I would like to suggest that the first mishna in Bava Batra is like sumchos and that this is in fact what the Gemara itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? And the Gemara answers "It is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them." That means: I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof, so now the mishna comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. And this point of view is close to that of the Ri Migash who wrote that the question of the Gemara is on the whole law of the mishna, “Is it not obvious that they divide?” However, he still explains the Mishna a little differently. He says the question is “If they divide evenly if the wall fell before, they decided to divide and come to court?” and it is a case of a doubt arises before they come to court. I might mention here that Tosfot holds the question of the Gemara is like the sages that the question is since the stones are in the middle and neither has any more claim on them than the other, therefore it is obvious that they divide equally. But even in that Tosphot on the first page, there is something that is unclear in Tosphot. The question in the beginning seems to be "Is it not obvious that they divide equally like the case of a valley where they divide equally (where there is no obligation)." But in the approach of the Ri, the question is, “Is it not obvious that they divide equally since both are required to build?” I might mention that to have a stam mishna like sumchos is not unusual like the mishna in bava kama about an ox that gores a cow and the mishna in Bava Mezia page 100, and others that I do not recall this minute _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to suggest that the first משנה in בבא בתרא is like סומכוס and that this is in fact what the גמרא itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? and the גמרא answers it is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them. That means I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof. so now the משנה comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. And this point of view is close to that of the ר''י מיגש who wrote that the question of the גמרא is on the whole law of the משנה, “Is it not obvious that they divide?” However, he still explains the משנה a little differently. He says the question is “If they divide evenly if the wall fell before, they decided to divide and come to court?” and it is a case of a doubt arises before they come to court. I might mention here that תוספות holds the question of the גמרא is like the חכמים that the question is since the stones are in the middle and neither has any more claim on them than the other, therefore it is obvious that they divide equally. But even in that תוספות on the first page there is something that is unclear in תוספות. The question in the beginning seems to be is it not obvious that they divide equally like the case of a valley where they divide equally. But in the approach of the Ri the question is, “Is it not obvious that they divide equally since both are required to build?” I might mention that to have a סתם משנה like סומכוס is not unusual like the משנה in בבא קמא about an ox that gores a cow and the משנה in בבא מציעא page ק', and others that I do not recall this minute ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ אני רוצה להציע שהמשנה הראשונה בבא בתרא היא כמו סומכוס וזה בעצם מה שהגמרא עצמה מציעה כשהיא שואלת אם החומה נופלת, מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. זה לא ברור מאליו? והגמרא עונה זה בא לומר לנו שזה הדין גם כשהאבנים נופלות לצד החצר של רק אחד מהם. כלומר אולי חשבת שהדין הוא כמו החכמים שמי שמוציא מתחום חברו צריך להביא הוכחה. אז עכשיו המשנה באה להגיד לנו כסף שיש בו ספק מחלקים. ונקודת מבט זו קרובה לזו של הר''י מיגש שכתב ששאלת הגמרא היא על כל דין המשנה "הרי ברור שהם מחלקים?" עם זאת, הוא עדיין מסביר את המשנה קצת אחרת. הוא אומר שהשאלה היא "אם יחלקו שווה בשווה אם החומה נפלה לפני שהם החליטו לחלק ולבוא לבית המשפט?" וזה מקרה של ספק המתעורר לפני שהם מגיעים לבית המשפט. אציין כאן שתוספות מחזיקים שאלת הגמרא היא כמו החכמים שהשאלה היא כיון שהאבנים באמצע ואין לאף אחד מהם טענה יותר חזקה מהשני, לפיכך ברור שהן מחלקים שווה בשווה. אבל גם בתוספות ההיא בעמוד הראשון יש משהו שלא ברור בתוספות. נראה שהשאלה בהתחלה היא האם לא מובן מאליו שהם מתחלקים שווה בשווה כמו במקרה של עמק שבו הם מתחלקים שווה בשווה. אבל בגישה של הרי השאלה היא, "האם זה לא ברור שהם מתחלקים שווה בשווה מכיוון ששניהם נדרשים לבנות אני יכול להזכיר שליש משהו סתם כמו סומכוס זה לא יוצא דופן כמו המשנה בבא קמא על שור שדוחף פרה והמשנה בבא מציעא עמוד ק', ואחרים שאני לא זוכר ברגע זה

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Tractate Bava Batra page 2A and page four

Rambam laws of Neighbors chapter 2 law 18, he says "since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both." And in chapter 3 law 3 he says "If a neighbor surrounds another neighbor, and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in, then that other neighbor has to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence is partly on the land of the other neighbor." You see the Rambam holds the possession of the land is what determines the ownership. The case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls, the stones are divided equally between them. What I am getting at here is this is surprising. The Gemara in Bava Batra has a few approaches to the Mishna about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is "Who has to pay for the fence?," and "How much?," but the question of "On who's land is the fence?" is never mentioned in Bava Batra nor in Bava Kama page 20 {There is a book of lectures of Rav Nachum of the Mir and a book by Rav shach that try to understand what the approach of the Rambam is. The reason the Rambam requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the Ramban and Tosphot bava kama page 58 hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in Bava Mezia, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the Rambam holds (according to the Kesef Mishna laws of theft and loss chapter 10, law 5) the neighbor can say take your trees away and I will not pay for them. But here if the wall I already on his property we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it I a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in bava mezia page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount __________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , he says since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both. And in פרק ג' הלכה ג'he says if a neighbor surrounds another neighbor and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in then that other neighbor צריך to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence Is partly on the land of the other neighbor. You see the רמב''ם hold the possession of the land what determines the ownership. the case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls the stones are divided equally between them/ what I am getting at here is this is surprising. The גמרא in בבא שתרא has a few approaches to the משנה about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is who has to pay for the fence, and how much, but the question of on who's land is the fence is never mentioned in בבא בתרא nor in בבא קמא The reason the רמב''ם requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor (ניקף) is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the רמב''ן and תוספות בבא קמא page נ''ח hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in בבא מציעא ק''א, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the רמב''ם holds (according to the כסף משנה laws of גזילה and אבידה chapter י', law ה') holds the neighbor can say "Take your trees away and I will not pay for them." But here if the wall already on his property, we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it is a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in בבא מציעא ק''א page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , הוא אומר כיון שמקום החומה שייך לשניהם, אם נפל החומה, המקום והאבנים שייכים לשניהם. בפרק ג' הלכה ג' הוא אומר אם שכן מקיף שכן אחר ומציב גדר מסביב לקרקע שלו כך שגם הקרקע של שכנו מגודרת אוטומטית, אז השכן השני צריך לשלם חצי מההוצאה. עם זאת, זה חל רק אם גדר זו נמצאת בחלקה על הקרקע של השכן השני. אתה רואה שהרמב''ם מחזיק שחזקה בקרקע היא מה שקובעת את הבעלות. המקרה של החוק הראשון הוא שאם שני אנשים חולקים חצר ומעמידים חומה, אם היא נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה מה שאני מתכוון כאן זה שזה מפתיע. בגמרא בבא בתרא יש כמה גישות למשנה לגבי שכן אחד שמקיף אחר. השאלה היא מי צריך לשלם על הגדר, וכמה, אבל השאלה על אדמת מי נמצאת הגדר לא מוזכרת בבא בתרא ולא בבא קמא הסיבה שהרמב''ם מחייב שהחומה תהיה בחלקה על אדמת השכן המוקף (ניקף) היא לדעתי משום שהוא מחזיק בדין זה מדין מי שנכנס לשדה של חברו ונוטע עצים. כך מחזיקים הרמב''ן ותוספות בבא קמא דף נ''ח. אם החומה לא תהיה על אדמת השכן, אזי דין זה לא היה רלוונטי כלל. אבל גם אם זה בא מהחוק הזה בבא מציעא ק''א, זה עדיין לא יהיה מקביל בדיוק, כי הרמב''ם מחזיק (לפי הכסף משנה גזלה ואבדה פרק י', חוק ה') יכול השכן לומר "קח את העצים שלך ואני לא אשלם עליהם". אבל כאן אם הקיר כבר על הנכס שלו, אנחנו מניחים שזה בסדר מבחינתו שהשכן השני שם אותו שם. ולכן זה מקרה שזה בסדר מבחינתו (ניחא ליה) ולכן הוא צריך לשלם חצי הסכום. כמו המקרה בבא מציעא ק''א עמוד ק''א שבו הוא משלם את מלוא הסכום, [אבל אם הוא באמת לא רוצה את העצים שם, אבל עדיין לא מוכן להכריח את השני לקחת אותם, אז הוא משלם את הסכום הכי נמוך.

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Bava Mezia page 2 side B. the last Tosphot on the page

Let me present the Gemara Bava Mezia page 2 side B and the last Tosphot on the page. Our mishna says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The gemara asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox, or not. The gemara asked, “Then perhaps our Mishna is not like sumchos, because our mishna says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox, sumchos says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is derara demomona (so they divide without an oath). {Derara demomona means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The gemara asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is derara demomona, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the mishna is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." Tosphot says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that sumchos says to divide without an oath is that is a case of derara demomona. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about rav Nahman said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, derara demomona only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of derara demomona, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to-do with derara demomona. The question I have here I that the gemara say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of derara demomona, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of derara demomona. We see the gemara wants to say that in our case, the lack of derara demomona means we should divide without an oath The gemara is not asking here that we should divide like the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of derara demomna is what the gerama says should cause dividing without an oath—not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of derara demomona should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this mut be the reason of Rabbainu Tam who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment. However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have till found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the gemara says there is a "all the more so from derara demmona to lack of derara demomona".This is different from the way rabbainu tam is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it i a different kind of case of holding the object It occurred to me that this must be the reason of rabbainu Tam to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their pleas instead of the other opinion of the Rashbaam and Rabbaainu Jona that it means relevance of money. For if there is no doubt to the court then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind of holding onto the object, then stll it would be sensible to have each take an oath and all the more so if each has no relavance to the object. so the Gemara wouldmaake sence in either way _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב and the last תוספות on the page. Our משנה says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The גמרא asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox או not. The גמרא asked, “Then perhaps our משנה is not like סומבוס, because our משנה says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox סומכוס says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is דררא דממונא (so they divide without an oath). { דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The גמרא asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is דררא דממונא, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the משנה is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." תוספות says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that סומכוס says to divide without an oath is that is a case of דררא דממונא. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about רב נחמן said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, דררא דממונא only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of דררא דממונא, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to do with דררא דממונא. The question I have here I that the גמרא say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. We see the גמרא wants to say that in our case, the lack of דררא דממונא means we should divide without an oath The גמרא is not asking here that we should divide ץlike the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of דררא דממונא is what the גמרא says should cause dividing without an oath; not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of דררא דממונא should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this be the reason of רבינו תם who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the גמרא says there is a "all the more so from דררא דממונא to lack of דררא דממונא ".This is different from the way ר''ת is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it is a different kind of case of holding the object. Also if דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות then lack of דררא דממונא meaans there i a doubt only becaue of their טענות and so thee ought to be an a oath. It occurred to me that this must be the reason of רבינו תם to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות instead of the other opinion of the רשב''ם and רבינו יונה that it means שייכות of money. For if there is no doubt to the court, then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind ofשייכות onto the object, then stll it would be sensible that neither takes an oath and all the more so if each has no שייכות to the object. so the גמרא would make sence in either way ______________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב ותוספות אחרון בדף. המשנה שלנו אומרת ששני אנשים אוחזים בבגד מתחלקים עם שבועה. שואלת הגמרא ממקרה של שור דופק פרה, ונמצא עוברה בסמוך לה, ואין אנו יודעים אם היא הולידה מוקדם בגלל השור או לא. שאלה הגמרא "אז אולי המשנה שלנו לא כמו סומבוס, כי המשנה שלנו אומרת לחלק את ערך הבגד בשבועה, ואילו במקרה של השור סומכוס אומר לחלק בלי שבועה". תשובה: המקרה של השור הוא דררא דממונא (ולכן מחלקים בלא שבועה). { דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק לבית הדין גם בלי הטענות שלהם.} הגמרא שואלת "האם אין זה "על אחת כמה וכמה"? אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשיש דררא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה כשאין? תשובה: המשנה היא מצב של שבועה שנגזרה על ידי הסופרים. תוספות אומר שהטעם למקרה של שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שהם מחלקים בשבועה הוא בגלל שהם מחזיקים בו. פרשת שור שנגח פרה ונמצא סמוך לה העגל שטרם נולד ושסומכוס אומר לחלק בלא שבועה הוא בגלל הדין של דררא דממונא. במקרה של סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה רב נחמן אמר "מי שחזק מקבל אותה", כי שם אף אחד לא אוחז בסירה. כלומר דררא דממונא רק אומר לנו לחלק בלא שבועה. אם לא מדובר בדרא דממונא, הרי שהדין תלוי אם שני האנשים אוחזים בחפץ או לא, ואין לזה קשר לדררא דממונא. השאלה שיש לי כאן אני שהגמרא אומר אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשמדובר בדרא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה שיחלקו בלא שבועה כשאין זה דררא דממונא. רואים שהגמרא רוצה לומר שבמקרה שלנו חסרון דררא דממונא אומר שצריך לחלק בלי שבועה. הגמרא לא שואל כאן שנחלק כמו במקרה של שור שנגח כי בעצם כן מחלקים. ההבדל היחיד הוא השבועה. ולכן חסרון דררא דממונא הוא מה שהגמרא אומר צריך לגרום לחלוקה בלא שבועה; לא העובדה שהם מחזיקים את הבגד אולי תשיב שחוסר דררא דממונא לא צריך להיות כשלעצמו סיבה לחלוקה. אני חושב שזו הסיבה של רבינו תם שאומר שהסיבה לחלוקה היא שהם מחזיקים את הבגד עם זאת, אני מאמין ששותפי ללמידה היה מוצא את התשובה הזו כלא מספקת. הסיבה היא שהגמרא אומרת שיש "על אחת כמה וכמה מדררא דממונא לחסרון דררא דממונא". זה שונה מהדרך שבה ר''ת לומד שהסיבה שמחלקים את הבגד אינה ''על אחת כמה וכמה" סוג של היגיון, אבל בגלל שזה סוג אחר של מקרה של החזקת האובייקט כמו כן אם דררא דממונא משמע שיש ספק לבית הדין בלא טענותיהם אזי חסר דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק רק בגלל טענותיהם, ולכן צריך להיות שבועה עלה בדעתי שזו חייבת להיות הטעם של רבינו תם להחזיק דררא דממונא משמע יש ספק לבית הדין בלא מחלוקתם במקום דעתו האחרת של הרשב''ם ורבינו יונה שמשמעותה כמות גדולה של כסף. שהרי אם אין ספק לבית הדין, אז אין סיבה לגרום לאיש להישבע, עם זאת, אפילו אם זה אומר שלכל אחד יש סוג של שייכות על החפץ, אז עדיין יהיה הגיוני שאין צריכים להישבע שבועה, ועל אחת כמה וכמה אם לכל אחד אין זכות לחפץ. אז הגמרא יהיה הגיוני בכל דרך

za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format Music has been numbered from 1 to 100 in each series A to Z. Then started again from "za". However many files are missing or lost. Most were never put on line. There are however older files with names like black hole or anything I could think of at the time. There is a file by the name of mathematics and another by name "orchetra"--for that it was written for

misuse of a philosophy. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs

If every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory, but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed. Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular, the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently, and held that one need to learn the Organum of Aristotle (known by the name of the seven wisdoms). It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam are ignored. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs. To be clear, I prefer the distilled approach of Kelley Ross who combines Kant with Leonard Nelson and Schopenhauer. But, I still see great value in Hegel and a more modern great thinker, Michael Huemer of the Intuitionist approach. still I think the Kelley Ross approach is the best.{friesian.com.} Reichenbach had more sense than the Friesian school when it came to Relativity, so to be able to create a consistent system, the Friesian school did not have much to work with until Kelley Ross who managed to put together the various strands of thought into a consistent system. [However he is ignored in Germany, which is sad. For that approach needs modification.] Rav Nachman of Breslov dismissed learning philosophy completely, and there is a good point to that as we can see nowadays how crazy it can get. But still, I see great values in a few of them, e.g. the minor dialogoes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fries, Hegel,Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross.