MICHAEL HUEMER--- The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts [See also Robert Hanna about this same issue --but Hanna is much longer and difficult.]

 

The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts MICHAEL HUEMER Here, I figure out why conceptual analysis failed and what concepts are really like.* [ *Based on: “The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts,” pp. 51-76 in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, ed. Chris Daly (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).] 1. The Failure of Analysis Philosophy began with attempts to define things. Socrates asked people “What is virtue?”, “What is justice?”, “What is knowledge?” Famously, he never found out. Two millennia later, a movement arose in the English-speaking philosophical world known as “analytic philosophy”. At its inception, analytic philosophers thought that their main job was to analyze language or concepts. Many very smart, highly-educated people dedicated careers to the project of conceptual analysis in the 20th century. If ever we should have expected that project to bear fruit, it would have been in the 20th century. What do we have to show for it? Only negative results—we refuted some analyses. We never found a single correct analysis. To speak more cautiously, as far as I can tell, no one—either in the 20th century or any other time—has ever advanced an analysis of any philosophically interesting concept that was widely accepted by philosophers as correct. Nearly all analyses are subject to counter-examples that most philosophers would agree refute the analysis. (Caveat: sometimes you will meet a philosopher who claims to have correctly analyzed some concept. But hardly ever do you meet one who thinks that anyone else has correctly analyzed a concept.) ( *The field of mathematics is an exception to the rule. It contains many precise definitions that are widely accepted by mathematicians. There may also be a few other concepts that can be defined. ) The attempts to define “knowledge” after 1963 are the most instructive case, because that term received particularly intense scrutiny. Philosophers went through dozens of increasingly complicated analyses and counter-examples over several decades, and no consensus emerged. To this day, we don’t know the definition of “knowledge”. Philosophers had similar experiences when they tried to define such things as “good”, “cause”, “if”, “freedom”, and so on. This raises some questions: What made people think that we could and should analyze concepts? Why did it prove so difficult, and what does this tell us about the nature of concepts? 2. The Roots of Conceptual Analysis a. Empiricism The project of conceptual analysis was given motivation by the popularity of empiricism, which held that all knowledge must be either analytic or empirical (there is no synthetic a priori knowledge). Once you adopt that theory, you should next wonder what kind of knowledge philosophy itself might be producing. The 20th-century empiricists didn’t want to deny that they were producing knowledge, but they also couldn’t plausibly claim that they were producing empirical results (nor did they want to have to start doing observations and experiments). So they were almost forced to say that philosophy is all about analytic knowledge, which is knowledge that derives from the understanding of concepts, or of the meanings of words. So the job of philosophers must be to analyze concepts or words. Fortunately, few people think that anymore. b. The Lockean Theory of Concepts Here is the important part. The drive for conceptual analysis comes from a very natural way of thinking about concepts and meanings, which is probably the way you’d think about them if no one told you differently. I call it the Lockean Theory of Concepts (but I don’t care whether this was really Locke’s view). It includes three elements: 1. Concepts are directly introspectible mental objects. 2. Most concepts are composed of other concepts. 3. The application of words is governed by definitions, which describe the composition of the concepts that a word expresses. Notice two implications of this view: (i) that most concepts should be definable. Apart from a few simple concepts, most concepts will be composed of other concepts. Since we can directly, introspectively observe our concepts, we should be able to describe how they are composed, and that would be to give a definition. (ii) that definitions are useful, even necessary, to understand most words. The history of philosophy, however, shows that this theory is wrong. If the Lockean Theory were true, we should have many successful analyses by now. Also, if the Lockean theory were true, the lack of analyses would prevent us from understanding and applying words. But in fact, we have approximately zero successful analyses, and this hasn’t stopped us from understanding and applying words. 3. An Intuitionist Theory of Concepts Following is a better theory about concepts, which seems vaguely in line with some intuitionist views in ethics. a. Properties and Natures Every thing in the universe has a specific nature. This is a maximally specific, comprehensive property (or, the sum of all the properties of the thing). This would include, e.g., the exact shade of color of the object (or the exact distribution of colors throughout the object). The natures of things vary along numerous dimensions. We can imagine a space with those dimensions, the “quality space”: every particular thing occupies a point in the quality space. (You can also include dimensions for spatial locations and relational properties.) There could in principle be more than one thing at that point, but in practice, each ordinary object is the only thing that has its exact nature (other objects may be similar but we never find one exactly the same). The quality space is like the color cone (see image), but with dimensions for all other properties, not just colors. There are also more general properties, such as redness, roundness, cathood. These are properties that many objects share. These can be thought of as regions in the quality space. Compare how the property redness is a roughly wedge-shaped region in the color cone. Aside: This is a non-traditional way of thinking about properties. In the traditional view, one treats properties as primary and thinks of the natures of objects as conjunctions of their properties. I treat specific, determinate natures of things as primary, and think of properties as ranges of natures. b. Concepts When we form a concept, we are drawing a line (or a hypersurface, to be more pedantic) around a region in the quality space. Everything in that region is what the concept applies to. How do we draw the boundaries of concepts? Many factors can influence this. We want concepts to be useful for conveying information in the world we live in. Hence, we tend to draw lines that wind up including a lot of things in the world. If there is a cluster of objects in a certain region of the quality space, we draw a line around that cluster. Had objects clustered differently, we would have drawn our conceptual schemes differently. Example: Pluto used to be considered a “planet” when we thought there were 9 planets in the solar system. It was smaller than the other 8 planets, but that was okay. Later, astronomers discovered that there were 50 other objects in the solar system that were similar to Pluto and different from the other 8 “planets” (in a way similar to how Pluto differed from the other 8 planets). So we redrew our conceptual scheme to make the 8 big planets fit in one category (“planets”), and the 50 smaller things (including Pluto) another category (“planetoids”). Conceptual boundaries also depend on practical interests. For instance, the category “bachelor” is of interest because humans are interested in who is eligible to marry a woman. That is why most people find the Pope to be, at best, a borderline case of a “bachelor”. He’s an unmarried man, sure, but he’s not quite a bachelor, because he’s not exactly marriageable. Conceptual boundaries also drift over time. The etymology of most modern words shows them originating in words with completely different meanings. The meanings must have drifted through the quality space. There are infinitely many regions in the quality space, so there are infinitely many possible concepts, though of course any human mind can only grasp finitely many concepts at a time. c. Language & concepts Most of our concepts are tied to language: we are prompted to form a concept by hearing a word in our language. We attempt to imitate how others are using that word, so each use we hear (while we are learning) influences our dispositions to apply that word. To “understand” the word is to have formed the right dispositions – i.e., to have become disposed to apply the word (or at least to sense that its application is appropriate) in approximately the same circumstances that people in your speech community apply it. Your understanding just consists of having those dispositions. E.g., my grasp of the concept of knowledge consists of my ability to tell when it is appropriate to apply “knows” to someone’s mental state and when it isn’t. 4. Against Locke Every element of the Lockean theory is deeply mistaken: 1. Concepts are not directly introspectible mental objects. They are instead dispositional. Thus, the way to limn the contours of a concept is usually not to directly, introspectively examine that concept. The way is to activate your linguistic dispositions by imagining specific scenarios and observing your own disposition to find the application of a certain term appropriate or inappropriate. 2. Most concepts are not composed of other concepts. They are constituted by dispositions that were formed by distinct sets of experiences. Each concept can have a unique boundary, which need not coincide for any distance with the boundary of any other concept. The boundaries can have complex, idiosyncratic shapes. This is why most concepts are indefinable. 3. The application of words is not governed by definitions. It is governed by these dispositions that we spontaneously form after hearing others’ word usage and attempting to imitate it. We almost never learn words by hearing definitions; we almost always learn by seeing examples of the correct use of the word. This is why it does not matter that we don’t have definitions for most words; this does not stop us from learning and applying the words. Wittgenstein might have agreed with some of this. All this explains (i) why conceptual analysis failed in the 20th century, (ii) why we don’t need definitions, and (iii) why we evaluate definitions using particular examples. About point (iii), consider that we rejected the “justified, true belief” analysis of knowledge based on the Gettier examples, rather than applying the analysis to conclude that the Gettier examples are cases of knowledge. Nearly everyone instinctively found that the correct reaction. It can still be useful to try to clarify concepts – e.g., by distinguishing a concept from others that it is often confused with, by drawing out some key conceptual relations (one concept implying another, etc.). What we don’t need and shouldn’t expect to do is to identify the exact necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a given concept, using other concepts.

Three Russian authors are where Russia contributed most to understanding of the human soul, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, the Gulag Archipelago by Solzhenitsyn. NOT in Psychology nor philosophy and  these writers surpassed all the shallow pseudo philosophy and pseudo-psycholgy of the West.

The reason is not just their understanding of the human soul but also their refusal to reduce man to a bundle of urges. The philosophical man--the combination of mind and body [no soul] never existed. The economic man--the rational economic agent never existed. The psychological man -the team engine who sublimates his sexual desire to produce alternative energy never exited. These are figments of the sick imaginations of Freud, Marx, and economic professors. 

No meta narrative can explain the human soul. The problem is the intellectuals who believe they know the right narrative and want to impose it on everyone else.

Rav Nahman said --"to say the words in order and automatically one will understand, And even if he does not understand immediately eventually he will understand

This comes from an insight of Rav Nahman about learning in conversation 76 on the conversations of Rav Nahman. But I combine it with the few Rishonim that agree with the importance  of math and physics. And I say that the idea that only talented people can learn math and physics is wrong. I say with the way of learning that Rav Nahman explained in the conversations 76 even a block of wood can know math and physics.

Rav Nahman said --"to say the words in order and automatically one will understand, And even if he does not understand immediately eventually he will understand.''

But he did not apply this to Physics but rather to learning Torah as is brought in the Talmud Tractate Shabat page 63. Still I learned late to discover that some rishonim hold of the importance of Physics and Metaphysics as you can see in the Mishna Torah chapter III:" The subjects discussed in the first four chapters of the Mishna Torah are in the category of learning Gemara."  

But are these the only things to learn? Well, to the Gra the seven wisdoms are needed for understanding Torah {Trivium and Quadrium) but besides that? I would say besides these everything else is Bitul Torah   

[I did read in high school and later in Shar Yashuv in NY but i can not tell how much of that did me much good. Maybe it did or maybe not--. The books  were what was required in an average  American public high school. But  most of my time was spent on the violin and piano. I did not get into Gemara until my first year after high school at Shar Yashuv [3.5 years there and then another 3.5 years at the Mir in NY. But there I did mainly Gemara. ]

Moses asked the two tribes that wanted to sit out the war "Your brothers go up to war and you will sit here?" People ought to volunteer for the IDF Israel Defense Force

 אחיכם יעלו למלחמה ואתם תשבו פה Moses asked the two  tribes that wanted to sit out the war "Your brothers go up to war and you will sit here?" The idea was that the area beyond the Jordan river was empty. Sihon and Og had attacked the children of Israel and lost the war, so that whole area was empty and 2.5 tribes wanted to stay and settle there while the rest of Israel would enter the land of Canaan to fight and settle. Moses did not like the idea of these 2.5 tribes  staying behind. [Two tribes asked originally but in the end 2.5 settled there] [Two tribes asked originally, but in the end 2.5 settled there]. The end result was they in fact joined in the war, but afterwards went back to settle that land beyond the Jordan River. However I have never been able to figure this out very well since in fact the whole land was not conquered until King David conquered Jerusalem many many years later; and the five cities of the Plishtim also were not settled  as far as I can tell. 

[Besides that, I think it is best to take care of the Iranian problem before it gets out of hand. Like Alexander the Great said when he was asked how he reached his success. He said because when there was anything to take care of he took care of it right away without delay.  That applies here. Better take care of the problem before it is too late. I would not worry if anyone wants to help. If the USA wants to help then fine, but if not Iran is a threat to all Western Civilization and need to be put in its place.  

 Even though learning Torah is the most important of all commandments (as it says in the mishna in Peah  ת''ת כנגד כולם  "Learning  Torah weighs more that all the commandments,'') still I do not think that this value remains if one learns for money. That is to say I think the entire value of the mitzvah disappears when one gets paid to learn. This opinion you can see in Pirkei Avot (Chapters of the Fathers) chapter four where the Rambam explains what the mishna says about not making Torah into a shovel to dig with that if one does so he takes his life from the world and the Rambam there in his commentary explains: ''from the world i.e., the world to come.''

Serving God is not a money making profession and those that claim that it is are enemies of God and enemies of Torah for its own sake.  [I  mean to say that no matter what, you need to be sure of DIVINE SIMPLICITY--that God does not share of any traits that any human can even imagine. He is totally ''other'' and not a composite.   

difference between Peter and Paul.

 I have thought for along time that there is an essential difference between Peter and Paul. At least there must be between James and Paul. However, recently I noticed that Peter recommends the letters of Paul. Perhaps Peter was unaware of the later letters where Paul becomes more and more against keeping the commandments? [At first Paul did not want the idea of peter that gentiles need to become jewish-by means of brit mila [circumcision] and dipping in a fresh body of water and accepting to keep the commandments. ] in later letters Paul gets more and more insistent that Sinai is Hagar [mother of Ishmael.] Nullification of the commandments has been a problem ever since then until now. Thomas Aquinas tried to answer this basic contradiction with (I think) little success. [from what i recall i think Aquinas writes that the eternal laws of Torah are not the services in the Temple and similar what could be called rituals.] 

[This was the one issue that Saadia Gaon brought up in his book Faiths and Doctrines along with the problem of the Trinity. The Trinity is not in the New Testament --not even in Paul.] [HOWEVER if what the claim about the Trinity is along the lines of what the ARI said about the patriarchs, Moses, Aaron, Josef and David that they are souls of Emanation [Azilut] then I do not see any issue. But i am not sure what the claim is. 

getting through the Oral and Written Law.

 Even though I am really not up to doing this myself, but I would like to remind people of what the Gra held by in terms of getting through the Oral and Written Law. But I do not think that people are aware of what that entails. You have to recall what the Rambam wrote in his letter to Yemen ''Just like one can not add or subtract from the Written Law, so one can't add nor subtract from the Oral Law.'' All books written after the completion of the two Talmuds are not the Oral Law. They might be ''second hand'' Oral Law in so far as they are commentary, but not the actual thing in itself.

So I think people ought to have a session every day of doing a half  page of Gemara with Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, and Maharam. Then the Yerushalmi in the same way. --Plus getting through the midrashim.

However this whole thing I mean mainly for the afternoon. The morning I think should go for in depth learning with the Avi Ezri, Reb Chaim [Brisk], Naftali Troup and the other basic Litvak sages. 

[The Oral Law is the Two Talmuds, Tosephta, Midrash Rabah, Midrash Tanchuma, Sifrei and Sifra,  ]

[When to fit into this the math and physics? I would say that is best in the afternoon, since the morning in-depth sessions are the most important as my son Izhak told me many times (about the importance of in depth learning).  ]

Why is learning Torah important--see vol 4 of the Nefesh Hachaim by Reb Chaim of Voloshin-a disciple of the Gra

I might mention here that objective morality is not something that one can know without this-- as the Rambam showed in the Guide (that even Avraham Avinu would not have known Natural Law unless it was revealed to him from above).