michael huemer on Israel

(I see Dr. Huemer as very important in terms of his uniting and synthesizing much of the good ideas in the schools of thought of Prichard and G.E. Moore. this coming up essay just shows the great clarity of his thought.)

 The Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for decades, drawing particular attention since October 7. Paradoxically, in the wake of the October 7 attacks, left-leaning observers in the West appear to have reached their highest degree of sympathy yet for the cause of Hamas. I call this “paradoxical” because usually, the way to gain sympathy for your cause isn’t to rape and kill civilians (not even if the the other side reacts by committing more violence).

I don’t have a solution to the conflict. Instead, I’ll discuss why the conflict is intractable. Note: If some fanatics show up to berate me about how obviously one side or the other is completely evil and I didn’t sufficiently condemn them, I will ignore you and delete your comments. If you get super-emotional while reading this, I suggest not posting anything. My aim here is not to condemn people but to understand what’s going on.

Short Background

(See the Wikipedia entry on the history of the conflict.) There were Jews living in Palestine since ~2000 years ago. Many people ruled the region since then. The British took it over in the 20th century after defeating the Ottomans. Around the time of World War II, many Jews migrated from Europe to Palestine. Due to the persecution Jews had suffered, including especially Hitler’s attempt to exterminate them, many Jews wanted to leave Europe and to have a Jewish state in their ancestral homeland, where they could presumably escape persecution.

After World War II, Britain and the U.N. decided to divide Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, as of 1948. Palestinian Arabs rejected this, and a war ensued, during which ~700,000 Palestinian Arabs were driven from their homes, and Israel captured some of the territory that the U.N. originally allocated to the Arabs.

Arabs and Israelis have been fighting over the area ever since.

This raises a question: Most violent conflicts end within a few years. For example, the U.S. fought Germany and Japan in World War II, yet the conflict ended after a few years, and now both countries are strong U.S. allies. Territory has changed hands during wars many times in many parts of the world, without ongoing decades-long fights ensuing. Why is the Arab-Israeli conflict still going on, 75 years after the initial division of Palestine?

Possible Resolutions

Let’s first consider how the conflict could possibly end.

1: Arabs win

Resolution #1: Israel disbands, and Arabs get control of the entire region. This is what Hamas and other Muslim extremist groups are fighting for. This is the meaning of the slogan “From the river to the sea” (the river being the Jordan River, at the eastern edge of Israel, and the sea being the Mediterranean Sea, at the western edge. The slogan refers to the goal of the Arabs gaining control of the entire region.)

This resolution would be disastrous for the Jews in the region. They would either have to flee in a mass exodus or risk being killed by the victorious Arab/Muslim forces. (For evidence about this risk, see below under “Why the Conflict Endures”.)

This resolution would also be terrible for almost everyone other than the Islamic extremist groups. Israel is the most prosperous and free nation in the region; if it disbanded, the most likely successor would be something similar to the surrounding Islamic theocracies, but even worse because it would be run by fanatics like Hamas.

But this proposed resolution is not serious. Israel is not going to voluntarily disband, and the Arabs are not going to defeat it. Israel is the most advanced and powerful state in the region, besides having the support of the most powerful nation in the world. Israel has repeatedly defeated Arabs in military conflict. In the Six-Day War of 1967, they fought Egypt, Syria, and Jordan at the same time, beating all three and capturing huge swaths of territory, including the entire Sinai Peninsula. You might as well hypothesize a world in which the U.S. disbands in order to give America back to the Native Americans.

Anyone who thinks this is on the table is not living in the real world. Which means that Hamas and the other Islamic extremist groups are not living in the real world.

2: Israel Wins

Resolution #2: Israel wins, and the Arabs give up. Israel takes complete control of the entire region.

This resolution is more realistic than the previous one, in that it contemplates victory by the stronger party rather than the weaker. However, it is also infeasible, because there is nowhere for the Palestinian Arabs to go—the surrounding countries do not want to take the Palestinians (including many terrorists and terrorist-sympathizers) into their lands. The Palestinians are also not going to voluntarily leave, and Israel is not prepared for the level of mass violence they would have to use to drive them out. Militarily, Israel is capable of that level of force (it is widely accepted that they have nuclear weapons); they just are not willing to use it.

So this one is also not going to happen.

3: Two-State Solution

Resolution #3: The Arabs and the Jews share the land; each gets their own state within the region. This is what almost all non-extremist observers have thought needs to happen ever since the original 1948 division. It seems like the obvious answer, and it doesn’t sound all that complicated.

Why hasn’t this solved the conflict? Because it’s really hard to figure out an equitable distribution of territory? Because there are some indivisible goods? Not really. The main reason this hasn’t solved the conflict is that there are violent extremists who refuse to accept any solution other than “my side gets everything”. There are some Israeli extremists who think Israel should get the entire region; that is why one of them assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin when Rabin was trying to make peace with the Palestinians in 1995.

And there are even more Islamic extremists who think Muslims should get the entire region and the Jews should get nothing. These extremists refuse to accept any compromise whatsoever, and they’re prepared to fight to the death.

Why the Conflict Endures

How conflicts end

History has seen many bitter conflicts in which each side demonizes the other. And yet, as I say, most of them are more or less resolved in a few years. Often, the two sides forgive each other and normalize relations after the war. How does this happen?

Usually, one of two things happens:

(a) The two sides inflict sufficient pain on each other that both realize that it would be better to make a compromise, and so they sign a peace agreement. But if one side is unwilling to compromise, then

(b) the two sides fight until it is clear that one of them is the loser. Who decides when this is clear? The loser. I.e., the fighting goes on until one side is losing so badly that they admit that they have lost and they surrender. The reason we’re not still fighting the Japanese is that in 1945, the Japanese government signed an unconditional surrender agreement. Then the U.S. rewrote their constitution to prevent further militarism and helped them to recover economically.

The Arab/Israeli problem

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East will not end because neither side will surrender, and the Muslim/Arab side will not compromise. Israel is not going to surrender since they know they’re more powerful and could wipe out the Palestinians any time they want.

The Islamic extremists are not going to either compromise or surrender, because they are delusional and they think they’re going to win. On October 7, Hamas thought that they were going to make it all the way to the West Bank. (They made it about halfway there.) They knew that Israel would have a massive military response, but they didn’t care; they’re fine with sacrificing many Palestinian lives for each Jewish life they can end.

They’re not interested in peace. A Hamas media adviser explained, “I hope that the state of war with Israel will become permanent on all the borders, and that the Arab world will stand with us.” Another Hamas official explained, “Will we have to pay a price? Yes, and we are ready to pay it. We are called a nation of martyrs and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs.” Also: “We must teach Israel a lesson, and we will do this again and again. The Al-Aqsa Flood [the Oct. 7 attack] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth.”

Again, this is to make the point that they have no intention of stopping, because they can’t imagine that they’re going to lose. They think they are going to win. (Despite the “permanent war” comment, I assume they meant that the state of war would be permanent until they eliminate Israel, since presumably their ultimate goal can’t be literally to have war forever.)

All this is true despite Israel’s obvious military superiority, with more than 10 times as many troops, and despite the fact that Palestinian casualties are far greater than Israeli casualties, with Gaza suffering, by some estimates, 20 times more fatalities in the conflict. (These numbers are probably unreliable, but surely Gaza has suffered far greater losses.)

This is a highly unusual situation. Usually, a government does not keep thinking it is going to win a violent conflict against a vastly superior force. That’s why they usually do not launch attacks against such a foe or keep fighting while thousands of their people are dying. Religion may be playing a role here: Hamas may think they are going to win because they think God is supporting them. They also don’t mind seeing, or even are “proud” to see, Palestinians dying, because they think those people are going to heaven.

There has been some discussion of peace negotiations between the two sides. However, no peace deal that leaves Hamas still existing is a solution; Hamas will just use the respite to start building up to their next attack. I don’t see how Israel can accept Hamas’ continued existence, and I don’t see why Hamas would accept a deal that destroys Hamas.

What happens after Hamas is destroyed?

Okay, say Israel effectively destroys Hamas. Then will there be peace?

Probably not. More terrorists will just crop up to replace them. The problem is that the Palestinian population supports terrorism. Hamas was already a well-known terrorist organization when the population of Gaza elected Hamas to a majority of the legislature in 2006. Predictably, Hamas then violently suppressed all opposition. They haven’t allowed elections since then.

Have Gazans subsequently become more moderate? Not much. A poll taken after October 7 found that 72% of Palestinians supported the Hamas attack, and the attack increased support for Hamas among Palestinians, especially in the West Bank.

In the history of warfare, what would normally happen in a situation like this is that the more powerful nation would crush the weaker nation militarily. If the weaker nation initiated attacks on civilian targets, then the stronger nation would also destroy civilian targets. If the weaker nation kept fighting, the stronger nation would keep attacking until they physically destroyed the enemy’s capacity to fight any more. By the way, they normally wouldn’t be restrained by concern for the other side’s civilians, nor would the international community condemn them for killing more of the enemy than the enemy killed of them.

In this case, however, the weaker nation is happy to use human shields, and they contain so many insane extremists that they probably would never surrender unless Israel inflicts truly horrifying levels of violence on them, e.g., dropping nuclear bombs on them. Israel will not do this because they are not the kind of monsters that Hamas are (of course, if Hamas had nuclear bombs, they would immediately use them to kill as many Jews as possible).

So that is why the conflict is probably going to just continue for decades more. I don’t see how the traditional methods of ending conflicts can work here. In sum:

• The Arab/Israeli conflict will continue because (a) the Arab/Muslim side will not accept compromise, and (b) neither side will admit defeat.

• The Muslim side will not accept compromise because they have too many fanatics who think they can’t lose because God is on their side.

• Israel will not be defeated because they are the more powerful side.

• The Palestinian Arabs will not be defeated because Israel will be restrained by morality and the international community from taking the extreme measures needed to defeat them.

Will it Ever End?

Still, the conflict will someday end. It won’t be going on 1,000 years from now. But it will probably end through some much slower, non-traditional process—maybe the fanatics die off, and each succeeding generation has fewer fanatics. Perhaps some future generation of Palestinians and Israelis will be ready to accept a two-state solution. On the positive side, the rest of the Arab world hasn’t joined in the war as Hamas had hoped, so they may be tired of the conflict.

For future discussion: Why does the American left support the Arab/Muslim side? And why do we treat this war differently from other wars?

 Even though almost no one looks at this blog, I feel I ought to make clear that recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia is not worth a penny. All the more so that Israel ought not  allow a terrorist state by its side in return for empty promises. Recognition by nations are empty. Russia also recognized Israel, while it was sending Migs to all the surrounding Arab nations in order to wipe out Israel. Nations have no friends; they have interests [as per Kissinger ]. Saudi Arabia just wants some F-35s, and that is why they are playing nice. 

conversation number 76 of Rav Nahman

 I feel that conversation number 76 of Rav Nahman [Breslov] is not known well enough or understood well enough. In it he recommends learning fast, and specifically emphasizes that this applies even if one does not understand. while he was referring to learning through the two Talmuds, Midrash and  Shulchan Aruch in this way, I think it applies just a much to Mathematics and Physics.

The actual statement goes like this ''אין צריכים בלימוד רק האמירה לבד לומר הדברים כסדר  וממילא יבין ואם אינו מבין בתחילה יבין אחר כך ואם אע''פ כן לא יכול להבין כוונתו מה בכך? כי מעלת ריבוי הלימוד עולה על הכל  "One needs in learning only to say the words in order and automatically he will understand, and if he does not understand at first, he will understand afterwards. And if even after that he does not understand, so what? For the greatness of a lot of learning goes above everything."  

[Read to the end of that conversation and you will see that Rav Nahman meant  this with review;--but that is to get to the end of the book one is learning and then go back to the beginning.  I think review four times is the minimum amount. 

Learning in depth is also brought there in conversation 76, and in terms of Gemara I think the best in depth approach is to learn the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. However any of the basic achronim will work also--i.e. the Chidushei of Reb Chaim of Brisk or his two disciples Shimon Shkopf or the Birschat Shmuel. 

religious consider secular Jews

 In a religious city (Modiin Ilit) the Israeli army came to protect them from the terrorists. the city made a city building available to them. the local religious leaders sent a letter protesting the presence of the army saying that is pritzut nora פריצות נוראה  It hard to translate  that into English, but the basic idea  is that the religious consider  secular Jews as cockroaches and therefore the religious would rather not have them around.. [That is why I mentioned in my last blog entry that baali teshuva need to be aware of this attitude because the religious consider baali teshuva as half cockroaches and half human. 

[I use the word ''religious'' in reference to general usage;- not that they should be considered as keeping the laws of the Torah.]

 I really can not see why learning Torah is considered a reason not to serve  in the Israeli Defense Force.  The principle is for a mitzvah that can not be done by someone else, one is supposed to interrupt ones learning. That is from the Yerushalmi Talmud. But even so I can see in times of peace it makes sense. Nowadays this seems more in doubt. at any rate the there are only a few yeshivot here and there [e.g., Ponovitch] that I would consider to be in the category of ''Learning Torah.'' The vast majority are private clubs designed for chit chat. -as is well known.

But I guess it is clear that the issue is never the issue [as Steven Dutch wrote.]] The reason the religious do not serve in the IDF is because  they ask, "Why should we serve donkeys?" (i.e. secular Jews). However, I do not think that reason makes much sense. I have just not been able to see the religious as righteous. (After all, experience counts.)   [The religious world will always deny any and all principles of Torah as long as there is a perceived advantage to their group. Torah is a disguise for them. That is why it is extremely dangerous for baali teshuva to get involved with them because the worth of baali teshuva to them depends only on how much money the frum think they can get out of them or their rich American parents. However i would have to exempt most Litvak yeshivot from the criticism voiced here because is believe their commitment to Torah is complete, not their commitment to their group.

[Rav Nachman of course had great ideas but his teachings are used as conscious traps.]

Mark R. Sunwall What: Miss Rand saw and why it still matters. This the most recent essay that Kelley Ross put on his web site

[I assume Dr Ross put this paper by Sunwall on web site is because the whole Friesian School is geared to answer this flaw in Kant.] [I have to say that as absurd as it sounds I just can not see much difference between the foundationalists (Huemer, G.E, Moore) and Kelley Ross. To me immediate non intuitive knowledge is the same as just what Huemer calls just plain reason. But here is no place for that. just that to Huemer the same things we get with empirical knowledge and Bayesian probability, to Dr Ross we get because we have to have a ground or basis to decide what is probable.] ]

Back to the foundations of morality

In a time of escalating crises, reflections on the foundations of human action and cognition seems almost like an unaffordable luxury. Yet in the present moment when the civilization/barbarism antithesis has made a sudden (perhaps short-lived) comeback, we who remember the 20th century recall the rhetoric of Miss Rand. Yes, that Miss Rand, the one with the deliberately provocative counter-feminist preferred pronoun. Call her what you will, a shallow philosopher, a bad novelist, or even someone who was jointly complicit in the formation a cult centering on herself. Yet she excelled as a writer of essays and manifestos, of which the most important was her “For the New Intellectual.” Leaving aside the validity of Ayn Rand’s other notions, the central hypothesis of her manifesto has yet to be either refuted or elaborated since its publication in 1962. Here I am reopening her brief on the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and to that end I will proceed by further simplifying Rand’s already streamlined take on the history of Western thought.

The salient thought of the manifesto is epitomized by one bold hypothesis: The decline and ultimate canceling of Western Civilization was initiated by the popular reception of Immanuel Kant’s Critical Philosophy. On the face of it, this is an outrageous assertion, given Kant’s status as a pillar of the Western philosophical tradition together with his image as sublime moralist. Furthermore, Rand added fuel to the outrage by implying malicious intent on Kant’s part. None the less, it might be worth while to extract the core hypothesis from Rand’s ad hominum innuendo, with the purpose, not of condemning Kant, but of salvaging whatever might be its value to intellectual history. The core hypothesis is non-trivial, and indeed might be of great importance if it could identify (as Rand claimed) a root cause of civilization’s destruction. After all, we know plenty enough about the proximate causes, ranging from war to inflation to censorship to terrorism and so on and so forth. Let’s give the Rand vs. Kant case a hearing, not because we have any sympathy for the way Rand’s following degenerated into a cult (or cults), but because the hypothesis itself deserves testing. If Kant can be vindicated, then we will owe his historic memory an apology. On the other hand, if the hypothesis is substantiated, we will have a plausible answer to a seldom asked but important question: Why do we speak of “the European Enlightenment” as a period which has a tacit closing date around the beginning of the 19th century, nomenclature which seems to imply a following age of darkness? It would seem unlikely that the following age has duped historians into cloaking its decline under the attractive aliases of Industry, Democracy, Science and Romance. Furthermore, even if we grant the onset of spiritual and moral decline, this might be attributed to any number coincident factors outside the realm of philosophical discourse ranging from the French Revolution to the harnessing of the steam engine. However those of us who stubbornly adhere to Richard Weaver’s adage “ideas have consequences” are always gratified when an intellectual cause can be hypothesized for the progress or regress of civilization.

Now if the anti-Kant hypothesis, in some form or other, can be vindicated, then things become much more interesting, and much more constructive, since the hypothesis implies a corollary. If Kant is a wrong turning, then we can take up the thread of pre-Critical ideas and develop them in ways which were precluded after Western thought took a wrong turn at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. Rand’s thought hints at what such a possible civilization might have looked like, and what it might look like in the future if the “war” (here a metaphor for intellectual struggle) for civilization could be won. Rand herself is a kind of unicorn, and while her thought was generally well intended and well articulated, it is incomplete and insufficiently robust to carry out the kind of renewal of civilization which she envisioned. Correcting this requires filling in the missing links in Rand’s history of rationalism, which may turn out to have many forgotten (or covered-up) items both in her sketch of intellectual history and among the people and ideas which formed her own views. Ultimately neither you nor I should be interested in the perpetuation or justification of Rand’s thought, but only in the nature of “what is” and how human life should proceed in accordance with that truth. Yet Rand remains significant even if the only thing she ever did was to alert us to a fatal flaw in the thinking of the West. Perhaps it is truly fatal, and the West cannot be saved, in which case all we will have is the satisfaction of knowing the cause. Or perhaps the ancient threads of rationality can be picked up again and extended into a brighter future. Frankly, I am much more interested in the corollary of the anti-Kant hypothesis than in the hypothesis itself. Yet exploration of the corollary will have to wait until the hypothesis has been reiterated with greater simplicity and lesser animus than in Rand’s initial presentation.

Problems in Rand’s articulation of the hypothesis

At the outset, to maintain that Immanuel Kant was operating out of bad will in the development of his Critical Philosophy is simply counterfactual. Nothing has brought more discredit to Rand’s hypothesis than her mischaracterization of Kant as an evil human being, as nothing could be further from the truth. Anyone who has even the slightest knowledge of the Sage of Konnignburg’s life and times will see the enormity of the slander. This is not to say that an “evil philosopher” is necessarily an oxymoron. I have my own misgivings about Frederich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and especially J. J. Rousseau, the last of whom even the generally tolerant David Hume thought demented. More to the point, during her life and afterwards many people intimated that Rand herself was evil, and these included not just her predictable left-wing critics but fellow conservative Whittaker Chambers. Unlike Chambers I think that Rand was a passionate advocate for goodness and truth.

Indeed, perhaps she was too passionate, at least for a philosopher. My hunch is that she lashed out at Kant because she intuited a deep flaw in his thinking which she couldn’t describe with sufficient exactitude. The strong points in her anti-Kant manifesto are rhetorical, in which she links the splitting of reality into a noumenal world and a phenomenal world with a division of labor between priests and tyrants, whom she strikingly characterizes as the “Witch Doctor” and “Atilla [the Hun]” There are some problems with this from a historical point of view, primarily in that the categories of noumenal and phenomenal predate their adoption into Kant’s system. None the less, the reader gets a vivid impression that a “divide and conquer” scheme has been used to impose mental chains on whomever adopts Kant’s reasoning. So far so good, but when it comes to the analysis of Kant’s system rather than just its characterization Rand has trouble following through with her insight.

At first blush it would seem that Rand’s quest against post-Kantian thought is poorly aimed. For instance, in terms of his general moral tenor, Kant was neither a political nor religious apologist. On the contrary, Kant saw himself as an intellectual opponent of both tyranny (Atilla) and priestcraft (the Witch Doctor). Yet, significantly, he framed his dialectical inquiry not in terms of the tyranny/priestcraft doublet, but rather as a critical overcoming of the skepticism/dogmatism antithesis. Let us grant for the moment that Kant was successful in this endeavor of staking out a middle ground which in some sense incorporated the strengths of both skepticism and dogmatism while avoiding the weaknesses of either. But at what price? Did this overcoming of pre-Kantian thought set the stage for even deeper moral dilemmas in subsequent philosophy? This is a matter which must be considered before we move on to celebrate what Kant called his “Copernican revolution.”

Before we can answer this question we need to have a clear, succinct, and non-trivial definition of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. It is easy enough to dislike Kant for some non-essential reason. Rand herself falls into this trap when she lampoons Kant’s exposition as deliberately obscure. This has been a complaint of many others beside Rand, although the innuendo of bad faith is probably unique to her. More to the point, complaints about style sidetrack serious consideration of a writer’s salient thoughts. It is up to the reader to extract the essence of a complex body of thought.

Here I will go out on a limb and give my impression of Kant’s general movement of thought. At the price of raising academic hackles, I am striving for simplicity and clarity. It seems to me that Kant has overcome both skepticism and dogmatism at the price of grounding his philosophy in psychology. Now certainly, I realize that many Kant scholars take exception to the characterization of the Critical Philosophy as a form of psychologism, but here I am not trying to fine-tune my, let alone anyone else’s, understanding of Kant’s thinking, but rather attempting to elucidate what Rand sensed to be the terrible error in Kant which sent Western civilization down the path of destruction. I think she sensed right, but could not articulate the reason adequately, a painful irony for a thinker who valued explicit reason over what she called “sense-of-life.”

The Heart of the Matter: Unleashing the demon of Ethical Inventionism

If we define “ethical inventionism” as the arbitrary promulgation of values and ethical standards by human creators operating independently of either God or nature, then Immanuel Kant was, if anything, the opposite of an ethical inventionist. None the less, he may have opened the door for the rise of ethical inventionism in Western, and subsequently global, civilization. Arguably, this was the end result of the reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, first in Germany and later throughout all of Europe and its civilizational appendages. It was not, as Rand implies, a direct result of Kant’s metaphysics, but rather a consequence of the towering prestige attained by Kant’s formal ethics, which ostensibly surpassed all previous debates over substantive ethics. This movement towards a mental and formal ethics had as its unintended consequence, the eclipse of the lively debates over natural law, which had been the essential context within which European, and especially German, thought had developed throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Whether or not we want to call Kant’s transcendental philosophy “psychologistic” or not, its ideal and absolute character had, as the first of many unintended consequences the rise of the German historical schools to fill the gap left by the diminishing of natural law discourse. This void could not be filled by Critical Philosophy due to its ideal, and in the realm of sociopolitical theory, utopian implications.

The movement from abstract theory to history as the context for thinking about politics, law, and ethics does not, in one fell swoop, take us from immutable ethics (proper to both divine command theory and its friendly rival natural law theory) into the chaotic world of ethical inventionism. Furthermore, the development of history as a field of understanding is nothing to be disparaged. None the less the shift from natural law thinking to historicism, (whether of German provenance or otherwise) is evidence of a transition from thinking which uses principles to using narratives, and from deductions founded on universal axioms to parochial us/them inductions, from humanism to tribalism, from enlightenment to romance. Parenthetically, the last term is viewed as compatible with rationalism in Rand’s philosophy, but here we are not pointing out potential contradictions in her thought, but only her anti-Kant hypothesis.

We see the above mentioned transitions at almost exactly the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries which is also the period of the initial reception of the Critical Philosophy in Europe. Coincidence is not proof of causality, but it gives some grounds for examining Rand’s claim that Kant was an irrationalist, despite the near-universal verdict that he was a rationalist, albeit a rationalist who’s works were obscure enough to generate endless disagreements among his interpreters. The grounds that Rand stipulates for Kant being an irrationalist are not cogent in so far as she implies the segmentation of reality into noumenal and a phenomenal spheres defaults on a supposed requirement of rationalism to encompass all being with a comprehensive explanation, or at least a set of explanations. Hegel, who did exactly that, does not escape her ire either. Most importantly however, Rand herself does not pretend to offer a comprehensive account of being, as if such were a requirement for a rational philosophy. On the contrary, she deliberately precinds from making any statements on cosmology, on the sensible observation that a philosophy attempting to provide its followers with stable standards of thought and behavior will be constantly undercut if it attempts to ground itself on a science which is in a continual state of revision. To her credit Rand is seeking an ethics which is reliable, stable, and objective. Furthermore, while she frequently uses the word “metaphysics” in her own ideosyncratic way, the heart of her philosophy manifests itself in her ethics, and that is where we should expect to find validation of her anti-Kant hypothesis as well, in ethics rather than in metaphysics or epistemology.

Highlighting ethics means bypassing the usual understanding of how the Critical Philosophy developed, seen as an attempt to overcome the logjam created by equally well-argued dogmatism and skepticism. In a sense Kant’s solution, far from being a compromise between rationalism and its doubters, resulted in a kind of hyper-rationalism. However it was a rationalism rooted in the mind rather than any exterior or even interior (psychology in the vulgar sense) reality. One might hail it as the third (after divine command and natural law theories) and vastly improved version of an immutable ethics. It should have stabilized civilization and set the bar for unlimited future moral progress. Yet within a hundred years Nietzsche was already hinting that the dark gods had returned. Translated into the language I am employing here, the era of ethical invention had arrived. Nietzsche could see that once ethics had turned into an expression of human creativity, it didn’t stop at a little stylistic dabbing, a custom here, a moral there, but rather painting with broad strokes, turning evil into good and good into evil, if only to satisfy the creators that they had the power to do so.

All of this is far removed from Kant, who conceived of moral standards, like pretty much everything else, as being “hard-wired” into the human mind, and not susceptible to meddling. The will was empowered to comply with the standards, or ignore them, according to its choice, but it was not free to change the standards themselves. Kant’s ethics included and consolidated elements from previous exchanges among enlightenment and religious viewpoints and furthermore raised the bar of morality according to strict notion of duty. Generally speaking consolidation and high standards are good things. However the vicissitudes of human events often turn even the best of intentions into traps for the unwary.

It was the Roman emperor Caligula who said, “If only they had one neck!” [That he might chop them off, i.e., the Roman people as a whole, with one blow.] In a sense Kant, in his Critical Philosophy, provided the Enlightenment with one neck, a consolidated system which reconciled and extended much of the previous century’s thought. Furthermore it was too strong to be chopped off, even by the guillotine of dogmatic materialism emanating from France in its late form of “ideology” which declared human thought processes to be epiphenomena of biological and economic realities. Instead Kant’s system melted in a slow and insidious fashion which lasted through most of the 19th century.

It was the post-Kantian idealists themselves who initiated the metamorphosis of the immutable mental categories into dynamic historical processes. Taking advantage the Critical philosophy’s consolidation of rational categories into a mental/ideal framework, Fichte introduced the ego as a unifying principle, while Hegel integrated history into idealism. This introduction of the time element was, none the less, limited and ordered. But with the rise of materialism, with its implication of a strict determinism of laws exterior to the human mind, the radical aspirations for freedom which had been awakened by German idealism and romanticism were crowded into a displaced and disinherited mental realm. Thus limited, and in order to attain parity with the new evolutionary thinking of natural history, idealism had to lay claim to its own powers of metamorphosis. In this transformation of post-Kantian thought, ideas became the opposite Plato’s unchanging essences. Ideas now became fluid thought-forms, created and modified by the genius of human cerebration. The greatest consequence of this movement was an increasing tendency to see systems to morality as arbitrary constructs invented by human beings, these being either individual law-givers or groups acting in concert.

Conclusion

When we divide all possible ethics into either systems of immutable morality or systems of moral invention, it is clear that Kant’s ethics, whether we agree with it in substance or not, rests firmly within the former, immutable, camp. Kant’s “revolution” is not a revolution in the contemporary sense of an emergence of novel form out of a prior state of being. It was a revolution in the classical sense of a restoration of primordial form from the corruptions of time. Even something as seeming radical as his transcendental turn was only a movement in terms of a discovery process delving down into hitherto unexplored realities. It was not the promulgation of a new reality birthed by human thought. The freedom and autonomy spoken of so highly by Kant and his followers is only the disciplined freedom of moral attainment within an objective system of formal ethics. It is not the freedom to set one’s own standards of morality. So we must reject Rand’s characterization of Kant as “subjective.”

None the less, when Kant placed the location of an immutable morality into the mental, as opposed to the theistic or natural sphere, he opened the door to the possibility of moral inventionism. The major fruit of invented morality during the 19th century was the perfection of positive law, replacing natural or traditional law, and reflected in the consolidation of state power, signaled the rise of the various “gods” of sovereignty, popular, autocratic or otherwise. The minor though well-advertised counterpoint to this was the bourgeois decadence of celebrated individuals, attaining their own godhood through moral invention which characteristically involved inversion of norms. In the 20th century the first tendency intensified through the spread of universal state warfare, allegedly countered, but in fact complimented by universal revolutionary agitation on the part of revolutionary professionals. The 21st century has seen the combination of major (state) and minor (individualist) moral invention, with the public sanctioning of anomic behavior.

Assigning ultimate responsibility for this degeneration in civilization to Immanuel Kant seems rather unfair. None the less, in this modified form Ayn Rand’s anti-Kant hypothesis appears cogent. Left to their own devices, neither the rationalistic nor skeptical modes of thought popular in European philosophy prior to Kant would have been capable of birthing the moral inventionism of latter times. It took Kant’s static psychologism (or if you will “mentalism”) to suggest later dynamic roles for the human intellect in constructing novel moralities.

So much for the hypothesis. I hope at some point to comment on the possibility that Kant’s immediate predecessors shared much with Rand. It is always interesting to see if Rand, who denied any homage to other philosophers aside from Aristotle, was in fact influenced by unnamed sources. More importantly, if there are missteps in Kant, what can we learn by returning to the pre-Kantians? If we are able to pick up where those long abandoned trails left off then perhaps we will be, in Kant’s own words “…on the road to a true science.”

faith and reason after Kant

 The best way to combine faith and reason after Kant is through the approach of Leonard Nelson and his new Friesian School. Sadly, the best spokesman for this approach,  Kelley Ross, does not seem to be updating his website [friesian.com] anymore. There were -- great thinkers before that that also walked this path of faith and reason, but they were all before Kant, and thus do not take the points of the mind-body problem into account, nor Kant's solution. Though Hegel also can be understood as taking the place of Aquinas in bringing about a faith and reason approach (see Kaufman), still he never actually deals with the mind-body problem directly. Thus, it is better to go with the idea of Fries of immediate non intuitive knowledge. [Besides that, Hegel is used to prop up Communism. The history of Communism of 100 millions dead ought to give one pause as to how accurate a theory it is,- especially in view of its stated goals of bring about utopia.]