [tam] gores another. Each are worth 200. Since it is the first time you the owner of the gored ox gets 100. If the ox does it again to another ox it the two owners get 50 and 50. If again then 50, 25 and 25. So my question is what happens then next time? I can not figure out what kind of progression the mishna is getting at.

L.T Hobhouse wrote a scaling critique on Hegel's idea of the State. But looking at what he wrote before World War I you can see he was leaning towards socialism. This seems to me to be the case with Bradly also--the most famous Hegel scholar before WWI. WWI changed his point of view drastically also to the degree that as far as I recall he ended his days denouncing Hegel and everything that he had written defending him.

[My own feeling about this is that I think Hegel was more of a philosopher than a political thinker. In terms of politics i think England got it right to a large degree in the 1700's and then the founding fathers of the USA made their improvements on that system.]

There is something odd that I can not figure out. If an animal devours some part of a persons's crops then in the Gemara in Bava Metzia it says you measure one part from 60. That is you do not measure just the amount of that one small area because that will be too expensive if someone would buy it alone. Nor do you measure by the whole field. Rather you go by 60 times that area and then take 1/60 of the crops value.

The question I gave came up a week or two ago when I was looking briefly at the Mishna in Bava Kama where it has the exact same case but it says you measure the amount of a field needed to plant two seahs.[Not like the Gemara in Bava Metzia.] I recall learning that part in Bava Metzia with David Brosnon and then for some reason I looked at the Aruch Hashulchan and saw how he explains Tosphot over there But I do not recall anyone mention the mishna in Bava Kama.

psychotherapy is ridiculous.

Implicit in the Oral and Written Law is a world view of what makes people tick. But to get a full picture it is best to learn Rav Nahman of Breslov who makes the assumptions explicit.

One important point is that mental illness comes from sexual sin. And that there is a correction for that. The Tikun Klali. [Ten psalms 16,32,41, 42, 59,77.90.105,137,150]
See this person write on the problems with the modern approaches
psychotherapy is ridiculous.

In Torah there is a fall of man and of  all creation. So it is not exactly that man is inherently evil but also not inherently good. What is possible to suggest is that there are new stages of consciousness that come into the world at certain periods-- but along with them come the forces of evil to stop the good.
At that makes sense if you see things like  Hegel that the In God there is the Idea [Logos] which is the source of Being. So that is where the center of gravity is--in Logos. The Divine Reason brought down in Plotinus. But with Hegel it is an ongoing process.

Rav Avraham Abulafia

With Rav Avraham Abulafia it is possible to understand some of the good and some of the evils of Christian history. That is if you take Jesus as being from Kindness which fell into Foundation in Emanation, חסד שנפל בכלי של יסוד then a lot becomes clear. At least to me anyway. But the fact that he was from the root of Joseph, at that time meant that that was only a preliminary phase.

In any case you need to look it up in Abulafia's books and also Profesor Moshe Idel to get the whole picture. 

In the Torah, things exist that are not God, but they depend on God for their existence

"אין עוד מלבדו" Or there are no gods besides God.
In the Torah, things exist that are not God, but they depend on God for their existence.