I was walking out side the other day and saw printed on the back of someone's sweater "שומר אחי" ("My brother's keeper").That is in reference to what Cain asked God, "Am I my brother's keeper?"(This was just  after murdering him.)  This reminds me of the attitude that everyone had toward my son, Izhak (also known as Nahman), when he was begging for help and everyone's answer was "Am I my brother's keeper?" Everyone's answer should have been just what was printed on that fellow's sweatshirt:  "שומר אחי" ("My brother's keeper")

 za6 midi file

The subject of string theory

The  subject of string theory came up recently so I thought to write down my thinking on this. Mainly it is appeal to authority. Feynman worked long and hard on gravity and saw that quantum gravity has no chance since it is not renormalizable. So if there is any way to reconcile QM with gravity, it has to be something else. Then there is the remarkable fact that String Theory has a two spin particle which arises  naturally in the equations; and for  along time that was thought to be a strike against it until someone realized that the graviton implied in General Relativity is  a two spin particle.

't Hooft has a synopsis of it, and also Siegel at Stony Brook in NY. 

I am nothing, but a layman, but this I how I see things. Maybe I am not qualified to offer an opinion but neither are most of the enemies of string theory. They are certainly not in the major league like 't Hooft or Siegel or Susskind at Stanford.

Musar approach of the Rishonim

I might have just gone with the Musar approach of the Rishonim except that their framework is faith {sinai} with reason {Aristotle}. That works for me to some degree except for the problem pointed out by Berkley that there is nothing of the heat of the fire or the sharpness of the sword that enters the mind to give an idea of heat or fire. To see that point clearly it helps to read Thomas Reid, the common sense philosopher. [There are also problems  in Aristotle's Metaphysics.] So the purely Aristotelian approach is not possible except with some sort of modification. Thus, the three critiques of Kant are a necessary development. That leaves me however with some problems in Kant which were noticed almost before the ink was dry. From that emanated a few schools. To me the one that makes the most sense is Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson. ["Why not Hegel?" you might ask. For me, the reason is the dialectic method is a tool of reason, but not the only way reason progress. Empirical evidence is needed. There is the problem of pure reason alone that Kant pointed out.

Roughly the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson https://www.friesian.com/nelson.htm"> makes the most sense to me, but not exactly because of an issue in Kant. I,e, Kant accepts Hume's critique of reason to some degree and does escape from it. I however have an issue thus: I think Hume was wrong from the start. Reason is not limited to figuring out contradictions based in definitions like: bachelors are not married. Why did Hume make this mistake? Because in his day, Euclid had authority almost equal to the Bible. And in Euclid, reason is to see when a result of a hypothesis contradicts one of the five starting axioms. Hume says over and over that that is the only function of reason, but with no proof. He assumes it. But that is an arbitrary limitation. Kant did break out of that prison, but limited reason to the realm of possible experience. That is true to some degree, but still assumes that there is no knowledge outside of reason or empirical experience. But that too is too limiting. For even if we start with Euclid, from where do the axioms come from? Why are they reasonable? That is the starting point of Fries and Leonard Nelson: non intuitive immediate knowledge I owe a debt of gratitude in understanding this to Kelley Ross for his web site on the approach of Leonard Nelson and in particular his PhD thesis there. Also To Michael Huemer in his books and essays and Brain Caplan and Steven Dutch whose web it is back after being down for year.

Bava Metzia page 41 in Rashi and the Baal HaMeor.Rambam laws of stealing and losing chapter 3. law 11.

 שולח יד בפיקדון  In Exodus there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard{shomer hinam{ is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen.

To the Baal Hameor if he steals that object by force then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the Rambam and Ravad.[In the Rambam this is open. For the Raavad you have to see where the Shita Mekubetzet bring him there.]

But if so then arises a difficulty. In the Rambam it say about one that steals [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather ''one uses a pledge'' then why is stealing not by force not also considered the same way? Or visa versa why not consider stealing by force just stealing by force.

See the Avi Ezri in Laws of stealing chapter 3. halacha 11 for more details.

[The main reason why the Rishonim hold stealing by force if a pledge is  שולח יד בפיקדון is from that Gemara in Bava Metzia 41.] 

Answer: Using  a pledge is obligated only when the pledge is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the pledge. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of stealing by force. The case of stealing not by force where he pay double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of swearing "it was  stolen not by force" is a special case learned from verses in Bava Kama 105

 

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 שולח יד בפיקדון  In שמות there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost, he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen. To the בעל המאור if he steals that object by force [גוזל] then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the רמב''ם andהראב''ד. But if so then arises a difficulty. In the רמב''ם it say about one that גונב [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather שולח יד בפיקדון, then why is גונב not also considered the same way? Or visa versa, why not consider גוזל just גוזל. see the אבי עזרי in הלכות גזלה ואביה ג' הלכה י''א  

Answer: Using  a פיקדון is obligated only when the פיקדון is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the פיקדון. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of גזלה. The case of גנבה where he pays double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of נשבע הפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל is a special case learned from verses in בבא קמא ק''ה 

שולח יד בפיקדון. בשמות יש פסוק שאם אחד  משתמש במשכון או בכל חפץ שהוא שומר עבור אחר, ואז החפץ הזה אבד, הוא חייב למרות שבדרך כלל שומר ללא תשלום[שומר חינם] אינו חייב כאשר חפץ נמצא אצלו אבד או נגנב. לבעל המאור אם הוא גונב את החפץ בכוח [גוזל] אז גם הוא חייב באותו איסור של "משתמש במשכון". נראה שזאת גם דעת הרמב''ם והראב''ד. אבל אם כן אז מתעורר קושי. הרמב''ם אומר על אחד שגונב [שלא בכוח] משכון הוא חייב בכפל. הבעיה היא שיש אסימטריה בין שני המקרים. אם גזלה בכוח אינה נחשבת לגזלה [שהרי היא ממילא ברשותו ברשות בעל המשכון] אלא שולח יד בפיקדון, אז מדוע לא נחשב גם גונב באותה דרך? או להיפך, למה לא לשקול גוזל רק גוזל. ראה אבי עזרי בהלכות גזלה ואבדה ג' הלכה י''א

תשובה: חיוב על השתמשות בפיקדון הוא רק כאשר הפיקדון אינו זמין יותר. אחרת הוא פשוט מחזיר את הפיקדון. או אם הוא אבד או נגנב, הוא משלם את הסכום שהיה שווה. המקרה של שולח יד בפיקדון הוא כשהוא נשבע שהיא אבדה או ש"לא היה דבר כזה מעולם" וכשומר ללא שכר לא היה מחזיר כלום. זה המקרה של גזלה. מקרה הגניבה שבו הוא משלם כפול הוא כאשר הוא טוען שהפריט נגנב שלא בכוח

דהיינו נשבע שהפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל הוא מקרה מיוחד הנלמד מפסוקים בבא קמא ק''ה.

i know this is way too short, but I hope anyone reading this will look at the Baal Hameor over there in Bava Metzia and I think you see what I mean here. I  think he is right. Rather, my question is about גניבה stealing not by force.

the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent wholesome society.

 The ancient Greeks thought the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent, wholesome society. They knew that the influence of parents and family is limited while that of society is unlimited, Thus I can see that even though I have a great deal of respect for Rav Nahman of Breslov, still it would have been better to stick with the wholesome Litvak Yeshiva environment. 

One lesson I learned in Shar Yahuv  was the idea of review ten times everything you learn. Another thing I noticed in the Litvak world is a great respect for Rav Nahman, but no interest to  "become Breslov".

"Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

 There is a point in not doing a favor for someone who will use it against you. In the Midrash i brought a story about some one who came from Israel to Persia and saw a dead bird. Then came another bird with a leaf from a plant, and put it on the dead bird, and that bird came back to life. Then he went to that same plant and picked a leaf from it, and said to himself,
"This will come in handy." On the way, he saw the carcass of a dead lion. He put it on the lion, and it came back to life and ate  him. From this the Midrash learns: "Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל

 A lot of religious motivation is from schizoid personality defects, not from strong faith in God. [video lecture by Sapolsky (start at minutes 8:00 and onward. And in particular minute 1:15:16 [i.e. one hour and fifteen min.]) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEnklxGAmak] [See : Alfred Kroeber] Thus it is easy to see why the religious world seems so unhealthy. Clearly, this was noticed by Rav Israel Salanter who saw that the essence of Torah is Monotheism with good Midot [good character traits], not religions fanaticism. But that did not help after the first few generations of Musar. Eventually, it became  another sort of religious fanaticism. [See: Geschwind Syndrome]

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל." ''All who calls names calls with his own name." [ Gemara and brought in many Musar books.]

learning in depth. that is with lot's of review

 The major lesson that I learned from my son Izhak is that of learning in depth, that is with lot's of review until I understand, and even then to keep on reviewing. I had of course been introduced to this at Shar Yashuv and the Mir yeshivot, but the lesson did not really sink in until Izhak explained this to me. But it still seem to me to be unclear how much review to do. I have been thinking of the idea of focusing on one subject and kind of expanding out from there. 

Even though Rav Nahman is known for advocating the fast kind of learning, see his book Le.M vol I chap. 74 where learning with iyun [review and depth] is considered to be a higher level.

to rav nahman there are two kinds of judgment: (1) from the realm of holiness, (2) from the realm of uncleaniness. The last is understood: sickness, tragedy, etc. The first i when one tries to come into the realm of holiness and just then troubles begin. These come as tests of faith, or because one was not fit in the first place. And learning without understanding is the same essence as judgment of the realm  of holiness. But when one learns with understanding that mitigates and weakens that all the judgments. 

 There was on Friday afternoon an Arab with a blue id card [i.e. Israeli Citizenship] plowed into a bus stop and wiped out a whole family. Aristotle wrote that two people's that are not getting along, there is no solution but separation. the idea of Israeli Arabs maybe was an ok idea at first, but after 70 years of experience that is clearly unreasonable already. 

The evil inclination uses false mitzvot to bring people into the paths of darkness.

 I was in a local sort of Litvak kind of Beit Midrash and worked on some sugia there for a while. Then I noted that they had there a book of a collection of ideas if the Gra on the Five Books of Moses [Chumash]. There I noted a comment by the Gra that reminded me of the very first lesson of Rav Nahman (in his book the Le.M vol. I, chapter 1). That is that the evil inclination uses false mitzvot to bring people into the paths of darkness,

This is why the straight path of Torah of the Gra is important--, it is that it is too easy to be distracted and fall by pseudo mitzvot, and they lead from one thing to another until one's whole life is ruined. [Breslov itself, while based on the teaching of Rav Nahman, tends to have that same sort of aspect [being a half way house] between holiness [kedusha] and anti-holiness.  It is like a door by which people leave the straight and narrow path of the Torah [the Litvak Yeshiva world],  and by which some people come into Torah after being outside.. Rav Nahman has great and powerful advice, but also there is there things that can be (and are)  misunderstood from how he intended them.

People in Ukraine are afraid to say their true feelings

I can imagine that people in Ukraine are afraid to say their true feelings, but when I was there in Middle Ukraine [not the East] people told me openly that they were upset that the USSR was gone. The vast majority of people in Uman went to the Russian Orthodox Church [near the local bazar]. Now you might counter that that was because it was in the city center, while the large Ukrainian Orthodox church was out a bit from the main city. But even so, that does not answer it, because there was also a small  Ukrainian Orthodox church on Sadova  Drive [also city centre], and that was open just a few hours on Sunday. But the Russian Orthodox Church was open all the time--from morning to evening every day, and always had plenty of people in it. And on Sunday, it was packed--hardly room to move.

Of course, now the government has closed it, and made it illegal. Even the Communists never did that during the entire 70 years they were in power. [I admit that there was talk among the Communist officials during the 1980's to close it, but they never did.]

superiority attitude in the religious world

The Litvak Yeshiva world really was a great place for me for some period, but I did not have the appreciation for it and the straight path of the Gra as I should have had. Even so I find it important to show respect of it's tremendous value, even though I did not manage to stick with it. And I think that is an important lesson--that Rav Nahman pointed out: "Even if I can't be "איש כשר" kosher person, I should at least want my friend to be one." 

[However, there is a kind of  superiority attitude in the religious world. Gentiles are not considered human and baali teshuva [newly religious] are thought to be sub human. This attitude displays itself in subtle ways at first when they are love bombing teen agers with rich parents. Only later when they have no more use for you, does this attitude become apparent. 

The State of Israel, Reb Moshe Feinstein and Rav Aaron Kotler

 Even though there is a certain amount of criticism from the religious world on the State of Israel, I think it is mistaken from a few different angles, --mainly by the fact that both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Rav Aaron Kotler held ''the law of the country is the law'' in regards to Israel. [That means it has the legitimate category of a state with all the implication of that in halacha.] So I would say it is  great mitzvah to serve in the IDF. If you look into history yoas in their area in the old city.

The book of the Rav of Satmer is meant to show that the State of Israel is not legitimate is based on a midrash about not to go up to  Israel "as a wall" against the nations. This ignores the League of Nations and the Balfour Declaration. 

 I have been thinking about the importance of learning Torah and the straight path of the Gra. But I also see that one aspect of the Gra is ignored what was known as the "seven wisdoms".[note 1]That was the name that several secular subjects were known by during the Middle Ages,- but not all secular subjects.

There is at any rate some difference between rishonim what would be permitted to learn and not count a bitul Torah. To find some middle ground I recommend the authentic sciences, but would leave out the pseudo sciences like psychology.

[note 1] the translation of Euclid by a disciple of the Gra quotes him saying, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding Torah a hundred fold."

American education

 The whole  problem with American education is that it starts too late. For the real root of the USA is England. If one does not know the origin of the Parliamentary system, the Magna Carta. and trials and tribulations that led to the English system of government, then his understanding of the Constitution of the  USA itself has to be superficial. It can not start either with John Locke who was encoding facts that were already history. He found the justification for the Glorious Revolution.     

 Parents think they can go to the schools, and find out what their children are learning? No such luck. Because of the Ferrari method of education, your children ae being taught gender and woke poison propaganda in the disguise of reading, writing, and arithmetic.

In terms of what would be better than the poisonous public schools, I think that self learning is the best idea. And in order to advance this, I would like to suggest learning with ten times review of every chapter or section. This idea of leaning with lot of review I understood from my son, Izak. (I had suggested to him to "just say the words and go on," but he did not accept that. So I finally decided to accept his advice.)

Furthermore I would like to suggest that most of what is learnt in schools is really not very positive. [See  Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind,] 

Rav Nahman emphasized living in the land of Israel as [I noted in the Le,M vol I chap. 55 when I went into the local Na Nach place to study that book of Rav Nahman today] and in fact it was the encouragement that I saw in a different chapter in the Le.M that convinced me to come to Israel for the first time some years ago. I also saw this emphasis in the letter of the Gra  that he wrote to his wife on his journey to Israel.

The original motivation was from the general approach of Musar that I had been reading. But when I actually began to take steps, I found my way blocked. Then i noted that Rav Nahman had said that the land of Israel is acquired by hardships,,, and the major hardships and obstacles are the slanderers of the land ,

Avi Ezri Laws of Inheritance, chapter 1 halacha 3. Ketuboth pg 69 in the Gemara and Rashi.

 There is an argument between the Beit Yoseph and the Darkei Moshe concerning the law about one who is dying and he gives instructions about his will that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. R. Akiva Eiger [Responsa 138] explains this argument in one way, and Rav Shach explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with R Akiva Eiger and another way to agree with Rav Shach. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The Beit Joseph holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers and this is still valid.  The Darchei Moshe holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers this law is still valid. To R. Akiva Eiger the argument is about indirect inheritance. The son and brothers inherit directly, and so the father can not disinherit them. The Darchei Moshe holds that the brothers inherit indirectly, and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.  Rav Shach  writes that the  Beit Yoseph  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger--and that can not be valid. But Rav Akiva Eiger could say this reason can not be so because the Beit Joseph agrees that if the father has a brother, then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But Rav Shach points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that Rav Shach bringc against R Akiva Eiger is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the others that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {Mishmush}. However the question is if this applies also to the halacha that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the Beit Yoseph is that you can not combine both halachot. So even though the explanation of Rav Shach in the Beit Yoseph makes sense, but  also the explanation of R Akiva Eiger. i.e., that the Darchei Moshe might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However Rav Shach could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the Darchei Moshe, but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly then that is established in all cases.

I am being short here but just look in the Avi Ezri and you will see that  Rav Shach is bringing his proof only from the law of R Yochanan ben Broka as it is brought in the Rambam. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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 There is an argument between the בית יוסף and the  דרכי משה concerning the law about one who is dying (שכיב מרע) and he gives instruction about his צוואה that are valid, but would not be valid if he gave these instructions while he was healthy. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח  explains this argument in one way and רב שך explains this in a different way, and I can see a way to agree with ר' עקיבא איגר and another way to agree with רב שך. This refers to one who is dying and he gives instruction that one of his children should inherit, and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger. The בית יוסף holds this is valid only if the son that is inheriting has no children nor brothers. However the one that is dying might have brothers, and this is still valid.  The  דרכי משה holds even if that son that is inheriting has brothers, this law is still valid. To ר' עקיבא איגר the argument is about indirect inheritance (מישמוש). The son and brothers inherit directly and so the father can not disinherit them. The  דרכי משה holds that the brothers inherit indirectly (מישמוש) and so the father can say that one of his children should inherit and then after him the inheritance should go to a stranger.   רב שך writes that the  בית יוסף  holds the reason the father can not disinherit the brothers is then it would be as though there was no inheritance at all [after that brother has died] and the whole inheritance would be a present to a stranger, and that can not be valid. But ר' עקיבא איגר could say this reason can not be so because the בית יוסף agrees that if the father has a brother then it would be valid to give to the brother and then the stranger.  But רב שך points out that then even though there is someone that could inherit, still he does not inherit and it is as if there was no inheritance at all but simply a present to a stranger which can not be valid.

I would like to add here  that the proof that רב שך bring against ר' עקיבא איגר is from the law that one can choose to give inheritance to only one of the other that can inherit him. And that includes those that could inherit from him indirectly {מישמוש}. However the question is if this applies also to the law that one can give the inheritance to one son and from him to a stranger. And the whole point of the  בית יוסף is that you can not combine both laws. So even though the explanation of  רב שך in the בית יוסף makes sense, but  also the explanation of ר' עקיבא איגר, i.e., that the דרכי משה  might hold true that brothers inherit only indirectly. However  רב שך could answer that the point of his objection is not about  just one of the two laws that are being combined here by the דרכי משה , but about the very essence of the inheritance of the brothers. If we have established that they inherit directly, then that is established in all cases

I am being short here, but just look in the אבי עזרי and you will see that רב שך is bringing his proof only from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא as it is brought in the רמב''ם. That establishes that brothers inherit directly.

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יש ויכוח בין הבית יוסף לדרכי משה בנוגע להלכה על גוסס (שכיב מרע) והוא נותן הוראה על צוואה שלו שהיא תקפה, אבל לא תקפה אם היה נותן אותה הוראה בעודו בריא. ר' עקיבא איגר תשובות קל''ח מסביר את הטיעון הזה בצורה אחת, ורב שך מסביר זאת בצורה אחרת, ואני יכול לראות דרך להסכים עם ר' עקיבא איגר ודרך אחרת להסכים עם רב שך. הכוונה היא למי שגוסס והוא נותן הוראה שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת, ואחריו הירושה תעבור לזר. הבית יוסף קובע שזה תקף רק אם לבן שיורש אין בנים ואחים. אולם למי שגוסס אולי יהיו אחים, וזה עדיין תקף. הדרכי משה קובע גם אם לבן שיורש יש אחים, דין זה עדיין תקף. לר' עקיבא איגר הוויכוח הוא על ירושה עקיפה (מישמוש). הבן והאחים יורשים ישירות, ולכן האב לא יכול לנשל אותם. הדרכי משה גורס שהאחים יורשים בעקיפין (מישמוש) ולכן האב יכול לומר שאחד מבניו צריך לרשת ואחריו הירושה צריכה לעבור לזר. רב שך כותב שהבית יוסף מחזיק שהסיבה שהאב לא יכול לבטל את האחים היא שאז זה יהיה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה כלל [אחרי שאח זה נפטר] וכל הירושה תהיה מתנה לזר, ו זה לא יכול להיות תקף. אבל ר' עקיבא איגר יכול לומר שסיבה זו לא יכולה להיות כך, כי בית יוסף מסכים שאם לאב יש אח, אז יהיה תקף לתת לאח ולאחר מכן לזר. אבל רב שך מציין שאז למרות שיש מי שיכול לרשת, בכל זאת הוא לא יורש וזה כאילו לא הייתה ירושה בכלל אלא פשוט מתנה לזר שאינה יכולה להיות תקפה.

  אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שההוכחה שרב שך מביא נגד ר' עקיבא איגר היא מההלכה שאפשר לבחור לתת ירושה רק לאחד מהאחרים שיכולים לרשת אותו. וזה כולל את אלו שיכולים לרשת ממנו בעקיפין {מישמוש}. אולם השאלה היא האם זה חל גם על הדין שניתן לתת את הירושה לבנו וממנו לזר. וכל העניין של בית יוסף הוא שאי אפשר לשלב את שני הדינים. אז למרות שההסבר של רב שך בבית יוסף הגיוני, אבל גם ההסבר של ר' עקיבא איגר, דהיינו, שהדרכי משה עשוי לקבוע שאחים יורשים רק בעקיפין. אולם רב שך יכול היה להשיב שטעם התנגדותו אינו רק באחד משני ההלכות המשולבות כאן על ידי הדרכי משה, אלא על עצם הירושה של האחים. אם קבענו שהם יורשים ישירות, אז זה נקבע בכל המקרים

אני מקצר כאן, אבל רק עיין באבי עזרי ותראה שרב שך מביא את הוכחתו רק מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא כפי שמובא ברמב''ם. זה קובע שאחים יורשים ישירות

The West is decaying

 The West is decaying from within the reason is''reason'' alone. Reason alone can not arrive at the true nature of reality. This was noted by Hume. Pure reason can only tell us knowledge without sensory input. [''Pure'' mean with no empirical input.]. But for areas where the ''is'' can not tell us about ''ought'', there one needs faith,  Faith with reason. For faith without reason believes nonsense. And reason without faith tells us nothing.  

One important lesson  I learned from my son  Izhak [aka Nahman] is specifically not to add nor subtract from the commandment of the Torah. \This in particular is relevant to sexual sin where it is common for people to add restrictions which then leads them to transgress real ones.  The secular world demises all the prohibition of the Torah, and so in place of them, they make up new ones. On the other hand, the religious world makes up new restrictions, and by that transgress actual prohibitions.

Examples are fairly well known, concubines [or mistress] [''girl friend''] is permitted to most rishonim [mediaeval authorities.] But the Rosh bring the problem that she might be embarrassed to go to the mikve. But I do not think  mikves are okay anyway since they are made from concrete which can be lifted out of the ground in one piece--so they are vessels. And one who dips in a vessel is not made clean. הטובל בכלים לא עולה לו טבילה Instead one might go to the sea, or river, or have the concrete thin enough that it would nor be a vessel. But nowadays, often when making a pool or mikve, there is put some layer of plastic under the concrete. That, in any case, makes the mikve invalid.   

[I might add that clothing is not a separation חציצה from water since the water can and doe get through the clothing.]