Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
2.3.26
יש כמה שאלות שעלו בי בדרך חזרה מהים בנוגע לנושא במנחות דף ג, ובזבחים עמוד 9 על הוויכוח בין רבא לרב אחא בר רבא. עבור רבא, חטאת לחלב שמובאת לשם דם היא כשר. משמעות הדבר היא שזה קרוב מספיק כדי לא להיות "שלא לשמה". [] עבור רב אחא זה פסול. הדבר הקשה פה הוא שאם חטאת מובאת לשם כל קורבן אחר, זה פסול ואינו נחשב כלל. אז מה שאני חושב הוא שבמקרה שלנו, זה קרוב מספיק כדי לא להיות פסול לחלוטין, אבל עדיין מספיק רחוק לדעת רב אחא שלא להיות כשר לגמרי. הדבר הקשה להבנה כאן הוא שככל שזה קרוב יותר לעצם העניין של הקרבן, כך זה צריך להיות יותר פסול. (זה מבוסס על העיקרון "אם זה מאותו סוג, זה יכול להרוס אותו. אם זה לא אותו הסוג שלו, זה לא יכול להרוס אותו."] \) השאלה השנייה היא מקרה שבו מביאים קרבן. עולה למען מישהו אחר שאינו מחויב בקרבן עולה. זה תקף, אך לא נחשב כמילוי חובת הבעלים מכיוון שכולם עברו על מצוות עשה בזמן כזה או אחר. הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא שבכל מקרה, מדובר במקרה של שינוי בעלים, ולכן זהו מקרה רגיל של "כל הקורבנות המובאים שלא לשם (או שלא למען בעליהם) תקפים, אך אינם נחשבים לחובת הבעלים"
There are a few questions that occurred to me on the way back from the sea concerning the subject in Menachot page 3 and Zevachim page 9 about the argument between rava and rav acha bar rava. To Rava a sin offering for fat that is brought for blood is valid. That means it is close enough to be not shelo lishma. [] To rav acha bar Rava it is pasul. The thing that if a sin offering is brought for the sake of any other sacrifice, it is pasul and does not count at all. so, what i think is that in our case, it is close enough to be to be not pasul completely, but still off enough to be not counted for the owners obligation in the opinion of Rav Acha. The difficult thing to understand here is that it ought to be the case that the closer it is to the actual obligation, the more pasul it ought to be. (This is based on the principle “If it is its same kind, it can destroy it. If it is not its same type, it cannot destroy it.” (It is like a third category. In general, if one sacrifices most things shelo lashma, they are valid but do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. But a sin offering is different. If it is brought not for its own sake, it is pasul completely. But here we have a third category of a sin offering that is not psul but does no-count for the owners obligation, that is a category that usually resourced for a sin offering,) The other question is a case where one brings a burnt offering for the sake of someone else who is not obligated in a burnt offering. The law it is valid, but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of the owner because everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or another. The problem I see in this is that in any case it is a case of change of owner, and so it is a regular case of, “All sacrifices that are brought shelo lishma (or not for the sake of their owners) are valid, but do not count for the obligation of the owner.------------------------There are a few questions that occurred to me on the way back from the sea concerning the subject in מנחות page 3 and זבחים page 9 about the argument between רבא and רב אחא בר רבא. To רבא ,a חטאת for חלב that is brought for blood is כשר. That means it is close enough to be notשלא לשמה . [] To רב אחא it is פסול. The thing that if a חטאת is brought for the sake of any other sacrifice, it is פסול and does not count at all. So, what I think is that in our case, it is close enough to be to be not פסול completely, but still off enough to be not counted for the owners obligation in the opinion of רב אחא. The difficult thing to understand here is that it ought to be the case that the closer it is to the actual obligation, the more pasul it ought to be. (This is based on the principle “If it is its same kind, it can destroy it. If it is not its same type, it cannot destroy it.”מינה מחריב בה שלא מינה אינו מחריב בה (It is like a third category. In general, if one sacrifices most things שלא לשמה, they are valid but do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. But a חטאת is different. If it is brought not for its שלא לשמה, it is פסול completely. But here we have a third category of a חטאת that is not פסול but does לא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה, that is a category that usually אינו resourced for a חטאת,) The other question is a case where one brings a קרבן עולה for the sake of someone else who is not obligated in a קרבן עולה. It is valid, but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of the owner because everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or another. The problem I see in this is that in any case it is a case of שינוי בעלים, and so it is a regular case of, “All sacrifices that are brought שלא לשמם(or not for the sake of their owners) are valid, but do not count for the obligation of the owner.
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