21.5.15
N11
n11 [n11 in midi] n11 in nwc format[When this was written originally the instruments on the score needed some work. The basic piece however is the same. ]
One can ask on תוספות סנהדרין סג א in understanding why is there a difference between לא תעבדם and לא תעשה מלאכה. He says לא תעשה מלאכה is not a לאו שבכללות because it means don't do any kind of work. While לא תעבדם does not tell us what kinds of things are called service. But if you go to page סג תוספות makes the exact opposite kind of assumption.
תוספות gets the ברייתא to be placing three things into the first part of the verse ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו and the last part of the verse לא ישמע על פיך to mean only אזהרה למסית ומדיח. That is fine. But then what are the three things? One is נשבע בשם עבודה זרה. And how can one get מלקות for that? Why is it not a לאו שבכללות? Because נשבע בשם עבודה זרה and הזכרת שם אלילים and one more thing are all the same thing--mentioning another god, so one can get lashes for that.
In what way is this different than לא תעבדם that one does not get lashes for because it לאו שבכללות
That is each Tosphot is fine by itself. But if you try to put them together you get a problem.
I used google for this Hebrew translation but just made a few minor corrections when it was necessary.
אפשר לשאול על תוספות סנהדרין סג א' בהבנתו מדוע יש הבדל בין "לא תעבדם" ו"לא תעשה מלאכה". לדבריו, "לא יעשה מלאכה" אינה לאו שבכללות, כי הוא אומר לא לעשות כל סוג של עבודה. בעוד "לא תעבדם" אינו אומר לנו איזה מיני דברים נקראים שירות. אבל אם אתה הולך לדף סג עמוד ב' תוספות הופך את סוג ההנחה להפכו הגמור
תוספות מסביר את הברייתא באופן ששלושה דברים נכנסים לחלק הראשון של הפסוק "ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו" ואת החלק האחרון של הפסוק "לא ישמע על פיך" הוא אומר שהוא אזהרה למסית ומדיח. זה בסדר. אבל אז מה הם שלושה הדברים? אחד נשבע בשם עבודה זרה. ואיך אפשר לקבל מלקות לזה? למה זה לא לאו שבכללות? מכיוון שנשבע בשם עבודה זרה והזכרת שם אלילים ועוד דבר אחד כולם אותו הדבר = להזכיר אל אחר, כך שאפשר לקבל מלקות
?באיזה אופן זה שונה מ"לא תעבדם" שאחד לא מקבל מלקות על כי זה לאו שבכללות
So what is the difference between לא תעבדם and the three things that are included in שם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו? For the first there are no lashes, because it is a לאו שבכללות. For the second we say is all one thing. I fail to see any difference here.
Summery:
The last Tosphot on 63a makes sense--sort of. And the first Tosphot on 63b makes sense--sort of. But try to put them together! It doesn't seem to work. What needs to be done I think is to go the Pesachim and get a better idea of what לאו שבכללות is.
What I want is to go through the entire Oral Law. This process got interrupted in the Middle
But I at least want to mention what this entails.
The Oral Law is seven books. (1) The Babylonian Talmud (2) The Jerusalem Talmud (3) Sifra (4) Sifri (5) Mechilta (6) Torat Kohanim (7) Tosephta.
This process could be started simply without Rashi and Tosphot--just do the straight pages. Go through the Babylonian Talmud. And then when you have finished then instead of going back then you start the Jerusalem Talmud. And when you have finished that you do the halachic midrashim. So in that way at least once you have completed the entire Torah. [You need to go through the Old Testament also in Hebrew]
.
But I at least want to mention what this entails.
The Oral Law is seven books. (1) The Babylonian Talmud (2) The Jerusalem Talmud (3) Sifra (4) Sifri (5) Mechilta (6) Torat Kohanim (7) Tosephta.
This process could be started simply without Rashi and Tosphot--just do the straight pages. Go through the Babylonian Talmud. And then when you have finished then instead of going back then you start the Jerusalem Talmud. And when you have finished that you do the halachic midrashim. So in that way at least once you have completed the entire Torah. [You need to go through the Old Testament also in Hebrew]
.
The Torah is monotheistic. This we know from the Rambam and Saadia Gaon.
And the Rambam spends the entire second volume of The Guide for the Perplexed showing this in detail.
Also we find the Rambam in Mishna Torah saying when one swears by heaven and earth it does not count as an oath because heaven and earth have no divinity in them.
And so we see that it is easy to seem to be keeping Torah and yet to be transgressing its major thesis--monotheism. For we see some people hold from some form of pantheism.
Not only that but sometimes people attribute powers to certain individuals
And we know from Tractate Avoda Zara page 41 the main thing which makes something considered an idol is the ability to save. So the Gemara says An idol worshiper nullifies his idol by saving, "If it could not save itself, how can it save me?"
See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which is the source of my comment here.
And the Rambam spends the entire second volume of The Guide for the Perplexed showing this in detail.
Also we find the Rambam in Mishna Torah saying when one swears by heaven and earth it does not count as an oath because heaven and earth have no divinity in them.
And so we see that it is easy to seem to be keeping Torah and yet to be transgressing its major thesis--monotheism. For we see some people hold from some form of pantheism.
Not only that but sometimes people attribute powers to certain individuals
And we know from Tractate Avoda Zara page 41 the main thing which makes something considered an idol is the ability to save. So the Gemara says An idol worshiper nullifies his idol by saving, "If it could not save itself, how can it save me?"
See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which is the source of my comment here.
I finally got to Sanhedrin 63b. But only by means of ignoring the last Tosphot on 63a.
And Sanhedrin 63 b deals with one who attempts to convince someone else to do idolatry.The first thing to notice is that the verse they bring it from does not seem to be saying that. שם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו לא ישמע על פיך the names of other gods you should not mention and they should not be heard on your mouth.
This seems to be saying not to mention the names of other gods. One could perhaps not mention the name of some god by spelling it try to convince someone to worship it. So what we have here is a subject of investigation to try to understand why the Talmud understands this verse in the way that they do,
And Sanhedrin 63 b deals with one who attempts to convince someone else to do idolatry.The first thing to notice is that the verse they bring it from does not seem to be saying that. שם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו לא ישמע על פיך the names of other gods you should not mention and they should not be heard on your mouth.
This seems to be saying not to mention the names of other gods. One could perhaps not mention the name of some god by spelling it try to convince someone to worship it. So what we have here is a subject of investigation to try to understand why the Talmud understands this verse in the way that they do,
20.5.15
What I would like to do would be to begin a new era of learning Torah that would concentrate on Tosphot. [Tosphot is the commentary on the side of the Gemara on the outside of the page.]
This is not to belittle the value of the contribution of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and his whole school of thought. [That is: Chidushei HaRambam by Reb Chaim, Baruch Ber, Shimon Skop, Elazar Menachem Shach.]
But it seems to me that this whole track of thought is really more relevant to halacaha than to learning the Gemara.
And in fact, I do think that one should go through the Rambam--[every last word that he ever wrote including his son Reb Avraham] with the commentaries on the page and then do the whole Reb Chaim straight and then the Avi Ezri which I think is the most important book to be printed in the last hundred years.
But there is something about Tosphot I think people are missing. And I have noted this for many years.
It all began in my first yeshiva where my teacher was Naphtali Yegear. He had a really intense and deep way of looking at Tosphot. [That was in a Baal Teshuva Yeshiva in Far Rockaway.] And I thought that that is what everyone else was doing. But then I got to the Mirrer Yeshiva in Brooklyn and even though it is an Ivy League school, still there was something I was missing about the way Naphtali Yeager was learning.
I can't make up for lost time. But at least I would like to share with people this idea of how great and significant Tosphot is.
But as I wrote elsewhere, I have no secret formula for getting into Tosphot. You can keep reviewing it by yourself for a month or so until you start to see the depths. Or you can get a smart learning partner. For reference it is good to have on hand the R. Akiva Eiger. And the first thing I always do is to look at the Mahrasha and Maharam.
It has always surprised me and in fact shocked me to see people that thought they understood the Gemara or Halacha without knowing or understanding Tosphot.
This is not to belittle the value of the contribution of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and his whole school of thought. [That is: Chidushei HaRambam by Reb Chaim, Baruch Ber, Shimon Skop, Elazar Menachem Shach.]
But it seems to me that this whole track of thought is really more relevant to halacaha than to learning the Gemara.
And in fact, I do think that one should go through the Rambam--[every last word that he ever wrote including his son Reb Avraham] with the commentaries on the page and then do the whole Reb Chaim straight and then the Avi Ezri which I think is the most important book to be printed in the last hundred years.
But there is something about Tosphot I think people are missing. And I have noted this for many years.
It all began in my first yeshiva where my teacher was Naphtali Yegear. He had a really intense and deep way of looking at Tosphot. [That was in a Baal Teshuva Yeshiva in Far Rockaway.] And I thought that that is what everyone else was doing. But then I got to the Mirrer Yeshiva in Brooklyn and even though it is an Ivy League school, still there was something I was missing about the way Naphtali Yeager was learning.
I can't make up for lost time. But at least I would like to share with people this idea of how great and significant Tosphot is.
But as I wrote elsewhere, I have no secret formula for getting into Tosphot. You can keep reviewing it by yourself for a month or so until you start to see the depths. Or you can get a smart learning partner. For reference it is good to have on hand the R. Akiva Eiger. And the first thing I always do is to look at the Mahrasha and Maharam.
It has always surprised me and in fact shocked me to see people that thought they understood the Gemara or Halacha without knowing or understanding Tosphot.
Torah of the Dark Side [Sitra Achra]
That not everything people claim is Torah is in fact Torah.
Much of what people claim is Torah, is from the demons. And it is for this reason, I will in general avoid teachers that arrogance and rudeness characterizes them. And therefore whatever they teach must be from the demons, and are consciousness traps. [The arrogance and rudeness are sure signs according that their Torah is from the Dark Side. That means it sounds good, but it leads one to destruction.]
And it is this exact same reason that I regard highly Lithuanian yeshivas. It is the humility I see there that indicates to me that they are good people.
In any case, what I recommend in order to be safe from the Torah of the Dark Side is to learn authentic Torah= the Old Testament (which is the written law) and the Oral Law (Bavli, Yerushalmi, Sifri, Sifra). [When doing Talmud you don't have to do every Rashi. But you do have to do Tosphot. Rashi is just for understanding the page. Tosphot is for understanding the subject.] Mainly I would avoid mystics. But that does not mean all of them. And I like Issac Luria, Moshe Cardovero, Avraham Abulafia, Yaakov Abuchatzeira, and Shalom Sharabi.
They are from the side of good but still learning them does take a certain degree of caution.
I have a lot of confidence in the power of the Torah to change everything in peoples lives.
My suggestion is mainly to learn Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot. For that is the Oral Law.
I get the impression that not everyone feels the same way as I do but I think that is because they have not tried it. It is like ice cream. How can someone not like ice cream?
You might intellectual questions about ice cream. Were the cows treated properly? Was the factory inspected? Is it good for you? But how can someone not like ice cream if they have at least tasted it? The Torah is the same thing.
One condition:
This works as long as you are not learning pseudo Torah, and as long as you are not learning from the charlatans and scam artists that put on the right clothing to make it seem like they know Torah.
And there are lots of scam artists. The way to avoid them is to make sure you learn Torah only in a legitimate, name brand Lithuanian Yeshiva. That is Ponovitch, Brisk, Merkaz HaRav [in Israel] and Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaath and the Mirrer in NY. Nothing else.
Better to have nothing than to buy a fake product. Don't accept anything but the name brands or their legitimate branches.
My suggestion is mainly to learn Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot. For that is the Oral Law.
I get the impression that not everyone feels the same way as I do but I think that is because they have not tried it. It is like ice cream. How can someone not like ice cream?
You might intellectual questions about ice cream. Were the cows treated properly? Was the factory inspected? Is it good for you? But how can someone not like ice cream if they have at least tasted it? The Torah is the same thing.
One condition:
This works as long as you are not learning pseudo Torah, and as long as you are not learning from the charlatans and scam artists that put on the right clothing to make it seem like they know Torah.
And there are lots of scam artists. The way to avoid them is to make sure you learn Torah only in a legitimate, name brand Lithuanian Yeshiva. That is Ponovitch, Brisk, Merkaz HaRav [in Israel] and Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaath and the Mirrer in NY. Nothing else.
Better to have nothing than to buy a fake product. Don't accept anything but the name brands or their legitimate branches.
The Torah is also libertarian. It protects liberty by means of negative commandments. For example, instead of arguing for protection of personal liberty and limited government based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights, the Torah says it all simply "Thou shalt not steal."
An nice site for people that wish to turn the USA back into a citadel of freedom.
I wish them success.
Freedom is important and I think Ann Rand is an important foundation of liberty. But Liberty I think needs a foundation in the Kant school of thought. Empiricism or any of the other justification of liberty and freedom seem to be to fall short. Today I think it is mainly the Intuitionist school of G.E. Moore, Prichard, and Michael Huemer that defend liberty, but I think the Institutionist school is a type of quietism. That is to say it is a kind of way for saying you have questions and that is OK because any answer will be impossible to defend.
But that does not mean to vote libertarian. As far as I can see every libertarian candidate has just split the republican vote and effectively given the elections to the Democrats.
The Torah is also libertarian. It protects liberty by means of negative commandments. For example, instead of arguing for protection of personal liberty and limited government based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights, the Torah says it all simply "Thou shalt not steal."
And in teh Torah there is no special permission given to the King to steal any more than you the local Mafia. As far as the Torah is concerned everyone is equal. Though shalt not steal refers to the loftiest to the lowest.
I wish them success.
Freedom is important and I think Ann Rand is an important foundation of liberty. But Liberty I think needs a foundation in the Kant school of thought. Empiricism or any of the other justification of liberty and freedom seem to be to fall short. Today I think it is mainly the Intuitionist school of G.E. Moore, Prichard, and Michael Huemer that defend liberty, but I think the Institutionist school is a type of quietism. That is to say it is a kind of way for saying you have questions and that is OK because any answer will be impossible to defend.
But that does not mean to vote libertarian. As far as I can see every libertarian candidate has just split the republican vote and effectively given the elections to the Democrats.
The Torah is also libertarian. It protects liberty by means of negative commandments. For example, instead of arguing for protection of personal liberty and limited government based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights, the Torah says it all simply "Thou shalt not steal."
And in teh Torah there is no special permission given to the King to steal any more than you the local Mafia. As far as the Torah is concerned everyone is equal. Though shalt not steal refers to the loftiest to the lowest.
19.5.15
There is a certain amount of Sitra Achra [Dark Side] that got mixed up with Torah world. And that is the major reason that Reform Judaism is right. They might not be doing this by intention, but at least subconsciously they are trying to keep the Torah and at the same time avoid the Sitra Achra problems.
Of course Reform Jews should keep all the mitzvot, down to the last drop. But they are trying to avoid the idolatry and Dark Side that seems inescapable when people get involved in more religious types of groups.
So while I see Torah as a cure for all evils,--but it has to be Torah from the realm of holiness.
Torah of the Sitra Achra is not my own idea of a good time.
However, I am fairly happy with Lithuanian types of yeshivas. As long as someone is following the Gra and the Gedolei Lita [the Lithuanian type of Rosh Yeshiva] I think they are safe.
I say this because on this blog I try to focus on the positive aspects of Torah. But I would be amiss if I did not warn people about the negative forces. And that is after all why most people became Reform and Conservative. They were trying to avoid the Sitra Achra.
[The Torah of the Sitra Achra.
It is hard to know how to deal with this problem. My suggestion is to learn Musar. That is the books of ethics that were written during the Middle Ages along the lines of the Chovot Levavot and the books from the direct disciples of Israel Salanter which deal with Ethics. I have heard of other solutions but from what I can tell all other solutions to this dilemma lead directly into the dark side.
Musar is the only thing which from what I can tell works to any degree.
But even Musar has problems. Kabalah got into all Musar books and that changed the basic approach of Torah and that Kabalah thing does seem to be the type of thing in which people think they are gaining holiness, but in fact losing it. Not because of any problem in the Ari himself, but people usually get into Kabala without having finished the entire oral Torah first. The Ari warned about this himself.
The way that the Sitra Achra (the Dark Side) seduces people is by saying "Come and do a mitzvah."
Reb Chaim from Voloshin said a similar idea. "It is better to sit in your room and twidde your thumbs than to seek mitzvot." That is in the sidur HaGra in a small booklet printed in the back of statements and halachas from the Gra and Reb Chaim
Of course Reform Jews should keep all the mitzvot, down to the last drop. But they are trying to avoid the idolatry and Dark Side that seems inescapable when people get involved in more religious types of groups.
So while I see Torah as a cure for all evils,--but it has to be Torah from the realm of holiness.
Torah of the Sitra Achra is not my own idea of a good time.
However, I am fairly happy with Lithuanian types of yeshivas. As long as someone is following the Gra and the Gedolei Lita [the Lithuanian type of Rosh Yeshiva] I think they are safe.
I say this because on this blog I try to focus on the positive aspects of Torah. But I would be amiss if I did not warn people about the negative forces. And that is after all why most people became Reform and Conservative. They were trying to avoid the Sitra Achra.
[The Torah of the Sitra Achra.
It is hard to know how to deal with this problem. My suggestion is to learn Musar. That is the books of ethics that were written during the Middle Ages along the lines of the Chovot Levavot and the books from the direct disciples of Israel Salanter which deal with Ethics. I have heard of other solutions but from what I can tell all other solutions to this dilemma lead directly into the dark side.
Musar is the only thing which from what I can tell works to any degree.
But even Musar has problems. Kabalah got into all Musar books and that changed the basic approach of Torah and that Kabalah thing does seem to be the type of thing in which people think they are gaining holiness, but in fact losing it. Not because of any problem in the Ari himself, but people usually get into Kabala without having finished the entire oral Torah first. The Ari warned about this himself.
The way that the Sitra Achra (the Dark Side) seduces people is by saying "Come and do a mitzvah."
Reb Chaim from Voloshin said a similar idea. "It is better to sit in your room and twidde your thumbs than to seek mitzvot." That is in the sidur HaGra in a small booklet printed in the back of statements and halachas from the Gra and Reb Chaim
Sanhedrin 63 side a at the bottom of the page.
The Tosphot here is divided into two parts. It is the second part here that is hard to understand. What is the difference between the prohibition of cooking on the festival and serving idols?
Th background you need for my question here is this. You have two verses telling us not to serve idols. and we have one verse not to sacrifice to idols. [And for every prohibition you need another verse telling you the punishment.] But the second verse not to serve has no punishment written with it. So we assume it is a regular prohibition with no punishment except the usual lashes.
I forget all the details but just for now take my word for it that the first service mentioned in "Thou shalt not bow before them and that shalt not serve them" is referring to service according to the general way that idol is served. And a death penalty is given for that in a different verse.
Sacrifice to an idol is in the same category.
That leaves us with the second "Thou shalt not serve other gods" in Exodus 23 with no death penalty. and it is referring to all kinds of serve no mentioned in exodus 20. But according to the Talmud in Sanhedrin it gets no lashes either because it is a לאו שבכללות a prohibition that includes lots of things that were not stated openly.
Tosphot is trying to figure out why this "Don't serve" is any different than don't do work on the festival which does gets lashes even though there also the exact prohibitions are not stated openly.
It is what the answer of Tosphot is to this question that I find hard to understand.
Appendix: I have heard it said that love of money is idolatry. And some people want to expand the definition of idolatry anything a person has an obsession with. I strongly object to adding to the Torah. Maybe obsessions are not good but surely if people would thing out their position they would realize that they cant be suggested someone should get the death penalty for an obsession. So if not then why call it idolatry? Call it an obsession.
Th background you need for my question here is this. You have two verses telling us not to serve idols. and we have one verse not to sacrifice to idols. [And for every prohibition you need another verse telling you the punishment.] But the second verse not to serve has no punishment written with it. So we assume it is a regular prohibition with no punishment except the usual lashes.
I forget all the details but just for now take my word for it that the first service mentioned in "Thou shalt not bow before them and that shalt not serve them" is referring to service according to the general way that idol is served. And a death penalty is given for that in a different verse.
Sacrifice to an idol is in the same category.
That leaves us with the second "Thou shalt not serve other gods" in Exodus 23 with no death penalty. and it is referring to all kinds of serve no mentioned in exodus 20. But according to the Talmud in Sanhedrin it gets no lashes either because it is a לאו שבכללות a prohibition that includes lots of things that were not stated openly.
Tosphot is trying to figure out why this "Don't serve" is any different than don't do work on the festival which does gets lashes even though there also the exact prohibitions are not stated openly.
It is what the answer of Tosphot is to this question that I find hard to understand.
Appendix: I have heard it said that love of money is idolatry. And some people want to expand the definition of idolatry anything a person has an obsession with. I strongly object to adding to the Torah. Maybe obsessions are not good but surely if people would thing out their position they would realize that they cant be suggested someone should get the death penalty for an obsession. So if not then why call it idolatry? Call it an obsession.
i29 [i29 in midi]
A piece of music written for the glory of God in circa 2012 in Uman.
I use a kind of idea that was developed during the Renaissance of 1, 1/2,1.5, 1 in a 4/4 time.
I was reluctant to use this idea until I saw that it was begun in the Renaissance.
e74 [e74 in midi] [e33 in mp3] [e33 in midi] [e34 in mp3] [e34 in midi] e35 in mp3 [e35 in midi]
e36 in mp3
e36 in midi
A piece of music written for the glory of God in circa 2012 in Uman.
I use a kind of idea that was developed during the Renaissance of 1, 1/2,1.5, 1 in a 4/4 time.
I was reluctant to use this idea until I saw that it was begun in the Renaissance.
e74 [e74 in midi] [e33 in mp3] [e33 in midi] [e34 in mp3] [e34 in midi] e35 in mp3 [e35 in midi]
e36 in mp3
e36 in midi
[e41 in midi] [there is no mp3 version]
Written also in Uman I think around 2006
To have fast session in learning Gemara every day. That is to learn Gemara Rashi and Topshot in this way: say the words and go on. 2) Also to have a similar session in the Rambam with the all the commentaries on the page. 3) Similarly to have a session in Mathematics in the same way. Take the Algebraic Toplogy of Allen Hatcher for example and just start from the beginning and say it word by word until you finish,--and then start again. Four times in a row. If you don't understand at first eventually you will. Things get absorbed into your subconscious even if you are not aware of it. 4) Dito the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach {Elazar Menachem Shach}. This is the most interesting and juicy book of Torah I have ever come across. Sell what you have and go out and buy it. It is on the Rambam and is is amazingly "Geshmak" in a way I had never suspected until I picked it up and looked inside.
18.5.15
1) The main thing is to start learning Torah. The Torah will help you out of all your problems.
2) The main thing is Torah. I believe that if one would start to learn Torah, that everything in his life would change for the better.
3) You have problems I admit that is true. But I have confidence that the power of Torah is so great that it can help one out of all his problems. But not all at once. One needs to keep at it year after year, and eventually he will see how in time everything changed for the better.
I know there are questions about this idea.
The questions are internal and external. There are people that learned Torah in order to make money. And these people are often nasty. But that is not a question because Torah has to be learned for its own sake in order to be effect.
After the recent events in Baltimore I think we can all agree that if Abraham Lincoln had learned this particular page of Gemara (Talmud) Baltimore would a lot better place. What he might have done was to stop the slave trade like England had done a long time before that. And there are strict laws about how a slave must be treated. But the result of freeing the slaves was disastrous.
Tractate Bava Metzia page 100a and 100b. And Tosphot first words "money of a slave"
Tosphot at first deals with the fact that when both are in doubt they divide. He asks, "How can they do that when it is not DM "derara demomona)?" This is what confused me because it is directly against the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 2. But then at some point I realized that Tosphot is depending on a Gemera in Bava Batra. But then the next problem is that Tosphot is dealing with the part of the Mishna that says when the both are sure then the seller takes an oath. But when he asks his question אי תימא "If you will ask how can they divide" it makes no sense. And for years I was confused by the question, "What could Tosphot be asking here?" Until I realized that Tosphot changed tracks and asks on the end of the mishna where it says "when both are in doubt they divide." This was the key insight.
So Tosphot says it is DM because there were two witnesses that heard the agreement but did not see how much money changed hands. Therefore there is doubt to the Beit Din even without their pleas.
So Sumchos says they divide with no oath.
But then I ask in the above essay what about the part of the mishna than says when the seller is certain that he takes an oath. The only variable that has changed is what is plea is. So if the end of the mishna is Dm [דררא דממומא] so must be the part above it. But there there is an oath and Sumchos holds where there is Dm there is no oath and they divide. I answer that there is an oath because it is admitting in part. מודה במקצת
In this essay I used google translator because the Hebrew of Google is better than my own. But still there are mistakes that got in and so I still need to do some corrections in the Hebrew.
)בבא מציעא ק. וק: תוספות ד''ה דמי עבד. המוכר מכר עבד. אבל יש לו שני עבדים, גדול וקטן. הגדול בעשרים וחמש, והקטן בעשרים. המוכר והקונה מסכימים לבטל את העסקה. יש ספק איזה עבד נמכר. המוכר אומר עבד קטן מכרתי. הלוקח אומר עבד גדול לקחתי. על המוכר להחזיר עשרים וחמש או עשרים? המשנה אומרת המוכר לוקח שבועה ונשבע כי הוא מכר את אחד הקטן ונותן בחזרה רק עשרים. המשנה שאנחנו יודעים הוא סומכוס מסיבות אחרות שמחזיק בשיטה כסף המוטל בספק מחלקים. החכמים אומרים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זאת אומרת להשאיר את הכסף ברשותו של מי שיש לו הכסף עד שלא הוכחה אחרת
תוספות כשהוא מתחיל "אי תימא" הוא מדבר על חלק אחר של המשנה מן החלק של תחילת התוספות. המשנה אומרת ראשונה, כאשר המוכר והקונה בטוחים אז המוכר לוקח שבועה כי הוא מכר את העבד הקטן. תוספות אומר שזה מקרה שבו אין מסמך נכתב על המכירה. אבל אז תוספות שואלים שאלתם שהטרידה אותי לסירוגין במשך כשבע שנים. "אבל איך הם יכולים לחלק? זה לא דררא דממונא?" עכשיו אני מבין. תוספות שואל על סוף משנה. הדיון הוא שהמוכר והקונה הם גם בספק. ויש החוק הוא שהם מחלקים. (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים.) ותוספות שואל על זה איך הם יכולים לחלק כאשר הוא לא מקרה של דררא דממונא. והם עונים שזה מקרה של דררא דממונא כי המכירה התרחשה לפני עדים ששמעו אותם מדברים ומחליטים על מחיר של עבד הגדול בעשרים וחמישה שקלים והקטן בעשרים והעדים לא ראו כמה כסף חליף ידיים. מה שתוספות מחכווין הוא שזה מצב שיש ספק לבית המשפט גם ללא הטיעונים וזה עושה את זה דררא דממונא. עכשיו תוספות היא ברורה. עם זאת, אנחנו צריכים לשאול איך זה משתלב עם החלק הקודם של המשנה שבו יש שבועה. אם סומכוס מסכים שיש שבועה כאשר הצדדים בטוחים, אז אין שום בעיה. אבל יש דעה שסומסוס סובר ממון המוטל בספק חולקים גם כאשר צדדים בטוחים. ואת תשובת התלמוד על זה היא שהוא מקרה שבו השבועה היא מהתורה. יש לי הסבר פה שהשבועה כאן הוא מהתורה, כי זה הוא מקרה של הודאה בחלק (מודה המקצת). המוכר מודה שהוא חייב עשרים שקלים. הוא פשוט לא מודה בחמשת השקלים הנותרים. אבל אם זה המקרה, אז מדוע אין שבועה בסוף משנה? תשובה: כי כאשר המוכר אומר שהוא לא יודע שזה לא נחשב להודאה בחלק. כשהוא אומר "איני יודע" זה לא מודה במקצת. להבין את התוספות הייתי צריך ללכת למסכת בבא בתרא לגלות שיש דעה שתוספות הוא בהתאם לכאן. זה שסומכוס רק אומר החוק שלו כאשר יש דררא דממונא. בגלל התוספות מודפסת עם התייחסות בבא מציעא דף ב' שבו אומר משהו שונה לחלוטין עשה את תוספות הזה מאוד מבלבל.
בסיכום
תוספות בראשונה עוסק בעובדה שכאשר שניהם נמצאים בספק שהם מחלקים. הוא שואל, "איך הם יכולים לעשות את זה כשזה לא דררא דממונא?" זה מה שבלבל אותי כי זה ישירות נגד הגמרא בבא מציעא דף ב'. אבל בשלב מסוים הבינתי שתוספות הוא בהתאם לגמרא בבא בתרא. אבל אז הבעיה היא שתוספות הוא מתמודד עם החלק המשנה שאומר כאשר שניהם בטוחים אז המוכר לוקח שבועה. אבל כשהוא שואל שאלתו. "אי תימא (אם תומר) איך הם יכולים לחלק" . במשך שנים הייתי מבולבל על ידי השאלה מה יכול להיות תוספות שואלים כאן. עד שהבנתי שתוספות שינו מסלולים ושואלים על סוף המשנה שבו כתוב "כאשר שניהם נמצאים בספק שהם מחלקים." זאת היתה תובנה מרכזית. אז תוספות אומר שזה דררא דממומא כי היו שני עדים ששמעו את הסכם אך לא ראו כמה כסף חליף ידיים. לכן יש ספק לבית דין אפילו בלי טיעוניהם. אז סומכוס אומר שהם מחלקים ללא שבועה . אבל אז אני שואל במאמר מעל מה על החלק משנה שאומר כאשר המוכר הוא בטוח שהוא לוקח שבועה. משתנה היחיד שהשתנה הוא מה הוא הטיעון. אז אם סוף המשנה דררא דממומא, כך חייב להיות החלק הזה. אבל יש שם שבועה וסומכוס מחזיק בשיטה כשיש דררא דממומא אין שבועה והם מחלקים. אני עונה שיש שבועה כי הוא מודה בחלק. מודה במקצת.
After the recent events in Baltimore I think we can all agree that if Abraham Lincoln had learned this particular page of Gemara (Talmud) Baltimore would a lot better place. What he might have done was to stop the slave trade like England had done a long time before that. And there are strict laws about how a slave must be treated. But the result of freeing the slaves was disastrous.
Tosphot at first deals with the fact that when both are in doubt they divide. He asks, "How can they do that when it is not DM "derara demomona)?" This is what confused me because it is directly against the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 2. But then at some point I realized that Tosphot is depending on a Gemera in Bava Batra. But then the next problem is that Tosphot is dealing with the part of the Mishna that says when the both are sure then the seller takes an oath. But when he asks his question אי תימא "If you will ask how can they divide" it makes no sense. And for years I was confused by the question, "What could Tosphot be asking here?" Until I realized that Tosphot changed tracks and asks on the end of the mishna where it says "when both are in doubt they divide." This was the key insight.
So Tosphot says it is DM because there were two witnesses that heard the agreement but did not see how much money changed hands. Therefore there is doubt to the Beit Din even without their pleas.
So Sumchos says they divide with no oath.
But then I ask in the above essay what about the part of the mishna than says when the seller is certain that he takes an oath. The only variable that has changed is what is plea is. So if the end of the mishna is Dm [דררא דממומא] so must be the part above it. But there there is an oath and Sumchos holds where there is Dm there is no oath and they divide. I answer that there is an oath because it is admitting in part. מודה במקצת
In this essay I used google translator because the Hebrew of Google is better than my own. But still there are mistakes that got in and so I still need to do some corrections in the Hebrew.
)בבא מציעא ק. וק: תוספות ד''ה דמי עבד. המוכר מכר עבד. אבל יש לו שני עבדים, גדול וקטן. הגדול בעשרים וחמש, והקטן בעשרים. המוכר והקונה מסכימים לבטל את העסקה. יש ספק איזה עבד נמכר. המוכר אומר עבד קטן מכרתי. הלוקח אומר עבד גדול לקחתי. על המוכר להחזיר עשרים וחמש או עשרים? המשנה אומרת המוכר לוקח שבועה ונשבע כי הוא מכר את אחד הקטן ונותן בחזרה רק עשרים. המשנה שאנחנו יודעים הוא סומכוס מסיבות אחרות שמחזיק בשיטה כסף המוטל בספק מחלקים. החכמים אומרים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זאת אומרת להשאיר את הכסף ברשותו של מי שיש לו הכסף עד שלא הוכחה אחרת
תוספות כשהוא מתחיל "אי תימא" הוא מדבר על חלק אחר של המשנה מן החלק של תחילת התוספות. המשנה אומרת ראשונה, כאשר המוכר והקונה בטוחים אז המוכר לוקח שבועה כי הוא מכר את העבד הקטן. תוספות אומר שזה מקרה שבו אין מסמך נכתב על המכירה. אבל אז תוספות שואלים שאלתם שהטרידה אותי לסירוגין במשך כשבע שנים. "אבל איך הם יכולים לחלק? זה לא דררא דממונא?" עכשיו אני מבין. תוספות שואל על סוף משנה. הדיון הוא שהמוכר והקונה הם גם בספק. ויש החוק הוא שהם מחלקים. (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים.) ותוספות שואל על זה איך הם יכולים לחלק כאשר הוא לא מקרה של דררא דממונא. והם עונים שזה מקרה של דררא דממונא כי המכירה התרחשה לפני עדים ששמעו אותם מדברים ומחליטים על מחיר של עבד הגדול בעשרים וחמישה שקלים והקטן בעשרים והעדים לא ראו כמה כסף חליף ידיים. מה שתוספות מחכווין הוא שזה מצב שיש ספק לבית המשפט גם ללא הטיעונים וזה עושה את זה דררא דממונא. עכשיו תוספות היא ברורה. עם זאת, אנחנו צריכים לשאול איך זה משתלב עם החלק הקודם של המשנה שבו יש שבועה. אם סומכוס מסכים שיש שבועה כאשר הצדדים בטוחים, אז אין שום בעיה. אבל יש דעה שסומסוס סובר ממון המוטל בספק חולקים גם כאשר צדדים בטוחים. ואת תשובת התלמוד על זה היא שהוא מקרה שבו השבועה היא מהתורה. יש לי הסבר פה שהשבועה כאן הוא מהתורה, כי זה הוא מקרה של הודאה בחלק (מודה המקצת). המוכר מודה שהוא חייב עשרים שקלים. הוא פשוט לא מודה בחמשת השקלים הנותרים. אבל אם זה המקרה, אז מדוע אין שבועה בסוף משנה? תשובה: כי כאשר המוכר אומר שהוא לא יודע שזה לא נחשב להודאה בחלק. כשהוא אומר "איני יודע" זה לא מודה במקצת. להבין את התוספות הייתי צריך ללכת למסכת בבא בתרא לגלות שיש דעה שתוספות הוא בהתאם לכאן. זה שסומכוס רק אומר החוק שלו כאשר יש דררא דממונא. בגלל התוספות מודפסת עם התייחסות בבא מציעא דף ב' שבו אומר משהו שונה לחלוטין עשה את תוספות הזה מאוד מבלבל.
בסיכום
תוספות בראשונה עוסק בעובדה שכאשר שניהם נמצאים בספק שהם מחלקים. הוא שואל, "איך הם יכולים לעשות את זה כשזה לא דררא דממונא?" זה מה שבלבל אותי כי זה ישירות נגד הגמרא בבא מציעא דף ב'. אבל בשלב מסוים הבינתי שתוספות הוא בהתאם לגמרא בבא בתרא. אבל אז הבעיה היא שתוספות הוא מתמודד עם החלק המשנה שאומר כאשר שניהם בטוחים אז המוכר לוקח שבועה. אבל כשהוא שואל שאלתו. "אי תימא (אם תומר) איך הם יכולים לחלק" . במשך שנים הייתי מבולבל על ידי השאלה מה יכול להיות תוספות שואלים כאן. עד שהבנתי שתוספות שינו מסלולים ושואלים על סוף המשנה שבו כתוב "כאשר שניהם נמצאים בספק שהם מחלקים." זאת היתה תובנה מרכזית. אז תוספות אומר שזה דררא דממומא כי היו שני עדים ששמעו את הסכם אך לא ראו כמה כסף חליף ידיים. לכן יש ספק לבית דין אפילו בלי טיעוניהם. אז סומכוס אומר שהם מחלקים ללא שבועה . אבל אז אני שואל במאמר מעל מה על החלק משנה שאומר כאשר המוכר הוא בטוח שהוא לוקח שבועה. משתנה היחיד שהשתנה הוא מה הוא הטיעון. אז אם סוף המשנה דררא דממומא, כך חייב להיות החלק הזה. אבל יש שם שבועה וסומכוס מחזיק בשיטה כשיש דררא דממומא אין שבועה והם מחלקים. אני עונה שיש שבועה כי הוא מודה בחלק. מודה במקצת.
After the recent events in Baltimore I think we can all agree that if Abraham Lincoln had learned this particular page of Gemara (Talmud) Baltimore would a lot better place. What he might have done was to stop the slave trade like England had done a long time before that. And there are strict laws about how a slave must be treated. But the result of freeing the slaves was disastrous.
17.5.15
Music for the glory of God
[bar yochai in nwc]
Mathematics [mathematics in midi] [mathematics nwc]
l89 [l89 midi] [l89 in nwc]
l96 [l96 in midi] [l96 in nwc]
b105 in mp3 [b105 midi] b105 in nwc format
Mathematics [mathematics in midi] [mathematics nwc]
l89 [l89 midi] [l89 in nwc]
l96 [l96 in midi] [l96 in nwc]
b105 in mp3 [b105 midi] b105 in nwc format
n67 [n67 in midi] [n67 nwc]
i6 [i6 in midi format] [i6 nwc]
l, n, and i files were written in Uman. Bar Yochai in NY. b files in Israel.
Mathematics was written in Uman in notebooks but put into orchestra form in NY.
\
Talmud Tractate Bava Metzia page 100.
The seller has sold a slave. But he has two slaves. The seller and buyer agree to cancel the deal. but does the seller give back 20 or 25? Which slave was sold? The big one or the small one? The משנה says the seller takes an oath that he sold the small one and gives back just 20. {The משנה we know is סומכוס for other reasons who holds we divide money in doubt. The חכמים say we leave money in the possession of he who has it until there is proof otherwise.} So it looks like we are leaving the money that is in doubt with the seller like the sages said--not like סומכוס.
But this is not my problem in this above note. I am puzzling over six words in תוספות: "But it is not דררא דממונא." What does תוספות want here? In another paragraph I explained this to mean תוספות want to leave the money with the seller without an oath. And that would seem to be like the רשב''ם that possession and certainty determine that the seller gets the whole five dollars with no oath. So תוספות seems to be saying that since this is not דררא דממונא there should be no oath. But that would be going against the idea that דררא דממונא has nothing to do with the oath but rather where the money goes to.
[מהרש''א דף ב בבא מציעא.]
I have been puzzling on and off about this תוספות for years. תוספות when he starts the אי תימא is talking about a different part of the משנה than the beginning of תוספות. This one simple fact clears up the entire תוספות.
The Mishna first says when both the seller and the buyer are sure then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. תוספות is bothered by this and says it is a case where no document has been written about the sale. But then תוספות asks his question that has been bothering me on and off for about 7 years. "But how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא?"
Now I understand. תוספות is asking about the end of the משנה. There the case is the seller and buyer are both in doubt. And there the law is they divide. And תוספות asks on this how can they divide when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. and they answer it is a case of דררא דממונא because the sale occurred before witnesses that heard them decide the large slave for twenty five dollars and the small one for twenty and they did not see how much money changed hands. What תוספות is saying is that that means there is a doubt to the court of law even without their pleas and that make it דררא דממונא. Now תוספות is crystal clear. Yet we do need to ask how this fits in with the previous part of the משנה where there is an oath.
If סומכוס agrees there is an oath when the parties are sure then there is no problem. But there is an opinion he holds money is doubt is divided even when the pleas are certain. And the תלמוד answers on this it is a case where the oath is from the תורה. I have answered before that the oath here is from the תורה because it is a case of admission in part. The seller admits he owes twenty dollars. He just does not admit the remaining five dollars. But if this is the case then why is there no oath at the end of the משנה? Answer: because when the sellers says he does not know that is not considered admitting in part.
Now to make this תוספות make sense I had to go to מסכת בבא בארא to discover there an opinion that תוספות is depending on here. That is that סומכוס only says his law when there is דררא דממונא.
Because the תוספות is printed with a reference to בבא מציעא דף ב where it says something completely different at made this תוספות very confusing.
Appendix: In the Torah there are laws about slaves. The Bible is not politically correct.
If America had known about this a long time ago the USA would have been saved from lot of trouble. And if the USA would accept that slaves still remain slaves even after a government official declares them to be freed the USA could still be saved from from trouble.
It is a general rule in life not to try to outsmart the Torah.
But this is not my problem in this above note. I am puzzling over six words in תוספות: "But it is not דררא דממונא." What does תוספות want here? In another paragraph I explained this to mean תוספות want to leave the money with the seller without an oath. And that would seem to be like the רשב''ם that possession and certainty determine that the seller gets the whole five dollars with no oath. So תוספות seems to be saying that since this is not דררא דממונא there should be no oath. But that would be going against the idea that דררא דממונא has nothing to do with the oath but rather where the money goes to.
[מהרש''א דף ב בבא מציעא.]
I have been puzzling on and off about this תוספות for years. תוספות when he starts the אי תימא is talking about a different part of the משנה than the beginning of תוספות. This one simple fact clears up the entire תוספות.
The Mishna first says when both the seller and the buyer are sure then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. תוספות is bothered by this and says it is a case where no document has been written about the sale. But then תוספות asks his question that has been bothering me on and off for about 7 years. "But how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא?"
Now I understand. תוספות is asking about the end of the משנה. There the case is the seller and buyer are both in doubt. And there the law is they divide. And תוספות asks on this how can they divide when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. and they answer it is a case of דררא דממונא because the sale occurred before witnesses that heard them decide the large slave for twenty five dollars and the small one for twenty and they did not see how much money changed hands. What תוספות is saying is that that means there is a doubt to the court of law even without their pleas and that make it דררא דממונא. Now תוספות is crystal clear. Yet we do need to ask how this fits in with the previous part of the משנה where there is an oath.
If סומכוס agrees there is an oath when the parties are sure then there is no problem. But there is an opinion he holds money is doubt is divided even when the pleas are certain. And the תלמוד answers on this it is a case where the oath is from the תורה. I have answered before that the oath here is from the תורה because it is a case of admission in part. The seller admits he owes twenty dollars. He just does not admit the remaining five dollars. But if this is the case then why is there no oath at the end of the משנה? Answer: because when the sellers says he does not know that is not considered admitting in part.
Now to make this תוספות make sense I had to go to מסכת בבא בארא to discover there an opinion that תוספות is depending on here. That is that סומכוס only says his law when there is דררא דממונא.
Because the תוספות is printed with a reference to בבא מציעא דף ב where it says something completely different at made this תוספות very confusing.
Appendix: In the Torah there are laws about slaves. The Bible is not politically correct.
If America had known about this a long time ago the USA would have been saved from lot of trouble. And if the USA would accept that slaves still remain slaves even after a government official declares them to be freed the USA could still be saved from from trouble.
It is a general rule in life not to try to outsmart the Torah.
16.5.15
The Torah path
I love Torah. When I got to yeshiva I felt like I was in Gan Eden.
I believe that the light of the Torah can change everything in one's life to good.
I think the best way to approach Torah is to take the straightforward Lithuanian yeshiva approach
[] Stay away from doctors. [They make people sick.]
[] Stay away from psychologists and other charlatans and frauds. [They make people sick mentally.]
[] Talk with God in nature. Thank him for the good in your life, and ask for the things you need. (If a forest is not available, then talk to God an hour per day in any situation. But not from a prayer book. It has to be your own words.)
[] Finish the Written Law in Hebrew.
[] Learn and finish the Oral Law. [i.e. the two Talmuds, Tosephta, Sifra, Sifi and the Midrash Raba.]
[] Learn Musar. (That is, classical books of morality from the Middle Ages, plus the books of the disciples of Israel Salanter and the Gra.) If nothing else learn these two books: (1) מדרגת האדם of the Altar of Narvardok about trust in God. (2) אור ישראל by Isaac Blasser a disciple of Israel Salanter about Musar.
[] Serve in the IDF (Israel Defense Force). If you are not in Israel, then go there and serve in the IDF.
[] There is an important piece of advice in the Guide ( Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam )--to learn Physics [String Theory] and Metaphysics [i.e. a book by Aristotle].
Appendix
1) I do think the Litvaks go a little drop too much in the religious direction. But my goal in this essay is to indicate what I think is the best approach. Not to deal with how far any particular groups falls from this straightforward approach. You can find fault in any of the groups that hold most strongly with anything I wrote above. I can't deal with that issue right now. Rather I am just saying what approach people should aim for.
2) To be able to learn string theory, you need a little bit of math. Mainly Algebra and Geometry.
And it takes time. In fact, I admit I have not spent as much time on this as I should have. But let us not make this about me. Mainly you need to get a book on Relativity and one on Field Theory. Also Allen Hachter's book Algebraic Topology. Say the words out-loud and fast and go on.
Also it is good to have an slow session in Math to take one particular subject and keep at it until you get it.
2) To be able to learn string theory, you need a little bit of math. Mainly Algebra and Geometry.
And it takes time. In fact, I admit I have not spent as much time on this as I should have. But let us not make this about me. Mainly you need to get a book on Relativity and one on Field Theory. Also Allen Hachter's book Algebraic Topology. Say the words out-loud and fast and go on.
Also it is good to have an slow session in Math to take one particular subject and keep at it until you get it.
15.5.15
A person involved in a mitzvah does not have to stop to do another one. Suka 25
"A groom and his friends do not have to sit in the Suka."
Braita: "A groom and his friends do not have to pray or put on Tefilin, but have to say the Shema."
Rashi says that Braita is going like the opinion: When is doing one mitzvah, he is obligated to do another one."
From what I can tell by looking at the back of the Gemara in the Rif at the Raavad, Ramban and Meor there is that this is an argument of tenaim [sages of the Mishna] and that we poskin [decide ] that one does not have to stop. So a groom would not even have to say Shema.
This looks to me how the Gra was thing about learning Torah. He says one can stop to do a mizvah. Not must.
The reason for the confusion is the Rif brings both braitas; and after him the Shulchan Aruch also.
So what is happening is the is an essential contradiction that is being presented as a consistent opinion.
So why the Rif does this no one knows. But they all come out saying that even if we don't know what the Rif was thinking, still we do know the actual pesak halacha.[decided law] העוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה
This has far reaching ramifications, as you can imagine.
I have not learned this "sugia" with a learning partner, so I must say my conclusions are only tentative.
Also I should mention that not everything can be called a mitzvah in this context. People like to expand the definition of mitzvah beyond what the Torah says is a mitzvah. And that kind of thinking would not work here.
"A groom and his friends do not have to sit in the Suka."
Braita: "A groom and his friends do not have to pray or put on Tefilin, but have to say the Shema."
Rashi says that Braita is going like the opinion: When is doing one mitzvah, he is obligated to do another one."
From what I can tell by looking at the back of the Gemara in the Rif at the Raavad, Ramban and Meor there is that this is an argument of tenaim [sages of the Mishna] and that we poskin [decide ] that one does not have to stop. So a groom would not even have to say Shema.
This looks to me how the Gra was thing about learning Torah. He says one can stop to do a mizvah. Not must.
The reason for the confusion is the Rif brings both braitas; and after him the Shulchan Aruch also.
So what is happening is the is an essential contradiction that is being presented as a consistent opinion.
So why the Rif does this no one knows. But they all come out saying that even if we don't know what the Rif was thinking, still we do know the actual pesak halacha.[decided law] העוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה
This has far reaching ramifications, as you can imagine.
I have not learned this "sugia" with a learning partner, so I must say my conclusions are only tentative.
Also I should mention that not everything can be called a mitzvah in this context. People like to expand the definition of mitzvah beyond what the Torah says is a mitzvah. And that kind of thinking would not work here.
Bava Metzia page 14. You have a case where a field was stolen and now goes back to the original owner. Rashi asks why the owner does not pay for the improvement? After all he is getting an improved field. Rashi says it is a case where the thief let it go fallow and it was improved in the hands of the buyer.
What you see here is even though this Rashi disagrees with Tosphot and the Rambam, still the foundation principle is the buyer who improved it gets back the improvement. Just like how Rav Shach explains things on page 15 where the case is the buyer ate fruit, and has to pay back. Rav Shach [Elazar Menachem Shach of the Ponovitch Yeshiva in Bnei Brak.]says that is fruit he did not work on. See the Avi Ezri.
מציעא בבא 14. יש לך מצב שבו שדה נגנב ונקנה ועכשיו חוזר לבעלים המקורים. רש"י שואל מדוע בעל השדה אינו משלם לשיפור? אחרי כל מה שהוא מקבל שדה שהשתפר. רש"י אומר שזה מקרה שבו הגנב נתן לשדה ללכת בור והיה שיפור בידיו של הקונה
מה שרואים מפה הוא שאף על פי שרש''י חולק על תוספות והרמב''ם בדין הזה עם כל זה היסוד הוא שמה שהלוקח שיפר הוא מקבל. וזה כמו שרב שך פירש הסוגיא בדף ט''ו איפה שיש דיון דומה
שם הלוקח אכל פירות וצריך לשלם על מה שאכל. רב שך מסביר שזה מצה שלא עבד על השבח כגון שהפירות הם פירי אילן
What is bothering me and has bothered me for a long time is that we seem to be letting the thief off the hook because of what the owner of the field pays. This is a question in my mind to the Tosphot Rambam Alliance, and all the more so to Rashi.
What I mean here is this. From the Rambam we have that the owner pays the lesser amount of one of two things, the improvement or the expense. And in the case the expense is less then that is all he pays and the thief pays the rest of the difference. But my question is what would happen if the owner would pay nothing? Then the thief would have to pay the entire improvement--not just the difference between the expense and the improvement.
All the more so to Rashi who puts the major burden of paying to the buyer on the back of the owner. Rashi says if the owner got back his field in a better state than when it was stolen he would have to pay for all the improvement. Then I ask what does the thief pay? Nothing except to give back the money to the buyer?
What you see here is even though this Rashi disagrees with Tosphot and the Rambam, still the foundation principle is the buyer who improved it gets back the improvement. Just like how Rav Shach explains things on page 15 where the case is the buyer ate fruit, and has to pay back. Rav Shach [Elazar Menachem Shach of the Ponovitch Yeshiva in Bnei Brak.]says that is fruit he did not work on. See the Avi Ezri.
מציעא בבא 14. יש לך מצב שבו שדה נגנב ונקנה ועכשיו חוזר לבעלים המקורים. רש"י שואל מדוע בעל השדה אינו משלם לשיפור? אחרי כל מה שהוא מקבל שדה שהשתפר. רש"י אומר שזה מקרה שבו הגנב נתן לשדה ללכת בור והיה שיפור בידיו של הקונה
מה שרואים מפה הוא שאף על פי שרש''י חולק על תוספות והרמב''ם בדין הזה עם כל זה היסוד הוא שמה שהלוקח שיפר הוא מקבל. וזה כמו שרב שך פירש הסוגיא בדף ט''ו איפה שיש דיון דומה
שם הלוקח אכל פירות וצריך לשלם על מה שאכל. רב שך מסביר שזה מצה שלא עבד על השבח כגון שהפירות הם פירי אילן
What is bothering me and has bothered me for a long time is that we seem to be letting the thief off the hook because of what the owner of the field pays. This is a question in my mind to the Tosphot Rambam Alliance, and all the more so to Rashi.
What I mean here is this. From the Rambam we have that the owner pays the lesser amount of one of two things, the improvement or the expense. And in the case the expense is less then that is all he pays and the thief pays the rest of the difference. But my question is what would happen if the owner would pay nothing? Then the thief would have to pay the entire improvement--not just the difference between the expense and the improvement.
All the more so to Rashi who puts the major burden of paying to the buyer on the back of the owner. Rashi says if the owner got back his field in a better state than when it was stolen he would have to pay for all the improvement. Then I ask what does the thief pay? Nothing except to give back the money to the buyer?
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