Rambam Laws of the Sanhedrin chap. 2 [paragraph 10]

Rav Shach says that both Rav Acha ben Ika and R. Abahu [in tractate Sanhedrin page 3] hold that one person can judge a case. [Meaning cases between two individuals.  The issue before Rav Acha and R Abahu is judging cases of civil law that come up between people. Not only that, but there can be cases where even the great Sanhedrin is wrong and has to itself bring sacrifices for making wrong judgments in cases involving karet [cutting off.] In those cases, if an individual knew better than the Sanhedrin then he is required to bring his own sacrifice, for he should not have followed the Sanhedrin when it was wrong. Thus we learn that objective morality does not depend on what the Sanhedrin says or on what anyone says. Objective right and wrong means that what is right is right, no matter what anyone says.]

At any rate, there is a debate between Rav Acha and R.Abahu if one person can be called a "court of law" [beit din] for laws that relate to a court of law, like admission before a court is different than admission outside a court.

You can see the point of Rav Shach right away in the Rambam Laws of the Sanhedrin chap. 2 [paragraph 10] where it says that a court of law is not less than three people even though one person can judge a case. Some rishonim (mediaeval authorities)[e.g., Rashba] thought that  means the Rambam poskined/decided like Rav Acha but Rav Shach says that to both Rav Acha and R Abahu, one can judge but to R Abahu he is not a court of law.    The proof that Rav Shach is right is that the Rambam writes, "If one judges that is Ok from the Torah, but from the words of the sages we need three. And two that judge, their judgment is not a judgment." If the Rambam would be poskening like Rav Acha ben Ika, then he would say two that judge, their judgment is a judgment. [To R. Abahu their judgment is not valid and that is what the Rambam wrote there so it does look at least in this place that the Rambam is going like R Abahu.] So he goes like R. Abahu and that shows that even R Abahu holds that one can judge from the Torah but is not considered a court of law.

However clear this might be in this place, still Rav Shach brings a few questions on this idea that I think would have given reason to the Rashba, the Ran, and the Keseph Mishna to say that the Rambam in fact poskined like Rav Acha. 

The question of Rav Shach about his own idea is this: R. Abahu holds "mixing of paragraphs" [eruv parshiot] so that all civil law needs a court of law of three. One is not a court of law to him. Then why is Iraq/Bavel [Babylon] can a civil court judge only cases of admissions or loans? That we can understand to Rav Acha who makes a difference between them and cases of injury or theft which are cases the Torah says needs a court of three people with ordination from mount Sinai. [That is the authentic ordination.] But To R. Abahu all cases are like that, and are judged in Iraq [anywhere outside of Israel] only because of the courts there being representatives of the court in Israel. But to Rav Acha there is no representation. They judge because they are a court --just not one that can judge cases where the Torah requires explicitly three judges with the authentic ordination which can not exist outside of Israel.

What is an issue here for me is that "mixing of paragraphs" [eruv parshiot] comes up in Bava Metzia  circa page 98. It seems if we hold of such a principle in one place we ought to hold of it elsewhere also.  

Government is something that is better not to get involved with.

 אל תתוודע לרשות "Don't be known to the government" [from Pirkei Avot]. Government is something that is better not to get involved with. However from the time of Socrates and Plato, it has been a subject of philosophical debate, but better not to be involved with. It does not really help you to be a better person, or gain good character or even get anywhere in life. it might be a subject of debate and perhaps there is some point in trying to apply reason to government, but when that happens the results are the opposite of reasonable.

a kind of knowledge that one knows but not by sense perception and not by reason.

In the Kant-Fries-Nelson school of thought there is a kind of knowledge that one knows but not by sense perception and not by reason. But this is not emotion either. Nor by structures imbedded in the brain

There is a tendency to understand Fries as ''psychologism'' [all in the mind[. And if that would be all there is to it, then I would not be impressed. But the way Dr. Kelley Ross understands and explains that school in a different way that made a lot of sense to me.

But there is a sort of conflict between this school of thought and Hegel-- which to me seems unjustified since they are dealing with different subjects. Hegel does not deal with how we know things. Empirical versus a priori. Rather with the very structure of reality itself.

So to me both the Kant-Fries and Hegel schools of thought seem important. Kind of like Plato and Aristotle are important, but not that we ought to choose between them. There is something to learn from both.

[As for the best of present day thinkers I would have to go with Dr. Kelley Ross at the Kant Friesian web site .]

music file x69

 x69 mp3 D major [x69 in midi]  x69 nwc

What was the story with me and philosophy?

What was the story with me and philosophy?

Even in high school I was fascinated by issues in philosophy. But that was soon enough after WWII that you did not find Kant, Hegel or any German philosophers in the library or book stores.

So I studied in my spare time the available authors. [That is when I was walking by the book stores on the way to the public library after school to wait for my dad to pick me up after his work day.]

But one way or  another, I got the idea that British-American philosophy was not going anywhere. Just a vacant lot. Empty and meaningless.

[However when I did get to Shar Yashuv in NY [a very great Litvak yeshiva] the rosh yeshiva did encourage me to continue my secular studies. So on the side, I did study some of the existentialists.

I did see the Ramchal [Rav Moshe Chaim Lutzatto] had a lot of depth. However, I still look at the issues as being somewhat unsettled.

In any case, looking at the rishonim, some like Aristotle and some do not. Still, my impression is that philosophy is important, but not after Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus [Neo Plato].

[In my view, Kant and Hegel fit into Plotinus. I see Hegel as a modified form of Plotinus]

 

But seeing that the Gra in fact went through Shas at least once, it is safe to say that that excommunication is valid.

The idea of a "neder" [vow] is different from an oath [shavuah]. The difference is that a vow is derived from the way one would vow something to the Temple. That is you would say "This animal I am vowing to be a peace offering." Or you might say, "I am vowing this chair." In that case you would bring the chair to a representative of the Temple [Gizbar] and they would sell it and the money would be used for the Temple. The whole idea of a vow comes from that. That is you can say, "This loaf of bread is a 'Karban' [sacrifice] to me". Or even less. You might say, ''This loaf of bread is forbidden to me'' and not even mention a sacrifice. You can even have "yadot nedarim" {extensions of vows}. That is where one does not even use the right words, or some broken version of the word.

So when it comes to a "herem" [excommunication], the same kind of set of laws applies. That is, that interacting with an individual or a group can be made to be forbidden. For example, I might say to myself, "so and so is herem to me." So then all interaction with that person is forbidden. But then you get the issue of the herem that the Gra signed.   [There were a few. The Gra signed the second one]. However in order to have the authority to make a decree of excommunication one needs to have gone through Shas Talmud at least once. Not anyone can make a valid excommunication on a group that makes it in fact forbidden for anyone to have any connection with that group. But seeing that the Gra in fact went through Shas at least once, it is safe to say that that excommunication is valid.   

And in addition to this I ought to make the point that one is obligated to remove a stumbling block in front of people. אל תעמוד על דם רעך/ לפני עוור לא תיתן מכשול. So if one is aware of this problem and yet ignores it or pretends that it doesn't exist. that in itself transgressing. One does not get off scot-free  by a plea of lason hara/ slander. It is not lashon hara to warn someone of a danger to their body and soul.

[By the way I do not think it applies to Rav Nahman of Breslov. You can see why yourself by looking up the actual language of the herem.]]

Socialist Student Gets DESTROYED on Live TV. she already knows that socialism can not pay for what it promises

 

I could not help but laugh the whole day. When asked how would she pay for all the "benefits" she said in answer: the USA is the "the bastion of capitalism and its success", and will not run out of money! So she already knows that socialism can not pay for what it promises. Only capitalism can do that.