רב שך סבור שיש רק שני סוגים של חליפין, שווה לשווה, או רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [לרב שך החלפת מחט בשריון היא שווה בשווה מכיוון שזה רוצה מחט והשני רוצה חליפת שריון.] רב שך סבור שהחליפין חל על נישואין לאישה, ולא על רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [זה דומה לתוספות ר''יד שסבור שקידושין באמצעות מטפחת שווה יותר מפרוטה שייך לקדש אישה.] לפי זה, עלינו לומר שכאשר רב נחמן אמר בבבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב ובקידושין כ''ח ע''ב שפרי לא יכול לעשות חליפין, הוא בטח מתכוון שהוא לא יכול ליצור חליפין, אלא שהוא יכול להתקבל באמצעות חליפין. כדי להבהיר את הערתי כאן, הרשו לי להביא כמה נקודות. ראשית, רב שך מדבר רק על הגישה של הרמב''ם. ברור שתוספות ורבינו תם שונים לחלוטין. כמו כן, אנו יודעים שהחוק הוא כמו רב נחמן, שפירות אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין [פירות לא עבדי חליפין], אלא רק כלים.זה לדעת הרמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק י''ג אבל מהו כלי? עבור תוספות, כלי הוא כל דבר שניתן להשתמש בו. אבל עבור רב שך, זה חייב להתייחס למה שיכול ליצור רכישה, לא למה שניתן לרכוש, משום שהוא סבור שאישה יכולה להרכש על ידי חליפין של שווה לשווה. גישה זו של רב שך, שאני חייב להזכיר, אינה דומה לתוספות, שיש חליפין שווה לשווה, וסוג אחר שאינו שווה לשווה, אך עדיין אינו רכישה על ידי מטפחת או נעל---------- ייתכן שיעזור להבין את מה שרב שך אומר אם אזכיר את ההבהרה של שמואל רוזובסקי שהבעיה היא האם משהו גורם לרכישה כמו במקרה של רכישה באמצעות מטפחת (סודר), או שאין שום מושא שגורם למעבר בכלל. פשוט בהחלפה, אחד רוכש את מושא האדם השני, והשני רוכש את מושא של הראשון. ועדיין, אפילו עם ההבהרה הזו, מוזר שרכישה באמצעות סודר לא תעבוד כדי לקדש אישה למרות שזוהי רכישה מוחלטת באמצעות כסף, בעוד שרכישה באמצעות החלפה תקנה אישה, למרות שזוהי רכישה מ ------------------------------------------------לאחר שכתבתי את האמור לעיל, הבנתי שלמעשה זה פתוח ברמב"ם עצמו. בתחילת פרק חמשה בהלכות מכירה הוא טוען שניתן לרכוש פירות על ידי חליפין שווה תחת שוהז-כמו -השאלה שיש לי לגבי גישה זו של הרמב"ם היא שהיא לא נראית מתאימה לגמרא. הגמרא עצמה מדברת תמיד על רכישה באמצעות חליפין ואינה מזכירה אפילו פעם אחת את הגורם לרכישת חליפין. אז מהיכן הרמב"ם היה שואב את גישתו----------ר' תם. לכן, כאשר הוא טוען כמו רב נחמן ש"פרי אינו יכול לבצע חליפין",(פירות לא עבדי חליפין) פירוש הדבר הוא שהוא אינו יכול לגרום לרכישת חליפין, אך ניתן לרכוש אותם על ידי חליפין

Bava Metzia 46

Rav Shach (laws of marriage 1:2)holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To Rav Shach exchange of a needle for a suit of armor is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of armor.] Rav Shach holds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. ([This is like the Tosphot R'id who holds acquisition by handkerchief that is worth more that a pruta can acquire a wife.])According to this, we must say that when Rav Nachman said in Bava Metzia 46 and Kidushin 28b that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First Rav Shach is only talking about the approach of the Rambam. Clearly, Tosphot and Rabbainu Tam are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like Rav Nachman that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. (Rambam laws of sale chapter 13) But what is a vessel? To Tosphot, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to Rav Shach this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of Rav Shach I must mention is not like Tosphot that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. It might help to understand what Rav Shach is saying if I mention the clarification of Shmuel Rozovski that the issue is if something causes a acquisition as in the case of acquisition by a handkerchief, or if there is no object causing the transition at all. Simply in the exchange one acquires the object of the other person, and the other acquires the object of the first person. Still even with this clarification it is odd that acquisition by handkerchief would not work to marry a wife even though it is absolutely acquisition by money while acquisition by pure exchange would acquire a woman though it is a different kind of acquisition. After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the Rambam himself. In the beginning of chapter five in laws of sale he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like Rabbainu Tam. So, when he holds like Rav Nachman that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired by exchange. The question I have on this approach of the Rambam is that it does not seem to fit with the Gemara. the Gemara itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the Rambam have derived his approach? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [laws of marriage 1:2] holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To רב שךexchange of a needle for a שריון is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of שריון.] רב שךholds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. According to this, we must say that when רב נחמן said in בבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב and קידושין כ''ח ע''ב that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First רב שךis only talking about the approach of the רמב''ם. Clearly, תוספות and רבינו תם are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like רב נחמן that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. But what is a vessel? To תוספות, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to רב שך this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of רב שךI must mention is not like תוספות that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the רמב''ם himself. In the beginning of chapter five in הלכות מכירה he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like ר' תם. So, when he holds like רב נחמן that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired bהThe question I have on this approach of the רמב''ם is that it does not seem to fit with the גמרא. Theגמרא itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the רמב''ם have derived his approach?y exchange.

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I noted that a king of Mesopotamia Cdarlaomer that conquered Sodom and Gomora (along with three other kings) also smote the Chori at Mount Seir (Genisis chapter 14), but did not wipe them out. Only later, the kings of Esau destroyed the Chori, and made Mount Seir their home base. see the events when Abraham first came to the land of Canaan and later in the recounting of the descendants of Esau in Genisis. אני רוצה לציין כי מלך מסופוטמיה, כדרלעומר שכבש את סדום (יחד עם עוד שלושה מלכים) גם את היכה את החורי בהר שעיר, אך לא חיסל אותם. רק מאוחר יותר השמידו מלכי עשו את החורי והפכו את הר שעיר לבסיס הבית שלהם

אני תוהה מדוע הרמב"ם פסק דין כמו "הייתי אומר", במקום מסקנת הגמרא בקידושין דף כ''ח. התשובה שחשבתי עליה היא שאולי מסקנת הגמרא הולכת כמו רב יוסף שקובע שצריך להעריך חפץ לפני שניתן להשתמש בו כבעל ערך כספי (שווה כסף). [אני מתייחס כאן לרב יוסף בקידושין דף ח']. הוא סבור שאם מתחתן עם אישה עם בד משי, יש להעריך אותו מראש. הוא לומד זאת מברייתא שמלמדת שעבד עברי ניתן לרכוש או על ידי כסף או משהי שווה כסף, אבל לא על ידי כלים או תבואה. אבל למה לא כלים או תבואה אם אחרי הכל, גם להם יש ערך כספי? אז, רב יוסף אומר שהסיבה שכלים אינם תקפים היא שערכם עדיין לא הוערך. אבל אז הבנתי שרב יוסף מתייחס רק לשימוש במשהו שהוא שווה כסף, ולא זה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין. רק בעמוד כ''ח אומר רב יהודה שמה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין, צריך להיערך מראש. אבל מכיוון שזה לא החוק, לכן הרמב"ם החליט ללכת עם ה"יכולתי לומר" (השערה שנדחתה) לפחות באופן שבו הגמרא מבינה את המשנה לפי רב נחמן. כדי להבהיר זאת, הרשו לי להביא את המשנה והגמרא. המשנה אומרת כל הנעשה דמים באחר כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. הגמרא אומרת זה, אולי חשבתי, מתייחס למטבע. אבל אנחנו יודעים שלא ניתן להשתמש במטבעות בהחלפה. רב יהודה ענה, "זה אומר, מה שמשתמשים בו בהחלפה צריך להיבחן כמה הוא שווה." הגמרא שואלת אז מדוע ה"הייתי אומר" הייתה אפשרות בת קיימא מלכתחילה? תשובה: זה היה אומר שניתן להשתמש במטבע בהחלפה, וגם ניתן להשתמש בפירות בהחלפה. אבל רב נחמן קבע שפירות לא יכולים לשמש בהחלפה, ולכן הגמרא מסיקה שהמשמעות היא שאם מישהו מוכר שור במאה, ולאחר מכן המוכר מגלה שלקונה יש פרה בשווי אותו מחיר, המוכר יכול לומר, "תן לי את הפרה במקום מזומן." ורק על ידי אמירה זו, הרכישה הושלמה. בכל מקרה, קשה להבין את הגמרא הזו, שכן היא אומרת שהגישה האחרונה שבה מישהו שמכר את השור אומר "שמור את המאה שאתה חייב לי" ותן לי את הפרה שלך במקומם, הדין הזה הוא כמו ר' יוחנן שסובר שמהתורה כסף גורם לעסקה כספית להיות תקפה. אני לא מבין מה עצם האמירה "שמור את הכסף ותן לי את הפרה" קשורה לדין התורה שהחלפת מטבע, לא משיכת החפץ שנקנה, גורמת למכירה להיות תקפה. במקרה שלנו, אף אחד מעולם לא משך מטבע כלשהו

I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin pg 28. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the Gemara is going like Rav Joseph that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to Rav Joseph in Kiddushin page 8. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a braita that teaches that a Jewish slave can be acquired either by money or what is worth money, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, Rav Joseph says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that Rav Joseph is referring only to using something that is worth money, not that which is used in an exchange. It is only on page28 that Rav Judah says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the Rambam decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the Gemara understands the mishna according to Rav Nachman. To make this clear let me bring the Mishna and Gemara. The Mishna says anything that is made money, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. R. Judah answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The Gemara then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But Rav Nachman held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the Gemara concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this Gemara is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like R. Yochanan who holds that from the torah money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying keep the money and give me the cow instead has any relevance to the law of the Torah that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the גמרא in קידושין דף כ''ח. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the גמרא is going like רב יוסף that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to רב יוסף in קידושין דף ח'. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a ברייתא that teaches that a עבד can be acquired either by כסף or what is שווה כסף, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, רב יוסף says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that רב יוסף is referring only to using something that isשווה כסף not that which is used in חליפין. It is only on page כ''ח that רב יהודה says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the רמב''ם decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the גמרא understands the משנה according to רב נחמן. To make this clear let me bring the משנה and גמרא. The משנה says כל הנעשה דמים כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. רב יהודה answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The גמרא then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But רב נחמן held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the גמרא concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this גמרא is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like ר' יוחנן who holds that from the תורה, money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying "Keep the money, and give me the cow instead," has any relevance to the law of the תורה that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever.

"What America used to stand for" by Michael Huemer

Here, I talk about what America used to stand for, and how we are losing it. What We Celebrate Sometimes, on the 4th of July, I think about what we’re celebrating, and I wonder how the founders who signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would feel if they saw our celebrations, and our society more generally. I used to think of July 4th as celebrating American values of freedom and independence. But when you look around, it’s hard to find any evidence that the holiday means anything like that to most people. It seems to be more a celebration of our ability to make loud noises and brightly colored flashes of light and, as with all holidays, to stuff our faces. I am not sure if Americans know the Declaration anymore, or if they value what it says. Here is part of what it says, a succinct expression of Lockean libertarian philosophy: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it …. A long list of complaints against King George follows. The document concludes thus: We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. There is then a series of signatures. It is worth remembering that all of those people had reason to believe that they were signing their death warrants. They had just declared war against the world’s most powerful nation; the most likely outcome was that they would lose that war and all be killed—either during the conflict, or by execution afterwards. Why did they do it? Narrow self-interest fails. The only satisfying explanation is that they believed in what they were saying— That the purpose of government is to protect the rights of the governed, that the British government was not doing that, and that the appropriate remedy for such a situation was to cast off that government. People in those days had a lot more courage and a lot more capacity for sacrifice than we do today. I suspect that the poetical bit about pledging their sacred honor was also sincere: people at that time actually thought in those terms.

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