The cure for all kinds of modern insanity

The cure for all kinds of modern insanity is faith and reason. I am a fan of faith and reason -the formula of the Middle Ages but with a modern twist. While in the Middle Ages, reason meant Aristotle and faith meant the catholic church. But I think that even starting at 1350 A.D. with the plague and later with wars against protestants that the approach to faith has to be rethought. And Reason I think is not really exactly reading Aristotle, but I would include Plato Plotinus and Kant, Hegel; also, John Locke and the founding papers of the USA, i.e. the Constitution, the Federalist Papers and the letters of the founding fathers. The line of division between philosophy and politics is blurred and so I think including John Locke and James Madison is important, Dr. Kelley Ross has some important improvements on the Friesian school started by Leonard Nelson, mainly the idea of Karl Popper about propositions that may not be able to be proven true, but can be proven false. At any rate, I think that philosophers tend to overextend themselves into politics. Though professors of philosophy tend to have high I.Q.s, but when they venture into politics, things seem to go haywire.

The irony about communism is that it can not exist without capitalism.

The problem with China is, that they depend on the USA for their economy and yet do everything they can to destroy the USA. The irony about communism is that it can not exist without capitalism. This is already a problem besides the odd fact that they steal American designs and then manufacture them cheaper and then try to sell them to the USA. My dad encountered this problem at TRW when he was inventing the laser communication used in Elon Musk's satellite system. There was a whole motion picture on the episode that the KBG had managed to steal the design. [snow man and the falcon]

za74 F minor in midi format za74 in nwc format

עכשיו הסתכלתי ברב שך בהלכות ניזקי ממון י''ג הלכה י''ט והוא מצביע על הגמרא בבא קמא דף ו' ע''א. משם מצאתי תשובה לשאלה שהרב שך מביא על הרמב''ם. שם רואים פעמיים שיכולה להיות סיבה לחשוב שאם עדיין יש ברשותו אבן, סכין או חבילה או עץ או קיר שנפלו לרשות הרבים וגרמו לנזק, שיש יותר סיבה לעשותו פטור. וחוץ מזה אני יכול לראות את הסיבה מאחורי זה. אם בכל זאת יש את הסכין או אבן, אזי הוא מתכוון לאסוף, ואם הם גורמים נזק לפני שהספיק לאסוף אותם, אזי אין הוא חייב באחריות שכן אין זו אשמתו. הסיבה הזו אנו מוצאים בדף כ''ב בבא קמא שם היה קיר שנפל ונמלט אש וגרם נזק, ולבעל האש לא היה אפשרות עדיין לתקן את הקיר. הוא אינו אחראי כי זו לא אשמתו (שכן לא הייתה לו הזדמנות לתקן זאת עדיין). אבל אם הפקיר את הרסיסים ברשות הרבים יש יותר סיבה להטיל עליו אחריות שכן הוא מתכוון להשאיר שם את החפצים המזיקים, ולעולם אין בדעתו להסירם. בְּסֵדֶר. עכשיו אחרי שאמרתי את זה תן לי להביא את הגמרא. כתוב שאביי אמר שהמשנה בוא לכלול את האבן, הסכין או החבילה שלו שהוא שם על הגג, והם נפלו בגלל רוח רגילה. ביקשה הגמרא על זה שאם הפקיר אותם ברשות הרבים, זה מקרה רגיל של חפירת בור ברשות הרבים. אז במקום זאת הגמרא מציעה שמכיוון שזה ברור מדי, אז זה חייב להיות שהמשנה באה לכלול כאשר הוא לא נטש אותם. בשלב זה בגמרא, אנו רואים שיש יותר סיבה להפוך אותו לפטור כאשר הוא עדיין בעל האבן או הסכין כי אנו צריכים לכלול אותם. אותו רעיון חוזר בעמוד ו' ע''א שרבינא אמר שהמשנה באה לספר לנו על קיר או עץ שנפלו לרשות הרבים, שהם חייבים. אם הוא נטש אותם, אז זה ברור, ואין שום סיבה שהמשנה תגיד לנו את זה. אז דווקא המקרה הוא כאשר הוא לא נטש אותם, ושם נוכל לחשוב שהוא לא חייב. אז אנחנו צריכים שהמשנה תגיד לנו שהוא אחראי. לכן, גם כאן אנו רואים שיש יותר סיבה לגרום לו להיות פטור כאשר הוא עדיין בעל העץ והחומה. לכן אתה צריך שהמשנה תבוא ותכלול אותה. כל זה בא לענות על השאלה הזו. ר''מ כותב שאם נפל קיר או עץ לרשות הרבים, אין הוא חייב באחריות למרות שנטש אותם. בדרך כלל, אתה אומר שככה זה המצב למרות שיש סיבה כזו או אחרת שמתנגדת לזה. אז הנה ר''מ אומר שהוא לא אחראי למרות שיש סיבה זו שמתנגדת לזה. הסיבה היא שהוא נטש אותם. אבל אם הוא נטש אותם, זה נראה יותר סיבה לגרום לו לא להיות אחראי. אז התשובה היא מה שכתבתי למעלה. אם נטש אותם, הוא צריך להיות ______________________________ עם זאת, אני רוצה להביא כאן כיצד רב שך עונה על שאלה זו על ר''מ. הוא אומר שהכוונה היא שבעל הבור נטש את תחום הבור שלו, וכך השטח הזה הופך לרשות הרבים וכבר אנו יודעים שבור חייב רק ברשות הרבים, ולכן למרות שנטש את הבור ואת השטח ההוא, עדיין אינו חייב אלא אם כן הייתה אזהרה מטעם בית הדין. אם הייתה אזהרה של בית המשפט להסיר את החומה והעץ וחלפו יותר משלושים יום, אזי הוא חייב. התשובה הזו ברורה. אולם, עדיין יש לי שאלה בסוף הפרק ההוא ברב שך שם הוא אומר שהסיבה שהר''מ לא הביא את דין אביי שאם הביא את אבנו, סכינו או חבילתו לגג ונפלו ברוח רגילה, הוא חייב באחריות כי זה על אחת כמה וכמה שניתן בקלות להסיק ממקרה הקיר והעץ שנפלו. לי זה נראה קשה להבין כי הר"מ אומר שהחומה והעץ אינם אחראים. לכן, אינך יכול ללמוד מהם אחריות למצב אחר, אלא אם כן במקרה האחר הזהיר אותו בית המשפט ועברו יותר משלושים יום. אבל מעולם לא שמענו על התנאים הללו במקרה של אבייאחראי שכן בכוונתו להשאירם ברשות הרבים. אך למרות זאת, הוא אינו אחראי. --יתר על כן, יש לי שאלה נוספת על התשובה הזו של רב שך. {תשובתו היא שברגע שנדע את הדין על החומה והעץ שנפלו, אז נוכל לדעת על האבן שעל הגג. השאלה שיש לי היא זו. אביי אומר שאנחנו לומדים את האחריות של האבן על הגג מהמכנה המשותף בין בור ואש. כי אולי הייתם אומרים שאין אחריות על סכין האבן והאריזה שעל הגג כי יש כוח אחר שפועל עליהם מלבד כוח הבעלים, זה הרוח. ובכן, אנחנו יכולים לענות על ההתנגדות הזאת מאש. כי כשם שהאש חייבת למרות שכוח אחר פועל עליה, כך גם האבן והסכין שעל הגג אחראים. עכשיו, איך נוכל לדעת את זה מהמקרה של החומה והעץ שנפלו? כי במקרה זה אמר רבינא שאנו יודעים שהם חייבים בגלל בור ושור. שהרי אולי היית אומר שאולי אין הם צריכים להיות אחראים כי לא נעשו מלכתחילה לעשות נזק, ובכן נוכל לענות כי גם שור לא נעשה מלכתחילה לעשות נזק, ובכל זאת הוא אחראי. כך גם העץ והחומה שנפלו צריכים להיות אחראים. אבל אם היינו יודעים את כל זה, איך נוכל ללמוד למקרה שבו כוח אחר פועל על הדבר הגורם לנזק? אולי זה לא יהיה אחראי עד שנלמד את זה מאיפשהו. אז אני מתקשה להבין את התשובה הזו של רב שך

Rav Shach in laws of damage 13 law 19 ,Gemara Bava Kama page 6a.

Now I have been looking at Rav Shach in laws of damage 13 law 19 and he points to the Gemara Bava Kama page 6a. From there I found an answer to the question that many achronim including Rav Shach bring on the Rambam. There we see twice that there can be a reason to think that if he still owns the stone, knife or package or the tree or wall that fell into a public domain, there is more of a reason to make him not obligated. And beside that I can see the reason behind it. If he still owns it, then he intends to pick it up, and if it causes damage before he got a chance to pick it up, then he should be not liable since it is not his fault. This exact reason we find on page 22 Bava Kama where there was a wall that fell down and fire escaped and did damage, and the owner of the fire did not have a chance yet to repair the wall. He is not liable because it is not his fault (since he did not have a chance to repair it yet). But if he abandoned the piece or hard in the public domain there is more of a reason to make him liable since he intends to leave the damaging objects there, and he never intends to remove them. Okay. Now that I have said this let me bring the gemara. It says abaye said the mishna come include his stone, knife or package that he put on a roof, and they fell due to a common wind. The Gemara asked on this that if he abandoned them in the public domain that is a regular case of digging a pit in a public domain. so instead the gemara suggests that since that is too obvious, then it must be that the mishna is coming to include when he did not abandon them. At this point, in the Gemara we see that there is more of a reason to a make him not liable when still own the stone or knife because we need to mishna to include them. This same idea is repeated on page 6b where Ravina said the mishna is coming to tell us about a wall or tree that fell into a public domain, that they are liable. if he abandoned them, then it is obvious, and there is no reason for the mishna to tell us that. so rather the case is when he did not abandon them, and there we might think he is not obligated. so, we need the mishna to tell us that he is liable. Therefore, here also we see there is a more of a reason to make him not liable when he still owns the tree and wall. That is why you need to Mishna to come and include it. This is all coming to answer this question. The Rambam writes that if a wall or tree fell into a public domain, he is not liable even though he abandoned them. Usually, you say such and such is the case even though there is such and such a reason that militates against it. so here the Rambam is saying that he is not liable even though there is this reason that militates against it. That reason is he abandoned them. But if he abandoned them that would seem to be more of reason to make him not liable. So, the answer is what I wrote up above. If he abandoned them, he should be liable since he intends to leave them in the public domain. But even so, he is not liable. However, I want to bring here how Rav Shach answers this question on the Rambam. He says that the meaning is that the owner of the pit abandoned his domain where the pit is located, and thus that area becomes a public domain and we already know that a pit is liable only in a public domain, so even though he abandoned the pit and that area still he is not liable unless there was warning by the court. If there was warning by the court to remove the wall and tree and more than 30 days have passed, then he is liable. This answer is clear. However, I still have a question on the end of that chapter in Rav Shach H say at the end that the reason the Rambam did not bring the law of Abaye that if he brought his tone knife or package to a roof top and they fell, that he is liable because it is a “all the more so” that can easily be derived from the case of the wall and tree that fell. To me this seems hard to understand because the Rambam say that the wall and tree are not liable. So, you can not learn liability to another case from them unless that other case would also have the court warning him and there were more than thirty days have passed. But we never heard of these conditions in the case of Abaye Furthermore, there is another question I have on this answer of Rav Shach. {His answer is that once we know the law about the wall and tree that fell, then we can know about the stone on the rooftop. The question I have is this. Abaye says we learn liability of the stone on the rooftop from the common denominator between pit and fire. For you might have said that the stone knife and package on the roof should not be liable because there is another force acting on them beside the owner’s force, that is the wind. Well, we can answer that objection from fire. For just like fire is obligated even though another force is acting on it, so the stone and knife on the roof also are liable. Now ho could we know this from the case of the wall and tree that fell? For in that case, Ravina said we know they are liable because of pit and ox. For you might have said that maybe they should not be liable because they were not made from the beginning to do damage, well we can answer that because ox also was not made from the beginning to do damage, and yet it is liable. so too should the tree and wall that fell be liable. But if we would know all this, how could we learn to a case where another force is acting on the thing that causes damage? maybe that would be not liable until we learn it from somewhere. so, I have a hard time understanding this answer of Rav Shach ______________________________________________________________Now I have been looking at רב שך in הלכות ניזקי ממון י''ג הלכה י''טand he points to the גמרא בבא קמא page ו' ע''א. From there I found an answer to the question that רב שך bring on the רמב''ם. There we see twice that there can be a reason to think that if he still owns the stone, knife or package or the tree or wall that fell into a public domain AND CAUED DAMAGE, there is more of a reason to make him not obligated. And beside that I can see the reason behind it. If he still owns it, then he intends to pick it up, and if it causes damage before he got a chance to pick it up, then he should be not liable since it is not his fault. This exact reason we find on page כ''ב בבא קמא where there was a wall that fell down and fire escaped and did damage, and the owner of the fire did not have a chance yet to repair the wall. He is not liable because it is not his fault (since he did not have a chance to repair it yet). But if he abandoned the shards in the public domain there is more of a reason to make him liable since he intends to leave the damaging objects there, and he never intends to remove them. Okay. Now that I have said this let me bring the גמרא. It says אביי said theמשנה come include his stone, knife or package that he put on a roof, and they fell due to a common wind. The גמרא asked on this that if he abandoned them in the public domain that is a regular case of digging a pit in a public domain. so instead the גמרא suggests that since that is too obvious, then it must be that theמשנה is coming to include when he did not abandon them. At this point, in the גמרא we see that there is more of a reason to a make him not liable when still own the stone or knife because we need toמשנה to include them. This same idea is repeated on page ו' ע''א where רבינא said theמשנה is coming to tell us about a wall or tree that fell into a public domain, that they are liable. if he abandoned them, then it is obvious, and there is no reason for theמשנה to tell us that. so rather the case is when he did not abandon them, and there we might think he is not obligated. so, we need theמשנה to tell us that he is liable. Therefore, here also we see there is a more of a reason to make him not liable when he still owns the tree and wall. That is why you need toמשנה to come and include it. This is all coming to answer this question. ר''מ writes that if a wall or tree fell into a public domain, he is not liable even though he abandoned them. Usually, you say such and such is the case even though there is such and such a reason that militates against it. so here ר''מ is saying that he is not liable even though there is this reason that militates against it. That reason is he abandoned them. But if he abandoned them that would seem to be more of reason to make him not liable. So, the answer is what I wrote up above. If he abandoned them, he should be liable since he intends to leave them in the public domain. But even so, he is not liable________________________ However, I want to bring here how רב שך answers this question on the ר’’מ. He says that the meaning is that the owner of the pit abandoned his domain where the pit is located, and thus that area becomes a public domain and we already know that a pit is liable only in a public domain, so even though he abandoned the pit and that area still he is not liable unless there was warning by the court. If there was warning by the court to remove the wall and tree and more than thirty days have passed, then he is liable. This answer is clear. However, I still have a question on the end of that chapter in רב שךTHERE HE say that the reason the ר’’מ did not bring the law of אביי that if he brought his stone, knife or package to a roof top and they fell by a common wind, that he is liable because it is a “all the more so” that can easily be derived from the case of the wall and tree that fell. To me this seems hard to understand because the ר’’מ say that the wall and tree are not liable. So, you can not learn liability to another case from them unless that other case would also have the court warning him and there were more than thirty days have passed. But we never heard of these conditions in the case of אביי Furthermore, there is another question I have on this answer of רב שך . {His answer is that once we know the law about the wall and tree that fell, then we can know about the stone on the rooftop. The question I have is this. אביי says we learn liability of the stone on the rooftop from the common denominator between pit and fire. For you might have said that the stone knife and package on the roof should not be liable because there is another force acting on them beside the owner’s force, that is the wind. Well, we can answer that objection from fire. For just like fire is obligated even though another force is acting on it, so the stone and knife on the roof also are liable. Now ho could we know this from the case of the wall and tree that fell? For in that case, רבינא said we know they are liable because of pit and ox. For you might have said that maybe they should not be liable because they were not made from the beginning to do damage, well we can answer that because ox also was not made from the beginning to do damage, and yet it is liable. so too should the tree and wall that fell be liable. But if we would know all this, how could we learn to a case where another force is acting on the thing that causes damage? maybe that would be not liable until we learn it from somewhere. so, I have a hard time understanding this answer of רב שך

This is the age of disappointment; the time when almost everyone experiences the same thing: the ideology or system that they point all their faith and might and energy into turned out to be a farce A good example of this I the book by Emma Goldman who had been a outspoken proponent of the Russian revolution until she came and saw it up close. But the same rule applies in all aspect of politic and belief systems. People jut don’t talk about it because their means of making money depend on that system continuing.

Destiny takes us only half way. The rest we have to do on our own. And that part is where we usually go wrong

Divine decree and free will are not compatible. By looking back on my life, I can see areas where there simply was divine decree that such and such had to happen, -- regardless of anyone’s free will. I think a good example, is my wife’s intense desire to get me to marry her in spite of my trying to get her off my tail for years. I think I can see this in the children that I eventually had with her that had to come into the world with this set of two parents. I would personally have given anything in the world instead to have been able to marry a daughter of a true Torah scholar so that I could continue to learn Torah. That option was not in the cards. Eventually when the Divine Decree was fulfilled, that when I was left to the fate of free will. Then my own free will got me off track. I am not the only one who gets distracted by free will. All of us go haywire left to our own devices. We all do better when God decrees things (or that in moment of divine grace, we manage to depend on Divine Grace in spite of our own free will pointing us elsewhere). Destiny takes us only half way. The rest we have to do on our own. And that part is where we usually go wrong