Sharira Gaon on Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] [The statement of Sharira Gaon is brought in the Itur]

 The nice thing I thought about  Sharira Gaon is that to him Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] come out parallel. Even though to the Rishonim, there are ways of explaining things, still  the approach of Rav Sharira Gaon makes a great deal of sense, For to Rava one can not dig a hole right next to the border of his neighbor. And to Sharira Gaon R Yose agrees with the sages that it is incumbent one one who might cause damage to move away some distance between himself and his neighbor. Otherwise it is hard to understand how R. Yose who holds it is upon the one that might be damaged to distance himself and Rava could agree.   [Sharira Gaon says R. Yose agrees with the decision of the sages, but not their reasoning- but also that the law is like Rava only in the case of a pit where just by digging he causes the ground on the other side of the border to be weakened. Thus to Rav Sharira Gaon, the the law is to bring close to the border anything besides a pit is ok-- as long as there is nothing there at the time that can be damaged. 

The Rishonim explain this differently (1) Rava is saying his law only in the case of a pit [hole in the ground because that is directly damaging the field of his neighbor; i.e. "his arrows". (2) The Rif and Tosphot say who comes first to the border can stay, and the neighbor who wants to put something on his side of the border can do so if he does not mind. But the first one can stay. (3) Rambam says the first neighbor can put  something there, but then if the neighbor puts something that can be damaged next to the border, then the first one then has to move away.]  (4) Some say the only permission is if the neighbor is new and bought that property after there is already something at the border that can damage. 

The Reasoning of Sharira Gaon is that one statement of the Gemara is that R. Yose is saying his law in answer to the sages in one case but really he disagrees with them in all cases. The another statement  is that he agrees with them. So Sharira is deciding with the later statement.

I can imagine that Harvard takes smart people from the pool of applicants, but from the long gone years of some good teachers, it seems to be in rapid decline. The physics that has come out of Harvard has been the result of no name people. [The greats are at Cal Tech, Stanford and Princeton. No where near Harvard.]The philosophy that came from there has been sloppy .

The Transcendental Deduction of Kant never really worked.

  Mainly, I believe that the Leonard Nelson approach makes the most sense because the transcendental deduction of Kant never really worked to be able to combine reason and perception. As Kelley Ross put it,-- both must  have a deeper source.  That is non-intuitive immediate knowledge. But as Michael Huemer pointed out, that there is no reason to believe implanted knowledge has any relation to reality.  Therefore, immediate non-intuitive knowledge (-the axioms by which knowledge starts) must be open to correction. It is not infallible. And if one asks-- that empirical facts ought not to be able to correct a priori knowledge, -that is where Hegel comes in handy. [Hegel would not have wanted empirical facts to correct an a priori, but even so even in Hegel, logic and reason flow through everything. Every fact is partly a priori.] There is a point where knowledge itself gets to a plateau, and gets above it by contrasting two points where separate series of reasoning led to and end up in a contradiction by which one starts the whole process again. Something like Electromagnetism and Newton that contradicted until you got Special Relativity,-- and Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradicted until you got Quantum Field Theory; and to sew up gravity, you get String Theory. [In STRING THEORY, I think there is a way forward with Hashimoto Flow in differential geometry, i.e. to see how the closed strings develop in time.]

The issue here are the two points of Jacob Fries: empirical facts can not tell us anything about  how to make logical deductions. And logical deductions can't tell us if there is a continent between Europe and Asia.  

[There is no problem here from General Relativity because to Kant, space is a formal intuition.--Not a priori.]

There is another problem in Kant's transcendental deduction. That deduction says that the knowledge of transcendental subject depends on the knowledge of the transcendental object;-  and knowledge of the transcendental object depends on knowledge of the unity of the transcendental subject. The circularity here does not bother me, even though it probably should. What bothers me is that how can knowledge of object A be dependent on knowledge of object B? Or more precisely: Why is it that Kant says I can not know that I exist unless I know that something else exists?  I assume people in Europe knew that Europe existed before they knew that America existed. Therefore I think that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right that there has to be a deeper source of knowledge: immediate non intuitive knowledge.

I realize that there is a certain amount of stretching things to combine Fries and Hegel in the way that I am doing it here. But what I am doing here I think is somewhat like Plotinus when he combined Plato and Aristotle.] 

I might mention here that I have thought a lot about the Fries-Leonard Nelson approach for years and how it compares with the Hegel- McTaggart approach. [Though there are other approaches to Kant and Hegel but these seem the best of both. But in the long run I think I have to go with the Leonard Nelson non intuitive immediate knowledge idea.] 

the age of prophecy is over.

In Zachariah 13 verse 3 it says that if one will prophesize his parents will tell him''you deserve to die because  you have spoken falsely in the name of the Lord' and then will stab him to death. Then a bit later    Zachariah continues that people  will ask one, ''Are you a prophet?" He will say, "I am just a working guy." And they will ask, "Then what then are those bruises on your hands?" And he will say, "I was at my girl friend's house, and they beat me up." So the idea is that the age of prophecy is over. That is after all the context of those verses--that God will get rid of the spirit of evil from the land. 

 During the era of Victorian England, people were  over much thinking and talking about death. People would spend vast fortunes on their future grave monuments,-- but sex was never discussed, and thought to be in extremely terrible taste to even mention it. Nowadays, people are thinking and talking all the time about sex, while death is a forbidden subject. But things are again changing into obsession's with power.--the attempt to take power from anyone who has had it, and give it to the least powerful--the race and competition to be the best victim. This age is reducing all relations to power relations.--Love is non-existant.  

 Both learning in depth with lots of review and learning by just saying the words and going on are mentioned in the gemara.''לעולם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג לא ידע מאי קאמר'' ''Always one should learn fast  by just saying the words even though he forgets and even though he does not even know what he is saying.'' And there is the event where one teacher was teaching each his lesson to his student 400 times until he understood. Then one day the student was not paying attention, so the teacher taught the same lesson another 400 times. Then in that merit, he was granted 400 years of life and that all the people of his generation would merit to the world to come.

So you need both. my suggestion is to do the in-depth learning in math, physics and gemara [talmud] in the morning and the fast type in the afternoon and evening as is the regular order in most Litvak yeshivot. [However, I do not think that Shar Yashuv had any set time for fast learning,-- as all the learning there was in depth.]   [My son, Isaac, told me many times that the main thing is in depth learning, and that fast learning (saying the words in order and going on) should only be after one has completed his in-depth learning sessions.] 

בבא בתרא כ''ב Bava Batra page 22 and In Laws of Neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam.

In laws of neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam, we have the law that one can put the leftovers of the olive press or other forms of garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The Gra explains  this in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:8) it is because the oven is a doubt, and in case of doubt in prohibitions the law is to be strict, and in money the law is to be lenient. So before the attic is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the attic was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the Avi Ezri the notebook on laws of damages paragraph 2 and the Avi Ezri on that law in the Rambam.] I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the ""chezkat mamon" possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built the garbage has little right to remain while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

      

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In הלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג in the רמב''ם we have the law that one can put the גפת leftovers of the olive press or  garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if  an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs right underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The גר''א explains this in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח'  it is because the oven is a doubt. In case of doubt in prohibitions, the law is to be strict.  In doubt of  money, the law is to be lenient. So before the upper floor is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the upper floor was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the רב שך אבי עזרי the notebook on קונטרס הרחקת נזקים paragraph ב and the אבי עזרי on that law in the רמב''ם. ]      

I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the חזקת ממון possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built, the garbage has little right to remain, while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

בהלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג ברמב''ם יש את הדין שאפשר לשים את שאריות הגפת של בית בד או אשפה ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים חומה שם. אז הוא חייב לקחת את האשפה כדי שלא יפגע בקיר הזה. אבל אם השכן מלמעלה מתכנן להפוך את הקומה העליונה למקום אחסון לפירות, אז הוא יכול להתנגד אם השכן מלמטה רוצה להכין תנור למטה ממש מתחת. אבל אם התנור הונח שם בכל זאת, הוא יכול להישאר. מה מחמיר את התנור משאריות בית הבד לפני הפיכת עליית הגג לחלל אחסון, ופחות מחמיר לאחר מכן? הגר''א מסביר זאת בשלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח' זה משום שהתנור ספק. במקרה של ספק באיסורים, יש להחמיר את הדין. בספק כסף, החוק צריך להיות מקל. אז לפני שהקומה העליונה נעשית לאחסון, השאלה היא של איסור גרימת נזק, ולכן אנחנו מחמירים. לאחר שהקומה העליונה נעשתה לאחסון, השאלה היא של כסף, ולכן אנו מקלים. השאלה שלי כאן היא שגם לאחר שהוכנס התנור למטה ועליית הגג משמשת לאחסון, עדיין נראה שהשאלה היא של גרימת נזק לפרי. [ראה רב שך אבי עזרי קונטרס הרחקת נזקים פסקה ב', ובאבי עזרי על הדין ההוא ברמב''ם. ]

אני רוצה להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו. זה שהחזקת ממון של אשפה חלשה יותר מהחזקה של תנור. אז בעוד שלאחר בניית הקיר, לאשפה אין זכות להישאר, בעוד שלתנור יש יותר זכות להישאר