Sanhedrin page 60b and 61A

It is not usual but just yesterday discovered that the Baal HaMeor has a nice explanation of the Talmud that looks better than Tosphot. Usually Tosphot comes out on top. But this case might very well be different.
It all starts with the subject of idolatry which to the Torah way of thinking is a very serious wrong.

We have to divide idolatry into several subsets. Service according to its way and service not according to it way. Service not according to it way was suggested by Rava bar Rav Chanan to be forbidden by the words "he will bow down."

Ravina  asked, "How is this possible? That is it is OK to learn not according to its way from the words ''he will sacrifice'' but not from ''he will bow down?'' The reason is that if we learn it from ''he will bow down,'' then what does, 'How do the nations serve their gods come to exclude?'"
[Now I wanted to mention here as a side topic that this will probably be the subject of great attention my learning partner. Knowing him, he will be bothered by the fact that if there would be no verse "How do the nations serve their gods," then "He will bow down" is not coming out of any general category and then you could not learn anything from it except exactly what it says. For all I know, today he might want to sit on this problem for several weeks.]

To make a long story short I just wanted to say that the Gemara comes out that service not according to the way of that idolatry is liable for types of service that are honor and is not liable for types of service that are not honorable. That is just a brief summery. The question that both Tosphot and the Baal HaMeor ask is: Why could the same question not apply to when we learn this law from "sacrifice" and not from "bowing?"

The Meor HaGadol (on the Rif) says something very common sensible. He says there are areas in the set of honorable service  not according to its way that would not be liable e.g. kissing an idol that normally one hugs.

But seems that numinous value can slip very easily from holiness into its opposite. It would be nice if there was some kind of test for this

 Numinous value.   Over-excitement in the service of God.

Also we do find that the world of Kabalah deals with a different planes of existence than the Oral Law.

This we can see right away in the Zohar itself. The Zohar takes mitzvot and applies them to areas that are clearly not legal parts of that mitzvah. That means that sometimes a person gets connected with what can be described as higher spiritual worlds. The idea would be that while a person is still in his physical body his spirit gets embedded in some kind of higher plane of existence.



But people looking for numinous value can find this kind of value in the Sitra Achara {the Dark Side} [a phrase made famous by Star wars movies but comes directly from the Kabalah].



Regardless of the problems with this area of value still there are people that interested in numinosity and they will get their thirst satisfied by someone illegitimate of they if they are lucky find someone or something legitimate.

But seems that numinous value can slip very easily from holiness into its opposite. It would be nice if there was some kind of test for this.

There is an area of value which the Geon from Villna was sensitive to--that is learning Torah and keeping mizvot in the most basic simple way possible.  It seems to me that this is a hard area of value to hold on to. For one thing some people are on a different frequency anyway. \
 It is like radio transmission. If you are tuned into the right frequency then  you have got it but if you are even a fraction of a micron off all you get is static.

I was once tuned into this frequency. Loud and clear. .

 I had a friend they went around with the Na Nach group of Breslov for a few years and he thinks that they in fact felt some kind of lift by saying Na Nach all the time. But that is not any different from what Hindu people  feel when they say the mantra given to them by their Guru.



In conclusion I would like to suggest that there is no substitute for simple and basic learning Gemara, Rashi and Tosphot and keeping Torah in the most simple basic way possible. .

But because idolatry is in fact the central issue of the Torah I thought it would be worth my while to do some digging into it.

Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (the Rambam) [Maimonides] held that worship of an intermediate is idolatry.
I claim that this does not include going to a prophet or a  saint for a blessing.

The reason for my claim is that we find lots of people in the Old Testament going to a Jewish saint for a blessing. Avimelech was commanded by God to go to Abraham and ask him to pray for him. Naaman, the Syrian, went to Elisha the prophet to ask a blessing to be cured of his leprosy. The examples are far too many to bring here.
 Be that as it may with the Rambam we get the idea that worship of a mediator is idolatry. With the Nefesh
HaChaim [the disciple of the Geon from Vilna] get the idea that tying ones soul to the Divine spirit in a tzadik is also idolatry.

These are two independent variables. Now what happens I ask if these two variables intersect? One ties his soul to the spirit of an intermediary? The Rambam did not say anything about the tying of ones spirit but rather referred to straight forward worship of an mediator which means either one of the for types of service pouring burning bowing and sacrifice or service according to its way. But it looks like he would agree that tying in spirit is what Reb Chaim also thought --the essence of service. At least we know that Reb Chaim from Voloshin would say that tying oneself in spirit to the spirit of a mediator is idolatry. 
I wanted to make clear that this does not imply that this is not an area of disagreement. All I am doing here is what you hear  "It is an argument among the Rishonim [Medieval Authorities]." While this approach does not answer any question it is important in order to clarify issues. 


I was discussing some of theses issues with an elder person at the synagogue of  Nachman in Uman on Shabat and he asked me to write some of my basic sources after Shabat.   So it occurs to me that there could be others interested in the source material here. So here is the list in a nutshell:Talmud Sanhedrin 60b and 61 a. Talmud Avoda Zara, chapters three and four and the very beginning of each chapter. Nefesh HaChaim by Chaim From Voloshin, the major disciple of the Geon. The Mishna Torah of the Rambam, chapter 3 of hilchot teshuva. Perush Hamishna of the Rambam on Perek Chelek in Sanhedrin. Ikar 5. Shaar Ruach HoKodesh written by Reb Chaim Vital the major disciple of Isaac Luria.

Now the relevance of this subject is vast. But it is not the same thing as the subject of the Sitra Achara (the Dark Side). [Or cults.] And that is a subject I tried to tackle  a few years back with no success.



We can also see now why some people make an exaggerated attempt to be extra careful about Jewish rituals. The reason is they think this will clear them from the charge that they are doing idolatry. But clearly one can be dressed religious and be careful in lots of rituals and still be doing idolatry. 

Whenever I bring up the subject of Musar  I get a viral reaction as if I was saying to rob the Federal Express. In fact if I was to suggest robbing the Federal Express I probably would less of a virulent reaction. I have been accused of advocating flattering the wicked and desecrating the Shabat and even much worse things just by mentioning this seeming modest trivial word Musar. What is it I wonder about Musar that evokes this violent and hostile reaction?





\
It has to do with world view issues. The three main examples I can think of this minute are Pantheism, the emphasis on rituals instead of on interaction between man and his fellow man (bein adam lechavero), and the centrality of the tzadik.

Let me mention the second issue here for a minute. The laws between man and his fellow man are often neglected in Orthodox Judaism because of the above mentioned principles that guys can concentrate on a very limited number of principles and when the religious ritual aspects of things looms large the aspect of the Torah which relates to the interactions between people becomes small and insignificant. Musar was meant to correct this. The Musar movement before World War Two did emphasize this. Whether it was Slabodka or Kelm or Navardok they all claimed that the most essential part of the Torah is the midot- the bein adam lechavero- the interaction between people. [The Reshash Shalom Sharabi makes this abundantly clear in his magnum opus the Nahar Shalom]. This aspect of Musar has become largely forgotten and breslov is no exception.


Appendix: Musar is founded on the idea of learning classical Musar like the book the duties of the heart and Orchot Tzadikim and the Mesilat Yesharim. But it developed in time its own secondary literature based on the approaches of Navardok, Slabodka, Kelm, and Mir. My suggestion for people in general is to look at the Madragat Haadam from the school of thought of Navardok.

Idolatry is by all accounts the central issue in the Torah. I think it is perhaps because some people have never finished reading the Old Testament [Tenach] in Hebrew that they are not aware of this fact.

But as you go through the Old Testament you notice that this is the most essential theme. I admit that keeping all the mitzvot comes in a close second but this is clearly what all the prophets considered the most essential aspect of the Torah. For this reason you would think that people would spend more time in clarifying exactly what is idolatry. After being involved in Breslov for a good number of years it started occurring to me to attempt to bring some clarity to this issue.


I want to first of all suggestion that (1) Idolatry has a close connection with spirituality.
(2) Also I want to suggest that it is easy to become an object of idolatry. Anyone can do so with one word. ("Serve me," Rabbi Mei says is liable for idolatry. Sanhedrin 61a)
(3) Also I want to defend the  thesis of the Rambam [Maimonides] that worship of a mediator is also in the category of idolatry by means of an idea of Reb Chaim from Voloshin [in his book the Nefesh Hachaim]

First the ways of doing idolatry are five. Four are not according to its way: pouring, burning, sacrifice, bowing, and one according to its way. [Sanhedrin 60b].
Second of all, no god needs to be considered to be a world creator..No god ever was. [  For example Zeus was the god of lightning.] [Brahama the creator is himself created  by Brahman. And Brahman is not a creator but a former of the world from his own substance.]Even those that were world formers had always found preexisting substance.. The gods were not immortal. The Norse gods could die.
To be considered a god all one needed was power over some aspect of the world like healing or giving birth to children etc.

So it seems possible to say that coming to a navi [prophet] for a blessing could be in this category. All one needs to do is to think that he has some kind of spiritual power over some aspect of the world like giving blessings for children or healing. And then doing the service that is special for him as perhaps in giving to him charity.

Yet we do find in the Torah people coming to a  navi (prophet) for blessings. Avimelech was commanded by God to go to Avraham and ask him for a prayer.
 It looks that the Torah is thinking that a mediator is OK. If one thinks the being has powers in himself that is idolatry but if he is only a pipeline to God that is OK.

This presents a problem to the Rambam who says a mediator is also idolatry.

The answer to this is in the Nefesh HaChaim by the disciple of the Geon from Villna. He considers that when a person attaches himself to the divine spirit in a tzadik that is idolatry. This is how the Rambam would answer our objection that when the Torah says to go to a Navi or prophet for blessing it does not mean that one attaches himself to the spirit of that prophet. That is that the idea of idolatry is a kind of spiritual connection with some being besides God.

The other people besides the Rambam that do not seem to think that a mediator is a problem are thinking of idolatry more along the lines of the Talmud itself that is means accepting some being as ones god.

Based on the above analysis I think we can see the reason that some people have considered Chasidut as problematic and others have thought it  very important. This seems to be dependent whether you go with the Rambam or other opinions.

I think there is no chance that older Hasidim will change their world view. I think they will continue in older  theology in which the tzadik is the central figure. But every day new people get involved in Chasidut and my hope is they they will understand that a tzadik is not the central aspect of Torah, but rather God.

I have been trying to understand the subject of Musar for a while.
One of my motivations was that there is a connection between fear of God and length of days.
So I asked someone to bring a few books of Musar which I was reading for a while.
I still am not sure how to evaluate the whole subject.
The good things are that it gives a basically consistent world view of the meaning  Torah and Life and the universe. And having a consistent world view are important in order that a person should not do evil.

The reason is simple. If the evil inclination can get an inconsistent world view into a person that has conflicting principles then anything can be justified.

Or if the Satan can get an evil world view into a person then even if the person is good hearted , his actions will be evil.


On the other hand I did notice that books of Musar written under the influence of Kabalah tend to become a bit fanatic.

My learning partner suggested that  what is called today orthodox Judaism has a lineage that comes directly from the Ramban (Moshe ben Nachman) and not from the Rambam and Saadia Geon.

Musar is traditionally divided between the Rishonim or the classical books, and then later achronim,  and then the actual books of the disciples of Israel Salanter. But I think a better division is between kabalah based books and Rambam based books.

I feel the world is headed towards catastrophe. My feeling about what to do is to learn Torah. 
I am not making this up. In fact I heard from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum this idea countless of times. It is certainly not what you would hear from Breslov people that I started hanging out with after only a few years at the Mir.

In Breslov prayer and coming to Uman for Rosh HaShannah are considered as the cure alls. But at the Mir it was definitely learning Torah.

I would like to defend the basic idea of the Mir. But before I do I want to explain what the idea of learning Torah is. The simplest way of explaining this is to quote from Maimonides: "Just like there is not validity in the concept of adding or subtracting from the written Torah so is there no validity in the concept of adding or subtraction from the Oral Torah."

I.e. at the Mir the idea of learning Torah was highly limited to the actual content of the Oral and written Torah. Things that were written after the Talmud bavli only had legitimacy in so far as they were accurate explanations of the Talmud Bavli. Rishonim might be called second level Torah. Torah but not actual first level Torah.





Musar could also be considered second level Torah because it explains the basic world view of the Talmud.
But one problem I have with Musar is in fact in a the area of world view issues.


I think it is very important to have a world view that is consistent with reality and also has no internal inconsistencies.  So while Musar as a whole does give a basic world view based on Torah and Talmud still there are areas which it gets too frum (religious).

Idolatry is   highly relevant issue nowadays especially in the world of Hasidut. It is a surprise for me that this issue is not studied more in depth. 




In the Nefesh Hachaim of Reb Chaim from Voloshin we find the idea of attaching oneself to the divine spirit inside of another human being is idolatry. This is also a helpful idea and might give us an idea of some problems we find in Chasidim today. But again it is not the kind of definition I am looking for.


I have gotten into the habit of looking at original sources to decide any issue. And I think this is helpful here also. So I went to the Talmud in Sanhedrin page 60b to learn what the ancient Jewish sages thought about idolatry.
There we find in the mishna a difference between serving an idol according to it way and not according to its way. The Mishna says serving an idol or even not according to its way is idolatry if it is one of four kinds of serve--sacrifice or a service that was in the temple in Jerusalem and also bowing.

My point today in this essay is that when the Talmud comes along to discover the reason for this mishna it brings a braita [outside teaching] that is hard to understand.

So now I come to my point.
The Braita gets sacrifice from "he sacrificed." It gets other kinds of service that were done in the temple in Jerusalem from "only to God alone." Then it gets bowing from "and he will bow".

So far everything looks good.

But then it wants to take out kissing or hugging or anything that is not one of these four types. It does this by invoking the rule anything that was in a category and has been mention specifically, has been mentioned to tell us not about itself alone but the whole category.
Sacrifice has gone out to tell us when it is not according to it way he is only liable if it is avodat panim[inner service --serve that was done in the temple]



Now the way this looks [at least from rashi ] is that it is referring to the verse he went and served which means all kinds of service [according to its way or not]. But this can't be so.
The verse,"He will sacrifice," tells us nothing about service according to the way of idolatry.

The Braita has to mean that he will sacrifice has come been singled out for mention out of the category of "only for God alone".
Just to give the reader a little context I should mention that there are plenty of issues in the rashi here as you can see in the Maharam from Lublin. And the Gemara on the next page also goes deeply into problems that this Braita poses. One could easily spend a good year on these two pages of Gemara. But I wanted to focus here on this problem that apparently no one else has mentioned.

 Reform Judaism tends to take a fairly loose idea of prohibitions of the Torah.
My own parents were Reform Jews and there is a lot of good there and I saw a lot of holiness and light in my home. [Maybe I should qualify that. My parents went to a reform shul but I think their ideas were a lot close to Torah Judaism. In our home there was a tremendous respect for Torah Judaism. It was just between being a World War Two captain fighting  in the USAF and working for the Space program and Star War at TRW my Dad did not have a lot of time ]



However my parents were born before 1960's during times in America when religious issues were just not that interesting. The most pressing issues in the USA for Jews was being Loyal to Torah and also doing honest work to raise good families. For American Jews there was little doubt that the USA represented the most fair and just society possible. But later on times have show that there are problems inherent in the American system (by which I am fairly alarmed) and religious issues are not possible to ignore, and it is likely that  we all need to observe the laws of the Torah a lot more than Reform Judaism dictates, but also to be careful not to fall into the trap of religious fanaticism.

At any rate one issue I think deserves a lot more attention than it gets is that of idolatry. Reform does not concern itself with this because they think religious tolerance is an ideal of the Torah. That is simply not true.
I should mention that Chanukah was not a holiday of religious tolerance but rather it was a celebration of the successful overturn of an idol.



I think Christians do not want to deal with the subject from the Talmudic point of view for several reasons. One is that there is the issue of the mediator which is problematic to them. Also they clearly feel that they are not allowed to learn Talmud. It comes at least in the minds of Protestants under the list of prohibited books. That means they don't have much in the way of source information to decide what is considered idolatry. So they tend to claim that things like baseball cards or addictions are idolatry.
Hindu people do not see idolatry as a problem in the first place. In fact I get the impression that they think it is a good thing. See the Sutras for some examples.

Idolatry is the central issue of the Torah. So it is in everyone’s interest to get an idea of what is and what it is not.
Now I should admit that am just beginning to look into this subject myself. But I want to say that I think I have hit a gold mine. It is page 60b and 61a in the Talmud Tractate Sanhedrin.

what is great is that you get good idea of what idolatry is about without it being mixed up with side issues.

 While if you ask almost anyone on the street nowadays they will have their own pet peeves about what idolatry involves.  Almost anything someone does not like will end up being called an idol.

  But before I go, I just want to say that I think any being besides the One First Cause that is worshiped in order to get closer to that being or to receive some good from that being would be considered an idol. Worship in this case means any one of four types of service, sacrifice, burning incense, bowing down, pouring libations, or service which is unique to that idol. And I think this whole subject has to do with numinous reality. Serving a customer in a restaurant would not be considered idolatry.

Now I admit that some things people like to call idolatry today might in fact be so. But before we go around making accusations, we need first to get a good grasp of what the actual definition of the thing is.

[Bava Kama 19, Rambam Hilchot Nizkei Mamon 2:9]




It seems clear that Maimonides and Tosphot are agree in principle about the case of a hen with a string attached to its leg and a pail gets caught in the string an breaks. It really bothers me to say this but in spite of the fact that the Migdol Oz tries to defend the Rambam by saying he is like Rashi I think it is crystal clear that this can't be true.

You find a movement started by Reb Chaim Solovietckik to try to give answers to the question why does the Rambam decide like he does.
The major personalities in this movement were Reb Chaim himself, Reb Baruch Ber Lebovitz, Reb Shimon Shkop, Rav Elazar Menachem Shach ( of Ponovith in Bnei Brak in the 1980's).
Rav Sach wrote the Achiezer on the Rambam and that was the last of this massive effort to understand the Rambam that I am aware of. 






You can see what I am saying if you read between the lines. When Reb Chaim wants to deal with the Rambam in how he decides the law about something not intended on Shabat he ignores the answer of the Magid Mishna --almost as if to say that it is not worth serious consideration. [Which indeed it is not. I wrote about this elsewhere.]

Here is the basic issue in short. We have a debate between Rabbi Nathan and the sages about the case of a ox pushing another ox into a pit in Bava Kama 53a. To R. Natan what you can't get from the owner of the ox you get from the owner of the pit. In our case in Bava Kama 19a we have a hen with a string attached and a bucket that gets tangled in the string and breaks. To the Rambam when the  string has an owner, he alone pays not the owner of the chicken. Clearly the Rambam holds the difference is when the string has an owner he alone is responsible, and the case of the ox and pit is different because there both owners are responsible. Exactly like Tosphot-- Not like Rashi there who says that even though the owner of the pit pays, it is a {kenas} penalty and not that he is really responsible.
Also let me add something I have mentioned before this. Why if the string has an owner that he alone is obligated" why could not both people be obligated like in the case of R. Natan? Answer because in the case of  a change like flying or a string attached there can't be more that one half damage. This principle you see in Tosphot and the Rambam both. It is the reason Topshot gives for why the Gemara rejected its original approach to Rav Huna. [Not like Rashi!] And this is the only possible reason the Rambam could have to saying the owner of the hen is not responsible in the case when the string has an owner!


It seems to me that there should be some effort to understand the opinion of Maimonides in The Guide for the Perplexed also. 

The idea is that it is easy from the perspective of Jewish law to slip into idolatry. One does not need to claim to be a creator of the universe. There is not on record any god that was a creator of the universe. The closest you get is Brahma but him himself was created from Brahaman, so he does not count . And Brahman is not a creator. he is the universe.

So to be an idol is not as hard as people think.  And it is fairly easy for a person to become an idol. all he needs to do is to say one word "Evduni"{"serve me"} [Sanhedrin 61a]. To R Meir just by that one word alone he is considered "mesit umadiach" one to tries to convince someone else to serve an idol.

I have been gaining some clarity about idolatry

I do not claim to have understood the subject but just by doing a tiny drop of the Gemara [Talmud] in Sanhedrin [60b] the whole subject is getting a lot clearer for me.

(This is I think a good idea for people in general whenever they are confused about any issue. Read the part of Talmud that relates to that issue.)
I see now that there are two completely separate issue concerning idolatry. One is what is service to an idol and the other is what brings something into the category of being an idol.

The first subject is highly based on verses of the Torah. The basic approach is this [from the Talmud 60b]: "He will go an serve false gods" [Deuteronomy in Parshat shoftim] applies to all service [i.e. whether that is the way of that idol or not]. Then we find another verse "he will serve and he will sacrifice." "He will sacrifice" was already in the category of "he will serve" so it comes out of that category to that which is not the particular service of that idol  to  teach about the whole category that serve that is not unique to that idol has to be like one of three inner services that were done in the holy temple in Jerusalem. Then there is a third verse "he will serve and bow down." “Bow down” can’t be adding anything because we already limited everything by means of the word sacrifice. so ''he will bow down'' cant be telling us anything except that it is in the category of service even when it is not the way of that idol. [note 1]

Sorry if this is not clear but I am anyway in the middle of this subject and I admit that it is not very clear to me. There is a lot to talk about here. You can see this for yourself if you look at the Tosphot on the page and then the Maharsha.

But even though all this is not very clear to me still it does come out of this discussion an important point. That if something is not an idol it is not forbidden to bow down to it.  What is fascinating here is the fact that the instant something comes into the category of an idol, a whole new set of laws begins to apply to it.

So my question here is what brings something into the category of being an idol? [This seems to be the subject of Tractate Idolatry on the question of statues that are put up in honor of kings.]
And here also I am just staring to look at this. But one thing is clear. An idol or god is not a world creator.

For example we do not find that Zeus created the world. He had certain powers over certain aspects of the world. But that fact does not make him any less a god. Worshiping Zeus is still idolatry even if one does not consider him to have created the world.. Either sacrificing to him or even saying you are my god or doing a service to him that is the particular service of Zeus is still forbidden. Or if one serves Zeus in order that Zeus should bring him closer to God that is still forbidden.

I should perhaps mention that I am aware of the major types of idolatry that exist. I studies Greek mythology and the Iliad and Odyssey Euripides Sophocles and etc for years. I also learned Latin for about three years.
The Large and small Edas. Buddhism and Hinduism. And much more. So i have some idea of what idolatry is about. Though I know that each one of these areas of interest is vast. But still from the small amount of knowledge I have about them I can say that most gods are not world creators. Most of the time they find preexistent substances to make the world from.
Even Brahama is created and is emanated from Brahman. Brahman is not a world creator but his is the universe.

Clearly one does not have to be world creator to be a god.

So what makes one a god? This is relevant because the instant something becomes a god it is forbidden to have almost anything to do with it.



I mean to say that for example bowing down to people we find all the time in the Torah. During the middle ages the common way for men greeting each other was by a slight bow. Women would curtsy. This is not forbidden. But doing such a thing to a god would be forbidden. So what makes something a god?

Now this question should be considered different from what the Talmud is dealing with in Tractate Avodah Zara about how to tell which statues are idols and which are not. In that Gemara we find that rabbi Meir considers all statues to be forbidden to use because he is has a general opinion that we forbid a majority because of a minority.
 But all that part of the Gemara deals with either the sigh that something already an idol or that if one does worship it that it becomes and idol. But still something can be an idol before one worships it.

Now we can see the answer to our problem in Maimonides. The way to see the answer is to notice what Maimonides says about a mediator. He says to worship a mediator in order that he should bring one closer to God or to receive some kind of blessing from God is considered idolatry. So now we see what is going on. . To worship an entity with any of the types of service that were done in the Temple of with any kind of serve that is specifically for that entity in order to receive some blessing or to bring one closer to God is idolatry.

This all came up yesterday when I was talking with some Breslov Hasidim in Uman.

  The in the actual discussion after I mentioned the idea that a god does not have to be world creator to be an idol we got into the related subject of pantheism.  Now we know that the belief system of the Torah is Monotheism and that of Advaita Vedanta is pantheism. So in theory there should not be any ambiguity that when a person wants to be following the Torah that he is accepting a monotheistic kind of belief system. But for some reason the basic philosophy of Advaita Vedanta has become the dominant theology of a most Hasidim along with belief in the importance of Jewish rituals. But that is not the same as belief in the Torah. note 2]







[note 1] Like if you say have the set of all colors and also blue. why did you mention blue?the way we understand the Torah when there is a situation like this is to say the Torah mentioned blue to tell us something unique about the set of all colors. 
so when the Torah says he will serve and he will sacrifice it tells us something new.that service that is not the particular way of the idol has to be like a serve done in the Temple. Later the gemara will ask on this conclusion and ask that we could say just the opposite. But that I leave for another time.


 

I want to start a Musar Movement II [Jewish Ethics].

This was to be a side topic today. The most important thing I wanted to discuss was that I found what I believe to be a possible answer for the Rambam concerning the Talmud Bava Kama page 19B. But I think I will have to put that on another blog because I think the idea of Musar for the general public is more of immediate concern.

So concerning the Musar Movement II let me first state why I think Musar Movement I is not sufficient.

The problem with  Musar Movement I as it exists today is that it became frum [religious]. The main issue are, "Be frum, learn Torah all day, don't go to university, be a good part of the chareidi world," and all that is somehow supposed to be related to fear of God or fixing of bad character traits. Musar today does not seem to have any connection with fixing of bad character or at all; and fear of God it seems to define as  frumkeit [being extra strict in ritual most of which are not from the Talmud and are not halacha]. This alone would have to put a damper on any enthusiasm for Musar for any reasonable person.

My suggestions are these. Musar first of all should be based on the original texts that R Israel Salanter wanted to be the basis of Musar Chovot Levavot, Orchot Tzadikim, MesilatYesharim, Sefer Hamidot,Sefer HaYasher of Rabbainu Tam (and a few other basic Ethical works from the Middle Ages).

But I also wanted to add a philosophical angle to this whole project.

My basic reasoning is that Musar depends a lot on metaphysics. Now most of the Metaphysics in Musar you don't see in the original set. [Notable exception the beginning of the Chovot Levavot ] But as you go on in time and kabalah gets more to be a part of the Musar books you see more and more metaphysics being thrown in. Yet we know from Kant that metaphysics is a problem.

Kant is not an issue that can be ignored. If you accept him then metaphysics is impossible. You can just choose some pre Kant approach like the Kabalah and go your merry way.

Musar II would also have to include books related to world view issues like the Emunot Vedeot of Saadia Geon. Because you can't separate character traits from world view. They are highly interconnected.


[There is a tendency that you find in the book of Job, "Is not your fear your stupidity?"Fear of God is often coupled with not very smart doctrines. Musar as it exist today is a good example. Most Musar books that are published in the Orthodox Jewish would today are incredibly stupid.
Musar has certainly decayed from the time of Israel Salanter. This has to be changed.]

Property Damages

I wanted to mention a few of the problems that exist between the Rambam (Maimonides) and the Talmud on the issue that is brought in Bava Kama page 19.
 However since it occurs to me that some people might read this blog that would like a bit of introduction let me begin with the basic ideas.

We know from the holy Torah [Exodus 22 and 23] that there are several kinds of damages that one is responsible for. Many of them are stated explicitly in the verse from the holy Torah itself. One explicit kind of damage is when ones animal damages another persons animal or vessels or person.This is an open verse.
Besides this there are other many other types. But here I want to concentrate on this one type.
What happens I ask if ones animal kicks stones up while walking and by that damages someones property?

If in a public domain the owner has no responsibility. If in the domain of the nizak [the person that received damage to his property] then he pays half damage.


So far so good.

Now what happens if ones animal has a string attached to it? This is not exactly a case of kicking stones. But it is also not the usual type of damage.


Let's take the case the string has an owner; and the owner did not hide the string or bury it. The Rambam says  the owner of the string pays half damage.

This sounds simple, does it not? But it is not. It seems to be in direct contradiction to the Talmud in  many ways.
How can I even begin to count the ways?

Maybe for the sake of everyone reading this I ought just to say over the actual statement of the Talmud so you can see for yourselves the problems.

The Mishna gives a case of a chicken that has string attached to its foot is kicking up a fuss. And it says the obligation for damage is 1/2.

Rav Huna said that is when the string got tied to the chicken by itself. [the chicken was in someones yards and the string was lying on the ground and it got attached to the chicken.] But if someone tied the string to it then the obligation is full damages. The Talmud here asks on Rav Huna. Who is obligated to pay?It cant be the owner of the string  because if he hide it it is not his fault. If he left it out then he should pay full damages.

So it must be it is the owner of the chicken and it is a case when the chicken was flying around--so it is is a case of kicking stones. And Rav Huna was talking about completely different case. He was referring to a string that has no owner.

At this point i think you can see how different this is from the Rambam. If you want to see a way of looking at the Talmud here that follows the logic of the Talmud you can take a look at the Rosh [Rabbainu Asher]. But that is not going to rescue us.
So let me see if I can at least try to enunciate some of the problems. First the obligation of the owner of the string the Rambam says is because of the type of damage called  "Hole" which means digging  a hole in public domain or in the domain of the Nizak [person that received damage]. But hole is obligated for damage persons if  and animals not vessels. And why is the owner of the chicken not obligated here? Just because the string has an owner why does that take away responsibility from the owner of the chicken? What about the person that tied the string? Why is he not obligated? Is he not the principle source of damage? [Actually that last statement might not be true, for when the string has an owner it looks like the Gemara itself is considering the owner to be responsible. Not the one who tied the string.]