בבא קמא י''ז

עלה בדעתי להזכיר כאן משהו שהתלבטתי לגביו. יש שני מקומות בבבא קמא שבהם שואל רב אשי על גישת סומכוס אך נראה ששני המקומות הללו אינם מתאימים. גם ש ם עולה השאלה בגמרא אם אתה הולך בהתחלה או בסוף ויש קשר כלשהו לשאלה אחרת אם אתה מחשיב את כוחו של כוח זהה לכוח. אבל אולי יותר הגיוני להביא את הנושא עצמו כהקדמה כדי להסביר על מה אני תמה. במקרים מסוימים שבהם בעל חיים גורם נזקים משלם נזק מלא. אבל יש מקרה שהחכמים אומרים שמשלם רק חצי נזק. כלומר כשבהמה הולכת, ודורכת על חלוקי נחל והם מתעופפים ושוברים כלי. שחייבים בחצי נזק לפי החכמים, אבל סומכוס גורסת שמשלם נזק מלא. רבא שאל על מקרה של כוח. האם כוח הוא כמו גוף של חיה או לא. ברור שבסומכוס זה כמו הגוף. אבל מה עם החכמים? אם זה כמו הגוף, אז הוא צריך לשלם נזק מלא. אם לא, הוא לא צריך לשלם כלום. רבא ענה על השאלה שלו ואמר שכולם מסכימים שכוח הוא כמו גוף. אבל החכמים לומדים דין שנמסר מסיני על חצי נזק של אבן להפחית נזקי מלא לחצי נזק. אתה יכול לראות שרבא חושב שחוק חצי פיצויים בא להפחית תשלום, לא להגדיל מכלום לחצי. מאוחר יותר שאל רבא "האם אתה הולך לפי ההתחלה או הסוףדוגמה לשאלה זו תהיה אם מישהו יורה חץ לעבר כלי ואז לפני שהגיע ליעד מישהו שבר את הכלי בפטיש. אם החוק על פי ההתחלה, זה הופך את האדם הראשון לחייב. אם החוק על פי הסיום זה יהפוך את האדם השני לחייב. הגמרא ניסתה לענות על שאלה זו על ידי ברייתא שאמרו במקרה של כח כחו שהוא רק חצי נזק. הגמרא עונה על זה ואומרת הברייתא ההיא כסומכוס. הגמרא אומרת אז שזה לא יכול להיות שכן אז לרב אשי תהיה תשובה לשאלתו. [רב אשי לא היה שואל את זה אם התשובה הייתה מיידית ופשוטה.] שאלת רב אשי הייתה אם כוח של כוח כמו כוח לפי סומכוס או לא. המקום שבו רב אשי שואל את השאלה הזו, אולם הוא שונה במקצת. שם הוא שואל לפי סומכוס כוח של כוח כמו כוח של לא? האם הוא לומד את חוק חצאי הנזק ומחיל אותו בכוח כוח או לא? אם ילמד רב אשי כמו רבא שדין חצי נזק בא להפחית את הקנס, אז זה אומר שסומכוס מחזיק כח כח כמו כח, אזי נדרש תשלום מלא. אבל יכול להיות שרב אשי ילמד שדין חצי נזק בא לתשלום להיות חייב במקום שאם לא כן, לא היה חייב כלל. כמו כן, נראה ששתי השאלות של רב אשי קשורות. אחד אם כוח של כוח הוא כמו כוח או לא. השני אם סומכוס למד לדין חצי נזק בכלל. נראה סביר לומר שאם יחיל בכלל דין חצי נזק זה יכול להיות רק מכוח כח ושאם לא יחיל את הדין הזה אז כח כח יכול להיות לגמרי לא חייב בכלל או שמא יתחייב במלוא הנזק. אני רוצה להוסיף שהרא''ש גורס שאפשר ללמוד משאלת רב אשי על גישתם של החכמים. היו גורסים שכוח כח חייב בנזק מלא, אבל לפי התוספות ורמב''ם החכמים היו אומרים בכח כח שאין חייבים כלל/אולם ברייתא שהגמרא מביא להשיב לשאלת כח כח לחכמים אומרים אם עוף שרט את החוט המחזיק את הדלי והוא נשבר ונפל הדלי ושבר כלי אחר שהוא חצי נזק.וכן בדף כ''ב תוספות מביאה לכאורה הוכחה שכוח כחו אינו חייב כלל, ובכל זאת אפשר ללמוד את הגמרא להיות כמו הרא''ש שיהיה נזק מלא. ומכל מקום שקשה להבין ה את הגמרא. למה לשאול מלכתחילה "בשביל מה חייבת אש?" ר' יוחנן אומר בגלל "חיציו" וריש לקיש אומר בגלל כספו. למה לא לענות כי יש פסוק בתורה שאומר שאש חייבת? כמו כן, מדוע ריש לקיש צריך להפוך את המצב של הכלב שנושא כיכר שיש בה פחם בוער לזה שצריך להיות מקרה של הזה שהכלב זרק את הכיכר. אולי זה בגלל שהוא חושב שאם הכלב היה מוריד את זה, יהיה נזק מלא? אבל על כל פנים, תוספות אומר שלר' יוחנן צריך להיות המצב שהכלב מניח את הכיכר, כי אם היה זורק אותה, זה יהיה כוח כוחו שלא יהיה חייב לגמרי. אני חושב שתוספות רוצה לומר שר' יוחנן רוצה להסביר את המשנה ([שאומרת אם כלב נושא לחם עם פחם בתוכו לערימת אלומות ואוכל אותו, והערימה נשרף, החיוב הוא שעל הכיכר נזק מלא וחצי נזק לערימת האלומות.]) ששריפת כל ערימת האלומות חייבת בחצי נזק, ולכן אם הכלב היה זורק את הכיכר, הוא לא היה אחראי כלל. אבל מצד שני, לר' יוחנן, אש היא כחיצים שלו, וחצים אתה זורק, אז אולי אם הכלב היה זורק את הכיכר, זה יהיה נזק מלא כמו שהרא''ש מבין את הדין לחכמים בכל אופן, דבר אחד אנחנו יכולים לראות הוא שהגמרא משווה את שאלת רבא אם אנחנו הולכים לפי ההתחלה או הסיום להיות זהה כאילו כוחו של כוחו הוא כמו כוחו או לא. לפיכך, הדברים הם סימטריים. רבא שאל לפי החכמים אם נלך לפי התחלה או סיום, כלומר אם כוח כוחו הוא כמו כוח ישיר או עקיף. ואותה שאלה שואל רב אשי לפי סומכוס. אם כן, אנו רואים מדוע רב אשי לא שאל את שאלתו גם לפי החכמים. ויתרה מכך, כיוון שאמרה רבה אנחנו הולכים לפי ההתחלה, עכשיו יש לנו תשובה לשאלת כוחו של כוח. תשובה: זה כמו הכוח. ולכן אם חיה דרכה על כלי והיא התגלגלה ואחר כך נשברה, אף על פי שמדובר בכוח של כח אנו פוסקים אותה ככוח הישיר לחכםים והוא חייב בחצי נזק. כך בהחלט לומד הרא''ש את הנושא הזה. אבל איך התוספות והרמב''ם לומדים את זה, זה לא מובן לי בשלב זה עם זאת, אני חושב שתוספות גורס שביבי בר אביי הסביר את התוספתא (ברייתא) משמע שהעוף דוחף את הכלי עד שהוא נשבר ולכן אין זה רומז שנלך לפי ההתחלה, ולכן יתכן שכוח הכוח אינו ככוח. אבל עד שזה לא אומר שאולי לחכמים זה לא יהיה חייב בכלל. אבל זה כנראה מה שתוספות ראו. שאי אפשר להתחייב לגמרי בנזק מלא, כי אז זה יחמיר עוד יותר מכוח ישיר שחייב רק בחצי נזק. אז תוספות מחזיקים שאנו למדים מביבי בר אביי (שהוא מסקנת הנושא) שכוח כוחו לחכמים אינו חייב כלל. זה לא יכול להיות חצי נזק כי אז זה יהיה כמו כוח ישיר שהגמרא מראה שזה לא יכול להיות שכן לרבא הייתה תשובה פשוטה לשאלתו עם זאת, יש שאלה על תשובה זו .וזאת היא. בשאלת רבא, אם תלך כפי ההתחלה או הסוף כשהכלי נשבר, הוא אומר בגלוי שאם תלך כפי הסוף, זה יהיה חייב בחצי נזק. אם אתה משווה את זה לכוח כוחו זה אינו יכול להיות כמו תוספות והרמב''ם שמחזיקים שכח כוחו אינו חייב כלל. מצד שני, אם היית הולך עם הרעיון של רבא שכח כחו ככחו, אז אין הבדל בין אם זה כמו כוח או כוח של כוח. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהתוספתא עצמה אינה בעיה אם תלמד כמו רב ביבי בר אביי, כי הנזק הראשון הוא ישיר ולכן חייב בנזק מלא, ואז הכלי השני שנשבר הוא הכוח הראשון, לא כח כוחו.

gemara bava kama pages 17, 18 and 19.

It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It is this. There are two places in the Gemara Bava Kama where Rav Ashi is asking about the approach of Sumchos, but these two places do not seem to correspond. Also, there comes up the question in the Gemara about whether you go by the beginning or end, and there seems to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same as a force? But, perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some cases where an animal causes damages, one pays full damage. But, there is a case where the sages say one pays only half damages. That is, when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the sages, but Sumchos holds that pays full damage. Rava asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal, or not? Clearly, to Sumchos, it is like the body. But what about the sages? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damage. If not, he should not have to pay anything. Rava answered his own question, and said that everyone agrees force is like body. But the sages learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebbles to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see Rava thinks half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half. Later Rava asked do you go by the start or the finish. The case that Rava is asking on is this. An animal stepped on a vessel, and it rolled away and then broke on a stone. If you go by the beginning, it is full damage. If you go by the end, it is half damage according to the sages. [Another example of this question would be: if one shot an arrow at a vessel, and then before it reached its destination, someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated.] The Gemara tried to answer this question by a braita that says in a case of force of a force where only half damage is required. The gemara answers this and says that braita is like Sumchos. The gemara then says that this cannot be so, since then Rav Ashi would have an answer to his question. [Rav Ashi would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple.] The question of Rav Ashi was, "If force of a force is like a force according to Sumchos or not?" The place page 19 where Rav Ashi asks this question however is somewhat different. There, he asks according to Sumchos, "Is force of a force like a force of not?' Does he learn the law of half damages and applies it to force of a force, or do he not? s If Rav Ashi learns like Rava that the law of half damages come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that Sumchos holds if force of a force is like a force, then full payment would be required. But it might be that Rav Ashi learns that the law of half damages comes to increace required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of Rav Ashi seem to be related. One, If force of a force is like force or not? The other is if Sumchos learned to law of half damages at all? It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damages at all, it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law, then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all, or that it might be obligated in full damages. I would like to add that the Rosh holds that one can learn from the question of Rav Ashi about the approach of the sages. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full damage, but the Tosphot and Rambam hold the sages would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all. Yet, the braita that the gemara bring (to answer the question of force of a force to the a sages) say if a chicken scratchs the string holding the bucket, and it breaks and the bucket falls and breaks another vessel, that is half damage. Also, on page 22 Tosphot is apparently bringing a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that Gemara to be like the Rosh that it would be full damage. At any rate, that Gemara is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place, "For what is fire obligated?" R Yochanan says because of “his arrows” and Reish Lakish says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the Torah which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does Reish Lakish have to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, Tosphot says that R. Yochanan has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think Tophot means to say that R. Yochanan wants to explain the Mishna [that says if a dog carries a loaf with a coal inside to a stack of sheaves, and eats it, and the stack burns up, the obligation is that on the loaf full damages and half damage for the stack of sheaves.] that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, to R Yochanan, fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the Rosh understands the law to the sages. At any rate, one thing we can see is that the Gemara equates the question of Rava if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. Rava asked according to the sages if we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question Rav Ashi asks according to sumchos. so, we see why Rav Ashi did not ask his question also according to the sages. And furthermore, since Raba said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force, we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages, and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the Rosh learns this subject. But how the Tosphot and Rambam learn it is beyond me at this point However, I think that Tosphot holds that Bivi bar Abaye explained the Tosefta (Braita) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke, and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of his force might be not like force. But still, that does not mean that to the sages it might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what Tosphot saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damages because then, it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so Tosphot holds that we learn from Bivi bar Abaye (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the sages is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the gemara shows that it cannot be since then Rava would have had a simple answer to his question. However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of Rava, if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like Tosphot and the Rambam who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of Rava that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the Tosephta itself is not a problem if you learn like Rav Bivi bar Abaye because the first damage is direct, and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It I this. There are two places in the בבא קמא where רב אשיis asking about the approach of סומכוס but these two place do not seem to correspond. Alo there come up the question in the גמרא about whether you go by the beginning or end and there reem to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same a force. But perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some case where an animal cause damages one pays full damage. But there is a case where the חכמים say one pays only half damages. That Is when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the חכמים , but סומכוס holds that pays full damage. רבא asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal or not. Clearly, to סומכוס it is like the body. But what about theחכמים ? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damages. If not, he should not have to pay anything. רבא answered his own question and אמר everyone agrees force is like body. But the חכמים learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebble to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see רבאthinks the law of half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half. Later רבא asked,” Do you go by the start or the finish.” An example of this question would be if one shot an arrow at a vessel and then before it reached it destination someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated. The גמרא tried to answer this question by a ברייתא that say in a case of force of a force where only half damage I required. The גמראanswers this and says that ברייתא is סומכוס. The גמרא then says that this cannot be so since then רב אשי would have an answer to his question. [רב אשי would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple] The question of רב אשי was If force of a force like a force according to סומכוס or not. The place where רב אשי asks this question however הוא somewhat different. There he asks according to סומכוס is force of a force like a force of not? Does he learn the law of half damages and apply it to force of a force or do he not? If רב אשי learns like רבא that the law of half damage come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that סומכוס hold if force of a force is like a force, then full payment required. But it might be that רב אשי learn that the law of half damage come to required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of רב אשי seem to be related. One If force of a force is like force or not. The other if סומכוס learned to law of half damage at all. It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damage at all it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all or that it might be obligated in full damage. I would like to add that the רא''ש holds that one can learn from the question of רב אשי about the approach of the חכמים. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full damage, but the תוספות and רמב''םhold the חכמים would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all. Also, on page כ''ב תוספות is apparently brining a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that גמרא to be like the רא''ש that it would be full damage. And at any rate that גמרא is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place "For what is fire obligated?" ר' יוחנן says because of “his arrows” and ריש לקיש says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the תורה which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does ריש לקישhave to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, תוספות says that ר' יוחנן has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think תוספות means to say that ר' יוחנן want to explain the משנה that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, toר' יוחנן , fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the רא''ש understands the law to the חכמים. At any rate, one thing we can see is that the גמרא equates the question of רבא if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. רבא asked according to the חכמיםif we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question רב אשי asks according to סומכוס. so, we see why רב אשי did not ask his question also according to the חכמים. And furthermore, since רבה said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the רא''ש learns this subject. But how the תוספות and רמב''ם learn it is beyond me at this point However, I think that תוספות holds that ביבי בר אביי explained the תוספתא.(ברייתא) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of force might be not like force. But till that does not mean that to the חכמיםit might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what תוספות saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damage because then it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so תוספותholds that we learn from ביבי בר אביי (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the חכמים is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the גמרא shows that it cannot be since then רבא would have had a simple answer to his question However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of רבא , if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like תוספותand the רמב''ם who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of רבא that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the תוספתא itself is not a problem if you learn like רב ביבי בר אביי because the first damage is direct and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force.

בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי לשאול מה לדעתי צריך להיות פשוט לענות, אבל אני באמת לא יודע מה יכולה להיות התשובה. בבא בתרא י''ז, אביי אומר שהמשנה צריך להיקרא: "צריך לשמור את בורו שלושת טפחים מכותל הבור של חברו", ולא "מבור חברו". זה נראה כמו הוכחה ישירה לרבא שצריך להחזיק חפץ שיכול לגרום נזק לשלושה טפחים מקו הגבול, גם כשאין עדיין כלום בצד השני. איך אביי יכול להבין את דבריו שלו לפי פסיקתו שאפשר לשים את הגורם לנזק ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים שם משהו שיכול להינזק?(רבא אמר שצריך להרחיק את החפץ שלו שלושה טפחים מהגבול, והצהרה זו של אביי עוזרת לו ישירות.) אולם בהמשך הגמרא רבא מסביר את המשנה לפי ר' יוסי שהחפירה עצמה גורמת נזק. אני לא מבין איך זה עוזר לאביי. אם הוא מתכוון שהקיר עצמו נחשב לחלק מהבור שגורם נזק, אז הוא צריך לומר שהוא יכול לשים אותו ליד הגבול, והשכן השני צריך אז לשמור את הבור שלו ששה טפחים מהגבול. אם מצד שני, הוא מתכוון שרק חלול הבור הוא שגורם לנזק, אז הדרך שבה הוא קורא את המשנה היא ההפרכה הישירה שלו. הוא אמר שהוא יכול לשים משהו שגורם נזק ליד הגבול. לא שלושה טפחים מהגבול. יתרה מזאת, איך כל זה יכול להתייחס לגמרא בהמשך גישתו של רבינו יצחק שאומרת שאם אחד עשה משהו מעט לא בסדר על ידי הצבת החפץ שלו ליד הגבול, אז השני יכול לעשות את אותו הדבר. האם זה אומר שהקיר עושה את הנזק? אז זה כמו מה שהוא אמר. אבל אם הוא מתכוון לשקע הבור, אז שני הבורות יתחברו לבור אחד. אבל על זה כבר ענה רבא שהחפירה היא שגורמת לנזק. אבל עדיין, אני לא רואה איך זה עוזר לאביי---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------הערה מאוחרת יותר. לאחר כתיבת האמור לעיל ראיתי שתוספות שואלים את השאלה הזו ועונים עליה. אבל הרשו לי לציין את המשנה והגמרא בפועל בשלב זה כדי להיות ברור. המשנה אומרת, "אסור לחפור בור ליד הקיר של שכנו ולא סוג אחר של דבר הגורם נזק אלא אם כן הוא מרחיק שלושה טפחים" הגמרא שואלת "למה המשנה משתנה מ'בור' ל'קיר'?" אביי ענה, "זה אומר 'כותל של הבור'". לאחר מכן שואלת הגמרא, "אם כן, יאמר: אסור לחפור בור ליד בור חברו אלא אם כן הרחיק שלוש טפחים". הגמרא ענה: "זה בא לומר לנו שקיר בור הוא שלושה טפחים." תוספות אומר "אם היה כתוב 'כותל הבור' זו תהיה הוכחה לרבא, וזה מה שהגמרא מתכוון לשאול. ואז הוא עונה לאביי, "זה אומר שהקיר הרגיל של בור הוא שלושה טפחים." זה עונה על השאלה במידה מסוימת. זה אומר שכל שאר החפצים שגורמים נזק צריכים להיות שלושה טפחים מהחפץ שיכול להינזק. אבל כאן שני הבורות גורמים נזק. לפיכך, לא ניתן לומר "אי אפשר לחפור בור שלושה טפחים מהבור השני", כי כל בור נדרש להזיז שלושה טפחים, בסך הכל שישה. לכן הוא אומר, "אי אפשר לחפור בור, החלל החלול של הבור, בתוך שלושה טפחים מהקיר של הבור השני". לפיכך ההפרדה תהיה שישה טפחים. הבעיה שעדיין יש לי בעניין זה היא הנקודה בדיון שגמרא שואלת אז, "אם כן, צריך לומר 'אסור לחפור בור ליד הבור של שכנו אלא אם כן הרחיק שלושה טפחים'. "זה אומר שאם אביי צודק צריך לומר, "יש להזיז בור שלושה טפחים מהבור השני". כלומר, חלול אחד של בור יכול להיות בגבול, ואת הבור השני יש להרחיק שלושה טפחים. אבל הבעיה שיש לי כאן היא שאם אביי צודק, אז צריך להרחיק את הבור השני שישה טפחים, לא שלושה טפחים. הסיבה היא שלכל סוג של חפץ שיכול לגרום נזק יש להעביר שלושה טפחים מחפץ שעלול להינזק. יש לקרוא את המשנה כך, "יש להזיז את הבור שלו שישה טפחים מהבור של שכנו" אם אביי צודק------------------------------------- אני רוצה לענות על שאלה זו, אך בהסתייגות מסוימת. ראשית אגיד שבגישת ר' יוסי יש כל הקודם זוכה (הרשאה של מי שקודם) ואם אביי הולך לפי ר' יוסי, אז קל לראות שאם המשנה תגיד אי אפשר לחפור בור ליד הבור של שכנו אלא אם כן התרחק שלוש טפחים, אז זה אומר שיש רשות מי בא ראשון. הבור הראשון אינו חייב לזוז, ובבור השני יש רק חובה להרחיק שלושה טפחים. אם הוא לא רוצה להיפגע מהבור הראשון, אז זכותו להתרחק יותר. עם זאת, תשובה זו תעבוד רק אם אביי ור' יוסי יסכימו. עם זאת, אצל אביי עצמו, איננו רואים כל סוג של אישור של כל הקודם זוכה. רק אנחנו רואים שאם אין שום דבר אחר לא ליד הגבול, אז הוא יכול לשים את הדבר שלו שם. אבל אחרי שמשהו יגיע, אנחנו לא יודעים מה אביי היה אומר

On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask what I think should be simple to answer but I really do not know what could be the answer. in Bava Batra page 17 Abaye says the Mishna should read: “One must keep his pit three handbreadths from the wall of the pit of his neighbor,” not "from the pit of his neighbor." This seems like a direct proof of Rava that one should keep an object that can cause damage three handbreadths from the border line, even when there is nothing yet on the other side. How could Abaye understand his own statement according to his ruling that one can put that which causes damage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor put there something that can be damaged? (Rava said that one must keep one's object three handbreadths from the border, and this statement of Abayee help him directly.) However, later in the gemara, Rava explains the Mishna according to R. Jose to mean that the digging itself causes damage. I do not how that helps Abayee. If he means the wall itself is considered part of the pit that causes damage then he should say he can put it next to the border, and the other neighbor then has to keep his pit 6 handbreadths from the border. If on the other hand, he means only the hollow of the pit is what causes damage, then the way he reads the Mishna is his direct refutation. He said he can put something that causes damage next to the border. Not three handbreadths from the border. Furthermore, how can any of this relate to the Gemara later in the approach of Rabainu Ihzhak that holds if one did something slightly wrong by putting his object next to the border, then the other can do the same. Does that mean the wall does the damage? Then that is like what he said. But if he means the hollow of the pit, then the two pits would be joined into one pit. But this was already answered by Rava that it is the digging that causes the damage. But still, I do not see how that helps Abayee. Later note. After writing the above I saw that Tosphot asks this question and answers it. But let me state the actual Mishna and Gemara at this point to be clear. The Mishna says, “One must not dig a pit near the wall of his neighbor nor other type of thing that causes damage unless he moves away three handbreadths.” The Gemara asks “Why does the Mishna change from ‘pit’ to ‘wall’?” Abaye answered, “It means ‘the wall of the pit’”. The Gemara then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’”. The Gemara answered, “It comes to tell us the wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” Tosphot says,” If it would say ‘the wall of the pit’ that would be proof to Rava and that is what the Gemara intends to ask. And then it answers for Abaye, “It means the normal wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” This answers the question to some degree. It means that all the other kind of objects that cause damage have to be three handbreadths from the object that can be damaged. But here both pits cause damage. Thus, it cannot say, “You cannot dig a pit three handbreadths from the other pit” because each pit is required to be moved three handbreadths totaling six in all. So, it says, “You cannot dig a pit (that is the hollow space of the pit) within three handbreadths of the wall of the other pit”, and thus the separation will be six handbreadths. The problem I still have on this is the point in the discussion “The Gemara then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’ “That means if abaye right it should say a pit three handbreadths from the other pit. That is, one hollow of a pit is at the boundary and the other must be away three. But if Abayee is right, the other would have to be six away, not three, since each kind of damage must be three from that which can be damaged. The Mishna would have to be read, "One must move his pit six handbreadths from the pit of his neigbor" if Abyee would be right.I would like to answer this question but with some reservation. First let me say that in the approach of R. Jose there is first come first served (permission of who comes first) and if Abaye is going according to R. Jose then it is easy to see that if the Mishna would say one cannot dig a pit next to the pit of hi neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths then that would mean there is permission of who came first. The first pit does not have to move and the second pit only has an obligation of moving three handbreadths away. If he de not want to be damaged by the first pit then it is his prerogative to move away further. However, this answer would only work if Abaye and r Jose agree. However, in Abaye himself, we do not see any kind of permission of first come first served. Only we ee if nothing else is next to the border, then he can put his thing there. But after something comes, we do not know what Abaye would say ______________________________________________________________________________________ On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask what I think should be simple to answer but I really do not know what could be the answer. In בבא בתרא י''ז אביי says the משנה should read: “One must keep his pit three טפחים from the wall of the pit of his neighbor,” not "from the pit of his neighbor." This seems like a direct proof of רבא that one should keep an object that can cause damage three טפחים from the border line, even when there is nothing yet on the other side. How could אביי understand his own statement according to his ruling that one can put that which causes damage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor put there something that can be damaged? However, later in the ,גמרא רבא explains the משנה according to ר' יוסי to mean that the digging itself causes damage. I do not how that helps אביי. If he means the wall itself is considered part of the pit that causes damage then he should say he can put it next to the border, and the other neighbor then has to keep his pit 6 handbreadths from the border. If on the other hand, he means only the hollow of the pit is what causes damage, then the way he reads the משנה is his direct refutation. He said he can put something that causes damage next to the border. Not three handbreadths from the border. Furthermore, how can any of this relate to the גמרא later in the approach of רבינו יצחקthat holds if one did something slightly wrong by putting his object next to the border, then the other can do the same. Does that mean the wall does the damage? Then that is like what he said. But if he means the hollow of the pit, then the two pits would be joined into one pit. But this was already answered by רבא that it is the digging that causes the damage. But still, I do not see how that helps אביי. Later note. After writing the above I saw that תוספות asks this question and answers it. But let me state the actual משנהand גמרא at this point to be clear. The משנהsays, “One must not dig a pit near the wall of his neighbor nor other type of thing that causes damage unless he moves away three handbreadths.” The גמרא asks “Why does the משנה change from ‘pit’ to ‘wall’?” אביי answered, “It means ‘the wall of the pit’”. The גמרא then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’”. The גמראanswered, “It comes to tell us the wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” תוספות says,” If it would say ‘the wall of the pit’ that would be proof to רבא and that is what the גמרא intends to ask. And then it answers for אביי, “It means the normal wall of a pit is three handbreadths.” This answers the question to some degree. It means that all the other kind of objects that cause damage have to be three handbreadths from the object that can be damaged. But here both pits cause damage. Thus, it cannot say, “You cannot dig a pit three handbreadths from the other pit” because each pit is required to be moved three handbreadths totaling six in all. So, it says, “You cannot dig a pit (that is the hollow space of the pit) within three handbreadths of the wall of the other pit”, and thus the separation will be six handbreadths. The problem I still have on this is the point in the discussion גמרא then asks, “If so, it should say, ‘One must not dig a pit near the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths’ “That mean if אביי right it should say a pit three handbreadths from the other pit. That is, one hollow of a pit is at the boundary and the other mut be away three. But if אביי is right the other would have to be six away not three since each kind of damage must be three from that which can be damaged. The משנהwould have to be read one must move his pit six handbreadths from the pit of his neigbor if אביי would be right I would like to answer this question but with some reservation. First let me say that in the approach of ר' יוסי there is first come first served (permission of who comes first) and if אביי is going according to ר' יוסי then it is easy to see that if the משנה would say one cannot dig a pit next to the pit of his neighbor unless he moved away three handbreadths, then that would mean there is permission of who came first. The first pit does not have to move, and the second pit only has an obligation of moving three handbreadths away. If he does not want to be damaged by the first pit, then it is his prerogative to move away further. However, this answer would only work if אבייand ר' יוסי agree. However, in אביי himself, we do not see any kind of permission of first come first served. Only we ee if nothing else is next to the border, then he can put his thing there. But after something comes, we do not know what אביי would say

יש לי שתי שאלות על גישתו של רבינו יצחק בבא בתרא דף י''ח. שתיהן מתייחסות לתשובת רב פפא שהמשנה הוא מקרה של מכירה. בגישת הר''י המצב שלפני תשובת רב פפא הוא שהדבורים נמצאות בגבול, והן עושות נזק. השאלה היא על רבא, "אם כן איך מוצאים את זה?" אבל לאביי, אין שאלה כי בעל הדבורים עשה משהו מעט לא בסדר בכך ששם את הדבורים ליד הגבול שבו התכוון בעל החרדל לשים את החרדל שלו. למרות שמותר לעשות זאת לאביי, עדיין זה היה מעט שגוי. ואז רב פפא אומר שזה מקרה של מכירה. זה אומר להר''י שעכשיו החרדל בגבול והחכמים מחזיקים שהדבורים לא עושות נזק, אבל ר' יוסי שומר על ההנחה המקורית שהם עושות נזק, אבל מסכים שעכשיו החרדל בגבול. השאלה היא אם אתה מניח שהבעלים של הדבורים עשה משהו מעט לא בסדר בכך ששם את הדבורים שלו ליד הגבול, אז למה שלא יגיד את אותו הדבר עכשיו לגבי החרדל? ר' יוסי יכול לומר שהבעלים של החרדל עשה משהו מעט לא בסדר, ולכן בעל הדבורים יכול לשים את הדבורים ליד הגבול. עם זאת, ניתן לענות על שאלה זו כך. שינוי העמדה הוא גם לרבנן. אומרים שעכשיו הדבורים לא גורמות נזק אז איפה שהן נמצאות, יש להרחיק את החרדל ששה טפחים. על כך משיב ר' יוסי שהייתי אומר שאם הדבורים בגבול, בעל החרדל יכול לשים שם את החרדל בגלל שהדבורים עושות משהו רע, וגם אם החרדל בגבול גם בגלל עשיית עוולה, אז בעל הדבורים יכול לשים שם גם את הדבורה. אולם במקרה הראשון לא הייתי אומר לשים את החרדל ליד הדבורים שכן מדובר במכירה. התכוונתי רק שאם החרדל כבר שם, אז הוא יכול להישאר. [כלומר שהוא מסכים שהחרדל עושה יותר נזק מהדבורים. לכן, הוא לא היה אומר לשים אותו ליד הדבורים במקרה שהדבורים כבר שם. אבל אם החרדל נמצא שם קודם הוא יכול להישאר ויש להניח שאפשר לשים את הדבורים לידו את החרדל.] (כוונתי היא שר' יוסי רק עונה את החכמים הם אומרים להרחיק את החרדל, והוא עונה לא צריך. "ר' יוסי מתיר.") שאלה נוספת היא שר' יוסי צריך לומר את אותו הדבר על שני הבורות. אבל תוספות כבר עונים על זה שבכל מקרה החפירה גורמת נזק, אז אף אחת מהן לא יכולה להיות ליד הגבול ואם כבר, צריך להזיז אותה

I have two questions on the approach of Rabainu Izhak in Bava Batra page 18.

I have two questions on the approach of Rabainu Izhak in Bava Batra page 18. Both relate to the answer of Rav Papa that the Mishna is a case of a sale. In the approach of the R"I (Rabainu Izhak), the situation before the answer of Rava Papa is the bees are at the border, and they do damage. The question is on Rava, "If so, how do we find this?" But to Abaye there is no question because the owner of the bees did something slightly wrong by putting the bees near the border where the owner of the mustard was going to put his mustard. Even though it is allowed to do so to Abaye, still it was slightly wrong. Then Rav Papa says it is a case of a sale. That means to R"I that now the mustard is at the border, and the sages hold the bees do no damage, but R. Jose keeps the original assumption that they do damage. He agrees that now the mustard is at the border. The question is if you assume the owner of the bees did something slightly wrong by putting his bees next to the boundary, then why not say the same thing now about the mustard? R. Jose could say owner of the mustard did something slightly wrong, and so the owner of the bees can put the bees next to the boundary. However, this question can be answered thus. The changing of the position is also to the sages. They say now the bees do no damage, so where ever they are, the mustard must be kept away 6 handbreadths. To that R. Jose replies that “I would have said if the bees are at the border, the owner of the mustard can put the mustard there because of the bees doing something wrong. Also if the mustard is at the border (also because of wrong doing), then the owner of the bees can put the bees there also. However, in the first case I would not say to put the mustard next to the bee since it is a case of a sale. I only meant if the mustard is already there then it can stay.” [That means that he agrees the mustard does more damage than the bees. so, he would not say, "Put it next to the bees" in the case they bees are already there. But, if the mustard is there first, it can stay, and presumably the bees can be put next it the mustard.] Another question is that R. Jose ought to say the same thing about the two pits. But Tosphot already answered this that in any case the digging causes damage so neither one can be right next to the border and if it already, it needs to be moved._______________________________________________I have two questions on the approach of רבינו יצחק in בבא בתרא page י''ח. Both relate to the answer of רב פפא that the משנה is a case of a sale. In the approach of the הר''י the situation before the answer of רב פפא is the bees are at the border and they do damage the question is on רבא, "If so, how do we find this?" But to אביי there is no question because the owner of the bees did something slightly wrong by putting the bees near the border where the owner of the mustard was going to put his mustard. Even though it is allowed to do so to אביי, still it was slightly wrong. Then רב פפא says it is a case of a sale. That mean to הר''י that now the mustard is at the border and the חכמים hold the bees do no damage, but ר' יוסי keeps the original assumption that they do damage, but agrees that now the mustard is at the border. The question is if you assume the owner of the bees did something slightly wrong by putting his bees next to the boundary, then why not say the same thing now about the mustard? ר' יוסי could say owner of the mustard did something slightly wrong, and so the owner of the bees can put the bees next to the boundary. However, this question can be answered thus. The changing of the position is also to theרבנן . They say now the bees do no damage so where ever they are, the mustard must be kept away ששה טפחים. To that ר' יוסי replies that I would have said if the bees are at the border, the owner of the mustard can put the mustard there because of the bee doing something wrong an also if the mustard is at the border also because of wrong doing, then the owner of the bees can put the bee there also. However, in the first case I would not say to put the mustard next to the bee since it is a case of a sale. I only meant if the mustard is already there then it can stay. [that means that he agrees the mustard does more damage than the bees. so, he would not say put it next to the bees in the case they bee are already there. But if the mustard is there first it can stay and presumably the bees can be put next it the mustard.] Another question is that ר' יוסי ought to say the same thing about the two pits. But תוספות already answered this that in any case the digging causes damage so neither one can be right next to the border and if it already, it needs to be moved.

First World Problems: Dating Michael Huemer Feb 18

First World Problems: Dating Michael Huemer Feb 18 “First world problems” are problems that only become salient when your basic physical needs are met. They’re not the worst problems; people in the third world regularly suffer from worse problems, such as malaria, malnutrition, and war, and they probably don’t think much about the sort of problems that we in the first world face. But since you probably live in the first world, first world problems are probably important to you. Among the biggest of these is the difficulty most people have with romantic and sexual relationships. So I’m going to talk about why this problem exists, why it’s bad, and how it might be addressed. 1. The Mating Problem If there is a God, He did not intend us for happiness. There are multiple fundamental aspects of life that are obvious recipes for pain and misery. For instance, there is the fact that all animals, to survive, must destroy other life. More broadly, there is the entropy law (the 2nd law of thermodynamics), which ensures that everything is destined for deterioration and requires a constant influx of energy to maintain. In spite of some huge problems like that, human beings have managed to do pretty well for ourselves. Technology solves for most of our physical needs. We can cure diseases and provide plentiful, nutritious foods through technology. We haven’t yet done that for everyone, but we’re getting there. But many of the first world problems appear to lie beyond the reach of technology, because the problem lies in our inherently incompatible desires. The mating problem is a collection of problems arising out of common human desires. (See my earlier posts, “Jerky Men and Crazy Women” and “Are Men and Women Different?”.) Most men desire multiple partners. However, there are not multiple times as many women as men, nor do many men want to share their partners with other men, so men’s desires are incompatible with each other. Nor do many women want to share their partners with other women, so men’s desires are also incompatible with women’s desires. Note: Among societies studied by anthropologists, 15% are strictly monogamous; 85% have polygamy. 0.3% have polyandry. Most men want women to be promiscuous with them, but they do not want women to be promiscuous with other men. Men want to have sex a lot more often than women do. (And, again, there are not multiple times more women than men in society.) Many, perhaps most people are unattractive. Unattractive people have just as strong desires for a mate as attractive people do, but people generally do not desire unattractive mates. Everyone wants to be with a highly attractive partner, but there are not enough of these. There is a particular shortage of attractive men (another way to put it: there is a shortage of female desire or feelings of attraction to typical males). While in a relationship, men and women have frequent problems due to their different desires and attitudes. They often have trouble understanding each other or relating to each other; hence the famous book title, “Men are from Mars; women are from Venus”. (I assume gay couples have an easier time.) To some extent, both sexes desire the sort of person who would make them unhappy. Women are often attracted to jerks (or attracted to traits that are positively correlated with jerkiness), which is an obvious recipe for unhappiness. Men, for their part, have traditionally wanted to get a woman with as few previous partners as possible, ideally a virgin. However, in a modern, free society, there are only two kinds of women who would be like this (after a certain age): (a) extremely unattractive women, and (b) women who do not like sex. Neither of these would make these men happy. Both sexes also greatly overemphasize appearance, which is not strongly correlated with ability to make a partner happy. 2. The Biggest First World Problem? This is among the biggest of the first world problems. a. It affects a huge number of people for a significant part of their lives. Maybe some super-attractive people are having an easy time, although I have even met super-attractive people who are still having a hard time. b. It affects us in one of the most important areas of our lives. Nature didn’t design us for making money, or just surviving, or being physically safe. Nature selects for reproduction. To Nature, everything else is instrumental to that. And the way we reproduce is through finding a mate. That is why Nature gave us very strong desires for a partner; the inability to find one, or to find a good one, is a source of huge dissatisfaction in life. The problem may be worsening. Increasing numbers of young people are not having sex. From 2000 to 2018, the portion of 18-24-year-old men who reported having no sex in the last year increased from 19% to 31% (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7293001/). This is a serious problem, since as discussed previously (“Are Men and Women Different”), evolution designed men (and this is especially true of young men) for general lust. I promise you that 31% of young men are not happy to be having no sex for over a year. For the benefit of female readers, the best way to explain it is to ask you to imagine that you wake up feeling hungry in the morning, and there’s no food. You remain hungry all day, and you go to bed hungry at night. The next day, the same thing happens. The next day, it happens again. And it’s just like that every day, all year. If this was your situation, that would be your biggest problem (unless you have malaria, or people are trying to kill you, or some crazy shit like that). Potential for violence Some people worry about the Young Male Syndrome, the phenomenon that young, single men are more prone to crime and violence. (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40750-023-00219-w) There is a growing online community of “incels”, involuntarily celibate men, who are generally miserable, resentful, and have a very dark view of life. One article describes the incel community as a domestic terrorism threat and cites a whopping total of 50 incel murders in the U.S. (https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/incels-americas-newest-domestic-terrorism-threat). In fact, the threat is surprisingly low. The above article didn’t specify the time period for the 50 murders, but it appears they included at least 2015-2019. For comparison, there were 72,781 total murders in the U.S. during that period. And there are tens to hundreds of thousands of members of the incel community (plus millions more who are involuntarily celibate but not members of an online community centered on such). So my guess is that the 50 murders make for a lower murder rate than the general male population, perhaps much lower. You might think that incels would be more prone to sexual violence, but there’s no indication of this. In surveys, incels are much less open to sexual violence than the general population of men. 20-30% of men report at least some willingness to commit rape if they could get away with it, compared to only 13% of incels. (https://labs.la.utexas.edu/buss/files/2023/07/Whyisnttheremoreincelviolence.pdf) One hypothesis is that incels are generally more passive than average, which could explain both why they haven’t found a mate and why they are less prone to violence. Suicidality So the threat of external violence is overblown. But the threat of self-harm is not. The mating problem (the difficulty of finding mates) is part of the suicide problem, especially for men. Among males in general, suicide rates are four times higher than among women. Suicide rates in the U.S. have increased 30% in the last 20 years, with about 47,000 people killing themselves per year. This is much more than the number of homicides. Aside: You might ask: Why especially men? There are equal numbers of men and women, so if men are having trouble finding partners, then women must be having about as much trouble. (Unless we have a lot of polygyny in our society.) The answer, I believe, is that for men, finding a partner is a more urgent felt need. It’s not like the desire for a good career (a long-term concern, which you can spend years working on and still feel ok); it’s more like the desire to eat when you’re hungry. I am not just guessing at the celibacy-suicide link. In one poll, 67% of incels reported seriously considering suicide (https://www.adl.org/resources/article/online-poll-results-provide-new-insights-incel-community), compared to a rate of just 4% for the general population (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/ss/ss7101a1.htm). Previous work has shown a strong inverse relationship between reproductive prospects and suicidal ideation. For young men (age 18-30), lack of sex in the last month was the single strongest predictor of suicidality. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0162309595000550) For those who might be inclined to pooh-pooh the “sex shortage” problem, this should be something of a wake up call. To be clear, the problem is not just that tens of thousands of people are killing themselves each year. The problem is that hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, are so miserable that the idea of killing themselves doesn’t sound unreasonable. Only a fraction of these people will actually kill themselves, but the suicidal ideation is just an indicator of how much suffering there is. Not being able to find a partner is not a trivial problem, like having too much dip for your chips; it is a life-ruining problem. Why is the incel problem underestimated? There is relatively little attention paid to the problem of involuntary celibacy in our society, and most discussion of the incel problem treats it purely as a problem of some bad men who have bad ideas and who might cause harm to others. (They’re misogynists! They’re terrorists!) I think this is partly because our society still has taboos around sex that prevent us from acknowledging that a shortage of sex is actually a serious problem; partly because neither women nor men care about the pain of unattractive men (these men are basically invisible); and partly because people who have romantic success either never knew or have forgotten the pain of not having it, and those people dominate our public conversations. 3. Solutions A certain amount of unhappiness appears to be built into the structure of human desires. Nevertheless, how could the mating problem be mitigated? Some ideas: Does pornography help single people cope? I doubt it. This is sort of like suggesting that, to mitigate world hunger, we should give hungry people pictures of food. The hungry people might spend time looking at the pictures instead of trying to find real food, but I don’t think this would make them happy. And of course, pornography does little for women. Prostitution: This should of course be legalized. However, this wouldn’t be of interest to most women, and it isn’t a great solution even for men, since men need to develop real relationships with people who actually want to have sex with them. Robot partners: These are probably coming, and they will probably ease some of the suffering of single people. With AI, these robots will not just provide sex; they’ll also provide pseudo-relationships, for both male and female users. Problem: These robot partners may supplant real (conscious, human) partners. This may prevent people from learning how to, or being motivated to, develop real relationships, which will keep people in a second-best state. It would also exacerbate the problem of declining fertility, which may be a complete disaster for our society. Optimisitically, perhaps robot partners could help people by giving them practice in interacting with the opposite sex in a low-stakes situation (because the other “party” isn’t actually conscious). Perhaps the robots could provide feedback which would help people improve their interaction skills. That’s possible, but to be honest, the “supplanting real relationships” option seems more likely to actually occur. Attractiveness: We need more attractive people. Technology can help with that. Weight-loss drugs can help people be more attractive as well as healthier. We should make them available over the counter. We can develop food additives that make food delicious without being fattening. Perhaps we can develop easy ways of becoming healthy without having to do tedious or unpleasant exercises. What if there was a pill you could take to get jacked? Perhaps the world should follow South Korea’s lead in using cosmetic surgery to make everyone more beautiful. Perhaps we will use genetic engineering to create generations who are born attractive. Perhaps we could make it so that virtually all men are taller than virtually all women, we could engineer out social anxiety, etc. Perhaps we can change our own desires, either through drugs or through genetic engineering, so that our desires wouldn’t be so incompatible. E.g., maybe we could engineer less jealous people, men with lower sex drive, and women with higher sex drive, so that they would match each other. We can also try developing cultural norms with the same effect. But I sense that we’ve already done about as much in that direction as we can.

סיכום הגישה של הר''י בבא בתרא י''ח ע''ב

אין סיבה לחבר אוטומטית את מושג "החצים שלו" בעמוד כ''ב עם הגישה של ר' יוסי בעמוד 18. יכול להיות שיש קשר, אבל זה לא אוטומטי. כאן ברצוני ללמוד את סוגיא בעמוד י''ח לפי רבינו יצחק (הר''י) ומה תהיה המסקנה הסופית. המסקנה הסופית היא שר' יוסי סבור שזה על החפץ שניתן להינזק שיועבר רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל במצב של שני שכנים בלבד, כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק צריך להזיז שלושה טפחים מהגבול לפי החוק שקבע רבא. במשנה שלנו כאן של החרדל והדבורים וגיגית הפשתן והירקות, ר' יוסי מחזיק שלא צריך להזיז את החרדל ולא את הגיגית כי זה מקרה של מכירה. וכן, זה יהיה המקרה של דף כ''ה עם העץ והבור. אין צורך להזיז את העץ כי לר' יוסי זה גם מקרה של מכירה. כעת רבא ור' יוסי מסכימים שכל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק במצב שאינו מכירה צריך להזיז. אבל האם זה אומר שר' יוסי מסכים עם כל שאר הנזקים בפרק זה? יכול להיות שהוא מסכים במקרים האלה ולא בגלל "החצים שלו", אלא פשוט בגלל שהוא מסכים עם כל שאר המקרים שהם גורמים נזק. זה לא קשור לרעיון חיציו בעמוד 22. בעמ' 22 נאמר שר' יוסי מסכים עם החכמים במקרה של חיציו. זה אומר שגם במקרה של מכירה, ר' יוסי יסכים עם החכמים שיש להזיז את כל מיני החפצים שיכולים לגרום נזק אם הם החצים שלו. אבל זה לא בהכרח קשור לגמרא שלנו בעמוד י''ח. כאן ר' יוסי חולק על החכמים בכל מקרה של מכירה. בכל שאר המשניות כנראה שבמקרה של מכירה הוא גם לא יסכים. אם אתה הולך עם הרעיון שר' יוסי מסכים במקרה של החצים שלו בעמוד 22, אז רבינו חננאל מחזיק כל המשניות בפרק זה הם החצים שלו ורש''י לא מסכים. זה כנראה מבוסס על הגמרא שלנו כאן בעמוד 18 שאומר במסקנתו שר' יוסי ניסה לשכנע את החכמים בעניין החרדל והדבורים. אבל הוא חולק עליהם גם לגבי המקרה של הגיגית והירקות. זו עשויה להיות סיבה לומר שר' יוסי חולק על כל שאר המקרים בפרק זה

The conclusion of Rabbainu Izhak in Bava Batra page 18

There is no reason to automatically connect the concept of his arrows on page 22 with the approach of R Jose on page 18. There might be a connection, but it is not automatic. Here I would like to learn the sugia on page 18 according to Rabbainu Izhak, and what would be the ultimate conclusion. The ultimate conclusion is that R Jose holds it is upon the object that can be damaged to be moved only in a case of a sale. But in a situation of just two neighbors, anything that can cause damage has to move three handbreadths from the border a per the law stated by Rava. In our mishna here of the mustard and bees and the tub of linen and vegetables, R Jose holds nor the mustard nor the tub have to be moved because this is a case of a sale. And also, that would be the case of page 25 with the tree and pit. The tree does not have to be moved because to R Jose that is also a case of a sale. Now Rava and R Jose agree that anything that can cause damage in a situation that is not a sale has to be moved. But does that mean that R Jose agrees with all the other kinds of damage in this chapter? It might be that he agrees in these cases, and not because of his arrows, but simply because he agrees with all the other cases that they cause damage. This does not relate to the idea of his arrows on page 22 On page 22 it is stated that R Jose agrees with the sages in the case of his arrows. That would mean that even in a case of a sale, R. Jose would agree with the sages that all the kinds of objects that can cause damage have to be moved if they are his arrows. But that does not necessarily relate to our gemara on page 18. Here R Jose disagrees with the sages in any case of a sale. In all the other mishnayot presumably in the case of a sale he would also disagree. (If you go with the idea that R Jose agrees in a case of his of his arrows on page 22, then then Rabbainu Chnanel holds all the mishnayot in this chapter are his arrows and Rashi disagrees based on our gemara here on page 18 that says in its conclusion that R Jose was trying to convince the sages about the case of mustard and bees, but in fact he disagrees with them also about the tub and vegetables. That might be a reason to say that R Jose disagrees in all the other cases in this chapter.) ____________________________________________________________________________ There is no reason to automatically connect the concept of his arrows on page כ''ב with the approach of ר' יוסי on page 18. There might be a connection, but it is not automatic. Here I would like to learn the סוגיא on page י''ח according to רבינו יצחק (הר''י)and what would be the ultimate conclusion. The ultimate conclusion is that ר' יוסי holds it is upon the object that can be damaged to be moved only in a case of a sale. But in a situation of just two neighbors, anything that can cause damage has to move three handbreadths from the border as per the law stated by רבא. In our משנה here of the mustard and bees and the tub of linen and vegetables, ר' יוסי holds nor the mustard nor the tub have to be moved because this is a case of a sale. Also, that would be the case of page כ''ה with the tree and pit. The tree does not have to be moved because to ר' יוסי that is also a case of a sale. Now רבא and ר' יוסי agree that anything that can cause damage in a situation that is not a sale has to be moved. But does that mean that ר' יוסי agree with all the other kind of damage in this chapter? It might be that he agrees in these cases and not because of his arrows, but simply because he agrees with all the other cases that they cause damage. This does not relate to the idea of his arrows on page 22 On page 22 it is stated that ר'יוסי agrees with the חכמים in the case of his arrows. That would mean that even in a case of a sale ר' יוסי would agree with the חכמים that all the kinds of objects that can cause damage have to be moved if they are his arrows. But that does not necessarily relate to our גמרא on page 18. Here ר' יוסי disagrees with the חכמים in any case of a sale. in all the other משניות presumably in the case of a sale he would also disagree.(If you go with the idea that ר' יוסי agree in a case of his of his arrows on page 22 then then רבינו חננאל holds all the משניות in this chapter are his arrows and רש''י disagrees based on our גמרא here on page 18 that says in its conclusion that ר' יוסי was trying to convince the חכמים about the case of mustard and bees, but in fact he disagrees with them also about the tub and vegetables. That might be a reason to say that ר' יוסי disagrees in all the other cases in this chapter.) ________

za68 in F Minor a Midi File za68 a nwc file

בבא בתרא דף י''ח לתוספות יש שאלה על רבינו יצחק שלדעתו אפילו די כדי לדרוש מאיתנו ללמוד את סוגיא לפי רבינו תם. השאלה היא שלפי ר''י נדרש להבחין בין המקרה של גיגית פשתן ליד ירקות לבין העץ ליד בור. אני רוצה להסביר את השאלה הזו כאן. אבל לפני שאעשה זאת, אני רוצה להזכיר שההבחנה הזו אינה שרירותית כפי שהיא נשמעת. הרי המשניות בפרק זה (לא יחפור, פרק שני בבא בתרא) לא מבדילות בין מתי הונח שם החפץ הגורם לנזק. בכל המקרים פרט לעץ, כתוב שצריך להסיר את החפץ שגורם לנזק (ואין בה הבחנה מתי החפץ הונח שם). ואפילו לפי נוסח ר''ת שהוא אלא אמר רבינא עדיין יכול להיות הבדל. שהרי זה נוסח הר''י מיגש, ובכל זאת גם הוא עושה הבחנה. הוא מחזיק במקרה של העץ, הוא יכול להישאר שם אם הוא היה שם קודם, אבל בכל שאר המקרים יש להסיר את הדבר הגורם לנזק ברגע ששמים שם משהו שיכול להינזק. עכשיו הרשו לי לומר מה הייתה השאלה המקורית על ר''י. זה שאנחנו שומרים על רעיון מכירה ושגם במקרה של מכירה אומרים החכמים להרחיק מהגבול את הדבר הגורם לנזק ואילו במקרה של עץ, אם היה שם קודם, הוא יכול להישאר. לר''ת אין בזה שאלה כי לדבריו כל המקרים בפרק זה שווים. בכולם, אם החפץ שגורם נזק היה שם ראשון, הוא יכול להישאר. עוד אני רוצה להזכיר שלשניהם ר''ת ור''י קשה להבין מדוע לא שאל הגמרא מיד מהחכמים על רבא; וכן, מדוע לא שאל הגמרא מדוע אמרו החכמים שאם העץ היה שם קודם הוא יכול להישאר בעוד שבשום מקרה אחר לא אומרים זאת.

Bava Batra page 18 Tosphot has a question on Rabbainu Izhak

Bava Batra page 18 Tosphot has a question on Rabbainu Izhak that he thinks even is enough to require us to learn the sugia according to Rabainu Tam. The question is that according to R Ihzhak one is required to make a distinction between the case of a tub of linen next to vegetables and the tree next to a pit. I would like to explain this question here. But before I do, I want to mention that this distinction is not as arbitrary as it sounds. After all, the mishnayot in this chapter make no distinction between when the object that causes damage was put there. In all cases except for the tree, it says you have to remove the object that causes damage (and it does not make any distinction about when the object was put there). And even according to the version of R''T which is “rather Ravina said” there still could be a difference. For that is the version of the Ri Migash, and yet he too makes a distinction. He holds in the case of the tree, it can stay there if it was there first, but in all other cases the thing that causes damage has to be removed once something is put there that can be damaged. Now let me say what the original question on Rabinu Izhak was. It is that we keep with the idea of a sale and that even in the case of sale the sages say to keep the thing that causes damage away from the border while in the case of a tree, if it was there first, it can stay. To rabainu Tam this is no question because according to him, all the cases in this chapter are equal. In all of them, if the object that causes damage was there first, it can stay. I also want to mention that to both Rabainu Tam and Rabainu Izhak it is hard to understand why the gemara did not ask from the sages on Rava right away; and also, why the Gemara did not ask why the sages said the if the tree was there first it can stay while in no other case do the sages say this.______________________________________________________________בבא בתרא page י''ח תוספות has a question on רבינו יצחק that he thinks even is enough to require us to learn the סוגיה according to רבינו תם. The question is that according to ר''י one is required to make a distinction between the case of a tub of linen next to vegetables and the tree next to a pit. I would like to explain this question here. But before I do, I want to mention that this distinction is not as arbitrary as it sounds. After all, the משניות in this chapter (לא יחפר, פרק שני בבא בתרא)make no distinction between when the object that causes damage was put there. In all cases except for the tree, it says you have to remove the object that causes damage (and it does not make any distinction about when the object was put there). And even according to the version of ר''ת which is אלא אמר רבינא there still could be a difference. For that is the version of the ר''י מיגש, and yet he too makes a distinction. He holds in the case of the tree, it can stay there if it was there first, but in all other cases the thing that causes damage has to be removed once something is put there that can be damaged. Now let me say what the original question on ר''י was. It is that we keep with the idea of a sale and that even in the case of sale the חכמים say to keep the thing that causes damage away from the border while in the case of a tree, if it was there first, it can stay. To ר''ת this is no question because according to him, all the cases in this chapter are equal. In all of them, if the object that causes damage was there first, it can stay. I also want to mention that to both ר''תandר''י it is hard to understand why the גמראdid not ask from the חכמים on רבא right away; and also, why the גמרא did not ask why the חכמים said the if the tree was there first it can stay while in no other case do the חכמים say this.

רבינו תם בבא בתרא י''ח ע''ב

לפי רבינו תם, רבא מחזיק כמו החכמים, לא כמו ר' יוסי. לפיכך, הדרך שבה ר''ת מבין את רבינא היא שרבא מחזיק כמו הרבנן שרק כשיש משהו בצד השני של הגבול שיכול להינזק, בעל החפץ שיכול לגרום נזק חייב להרחיק אותו מהגבול. הוויכוח בין החכמים לר' יוסי הוא על הרעיון שבעל הדבורים עשה משהו מעט לא תקין בכך ששם אותן ליד הגבול, ולכן בעל החרדל יכול לעשות את אותו הדבר. החכמים חולקים על כך, ואומרים שאף על פי שבעל הדבורים עשה משהו פסול מעט, אין זה סיבה להתיר שהחרדל יהיה גם בגבול. במקום זאת, החרדל חייב להיות ששה טפחים מהגבול. ואז מגיעה שאלת הגמרא ש"אם כן, אז למה ר' יוסי מסכים לגבי הגיגית והירקות?" כלומר לפי ר''ת, שהגמרא סובר שאין סיבה שהחכמים ור' יוסי יחלקו על הטעם של "מעט פסול", ובמקום זה, הטעם שמתיר ר' יוסי את החרדל בגבול הוא שצריך להרחיק מהגבול את הדבר שיכול להינזק. אז עכשיו, יש שאלה מהאמבטיה (משרה) על ר' יוסי שבמקרה כזה צריך להזיז גם את הירקות, לא את הגיגית. אבל עכשיו אפשר לשאול כיון שר' יוסי מחזיק ב"חיציו" ומסכים עם החכמים בכל המקרים בפרק זה אלא במקום שבו נאמר בגלוי שהוא חולק, אז באיזה נימוק חולקים כאן החכמים ור' יוסי? יכול להיות שההבדל הוא אם שמת את הדבר הגורם לנזק ליד הגבול כששום דבר אחר לא היה בצד השני, ואז השכן שם משהו שיכול להינזק. במקרה כזה, ר' יוסי היה אומר שהדבר שיכול לגרום נזק יכול להישאר שם כי באותה נקודה הבעלים לא עושה פעולה שיכולה לגרום נזק. הוא פסיבי בשלב הזה. זה לא "החצים שלו". מאידך היו אומרים חכמים שעליו להסיר את החפץ כיון שכל המשניות ברורות. אם יש משהו שיכול להינזק בצד השני, אז יש להזיז את החפץ שגורם לנזק. (הערה 1) כלומר, גם אם אותו חפץ שני הגיע לשם לאחר שהדבר אבל תוספות לא מחזיקים ככה. הם קובעים שאין הבדל בין המקרה של עץ ובור למקרה של הגיגית והירקות. כלומר שבשני המקרים, אם הדבר הגורם נזק היה קודם, יכול להישאר גם לאחר שבא אחר כך החפץ שיכול להינזק, וכך לדעת חכמים, לא ר' יוסי. אבל יש תשובה אחרת. אפשר גם שר' יוסי שהחרדל והדבורים צריכים להיות שניהם שלושה טפחים מהגבול, בעוד שחכמים מחזיקים שהחרדל צריך להיות במרחק ששה טפחים. זה פירוש ר' יוסי שאמר החרדל מותר. זה אומר שמותר להיות קרוב יותר לגבול ממה שאמרו החכמים. מכיוון שגם הדבורים וגם החרדל פוגעים זה בזה, שניהם חייבים להיות במרחק שלושה טפחים. (הערה 1) במילים אחרות, לחכמים ברגע שיש משהו בצד השני של הגבול שיכול להינזק, הם מחזיקים אתה לא יכול לשים שום דבר בצד שלך שיכול לגרום נזק. ר' יוסי אומר קרוב לאותו דבר, אלא שהנזק שהוא גורם צריך להיות מקרה של חיציו, כלומר נזק על ידי פעולה ישירה. (לפי הרמב''ן כל המזיקים בפרק זה הם החיצים שלו על פי ר' יוסי. לכן אין חילוק בינו ולחכמים חוץ ממקום שכתוב כן בפירוש. )

Rabbainu Tam in Bava Batra page 18b

Rabbainu Tam holds that Rava is holding like the sages, not like R. Jose. (However you can explain the version that says, “Rather, Ravina said” to mean that Rava holds like R. Jose but only with difficulty.) Thus the way Rabainu Tam understands Ravina is that Rava holds like the Rababan that only when there is something on the other side of the border that can be damaged is the owner of the object that can cause damage must keep it way from the border. The argument between the sages and R. Jose is about the idea that the owner of the bees did something slightly not proper by putting them by the border, and so the owner of the mustard can do the same thing. The sages disagree with this, and say that the owner of the bees did something slightly improper, that is no reason to allow the mustard also to be by the border. Rather, the mustard must be 6 handbreadths from the border. Then comes the question of the Gemara that, “If so, then why does R. Jose not disagree about the tub and vegetables?” That means according to R Tam, that the Gemara thinks there is no reason for the sages and R. Jose to disagree about the reason of "slightly improper", and that instead of that, the reason R. Jose allows the mustard by the border is that the thing that can be damaged should be moved away from the border. Then now, there is a question from the tub on R. Jose that in that case, also the vegetables ought to be moved, not the tub. But now we can ask since R. Jose holds with “his arrows” and agrees with the sages in all the cases in this chapter except where it says openly that he disagrees, then in what reasoning the sages and R Jose disagree here? I might have thought that the difference is if you have put the thing that causes damage next to the border when nothing else was on the other side, and then the neighbor put there something that can be damaged. In that case, R Jose would say the thing that can causes damage can remain there because that that point the owner is not doing an action that can cause damage. He is passive at that point. It is not his arrows. On the other hand, the sages would say he must remove the object as all the mishnayot are clear. If there something that can be damaged on the other side, then the object that causes damage must be moved. (note 1)That means, even if that second object came there after the thing that causes damage was already there. But Tosphot does not hold this way. He holds that there is no difference between the case of a tree and a pit and the case of the tub and vegetables. That means that in both cases. if the thing that causes damage was there first, it can stay even after the object that can be damaged came later and this is the opinion of the sages. But it is also possible that R. Jose holds that the mustard and the bees must both be three handbreadths from the border, while the sages hold the mustard must be 6 handbreadths away. This is the meaning of R. Jose that said the mustard is allowed. That means to be allowed to be nearer to the border than what the sages said. Since both the bee and mustard damage each other they must both be three handbreadths’ away. (note 1) In other words to the sages once anything is on the other side of the border that can be damaged, they hold you cannot put anything on your side that can cause damage. R Jose say closely to the same thing except that the damage that it causes has to be a case of his arrows, i.e. damage by a direct action ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ רבינו תםholds that רבא is holding like theחכמים , not like ר' יוסי. (However you can explain the version that says, “אלא אמר רבינא” to mean that רבא holds like ר' יוסי.) Thus, the way ר''ת understands רבינא is that רבא holds like the רבנן that only when there is something on the other side of the border that can be damaged, the owner of the object that can cause damage must keep it away from the border. The argument between the חכמים and ר' יוסי is about the idea that the owner of the bees did something slightly not proper by putting them by the border, and so the owner of the mustard can do the same thing. The חכמים disagree with this, and say that even though the owner of the bees did something slightly improper, that is no reason to allow the mustard also to be by the border. Rather, the mustard must be 6 טפחים from the border. Then comes the question of the גמרא that “If so, then why does ר' יוסי agree about the tub and vegetables?” That means according to ר''ת, that the גמרא thinks there is no reason for the חכמים and ר' יוסי to disagree about the reason of "slightly improper", and that instead of that, the reason ר' יוסי allows the mustard by the border is that the thing that can be damaged should be moved away from the border. Then now, there is a question from the tub on ר' יוסי that in that case, also the vegetables ought to be moved, not the tub. But now we can ask since ר' יוסי holds with “his arrows” and agrees with the חכמים in all the cases in this chapter except where it says openly that he disagrees, then in what reasoning the חכמים and ר' יוסי disagree here? I might have thought that the difference is if you have put the thing that causes damage next to the border when nothing else was on the other side, and then the neighbor put there something that can be damaged. In that case, ר' יוסי would say the thing that can cause damage can remain there because that that point the owner is not doing an action that can cause damage. He is passive at that point. It is not "his arrows". On the other hand, the sages would say he must remove the object as all the משניות are clear. If there something that can be damaged on the other side, then the object that causes damage must be moved. That means, even if that second object came there after the thing that causes damage was already there. But תוספות does not hold this way. He holds that there is no difference between the case of a tree and a pit and the case of the tub and vegetables. That means that in both cases if the thing that causes damage was there first, it can stay even after the object that can be damaged came later, and this is the opinion of the sages But it is also possible that ר' יוסי holds that the mustard and the bees must both be three טפחים from the border, while the sages hold the mustard must be 6 טפחים away. This is the meaning of ר' יוסי that said the mustard is allowed. That means to be allowed to be nearer to the border than what the חכמים said. Since both the bee and mustard damage each other they must both be three טפחים away (note 1) In other words to the חכמיםonce anything is on the other side of the border that can be damaged, they hold you cannot put anything on your side that can cause damage. ר' יוסי say closely to the same thing except that the damage that it causes has to be a case of his arrows, i.e. damage by a direct actionץ (הערה 1) במילים אחרות, לחכמים ברגע שיש משהו בצד השני של הגבול שיכול להינזק, הם מחזיקים אתה לא יכול לשים שום דבר בצד שלך שיכול לגרום נזק. ר' יוסי אומר קרוב לאותו דבר, אלא שהנזק שהוא גורם צריך להיות מקרה של חיציו, כלומר נזק על ידי פעולה ישירה.

bava batra pg 18 b

ברצוני לנסות לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול על גישתו של רבינו תם. אני חושב שמה שתוספות אומר זה שברגע שאנחנו זורקים את התשובה של "בעל הדבורים עשה משהו קצת לא תקין", אז אנחנו נאלצים לומר שר' יוסי התכוון שבכל המקרים הניזוק חייב להתרחק מהגבול. ולכן במקום לשאול על זה ממקרה הדבורים והחרדל, אנחנו שואלים מגיגית הכביסה שזה מקרה ברור שהירקות לא גורמים נזק ועדיין ר' יוסי אינו חולק על הדין שיש להזיז את הגיגית. אולם על כך ניתן להשיב שר' יוסי קובע במקרה של חציו שיש להסיר את הגורם הנזק (כמו שהגמרא אומרת בעמוד כ"ב ועמוד כ"ה). לכן, הגישה הזו של ר''ת עדיין קשה להבנה. כמו כן, אפשר לשאול כאן שעל התשובה הזו שזרקנו את הרעיון של "בעל הדבורים עושה משהו מעט לא תקין", אז נוכל לשאול אחת משתי שאלות. אחת שאם כן, אז לא ענינו על השאלה המקורית על רבא שמחזיק עכשיו כמו אביי ושעכשיו יש התנגשות בין ר' יוסי לאביי ונוכל לשאול ממקרה האמבטיה (משרה). אבל זו לא הבעיה העיקרית כאן כפי שכתבתי למעלה, כי אפשר לומר שהגמרא החליט לשאול שאלה אחת מתוך שתיים, אבל השאלה ששאלתי שאפשר לומר שר' יוסי מסכים במקרה של "חיציו" היא שאלה יותר קשה. אבל אולי אפשר לענות על זה שכל מה שהגמרא עושה הוא מנסה להגיע לבירור לגבי ר' יוסי ואביי, ובטווח הארוך זה מה שאנחנו מקבלים. ר' יוסי מחזיק הניזוק חייב להתרחק, אלא במקרה של "חיציו" של הגורם לנזק; וכי אין זה סותר את אביי שקבע שיכול להיות דבר שגורם נזק ליד הגבול אלא אם כן בא שם הדבר שניתן להזיק וזהו חיציו. רבינו חננאל אומר שר' יוסי מסכים עם החכמים בכל המשניות בפרק זה מלבד במקום שכתוב שהוא חולק בפירוש. אני מתאר לעצמי שזה יכול להיות בגלל שר' יוסי מחזיק ברוב המקרים הם מקרים של "החצים שלו". זה כשיש משהו בצד השני של הגבול שיכול להינזק

I would like to try to answer the question I asked yesterday on the approach of Rabbainu Tam. I think what Tosphot is saying is that once we throw out the answer of the owner of the bees did something slightly not proper then we are forced to say that R. Jose meant in all cases the one being damaged must move away from the border. so instead of asking on this from the case of the bees and mustard we ask from the tub of laundry which is a clear case of the vegetables doing no damage and still r Jose does not object to the law that the tub must be moved. However, on this is possible to answer that r Jose hold in a case of his arrow that the one causing the damage must be removed and a the Gemara says on page 22 and page 25. so, this approach of R. Tam is still difficult to understand. Also, it is possible to ask here that on this answer that we threw out the idea of the owner of the bees doing something slightly improper, then we could ask one of two questions. One that therefore we have not answered the original question of Rava who now holds like Abyee and that now there is a conflict between R Jose and Abyee and we can ask from the case of the tub. But this i not the main problem here as I wrote above that you can say that the Gemara decided to ask one question out of two But the question that I asked that we can say that R. Jose agrees in a case of “his arrows” is a more difficult question. But perhaps that can be answered that all that the Gemara is doing is trying to come to clarity about R. Jose and Abyee, and in the long run that is what we get. R Jose holds the one that is being damaged must move away except in a case of “his arrows” of the one causing the damage; and that this does not conflict with Abyee who held that one can have a thing that causes damage next to the border unless the thing that can be damaged comes there and it is a case of "his arrows". Later Rabainu Chananel (I think) says that in all the Mishnayot in this chapter, R Jose agree with the sages. I imagine this might be because R. Jose holds most of the cases are cases of "his arrows." And that is when there is something on the other side of the border that can be damaged I would like to try to answer the question I asked yesterday on the approach of רבינו תם. I think what תוספות is saying is that once we throw out the answer of "the owner of the bees did something slightly not proper," then we are forced to say that ר' יוסי meant in all cases the one being damaged must move away from the border. so instead of asking on this from the case of the bees and mustard we ask from the tub of laundry which is a clear case of the vegetables doing no damage and still ר' יוסי does not object to the law that the tub must be moved. However, on this is possible to answer that ר' יוסי hold in a case of his arrow that the one causing the damage must be removed (גמראas the Gemara says on page 22 and page 25). so, this approach of ר''ת is still difficult to understand. Also, it is possible to ask here that on this answer that we threw out the idea of "the owner of the bees doing something slightly improper," then we could ask one of two questions. One that if so, then we have not answered the original question of רבא who now holds like אביי and that now there is a conflict between ר' יוסי and אביי and we can ask from the case of the tub. But this is not the main problem here as I wrote above because that you can say that the גמראdecided to ask one question out of two But the question that I asked that we can say that ר' יוסי agrees in a case of “his arrows” is a more difficult question. But perhaps that can be answered that all that the גמרא is doing is trying to come to clarity about ר' יוסי and אביי, and in the long run that is what we get. ר' יוסי holds the one that is being damaged must move away except in a case of “his arrows” of the one causing the damage; and that this does not conflict with אבייwho held that one can have a thing that causes damage next to the border unless the thing that can be damaged comes there and it Is a case of his arrows.Later רבינו חננאל (I think) says that in all the משניות in this chapter, ר' יוסי agree with the חכמים. I imagine this might be because ר' יוסי holds most of the cases are cases of "his arrows." And that is when there is something on the other side of the border that can be damaged

הדרך שבה רבינו תם ורבינו חננאל מבינים את הגמרא בדף י''ח ע''ב בבבא בתרא יש בעיה קשה שאני מתקשה לענות עליה. או אם לומר את זה יותר טוב, הבעיה הזו תוספות מעלה ועונה עליה, אבל אני מוצא את התשובה קשה להבנה. הרקע לבעיה זו זה. אביי אמר שדבר שעלול לגרום נזק אפשר לשים ליד הגבול של שכן אם אין שום דבר בצד השני של הגבול. רבא אמר שזה לא יכול להיות ליד הגבול. אנו מבקשים על רבא מגיגית פשתן (השריית הכביסה) שיש להסירה מירקות. זה מרמז שאם אין ירקות, אז ניתן לשים שם את הגיגית של השריית הכביסה. תשובה: גם אם אין שם ירקות, בכל זאת זה צריך להיות שלושה טפחות מהגבול. במקום זאת, המשנה באה לספר לנו שאמבטיה של פשתן פוגעת בירקות. אחר כך נשאל מר' יוסי שאמר שאפשר לשים חרדל ליד דבורים למרות שהוא גורם נזק לדבורים. לפי רבינו תם, הגמרא עונה כאן שרבא חזר על דינו, ועתה מחזיק כמו אביי. משתמע זאת מהאמירה שגורסים חכמים שיש להסיר את מה שיכול לגרום נזק. אבל ר' יוסי אמר שיש להסיר את מה שיכול להינזק. הגמרא שואל אם כן, מדוע ר' יוסי אינו חולק על גיגית הפשתן. אם יש להסיר את הדבר שיכול להינזק, צריך לומר שצריך להסיר את הירקות. זו בהחלט שאלה טובה, אבל נראה שהיא מתעלמת מהעובדה שמעולם לא הייתה לנו בעיה עם אביי. אם רבא עכשיו מסכים עם אביי, למה יש עכשיו בעיה חדשה שלא הייתה לנו קודם? תוספות עונה על כך. ר' יוסי אמר רק שהוא יכול לשים את החרדל ליד הדבורים כי בעל הדבורים ידע שהשכן שלו מתכנן לשים שם חרדל ולמרות שהוא יכול לעשות זאת כחוק, עדיין זה היה מעט לא תקין, ולכן עכשיו אפשר לשים גם את החרדל גם. אבל באופן כללי ר' יוסי מחזיק כמו אביי שמה שיכול לגרום נזק יכול להיות ליד הגבול עד שמכניסים לשם גם את החפץ שיכול להינזק. זו הייתה הדרך המקורית להבין את ר' יוסי כדי שלא יהיה מסוכסך עם אביי. אך כעת אנו חוזרים בהנחה זו ואומרים בכל המקרים את מה שניתן להזיק יש להוציא מהגבול, ולא את הדבר הגורם לנזק, וזאת בניגוד ישיר לאבי שקבע שסיבת הנזק יכולה להיות בצמוד לגבול רק אם אין דבר בצד השני. הבעיה כאן היא, איך זה משתמע בשאלה: אם כן, מדוע ר' יוסי אינו חולק על גיגית הפשתן והירקות? זו לא שאלה על ר' יוסי אם אתה הולך עם אביי. זה בדיוק מה שאביי אמר. אם יש ירקות אז הסר את הגיגית של הפשתן. השאלה צריכה להיות מהחרדל והדבורים. שם צריך להיות סכסוך בין אביי ור' יוסי. איך תוספות עונה על השאלה הזו היא תעלומה עבורי

Rabainu Tam and Rabainu Chanael, the gemara on page 18b in Bava Batra

The way that Rabainu Tam and Rabainu Chanael understand the gemara on page 18b in Bava Batra has a difficult problem that I find hard to answer. Or to say it better, this problem tosphot brings up and answers it, but I find the answer to be hard to understand. The background to this problem this. Abyee said that something that can cause damage can be put next to the border of a neighbor if there is nothing on the other side of the border. Rava said it cannot be next to the border. We ask on Rava from a tub of linen that must be removed away from vegetables. That would imply that if there are no vegetables, then the tub of soaking laundry can be put there. Answer: even if there are no vegetables there, yet it still needs to be three handbreadths from the border. Rather, the mishna is coming to tell us the tub of linen damages vegetables. Then we ask from R. Jose who said mustard can be put next to bees though it causes damage to the bees. According to Rabainu Tam , the gemara answers here that Rava went back on his law, and now holds like Abyee. It implies this by the statement the sages hold that what can cause damage mut e removed. but r Jose said what can be damaged must be removed. the gemara then asks if so, why does R. Jose not disagree with the tub of linen?If the thing that can be damaged must be removed, he ought to say the vegetables should be removed. This is certainly a good question, but it seems to ignore the fact that we never had a problem with Abyee. If Rava now agrees with Abyee, why is there now a new problem that we never had before? Tosphot answers this thus. R. Jose only said he can put the mustard next to the bees because the owner of the bees knew that his neighbor was planning on putting mustard there, and though he could do so legally, still it was slightly improper, and so now the mustard also can be put there. But in general, R. Jose holds the same way as Abyee that what can cause damage can be next to the border until the object that can be damaged is also put there. This was the original way of understanding R. Jose so that he would not be in conflict with Abyee. But now we are retracting this assumption and saying in all cases what can be damaged must be removed from the border, not the thing that causes damage and this is in direct conflict with Abyee who held that the cause of damage can be next to the border only if there is nothing on the other side. The problem here is, “How is this implied in the question: If so, why does R. Jose not disagree with the tub of linen and vegetables?” That is not a question on R. Jose if you go with Abyee. In fact it is exactly what Abyee said. If there are vegetables, then remove the tub of linen. The question should be from the mustard and bees. That is where there should be a conflict between Abyee and R. Jose. How Tosphot answers this question is a mystery to me. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ vThe way that רבינו תםand רבינו חננאלl understand the גמרא on page י''ח ע''ב in בבא בתרא has a difficult problem that I find hard to answer. Or to say it better, this problem תוספות brings up and answers it, but I find the answer to be hard to understand. The background to this problem this. אביי said that something that can cause damage can be put next to the border of a neighbor if there is nothing on the other side of the border. רבא said it cannot be next to the border. We ask on רבא from a tub of linen that must be removed away from vegetables. That would imply that if there are no vegetables, then the tub of soaking laundry can be put there. Answer: even if there are no vegetables there, yet it still needs to be three handbreadths from the border. Rather, the משנה is coming to tell us the tub of linen damages vegetables. Then we ask from ר' יוסי who said mustard can be put next to bees though it causes damage to the bees. According to רבינו תם , the גמרא answers here that רבא went back on his law, and now holds like אביי. It implies this by the statement the sages hold that what can cause damage must be removed. But ר' יוסי said what can be damaged must be removed. the גמרא then asks if so why doe r Jose not disagree with the tub of linen. If the thing that can be damaged must be removed, he ought to say the vegetables should be removed. This is certainly a good question, but it seems to ignore the fact that we never had a problem withאביי . If רבא now agrees with אביי, why is there now a new problem that we never had before? תוספות answers this thus. ר' יוסי only said he can put the mustard next to the bees because the owner of the bees knew that his neighbor was planning on putting mustard there and though he could do so legally, still it was slightly improper, and so now the mustard also can be put thee. But in general, ר' יוסי holds the same way as אביי that what can cause damage can be next to the border until the object that can be damaged is also put there. This was the original way of understanding ר' יוסי so that he would not be in conflict with אביי. But now we are retracting this assumption and saying in all cases what can be damaged must be removed from the border, not the thing that causes damage and this is in direct conflict with Abyee who held that the cause of damage can be next to the border only if there is nothing on the other side. The problem here is “how here is how is this implied in the question: If so, why does ר' יוסי not disagree with the tub of linen and vegetables?” that is not a question on ר' עיוסי if you go with אביי in fact it is exactly what אביי said. If there are vegetables then remove the tub of linen. the question should be from the mustard and bees. That is where there should be a conflict between Abyee and r Jose. how tosphot answers this question is a mystery to me.

most divorces cannot be valid

I think most divorces cannot be valid because of the problem with names which has never been cleared up. All the best authorities disagree on how to write the Hebrew and otherwise nicknames, and the disagreements are relevant to the most basic validity of the “get” divorce document. But all this has relevance to the way a divorce is given through the husband telling someone else to write it. (However, the very essence of the divorce in itself is nothing more that a piece of paper that says, “You are allowed to any man”. From the law of the Torah, this is valid with no names, nor with any date. If this would be instituted, at least the divorce would be valid if given in front of two witnesses, or with two signatures.)[ Take a look at the "tshuvot" [questions asked of achronim and their answers and this issue about names is never resolved and always come up constantly.]The problem is where do you out the name given at birth and the nickname and the name that is preferred., Look at for example the questions and answers posed to Rav Joel sirkes of Krakow [the Bach number 95] and his disagreements with other great achronim of that period and later periods.The Ramban on Gitin page 20 brings the idea that the divorce should be valid without name and date, just a piece of paper that “you are permitted to any man.” Tosphot holds it is valid but the Ramban holds it is not valid._______________________________________________________________ I think most divorces cannot be valid because of the problem with names which has never been cleared up. All the best authorities disagree on how to write the Hebrew and otherwise nicknames, and the disagreements are relevant to the most basic validity of the “get” divorce document. But all this has relevance to the way a divorce is given through the husband telling someone else to write it. (However, the very essence of the divorce in itself is nothing more that a piece of paper that says, “You are allowed to any man”. From the law of the Torah, this is valid with no names, nor with any date. If this would be instituted, at least the divorce would be valid if given in front of two witnesses, or with two signatures.) look at theשל האחרונים שאלאת ותשובות and their answers and this issue about names is never resolved and always come up constantly. The problem is where do you out the name given at birth and the nickname and the name that is preferred., Look at for example the questions and answers posed to theב''ח number צ''הand his disagreements with other great אחרוניםof that period and later periods. The רמב''ן on גיטין page כ' brings the idea that the divorce should be valid without name and date, just a piece of paper that “you are permitted to any man.” תוספות holds it is valid but the רמב''ן holds it is not valid._____________________________________________________ אני חושב שרוב הגירושים לא יכולים להיות תקפים בגלל הבעיה עם שמות שמעולם לא הוסרה. כל מיטב האחרונים חולקים בדעתם כיצד לכתוב את הכינויים, וזה שייך לתוקף הבסיסי של מסמך הגירושין (הגט). אבל לכל זה יש רלוונטיות רק לדרך בה ניתן גט באמצעות שהבעל אומר למישהו אחר לכתוב את הגט. (אולם, עצם הגט מן התורה אינו אלא פיסת נייר שאומרת "את מותרת לכל אדם". מדין התורה זה תקף ללא שמות, ולא בשום תאריך. אם זה יתנהל, לפחות הגט יהיה תקף אם יינתן בפני שני עדים, או בשתי חתימות. הבעיה היא השם שניתן בלידה ואת הכינוי והשם המועדף. תסתכל למשל על השאלות והתשובות של הב''ח מספר צ''ה ובחילוקי הדעות של האחרונים מאותה תקופה ותקופות מאוחרות יותר. הרמב''ן בדף כ' גיטין מביא את הנושא שהגט צריך להיות תקף ללא שם ותאריך, רק פיסת נייר ש"אתה רשאי לכל אדם". תוספות מחזיקים זה תקף, אבל הרמב''ן מחזיק שזה לא תקף

בבא בתרא י''ח שיטת רבינו יצחק

אם הולכים עם רבינו יצחק, אז צריך לומר שהדין לפי ר' יוסי הוא במקרה של מכירה, וזה יחול גם לגבי הדבורים והחרדל, וגם לגבי העץ והבור. הטעם הוא שכאן בדף י''ח כל השאלה על רבא מר' יוסי הייתה שרבא צריך להחזיק בדינו אם לפי החכמים ואם לר' יוסי. וכך, שאלתנו על רבא הייתה מר' יוסי כיון שכבר ענינו לו לפי החכמים. עתה אמר רב פפא התשובה היא שר' יוסי אמר דינו רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל אז אנחנו שואלים על זה. כי אם כן, מה יכולה להיות הסיבה של החכמים במקרה של המשרה או אפילו במקרה זה של החרדל? במילים אחרות, כאשר ר' יוסי חולק על החכמים, הם צריכים לדבר על אותו מקרה. אחרת, ר' יוסי היה אומר "אני לא מסכים איתם רק במקרה של מכירה". ועתה תשובתנו היא שאמר ר' יוסי דינו במקרה של מכירה, ואחרת היה אומר כרבא שכל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מגבול חברו שלשה טפחים, אפילו כשעדיין אין דבר מעברו השני של הגבול. ואז מגיעה הנקודה המרכזית של רבינו יצחק. כלומר, שרבינא הוא רק המשך של תשובת רב פפא. ואמר שהחכמים אמרו גורם נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול, ואמר ר' יוסי שיש להוציא מהגבול את הדבר שיכול להינזק. וכיון שזו המשך תשובת רב פפא, משמע שאמר זאת ר' יוסי רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל במקרה שבו יש רק שני שכנים, כל אחד חייב להרחיק את החפץ שלו שיכול לגרום נזק מהגבול. משמע שאם הדין יהיה כמו רבינו יצחק, אז למרות שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי, זה רק במקרה של מכירה, אבל אחרת יש להרחיק מהגבול כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק. וכיון שכל ענין הדיון הזה הוא כדי שלא תהיה סתירה בין ר' יוסי לרבא, אותו נימוק חל בדף כ''ה עם העץ והבור. שם אמרו החכמים יש לכרות את העץ אם הוא תוך כ''ה אמות הבור אלא אם כן היה שם קודם. ואמר ר' יוסי אין צריך לקצץ כיון שכל אחד בתחומו. וגם כאן הדין הוא של מכירה שהיא המקרה היחיד שר' יוסי מחזיק בדינו, ואמרו החכמים דינם גם במקרה של מכירה. עתה לא ייתכן שמה שאמרו אם היה העץ קודם הוא יכול להישאר במצב בלי מכירה, כי זה יסתור את דין רבא שכל מה שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול גם כשבצד השני של הגבול אין דבר שיכול להינזק. כל העניין בדיון שלנו הוא שלא תהיה סתירה מין החכמים או מר' יוסי על דין רבא

Bava batra page 18b.The approach of Rabainu Izhak.

if you go with Rabainu Izhak, then you have to say that the only allowance according to r Jose is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. the reason is that here on page 18 the whole question on Rava from R. Jose was that Rava has to hold with his law whether according to the sages or to r Jose. and so, our question on Rava was from r Jose since we already answered him according to the sages. now Rav Papa said the answer is that R. Jose said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the sages in the case of the tub of linen or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when R. Jose disagrees with the sages, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, R. Jose would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that R. Jose said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like Rava that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of Rabbainu Izhak. That is that Ravina is just a continuance of the answer of Rav Papa. And he said that the sages said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that R. Jose said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of Rava Papa, this means that R. Jose said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like Rabbainu Izhak, then even though the law is like R. Jose, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between R. Jose and Rava, this same reasoning applies on page 25 with the tree and pit. There the sages said the tree must be cut down if it is with 25 cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And R. Jose said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that R Jose holds his law, and the sages said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first it can stay, because that would contradict the law of Rava that whatever can cause damage has to be kept way from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. _____________________________________________________________________________ if you go with רבינו יצחק, then you have to say that the only allowance according to ר' יוסי is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. The reason is that here on page י''ח the whole question on רבא from ר' יוסי was that רבא has to hold with his law whether according to the חכמים or to ר' יוסי. and so, our question on רבא was from ר' יוסי since we already answered him according to the חכמים. Now רב פפא said the answer is that ר' יוסי said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the חכמים in the case of theמישרה or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when ר' יוסי disagrees with the חכמים, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, ר' יוסי would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that ר' יוסי said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like רבא that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths, even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of רבינו יצחק. That is, that רבינא is just a continuance of the answer of רב פפא. And he said that the חכמים said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that ר' יוסי said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of רב פפא, this means that ר' יוסי said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like רבינו יצחק, then even though the law is like ר' יוסי, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between ר' יוסי and רבא, this same reasoning applies on page כ''ה with the tree and pit. There the חכמיםsaid the tree must be cut down if it is with כ''ה cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And ר' יוסי said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that ר' יוסי holds his law, and the חכמים said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first, it can stay, because that would contradict the law of רבא that whatever can cause damage has to be kept away from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. The whole point of our discussion is that there should be no contradiction from the חכמים or from ר' יוסי on the law of רבא