In the introduction to the Chovot Levavot you find he divides wisdom into knowledge of nature, knowledge of how to use nature, and knowledge of Godliness. But within that discussion he says the Arabic names. You can see there he is referring in this last to the subject known in the Muslim world as metaphysics. [He actually says that is what is talking about and then continues that this last subject is necessary to know for the sake of Torah. (So they are not the same thing.) So while he is referring to the actual book of Aristotle of that name he also clearly means the Muslim commentaries on that books which comprised that subject. [I assume he must have meant Al Farabi and Al Kindi.]

The thing about Metaphysics as a subject of study is that it seems to have its ups and downs. In fact I might have gone into philosophy myself if not for the fact that I felt that something was "off" about twentieth century philosophy. But some people did go into it anyway and retained their own common sense Like Dr Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School. Dr Ross, Huemer, Robert Hanna and a few others have also noticed this and suggested more or less just skipping twentieth century philosophy. [Dr. Ross wants to start with Leonard Nelson and Fries, Hanna wants to go straight back to Kant and skip everyone in-between, Humer goes back to Prichard and G.E. Moore.]

In the book of Rav Nahman of Uman he deals with the issue of Torah scholars that are themselves demons in the LeM vol I ch 12. Later in vol I chapter 28 he deals with a slightly different issue of people that hear Torah lessons from Torah scholars who themselves receive their Torah lessons from the Dark Side.

 

The basic idea there is that there are the "alef"s in the higher worlds. But often what some higher spiritual essence comes down into this world , it gets physicalized  in such a way that the dark forces have a hold on it. So when Torah scholars who receive their lessons from teh demons, when they see someone who is serving God with simplicity and with no "wisdoms", they try to stop them.

This I can imagine was the case in the days of Rav Nahman himself who had a lot of enemies and certainly his students. And this Torah lesson was probably said in relation to that fact. But I think it applies all the more so nowadays. When there is someone who just wants to sit and learn Torah for its own sake and not work and just trust in God to provide his needs, often the very enemies of that person are Tora scholars who are demons.

the beginning of בבא מציעא also page 7 and the end of that chapter.

  It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that רב שך laws of שאלה ופיקדון bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of בבא מציעא]. Now רב שך answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say "I paid". But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that רב שך had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both, so both have a חזקה. [The word "hazaka" means holding onto the object.] But רב שך [Rav Shach] himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both, but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful, we should not say "divide" but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently רב שך did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why. [I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of רב שך's approach in that entire section, the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a חזקה in the object. If this was not the case, then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of בבא מציעא that the law is to divide, because there is a חזקה for both people.]

עלה בדעתי כשהייתי בים וחשבתי על הנושא שרב שך מביא בהלכות שאלה ופיקדון. אדם מוצא מסמך בין המסמכים שלו והוא לא יודע אם המלווה או הלווה מסרו לו אותו לשמירה, [ בסוף הפרק הראשון של בבא מציעא]. כעת רב שך עונה שזה חוזר להלוואה מילולית בה הלווה יכול לומר "שילמתי". אבל חשבתי שאותן תשובות שרב שך נתן לפני כן במקרים אחרים כמו המאה השלישית עשויים לעבוד גם פה. אז במקרה של המאה השלישית הוא שומר על 300 המאות לשניהם כך שלשתיהן יש חזקה. אבל רב שך עצמו אומר על אובייקט אבוד שהוא נשאר על ידי המוצא כי הוא לא שומר עליו לשניהם, אלא רק לבעלים האמיתי. אז תהיתי מדוע לא להשתמש באותה תשובה מדויקת כאן במציאת מסמך בין המסמכים שלו. יכול להיות ששני האנשים נתנו לו את זה לשמירה. אך איננו יודעים זאת. יתכן שרק אדם אחד נתן לו את זה. מכיוון שזה ספק, אנחנו לא צריכים לומר "לחלק" אלא להשאיר את זה כמו שהחוק למעשה. כנראה שרב שך לא רוצה להשתמש בזה כתשובה, ואני לא בטוח למה. [אני חושב שנכון להוסיף כאן שזה הנושא שעומד במרכז הגישה של רב שך באותו סעיף, העובדה שאדם ששומר על משהו עבור מישהו אחר פירושו אותו אדם שהוא שומר עליו נחשב כבעל חזקה באובייקט. אם זה לא היה כך, תמיד היית אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זו הסיבה היחידה שבתחילת בבא מציעא שהחוק הוא חלוקה, כי יש חזקה לשני האנשים.  

 It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that Rav Shach [laws of שאלה ופיקדון] bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of Bava Metzia] Now Rav Shach answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say I paid. But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that Rav Shach had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both so both have a "Hazaka". But Rav Shach himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful we should not say divide but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently Rav Shach did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why.

[I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of Rav Shach's approach in that entire section--the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a hazaka in the object. If this was not the case then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of Bava Metzia that the law is to divide--because there is a hazaka for both people.

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Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

 Rav Avraham Abulafia held that Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

I asked Professor Moshe Idel about this since he brings it up in his first book which was actually his PhD thesis. But this does not imply what Christians are usually thinking about this issue.

But it is also not the same things as just a saint.

Rather if you look in the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov, vol I chapter 65 you can see what the idea of the "Baal Hasade" [lord of the meadow].

The idea there is that there is a meadow which has beautiful grasses and flowers and trees and fruit. And these trees and plants are all souls. And they need watering and taking care of. There can be weeds and diseases that try to attack these beautiful souls. So there has to be someone to do that work. That is a true tzadik. But even to get to that level to do the slightest smallest work  in meadow requires a very great saint.  

[There is a lot of animosity towards Jesus, but that is because people are not aware of Avraham Abulafia. Even among Christians people are ambivalent towards Abulafia, even if they hear about his insights. This seems sad to me. Now while he was not at all positive towards the catholic church that is clearly because of the problem of worshiping Jesus which  can not be correct. But that does not mean to go to the opposite extreme and start speaking slander about who was really a very great tzadik and even more. For most tzadikim do not have a soul from azilut/emanation. ] 

The sugia of messiah son of Joseph is brought at length in the Gra's Kol HaTor.

[It does seem that Rav Nahman himself was not careful about the signature  of the Gra. However he was not in that category himself.]

There are three cases that Rav Shach brings in the beginning of laws of שאלה ופיקדון in which you say, "Let it be". [Let it stay where it is until proof can be brought.] (1) The case of the third hundred, (2) signs and signs, [He found an object and two different people give signs that the object is theirs. So he does not know to who to return it.] (3) he found a document of  a loan among his documents. [The lender and borrower each claim that he alone was the one that gave it to him to guard.] 

These cases are like an unpaid guard who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But in a case of transgressing, he is somewhat similar to the borrower. The borrower pays for everything. But in the case of the third hundred he is not borrowing anything. Still the fact that he should have written down the names of each one, he is thought to have trespassed and so he pays both. That is like a borrower. 

In the cases above the fellow is somewhat like an unpaid guard since you just leave the found object where it is. He does not know to who to return it. But he does not take an oath because one never takes an oath of  "I do not know."

So  all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are simply still in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects.

 For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The un-paid guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the third hundred. There a person is given three hundred dollars to keep safe for two people. One gave 100 and the other 200. When they come to get it each says the 200 is his. There we say the third person has to pay 200 to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a unpaid guard who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל

The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the third hundred. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the 200 and whom is the 100. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives 100 to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each 200.

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There are three cases that רב שך brings in the הלכות פיקדון ואבדה in which you say, יהיה מונח. The case of the מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. It is clear that these cases are not considered to be like an שומר חינם who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But he is somewhat similar to the שואל. The borrower pays for everything. שואל משלם את הכל. But in the case of the מנה שלישית he is not borrowing anything. So it seems that in all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects. For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The שומר חינם נשבע על הכל guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the מנה שלישית. There a person is given three שלש מאות שקלים to keep safe for two people. One gave מאה and the other מאתיים. When they come to get it each says the מאתיים is his. There we say the third person has to pay מאתיים to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a שומר חינם who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל. The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the מנה שלישית. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the מאתיים and whom is the מאה. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives מאה to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על הכסף שלו

ישנם שלושה מקרים שרב שך מביא בהלכות פיקדון בהם אתה אומר, יהיה מונח. המקרה של מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. המקרים אלה כמו שומר חינם שאיבד את החפץ עליו היה אמור לשמור. אלא שאינו נשבע שלא לוקחים שבוע על איני יודע. אבל אם הוא פושע זה דומה לשואל. שואל משלם את הכל. כך בשלושת המקרים החפץ האבוד או הכספים אינם נחשבים לאבודים כלל מכיוון שהם למעשה לא אבודים. הם נמצאים ברשות האדם שנתן לשמור. אבל הוא לא יודע למי להחזיר את החפצים. כי אם הם היו משהו כמו חפצים אבודים, היינו אומרים שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. שומר חנם נשבע על הכל השומר נשבע על הכל. היום עלה בדעתי שזה לא דומה לחוק מנהלת השלישית. שם נותנים לאדם שלושה שלש מאות שקלים כדי לשמור על בטיחותם של שני אנשים. אחד נתן את מאה ולשני מאתיים. כשבאים לקחת את זה כל אחד אומר המאתיים הוא שלו. שם אנו אומרים שהאדם השלישי צריך לשלם מאתיים לכל אחד מכיוון שזו הייתה אשמתו. העניין כאן הוא גם נראה שזה קצת שונה ששומר חינם נשבע שהוא לא יודע איפה החפץ ואז לא משלם כלום. לכן נראה שמקרה זה פשוט לא נחשב לשומר של אובייקט אבוד. הסיבה היא שהאובייקט [המאה] לא אבד. הוא לא יודע למי לתת את זה. ולשם כך חושבים שהוא פושע. וכך הוא משלם כמו לווה, שואל משלם את הכל. [הצעדים הבסיסיים להגיע למסקנה זו הם אלה: יש לנו את מנה שלישית. שם שני אנשים נותנים לו שלוש מאות שקלים במעטפה אחת ואומרים לו למי הוא שתי מאות ומי המאה. אבל הם נתנו את זה בחבילה אחת, והוא לא כתב את זה. הוא שכח מי מהם. הוא נותן מאה לכל אחד, והמאה האחרונה נשאר במקום שהוא נמצא. אבל אם הכסף ניתן בשתי מעטפות, אז הוא נותן לכל אחד מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על מעטפה שלו]