Rambam עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א'

To understand the Rambam it is necessary to make a distinction between איסור הנאה and איסור למזבח.
In that way the Rambam is clear. He says in הלכות איסורי מזבח that any object that is נעבד is אסור למזבח. It makes no difference if the object belongs to him or not.  But in terms of אסורי הנאה he says in הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' that most surprising of laws. He says even on one's own animal, if he is עובד  it, it does not become forbidden in הנאה unless he does at least a small  מעשה. Clearly he is saying that if he bowed down to his own animal, the animal does not become forbidden in הנאה  and it is even מותר באכילה. [It is possible to miss this point of first reading because of the order the Rambam places the subject. At first he says one does not make forbidden in הנאה  anything that  אין בו תפיסת אדם even an animal unless he does a small act like שוחט סימן אחד. When do we say this. On his own objects. But objects that belong to another, even if he does a complete שחיטה  he does not forbid the animal or whatever object it might be. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו.

What this means is vast. It means that he is looking at the statement of רב הונא as referring to only his own animal and he is deciding the halacah as  Rav Huna. But it also means that he looked at the statement of Rav Amram אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו  and decided the halacah like that also. He decided both statements are true and do not contradict.
Thus he must have had a different version of the statement of Rav Huna.
Rav Huna said in Hulin page מ' ע''ב when a person bows down to the animal of his friend he does not make it forbidden but if he is שוחט סימן אחר he does make it forbidden. The Rambam's version must have said  when a person bows down to his own animal he does not make it forbidden בהנאה but if he is cuts one סימן he does make it forbidden.

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p129 t74 D major midi t74 mp3

p129 in midi format

Musar [learning the books of Ethics written during the Middle Ages

I noticed that Rav Shach mentioned Musar twice in his introduction to the Avi Ezri. He even goes so far as to bring the idea that without good character and fear of God, all one's Torah learning is negative and poison.

Musar, after it got mixed with kabalah, takes a  different direction than the Musar of the early Middle Ages. For example, the attitude of  the Rambam and his son's and grandchildren's Musar books  have very different attitudes than later books of Musar. A lot of fanaticism gets introduced after  the Middle Ages. [Muar of the Middle Ages held of the approach of Faith with Reason, Reason with Revelation.]
Later books can mix up people.
However this is not to imply anything negative about the Ari (Heaven forbid.)
My feeling about this is that if one feels ready to learn the Ari (Isaac Luria) and has  been through Shas a least a few times, then the best thing is to learn the Ari straight. [The main thing I think is the Tree of Life though my learning partner, David Bronson, thinks that the  מבוא שערים is even more essential.]

[Though I am myself ashkenazic, I can not stress enough to avoid all the ashkenazic sitra achra [dark side] books of mysticism written after the 1600's.] The only commentary on the Ari from the ashkenzic world  is the Gra. So for good commentary on the Ari, the best thing is the Gra, Rav Shalom Sharabi (Yemen) and or Rav Yaakov Abuchazeira.

The truth be told I do not think it is possible to get the "spirit of Torah" outside of a Litvak Musar yeshiva. I have absolutely no respect for synagogues at all. If one is not in the area of a genuine Litvak yeshiva then the best thing is to learn at home. 

Not enough attention is place on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.

Not enough attention is place on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.  It is almost inevitable that one gets involved in learning the Ari that he get caught up in some kind of occult activity. People find supposed proofs in his writings for all kinds of very stupid activities; or sometimes just the opposite. They attack true tzadikim thinking of themselves as having privy information about some deep secrets of the Torah revealed by the Ari.

public school is a waste of time.

My impression of education is basically that public school is a waste of time. It is best to limit oneself to the basic program of the Rambam--the Oral Law, the Written Law , Physics and Metaphysics. Even the Metaphysics thing I would limit it to what the Rambam meant by it--that is the book of Aristotle called Metaphysics. Most of secular education I think is bitul Torah [wasting time which could be spent learning Torah]. [The main thing to learn as far as the Oral and Written law is concerned in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which contains the prime essence of Torah in its pristine glory.]
Not that the religious world is any better. Most of what passes for Torah in the religious world is Torah of the Sitra Achra." [Dark Side Torah](The demons have Torah also. This is what passes for authentic Torah in the religious world.)

In terms of Torah learning my impression is to do in depth learning right away. That is what Reb Shelomo Freifeld did when he made his yeshiva Shar Yashuv. The idea there was to plunge into the depth of the Gemara right away. I was not happy with that at the time but since then I have seen that when people do not learn how to learn right away, they never get it.

[As for Physics I do not have a lot to say except it is best not to make random detours. The best thing is to go to Quantum Field Theory as soon as possible.[What is as soon as possible? That is after doing Quantum Mechanics and Calculus, and Functional Analysis.]
It is true that the Rambam wanted his Mishna Torah to be learned straight but that does not exclude the importance of going into it in depth as Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and Rav Shach did as you can see in the law of learning Torah where 1/3 is for the Oral Law and another third is for in depth learning.

Gitin page 4a

I should mention that I gained a great deal of respect for Tosphot from my learning partner David Bronson. If not for him I might have been satisfied with asking a question on Tosphot and then going on. So in answer to my question on Tosphot Gitin page 4a let me just say that Tosphot is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me 100 shekalim and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
If anyone on the blog' sphere has read my little book on Shas they would have already have seen me go into the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what Tosphot is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you ow me 100 shekalim and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then Tosphot is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that Tosphot is thinking that even to R. Elazar the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But Topshot is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. So now what looked to be an unanswerable question on Tosphot now becomes clear. Tosphot suggest that even R Elazar agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the halachic category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a halachic category that he has to pay.

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So in answer to my question on תוספות  let me just say that תוספות is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
This is like  the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what תוספות is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then תוספות is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that תוספות is thinking that even to ר. אלעזר the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But תוספות is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. What תוספות suggests that even ר. אלעזר agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the דין category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a הלכה category that he has to pay.


 התשובה לשאלה שלי על תוספות. תוספות הוא חושב בכיוונים האלה. נניח שאדם אחד מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר לשני אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים והשני אומר כן! אז מה הדין? הוא חייב לשלם, למרות שאולי מעולם לא היה כל הלוואה בכלל. כלומר יש חלות הדין גם אם לא היה אף פעם חלות קניין. וזה לא אותו דבר כאדם שכותב שטר שבאמצעותו הוא מחייב את עצמו לשלם כסף. זה כמו ההבדל החוקי בשגגות בין טעות במציאות וטעות בדין. אז זה מה תוספות חושב. נניח שאדם מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר "אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים", והשני אומר "לא היו דברים מעולם", ושני עדים באים ואומרים "לווה ופרע", הוא חייב לשלם כי כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע, והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אז נכון שאנחנו מאמינים שיש הלוואה. אבל יש גם חלות דין. כלומר יש עכשיו חוק שהוא חייב לשלם גם אם מעולם לא היה הלוואה. הדין הוא חל. ותוספות  גם חושבים מה זה עושה שטר להיות שטר?  אנו יודעים כבר כי שתוספות חושבים שגם לר' אלעזר החתימה של שני עדים עושה את השטר להיות שטר. אבל תוספות חושבות בנוסף. הוא חושב שיש שני היבטים של שטר. האחת היא כי היא מעידה על מה שכתוב שקרה. אבל יש גם את הדין של שטר. מה שתוספות מרמזים הוא שגם ר' אלעזר מסכים כי עבור שטרי מכר, עדי חתימה כרתי, כי הם נותנים את המסמך דין והקטגוריה של שטר. באותה מדה  הודאת פיו יוצרת קטגוריה בהלכה כי הוא צריך לשלם. זה חלות דין

representative democracy

I first ran into the idea of feedback  in electricity and it seems like a good analogy. [I was learning that as part of the idea of the Rambam of learning Physics.]

The idea of feedback seems to be central to Calvin in his establishment of representative democracy in Geneva and in its outskirts.

[It has been noted before me that representative government did not originate with Athens , nor Rome, nor John Locke but rather Calvin. Athens was not a representative government but rather a democracy.]
The thing which is interesting to me is the complain  of Shmuel the prophet about the sin of setting up a king. You can not say that Shmuel was saying bad kings are bad, but even good kings. After all Shmuel only anointed two kings, Saul and David. And he was saying to Israel that their desire to have a king was a terrible sin in the sight of God. Unless we understand him to be ignorant he must have been referring even to the two kings that he set up.