Problems in modern philosophy

 The line of thought of Plato and Aristotle  got to be a part of Torah thought in the Rishonim [authorities from the middle ages.] But there are problems in this as pointed out by Berkley and Thomas Reid. Nevertheless, when I saw the problems in modern philosophy, I more or less retreated to the Rishonim. Still the problem remained, though I tended to ignore them. But to get some sort of answer for the mind body problem which remained in the enlightenment until Kant  is important. And the developments since Kant seem futile. So to get to some kind of answer for problems that remained in Kant, I think the New Friesian School of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross seems to be the best. [See this link]

To get an idea of what bothered me about British American ''analytic philosophy" see Robert Hanna. See this link [I had not read Hanna when in high school, but still the problems in analytic philosophy and continental philosophy seemed apparent to me.]

Why did Hegel not seem like the right track? Mainly because the dialectic approach of Socrates is just  one sub category of ways that reason  gets to the truth of things. [There are lot of ways. We see this in Physics and math where every new discovery come about by some different approach.] And not every idea contain its opposite unless any kind of logic is impossible. "Hot" does not mean "cold". Furthermore the off shoots from Hegel are more like alchemy than any kind of building up anything. the idea of melting down lead to find the core of gold is wrong. So to destroy western civilization in order  that the gold underneath becomes apparent  does not work.  

Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88

 I have not had time to consider how to express my notion here. But just to do the best that I can right now let me say that there is something hard to understand in the Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of maaser depends on one's intention at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in tithes from the Torah. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. 

this is based on the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88 which says that a buyer is not obligated from the Torah but only by decree.

Rabbainu Tam says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the Rambam but Rabainu Tam does not mention intention.

Rav Shach brings some clarity on here. He brings the mishna [maaser I:5] that selling grain makes it obligated but if he is bringing it home then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not "tevel". But that does not explain from where the Rambam derives the idea of intention. 

(I am not sure if the Rambam is posek (deciding) like the simple explanation of that mishna. It might be that he explains that mishna as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in laws of maaser chapter 3 law 1 that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean until he reaches home, but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

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 There is something hard to understand in the Rambam in הלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א . The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of מעשר depends on one's כוונה at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in מעשר from the תורה. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. This is based on the גמרא in בבא מציעא page פ''ח which says that a buyer is not obligated from the תורה but only by decree. רבינו תם says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the רמב''ם, but רבינו תם does not mention intention. רב שך brings some clarity on here. He brings the משנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה  that מוליכן לשוק makes it obligated, but if he is bringing it home, then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not טבל. But that does not explain from where the רמב''ם derives the idea of intention בגמר מלאכה. 

(I am not sure if the רמב''ם is פוסק  like the simple explanation of that משנה. It might be that he explains that משנה as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all, he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in הלכות מעשר פרק ג הלכה א that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean ""until he reaches home", but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

יש משהו קשה להבין ברמב"ם בהלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א'. הדבר שקשה להבין הוא מנין הוא שואב את הרעיון שחיוב מעשר תלוי בכוונה של האדם ברגע החלקת ערימת התבואה. כוונתי בשאלה זו: הוא כותב כשמסיימים את המלאכה על התבואה, אם הייתה כוונתו לאכול אותה, הרי הוא חייב במעשר מהתורה. אבל אם כוונתו הייתה למכור אותו. ואז הוא חייב רק בגזרה. וכן, הקונה חייב מהתורה אם סיים את המלאכה בעצמו. אבל אם קנה את התבואה לאחר שסיים המלאכה בו על ידי המוכר, הרי שחייב רק בגזירה. זאת על סמך הגמרא בבא מציעא דף פ''ח שאומר שקונה אינו חייב מהתורה אלא רק בגזרה. רבינו תם אומר אם הסתיימה המלאכה ע"י המוכר הרי שהקונה אינו חייב. זה דומה לרמב''ם, אבל רבינו תם לא מזכיר כוונה. רב שך מביא כאן קצת בהירות. הוא מביא את המשנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה ''שמוליכן לשוק'' מחייב אותו, אבל אם הוא מביא אותו הביתה, אז הוא יכול לאכול ממנו בצורה סתמית עד שזה יגיע לביתו. אז כדי להיות חייב צריך להיות סיום העבודה וגם להגיע לביתו. אחרת זה לא טבל. אבל זה לא מסביר מהיכן שואב הרמב''ם את רעיון הכוונה בגמר מלאכה. אגב אני לא בטוח אם הרמב''ם פוסק כמו ההסבר הפשוט של אותה משנה. יכול להיות שהוא מסביר את המשנה הזאת כמתייחס למה שהכוונה שלו בזמן סיום העבודה, כלומר החלקה של הערימה של דגן. הרי אינו מזכיר שאפשר לאכול מהתבואה עד שיגיע הביתה. שהרי כותב בהלכות מעשר פרק ג' הלכה א' שאם כוונתו להביא את התבואה לביתו, יוכל לאכול ממנו בדרך אגבית. זה נשמע כאילו הוא בטח מתכוון ל""עד שהוא מגיע הביתה", אבל לא ברור לי למה הוא לא אומר את זה בגלוי

The illusion that Ukraine is winning is going to evaporate as soon as Russia gets serious.

It makes more sense to arrange peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.  The illusion that Ukraine is winning is going to evaporate as soon as Russia gets serious. As for the 50 billion dollars, do not worry. The Ukrainian army will not see a cent of it. [Anyone who has had any experience with Ukraine is aware that there is no chance in hell that the money will get to it intended destination.] [But if there will ever be peace talks, they should be more than paper as were the peace agreements in 2014 which were ignored by the Ukraine as soon as they were signed.]

 I can see why people have to take tests in high school and college.--That is for for them and for the future kinds of work they will do. You have to know your real abilities rather than what people tell you; like when they say, "You are so good at everything." But I hated  tests. And I think the reason is that I do not absorb information like others. I do not "learn". I absorb. That is one reason I found my element in the Litvak world of yeshivot . While of course, I had to take a test before I was accepted at the Mir Yeshiva in NY, still after that, there were no tests. And if you have ever been in  a Litvak yeshiva, you know what I mean. The atmosphere is that of intense learning all day and all night. But no tests. Everyone learns at their own pace.

[And I can see why Conversation number 76 in the Conversations of Rav Nahman appealed to me. He said "Say the words in order (of the book you are learning) from start to finish" 

the woke movement is based on the Frankfurt School

 the woke movement is based on the Frankfurt School but if you point this out the result is denial since none of the woke have heard of Marcuse and the One-D Man. Never the less, it i those ideas that have produced the movement. Just that the ideas are presented as new without citing the sources. 

I was on my way to the sea and I heard an Israeli song about ''Ok beit hamikdash [Temple] how can we build you again? With faith and understanding בית המקדש איך נבנה אותך מחדש באמונה בהבנה  and it occurred tome that in fact that would be a good idea. in fact there is a specific commandment in the Torah tobuild the beit hamikdah. So why does no one do it? or even want to do it?

Hegel was against this doctrine of Jacob Fries.

 A bit too much faith can come under the title ''non intuitive immediate knowledge,'' and I suspect that that was one of the reasons why Hegel was against this doctrine of Jacob Fries [as modified by Kelley Ross and Leonard Nelson].

But there is a way to justify this approach of Fries.  Michael Huemer points out the flaw of many philosophical systems-- that is they start out with premises that are shaky at best. And in that way they differ from the exact sciences. While the exact sciences also start with premises, their premises are almost obvious from the start--though they can be modified or changed a evidence against them grows. 

 In this way faith and reason can work together-- reason can modify faith.

SEE THE web site of Kelley Ross ''friesian.com'' . Why Fries, Leonard Nelson and K. Ross are important is that problems in Kant resulted in many new approaches, many of which led to dead ends. The most fruitful that I can see is this Leonard Nelson's ''The New Friesian School".   

A good place to see the problems of analytic philosophy is Robert Hanna [blog at against academic philosophy]. 

A good place to see problems in Hegel is Hobhouse [The Metaphysical State].

I could go on, but in the end my point will remain the same -that the best thing in philosophy today is Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross's New Friesian School.