to justify faith

 If you want to justify faith, I think you do not have much choice but the Kant Friesian School. I mean to say that Hegel gets to principles of faith, but he does so by reason alone. But if (like me) you believe that faith is a different source of knowledge than reason, then the Friesian School seems the only choice. But this school is not one block. It has developed from Fries to Leonard Nelson until Kelley Ross. 

There are others that have noticed and written on this school, but they all seem to get one point wrong-psychologism. To Nelson this was a thing a fought against his whole life-- [mainly against Husserl].

To the Friesian way, one does get to knowledge of the categories of Kant [which are roughly answers to the basic questions--how? where? when? what? etc.] by looking into ones mind--empirically,--but they are not known by the structure of the mind. Rather by non-intuitive immediate knowledge [which is close to the way Michael Huemer and the original intuitionists thought. It is close because to Huemer we know these things by reason, but in a wider understanding of what reason can tell us. But it is not like Huemer because pure reason is limited as Locke and Hume saw. Rather what Huemer thinks is reason is rather reasonable, but not reason.]

Non-intuitive immediate knowledge  means knowledge that is known not by reason nor by sense perception.

Rav Shach's Avi Ezri Laws of Loans. Rambam 13 halacha 4. Tractate Shavuot page 44 side B

רב שך באבי עזקי הלכות מלווה ולווה. פרק י''ג הלכה ד A lender has an object as a משכון for a loan of 100  and loses it בלי אונס. He says it was worth 50 and the borrower says 75. The lender  takes an oath it is not in his possession and the borrower takes an oath on how much it was worth and pays the 25 besides that that he owes. We have an argument between the רמב''ן and the ר''ן if the borrower has to take an oath on how much the object was worth. This is all clear.  But what has been bothering me is  this. Even though the lender has to take an oath on how much the object was worth, but let's say he does not take an oath. Then what? Anyway the borrower is taking an oath on how much he says it was worth and pays the rest. But the lender without the oath maybe would not get even that? Or maybe the borrower has to pay anyway what he admits he owes. Or gets 25 and pays 100? But then the borrower is taking an oath and getting money which is the opposite of an oath of the תורה which is when one takes an oath and does not pay and it is also not in the category of things that one takes an oath and gets paid which is a hired worker. 

רב שך באבי עזרי הלכות מלווה ולווה. פרק י''ג הלכה ד' למלווה יש חפץ כמשכון להלוואה של 100 ומפסיד אותו בלי אונס. הוא אומר שהיה שווה 50 והלווה אומר 75. המלווה נשבע שבועה זה לא ברשותו והלווה נדר כמה זה שווה ומשלם את ה-25  שהוא חייב. יש לנו ויכוח בין הרמב''ן לר''ן אם הלווה צריך להישבע כמה היה שווה החפץ. כל זה ברור. אבל מה שהפריע לי זה. אף על פי שהמלווה צריך להישבע כמה היה שווה החפץ, אבל נניח שאינו נשבע. ואז מה? בכל מקרה הלווה נשבע כמה הוא אומר שזה שווה ומשלם את השאר. אבל המלווה בלי השבועה אולי לא יקבל אפילו את זה? או אולי הלווה צריך לשלם בכל מקרה את מה שהוא מודה שהוא חייב. או מקבל 25 ומשלם 100? אבל אז הלווה שבועה ומקבל כסף שזה ההפך משבועת התורה שהיא נשבע ולא משלם וגם זה לא בקטגוריית הדברים נשבעים ומשלמים. שהוא שכיר.

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Rav Shach's Avi Ezri Laws of Loans. A lender has an object as a guarantee for a loan of 100  and loses it. He says it was worth 50 and the borrower says 75. The lender  takes an oath it is not in his possession and the borrower takes an oath on how much it was worth and pays the 25 besides that that he owes.

 I know I have not been blogging and also not learning Torah. However  there is one small thing that I have been thinking  and puzzling about. It is in Rav Shach's Avi Ezri Laws of Loans 13:4. You have a lender who has an object as a guarantee and he loses it in such a  way that he is obligated. [There are ways in which he would not be obligated for example: robbers.] So we have an argument between the Ramban {Nachmanides} and the Ran {Rabbainu Nisim}if the borrower has to take an oath on how much the object was worth. This is all clear. 

  But what has been bothering me is  this. Even though the lender has to take an oath on how much the object was worth, but let's say he does not take an oath. Then what? Anyway the borrower is taking an oath on how much he says it was worth and pays the rest. But the lender without the oath maybe would not get even that? Or maybe the borrower has to pay anyway what he admits he owes. Or gets25 and pays 100? But then the borrower is taking an oath and getting money which is the opposite of an oath of the Torah which is when one takes an oath and does not pay and it is also not in the category of things that one takes an oath and gets paid which is a hired worker. So this case seems confusing to me.

 

 

Those inside the palace are the physicists.

 I have not been blogging in part because my mental energy I have been trying to direct towards Physics and Mathematics which I find needs a lot more energy and effort than I originally thought. The major emphasis in this direction comes from the Guide for the Perplexed. It is mentioned off hand there and in other places in the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities.], but the one place that makes it clearer is the parable of the King in his palace [end of vol III] There is a king who rules of a vast country. And there are many levels of closeness with the King. Those outside the country are barbarians. Those inside are ruled by Divine Law. Those around the Palace are those that learn and keep the Talmud. Those inside the palace are the physicists. Those with the king himself are the prophets and philosophers.

Though this message is in many other places in the medieval authorities, here  it is without ambiguity.

However there are also many Rishonim that do not hold from this at all. To them learning Torah means Gemara and the other books of the sages of the Talmud-not science. 

However I was forced out of the yeshiva world, and found that I had no choice but to learn to make a living with no help from anyone. So I decided to take up Physics at NYU. Since then, I am not longer at NYU and do not even do Physics for the sake of making a living. But I wanted to make clear that if I had not found this opinion in the Rishonim, I probably would have chosen a different path. The fact that Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam hold from this path, made it make more sense to do the Physics thing rather than hang out where I was not wanted.