That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.

I thought today that at least once I ought to jot down a basic idea that I heard from Reb Shelomo Freifeld about learning. And it was also emphasized by his son Motti. That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.  Rav Freifeld might have said this in reference to each chapter of the Gemara but this idea I usually applied to much smaller sections of Gemara. For example  Tosphot and the Maharsha and the Pnei Yehoshua I would in general try to just say over ten times. I had a pencil that I would jot down a small dot for every time I had repeated a Pnei Yehoshua or a Tosphot.
This was usually done as part of the in depth sessions.

It is true I have mentioned on many blogs the idea of learning fast without review which I saw originally in Musar books, but that I never really applied in my yeshiva years--even in terms of fast learning. Even fast learning to me meant to review the Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot a few times and then go on.
It was only later that I started doing Physics, that learning fast made a lot more sense to me in order to get the big picture.

There was almost never a time in yeshiva that my struggle to make progress was looked kindly upon. Both Shar Yahuv and the Mir stressed learning in depth. I once made a siyum [finishing] of Shabat and the basic reaction of even my closest friend [Shelomo Berger ] was "How many times did you review it?"
That is to say learning in depth was embedded in the culture to the degree that fast learning was looked upon as superficial. My own feeling was that the in depth thing is great but I also wanted to get the "big picture." Not the big picture in the way of Reb Chaim or Rav Shach which is to go through Shas through one sugia. Rather I simply wanted  a clear idea of each tractate as a whole.
Years later I have begun to see how right they were. I have noticed that people that do not know how to  get into the essence of a sugia when they are young never get it.

Gitin page 4a

The problem is this. תוספות at first suggests that to ר. אלעזר one needs עדי מסירה for both money and גיטין to make a חלות קניין. Then he suggests maybe not for money since הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. But that rule does not suggest there can be a חלות קניין by means of words, nor does it suggest any kind of קניין for money at all. It only says that we believe there was  a חלות קניין because of his words.



הבעיה היא זו. תוספות בהתחלה מעלה כי לר. אלעזר  צריכים עדי המסירה  לחלות קניין כסף ולגיטין. אחר כך הוא מציע שאולי לא לכסף בגלל שהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אבל הכלל הזה אינו מציע שיכולה להיות חלות קניין באמצעות מילים, ואינו מציע שום סוג של קניין  כסף בכלל. הוא רק אומר שאנחנו מאמינים שהייתה  חלות קניין בגלל דבריו


I believe that תוספות meant to answer this question. That is why he brings up the issue of חב לאחרים.  That is he is saying I know the law of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי  does not mean that הודאת פיו makes a חלות קניין. But it might because, after all, we would not believe  הודאת פיו if it was a case of חב לאחרים.

אני מאמין כי תוספות נועד לענות על שאלה זו. זו הסיבה שהוא מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. כלומר הוא אומר אני מכיר את החוק של הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי אין זה אומר כי הודאת פיו עושה חלות קניין. אבל זה יכול להיות ראיה, שאחרי הכל, לא היינו מאמינים הודאת פיו אם זה היה מקרה של חב לאחרים.

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 תוספות suggests  that  ר. אלעזר should hold that both חלות גיטין and a חלות כסף should happen only by עדי מסירה. He is not thinking of שטרי ראיה but rather שטרי קניין. Then he wants to backtrack, and to say this: to ר. אלעזר all שטרות even to make a חלות are valid with just עדי חתימה. But we would still need עדי מסירה For גיטין because אין דבר שבערווה פחות משיים.
Then he wants to bring a proof from הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. On this I asked that הודאת  פיו  does not accomplish a חלות. Then I suggested that תוספות must be thinking of this objection and thus brings up the subject of חב לאחרים. The basic idea is in גיטין and קידושין one creates an obligation for others, but money might be different.  I do not understand why that is relevant. It is true that one can obligate himself money without any transaction just by a document. But it still has to be a valid document. But a more serious question is that the answer of תוספות  goes against the very same premise that תוספות is trying to prove. תוספות is trying to prove the validity of a שטר can be brought about by עדי חתימה. That means the validity of a document of גיטין קידושין or שטר מכר. But the brings a proof that גיטין וקידושין are different than קנייני כסף

 תוספות מעלה כי יכול להיות שר. אלעזר מחזיק ששני חלות גיטין וכן חלות שטרי מכר צריכות לקרות רק על ידי עדי המסירה. הוא לא חושב על שטרי ראיה אלא שטרי קניין. אז הוא רוצה לחזור בו, ולהגיד את זה:  לר. אלעזר כל שטרות אפילו לעשות חלות תקפות גם על ידי עדי חתימה. אבל אנחנו עדיין צריכים עדי המסירה עבור גיטין וקידושין כי אין דבר שבערווה פחות משניים. ואז הוא רוצה להביא ראיה מן הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי.  שאלתי כי הודאת פיו אינה משיגה חלות. ואז הצעתי שתוספות חושב על זה ובכך מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. הרעיון הבסיסי הוא שגיטין וקידושין  יוצרים מחויבות לאחרים, אבל קניין כסף יכול להיות שונה. אני לא מבין למה זה רלוונטי. זה נכון שאדם יכול לחייב את עצמו בכסף בלי שום עסקה רק על ידי מסמך. אבל זה עדיין צריך להיות מסמך תקף. אבל שאלה רצינית יותר היא כי התשובה של תוספות נוגדת את ההנחה שאותה תוספות מנסה להוכיח. תוספות מנסה להוכיח את תוקפו של שטר יכול להיות על ידי עדי חתימה. כלומר, את תוקפו של מסמך של גיטין קידושין או שטר מכר. אך מביא הוכחה לכך גיטין וקידושין הם שונים מאשר קנייני כסף.

Gitin page 4 a

 תוספות in גיטין page ד' ע''א. He says ר. אלעזר says you need עדי מסירה for both גיטין and also ממון. And then suggests maybe not. Maybe in money issues one might not need עדי מסירה because הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. I do not understand תוספות. When do you say הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי is when the obligation came about through some valid transaction. That is to say. One person comes to court and says,to another, "You owe me מאה שקלים." The נטען says, "לא היו דברים מעולם." Then two witnesses come in and say "לווה ופרע". He is obligated because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע and הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. That is  a case where we say the חיוב came about because of a real loan, not because he says he is obligated. But here תוספות is suggest because of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי he would be obligate even though there are no עדי מסירה because his words alone would obligate him. But that is not in fact the thing that הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי tells us.



 תוספות גיטין דף ד' ע''א. הוא אומר ר. אלעזר אומר צריכים עדי מסירה עבור גיטין וגם לשטרי ממון. ואז הוא שואל אולי לא. אולי בנושאים של כסף אולי לא צריכים עדי מסירה משום הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אני לא מבין את התוספות. כאשר אומרים הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי זה כאשר ההתחייבות באה על דרך עסקה תקפה. אבל הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי זה שאדם אחד בא לבית המשפט ואומר להנטען "אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים". הנטען אומר, "לא היו דברים מעולם". ואז שני עדים באים ואומרים לווה ופרע. הוא מחויב כי כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. זהו מקרה שבו אנחנו אומרים החיוב הושג בזכות הלוואה אמיתית, לא בגלל שהוא אומר שהוא מחויב. אבל כאן תוספות הוא מציע בגלל הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי שהוא יהיה מחוייב למרות שאין עדי מסירה. זה בגלל שדבריו לבד יחייבו אותו. אבל זה לא עצם הדבר שהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי מספר לנו.

A simple way to explain the problem is this. Tosphot at 1st suggests that to R. Elazar one needs עדי מסירה For both money and gitin to make a חלות קניין. Then he suggest maybe not for money since הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. But that rule does not suggest there can be a חלות קניין by means of words, nor does it suggest any kind of קניין for money at all. It only says that we believe there was  a חלות קניין because of his words.

trust in God

When I went to yeshiva in the first place I was not thinking about trust in God for making a living. But I also was not thinking of using Torah for that purpose either (--May God save us). Rather, I was thinking of fitting in, and whatever other people do for making a living while learning Torah, that is what I would do also. It was only later that I discovered this idea of accepting the yoke of Torah. That is;- when one accepts the yoke of Torah, then all other distractions are removed from him. And that worked well along with trust in God. At some point I left that idea, and had it in mind that I would work for a living. And then everyone that was using Torah for money was asking my wife, "Why is he not working?" and encouraged her to get a divorce. So I no longer see people using Torah to make money [the cult the Gra put into excommunication "cherem"] as friends. [They seem more like enemies.] But I also see that my own leaving the strict path of "Just Torah and Trust in God" also led to disaster.

What it seems like to me today is this. That this path works. One that accepts the yoke of Torah, all other distractions are, in fact, removed. But it only works once. One can not leave it, see bad results, and then return.


In a practical sense I think leaving the strict Litvak path was a disaster for our family. So in spite of the fact that phonies and frauds use the appearance of Torah to make money by collecting charity for their supposed :"learning Torah" -still the value of the real thing remains.
What this means is that the fact that the Gra put that cult into excommunication  means that that cult are enemies of the Jewish Family and of the Torah. Appearances to th contrary I have found the Gra to be 100% correct. They have fine sounding words, but Acta Non Verba (actions, not words.)
I would be amiss if i did not mention that Reb Nachman I think as not included in the Cherem and in fact I think it is a great thing to be in Uman on Rosh Hashanah--even if he never mentioned the burial site as a place to be for Rosh Hashanah as he did for the Tikun Haklali.

The main problem as far as I can see is that there is an essential and fundamental flaw in the Jewish religious world that is somewhat ignored. The leaders and teachers look human but are actually demons as Reb Nachman pointed out long ago. This mainly applies to the cult the Gra put into Cherem but the problem has spread.

what constitutes a valid divorce.

There is a lot of stuff going on in Gitin about what constitutes a valid divorce.

The interesting thing is that apparently the Rif and Rambam both said that R. Elazar who said עדי מסירה כרתי [the witnesses that see the giving of the document cause the divorce to be real] really meant אף עדי מסירה כרתי [also the witnesses that see the giving of the document cause the divorce to be real]] which is a surprise to me. [R. Meir said the witnesses on the document cause it to be real and valid. So the argument is only in that R Meir disagrees with R Elazar. But R Elazar agrees with R Meir.]


[Not that I ever learned that tractate very well anyway.] In any case, I saw Rav Shach brings up the larger subject of what constitutes any valid שטר (document). And he says that a valid document to be valid at all needs witnesses. But כתב ידו [one's own handwriting] also counts as a valid document.

That is he says that famous Rambam about  a document that says שדי קנוי לך ("My field is acquired to you") is valid even with no witnesses- is talking about כתב ידו (handwritten).
This is what leads to the famous practice in Litvak yeshivas that when someone asks for a loan, they write a small note, "I owe you $10." (for example). [That practice is based on two principles. (1) One should not make or receive a loan without a document or witnesses. (2) The other is כתב ידו (a handwritten document has the category of a valid document) is מחייב (obligates).]

[I have not spent much time on this. I went to the doctor and he said I have a damaged kidney, so my health has not been what would be considered optimal. That was exactly at the time another terrible problem in my life was solved.]

The main issue I am hoping  to get to is תוספות in גיטין page ד' ע''א. He says ר. אלעזר says you need עדי מסירה for both גיטין and also ממון. And then suggests maybe not. Maybe in money issues one might not need עדי מסירה because הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. I do not understand תוספות. When do you say הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי is when the obligation came about through some valid transaction. That is to say. One person comes to court and says you owe me מאה שקלים. The נטען says לא היו דברים מעולם. Then two witnesses come in and say לווה ופרע. He is obligated because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע andהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. That is  a case where we say the חיוב came about because of a real loan, not because he says he is obligated. But here תוספות is suggest because of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי he would be obligate even though there are no עדי מסירה because his words alone would obligate him. But that is not in fact the thing that הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי tells us.

Keeping one theology simple and in accord with Reason.

Keeping one theology simple and in accord with Reason.

I recall Steven Dutch having some great essays about this subject. One point of his that I vaguely recall is  the simplest theology wins.But I would have to look up his essays again to remind myself. In any case, I think one other point of his is that it helps to have reason on your side.

Thus it seems Christians throwing out Aquinas was not the smartest move. [I only say this because at least I did a drop of work on Aquinas. I just never got to St. Augustine--though I am aware that some of St. Augustine's good ideas were accepted into the Jewish world. Like time and space being creations.] [Even Aquinas I had a very limited ability to spend time on.] Dr. Ross also has some interesting thoughts on the subject.]. In any case it is a good idea to keep things simple and limit one's claims in areas he knows nothing about as Kant said.


Hegel was clearly trying to do what Aquinas had tried before him.

In any case the combination of Reason with Faith was a hard thing to get to as you can see from Hippolytus . It is a very specific approach of the Middle Ages. And for  Protestants to throw out that approach I think was a terrible mistake.


The basic approach of Reason with Faith you can see in Philo how it can result in something far from Torah. It was really the Rambam and Saadia Gaon that made a reasonable combination.

[I might mention that the Ari and Reb Nachman both go a long way in making the bridge between human reason and Torah.] That is in at least making it as understandable to human reason as possible.

I would have trouble explaining my own position because as the basic structure I go with the Rambam. But the Rambam himself is a neo Platonic thinker which means that one can fill up missing gaps in his structure with insights from the Ari and Reb Nachman

Reb Israel Salanter was absolutely right about the Musar Movement.

My basic idea of what Torah is about is to things: Good character and devakut [attachment with God.]. Thus anything which leaves to either of these results, I consider good. [Attachment with God is one of the 613 commandments.]

The trouble with the devakut thing is the tendency is for self deception. People that are part of a religious tradition believe they are good because they are part of that tradition. Not because they actually are good or decent people at all. And the more spiritual it is the more there is a tendency to let in a surge of immorality,. People begin to believe they are Divine. A small part of large creek in an ocean of divinity. Especially their leaders they think of as divine. Worship of their leaders is not uncommon. The "great leader" thinks his unrelated wishes are Divine Revelations. They have no law but their own will and twist the holy Torah any way they please in their pretense to be knowledgeable. There is no stopping their grossest desires. The thin film that divides religious fervor from passion and delusion is dissolved and  erased.

As for good character I think Reb Israel Salanter was absolutely right about the Musar Movement.[That is to learn Medieval Ethics.] In fact, it was in my learning Musar that I began to realize how much the Torah requires good character. Still, Musar was subject to debate and many people thought it was a distraction from Torah learning. I am not sure. Rav Shach credits Reb Israel Salanter a lot but I am not sure if that means the approach of combining Musar with yeshivas or if it is general agreement with Rav Salanter. I just can not tell..