If you take the Gra at his word, then the main problem that people have is lack of trust in God. After all, take the principle "as much as you trust in God, that is how much he helps you" then the problem is not how to get help. It is rather to get trust.
12.4.20
Sometimes you notice that people that are against the path of learning fast of Rav Nahman of Uman are not in fact doing so much learning. On one hand the idea of learning in depth is important. But often the same people that learn the deepest are also the same ones that learn very fast as separate sessions.
As if you consider what the Gra said that one has an obligation to get through the Oral and Written Law [the two Talmuds, Sifra, Sifrei, Michilta, the Midrash Raba, Tosephta.] at least once it seems that that would be difficult without this idea of Rav Nahman of learning as fast as possible [i.e saying the words in order and going on until the end of the book and then review.].
And if you take into account the obligation of doing Physics and Metaphysics also as the rishonim [medieval authorities] that went along with this basic approach of Saadia Gaon, then all the more so that the path of learning fast is the only possible way. [That is Ibn Pakuda of the Obligations of the Heart, Benjamin the Doctor, and the Rambam and others.]
[The most open about Metaphysics and Physics was Ibn Pakuda right on the first page of the Obligations of the Hearts. Later in the third chapter of Shaar HaBehina for Physics]
[It is not that in depth is not important. It is just that I am saying that experience showed that 1/2 of learning time ought to be in depth and the other half for going fast. This is in every Litvak yeshiva. The morning is for in depth. The afternoon for fast learning.]
It is the same with coffee. Those against it you notice are not anything like super-achievers. Rather it is just they do not want anyone else to be an achiever and thus to show them up.
As if you consider what the Gra said that one has an obligation to get through the Oral and Written Law [the two Talmuds, Sifra, Sifrei, Michilta, the Midrash Raba, Tosephta.] at least once it seems that that would be difficult without this idea of Rav Nahman of learning as fast as possible [i.e saying the words in order and going on until the end of the book and then review.].
And if you take into account the obligation of doing Physics and Metaphysics also as the rishonim [medieval authorities] that went along with this basic approach of Saadia Gaon, then all the more so that the path of learning fast is the only possible way. [That is Ibn Pakuda of the Obligations of the Heart, Benjamin the Doctor, and the Rambam and others.]
[The most open about Metaphysics and Physics was Ibn Pakuda right on the first page of the Obligations of the Hearts. Later in the third chapter of Shaar HaBehina for Physics]
[It is not that in depth is not important. It is just that I am saying that experience showed that 1/2 of learning time ought to be in depth and the other half for going fast. This is in every Litvak yeshiva. The morning is for in depth. The afternoon for fast learning.]
It is the same with coffee. Those against it you notice are not anything like super-achievers. Rather it is just they do not want anyone else to be an achiever and thus to show them up.
There is a subject I want to introduce. It is in Rav Shach's commentary on the Rambam Laws of Marriage. 18. law 10. The subject itself is well known but since the public might not know I bring it here. Let's say a priest כהן marries a girl גדולה או קטנה [she could be before 12 years old, but even after 12 she still would be forbidden. That is to say,-- we do not say that since she is after 12 maybe the signs of virginity fell off automatically as sometime happens with girls after twelve.] and finds she is not a virgin. [That is we assume she is not a virgin because of sex, not because of the hymen falling off by itself, or because of playing rough at skiing or as such.] ] She is forbidden because even if she was raped, she still is a "halala" חללה which is forbidden to a priest. [that is one of the few categories that are forbidden to a priest bur allowed to a Israeli] But if a Israel marries a girl and she is not a virgin she still is allowed to him. Why? Because it is a case of a ספק ספיקא doubt of a doubt. Maybe she had sex before engagement. Then she is allowed to him. Or maybe the sex was after the engagement, but it might have been rape. So she is still allowed. [Only if she had sex after engagement willingly with someone else is she forbidden. That is to say a married woman who has sex with anyone besides her husband willingly becomes forbidden to her husband. That is learned from Sota סוטה והיא נטמאה אחד לבעל אחד לבועל So what makes the woman forbidden to a priest? It is the fact that even rape makes her forbidden. So Tosphot in Ketuboth pg 9 asks why not say she is allowed because we put her on her original status חזקת כשרות. That is to say there is only one doubt. One doubt might make her forbidden, however here we have a case where there is a original status [hazaka חזקת כשרות] which ought to solve the doubt. Tosphot answers that there is a another status working against that status חזקת כשרות. That is status that she was a virgin and so continues to be assumed to be so until the second we know it is not so. חזקא מעיקרא That is we push the act of sex up until the last minute until it was found out that she was not a virgin. So it had to be during the time of engagement ["Arusin" אירוסין]Rav Akiva Eigger askes what about חזקת השתא that is a status of the way we know things are now. And so we push that back in time as far as possible. So חזקת השתא [hazaka of now] ought to work with חזקת כשרות to allow her to her husband. [This is like the case in Nida page 2 where חזקת השתא [hazaka of now] would not work against חזקא מעיקרא unless there is another חזקא working together with it. I.e. by itself it would not hold but with another it would.]R Akiva Eigger answers in Nida page two the two hazakot חזקות work together and can be joined since they both indicate the same thing. However in our case with the wife of the priest חזקת השתא does not help. חזקת כשרות since they indicate different things. One is that the sex was before the engagement. The other indicates there was no sex at all. So the two חזקות do not join. So on this Rav Shach asks from other places in Rav Akiva Eigger himself which indicate that we would joining two hazakot even when they do not indicate the same thing. The only thing I want to mention here is just something odd about the answer of Rav Akiva Eigger even before we get into Rav Shach. I want to ask a simple question. Why do the two hazakot not indicate the same thing? One says she is OK, that means that either there was no sex before engagement or there was. It makes no difference. All it says is there was no sex after engagement. That is all. It is hezkat A.O.K. That is all. The other pushes the sex back in time before the engagement. So the two hazakot do not contradict. Nor do they have to be indicating different things. It is like a case if "this or that" along with "that". So you know "that". So the answer of R Akiva Eigger is hard to understand even before we could get into Rav Shach's questions.
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רב שך הלכות אישות י''ח: הלכה י' כהן marries a girl גדולה או קטנה ומוציא שהיא בתולה. She is forbidden because even if she was raped, she still is a חללה which is forbidden to a כהן. But if a ישראלי marries a girl and she is not a virgin, she still is allowed to him. Why? Because it is a case of a ספק ספלקא. Maybe she had ביאה before אירוסין. Then she is allowed to him. Or maybe the ביאה was after the engagement, but it might have been באונס. So she is still allowed. Only if she had ביאה after אירוסין willingly with someone else. She forbidden. That is to say a married woman who has ביאה with anyone besides her husband willingly becomes forbidden to her husband. That is learned from סוטה והיא נטמאה אחד לבעל אחד לבועל So what makes the woman forbidden to a כהן? It is the fact that even rape makes her forbidden. So תוספות in כתובות דף ט' ע''ב asks why not say she is allowed because we put her on her חזקת כשרות. That is to say there is only one doubt. One doubt might make her forbidden, however here we have a case where there is a חזקת כשרות which ought to solve the doubt. תוספות answers that there is a another חזקה working against חזקת כשרות. That is חזקת הגוף that she was a virgin and so continues to be assumed to be so until the second we know it is not so. חזקא מעיקרא That is we push the act of ביאה up until the last minute until it was found out that she was not a virgin. So it had to be during the time of אירוסין רב אקיבא איגר asks what about חזקת השתא that is a status of the way we know things are now. And so we push that back in time as far as possible. So חזקת השתא ought to work with חזקת כשרות to allow her to her בעל. This is like the case in נידה ב' ע''ב where חזקת השתא would not work against חזקא מעיקרא unless there is another חזקא working together with it. היינו by itself it would not hold, but with another it would. רב אקיבא איגר answers in נידה דף ב' ע''ב the החזקות work together, and can be joined since they both indicate the same thing. However in our case with the wife of the כהן חזקת השתא does not help חזקת כשרות since they indicate different things. One is that the ביאה was before the אירוסין. The other indicates there was no sex at all. So the two חזקות do not join. So on this רב שך asks from other places in רב אקיבא איגר himself which indicate that we would joining two החזקות even when they do not indicate the same thing. The only thing I want to mention here is about the answer of רב אקיבא איגר. I want to ask a simple question. Why do the two החזקות not indicate the same thing? One says she is OK. That means that either there was no ביאה before אירוסין, or there was. It makes no difference. All it says is there was no ביאה after אירוסין. That is all. It is חזקת כשרות. That is all. The other pushes the ביאה back in time before the אירוסין. So the two חזקות do not contradict. Nor do they have to be indicating different things. It is like a case "this or that" along with that. So you know that.
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רב שך הלכות אישות י''ח: הלכה י' כהן marries a girl גדולה או קטנה ומוציא שהיא בתולה. She is forbidden because even if she was raped, she still is a חללה which is forbidden to a כהן. But if a ישראלי marries a girl and she is not a virgin, she still is allowed to him. Why? Because it is a case of a ספק ספלקא. Maybe she had ביאה before אירוסין. Then she is allowed to him. Or maybe the ביאה was after the engagement, but it might have been באונס. So she is still allowed. Only if she had ביאה after אירוסין willingly with someone else. She forbidden. That is to say a married woman who has ביאה with anyone besides her husband willingly becomes forbidden to her husband. That is learned from סוטה והיא נטמאה אחד לבעל אחד לבועל So what makes the woman forbidden to a כהן? It is the fact that even rape makes her forbidden. So תוספות in כתובות דף ט' ע''ב asks why not say she is allowed because we put her on her חזקת כשרות. That is to say there is only one doubt. One doubt might make her forbidden, however here we have a case where there is a חזקת כשרות which ought to solve the doubt. תוספות answers that there is a another חזקה working against חזקת כשרות. That is חזקת הגוף that she was a virgin and so continues to be assumed to be so until the second we know it is not so. חזקא מעיקרא That is we push the act of ביאה up until the last minute until it was found out that she was not a virgin. So it had to be during the time of אירוסין רב אקיבא איגר asks what about חזקת השתא that is a status of the way we know things are now. And so we push that back in time as far as possible. So חזקת השתא ought to work with חזקת כשרות to allow her to her בעל. This is like the case in נידה ב' ע''ב where חזקת השתא would not work against חזקא מעיקרא unless there is another חזקא working together with it. היינו by itself it would not hold, but with another it would. רב אקיבא איגר answers in נידה דף ב' ע''ב the החזקות work together, and can be joined since they both indicate the same thing. However in our case with the wife of the כהן חזקת השתא does not help חזקת כשרות since they indicate different things. One is that the ביאה was before the אירוסין. The other indicates there was no sex at all. So the two חזקות do not join. So on this רב שך asks from other places in רב אקיבא איגר himself which indicate that we would joining two החזקות even when they do not indicate the same thing. The only thing I want to mention here is about the answer of רב אקיבא איגר. I want to ask a simple question. Why do the two החזקות not indicate the same thing? One says she is OK. That means that either there was no ביאה before אירוסין, or there was. It makes no difference. All it says is there was no ביאה after אירוסין. That is all. It is חזקת כשרות. That is all. The other pushes the ביאה back in time before the אירוסין. So the two חזקות do not contradict. Nor do they have to be indicating different things. It is like a case "this or that" along with that. So you know that.
רב שך בהלכות אישות י''ח: הלכה י 'כהן
מתחתן עם אישה ומוציא שאינה בתולה. אסורה לו כי גם אם נאנסה, היא עדיין חללה
שאסורה לכהן. אבל אם ישראלי מתחתן עם בחורה והיא לא בתולה, היא עדיין מורשית לו.
למה? כי זה מקרה של ספק ספיקה. אולי הייתה לה ביאה לפני אירוסין. ואז מותרת לו.
ואולי הביאה הייתה אחרי האירוסין, אבל יכול להיות שזו באונס. אז היא עדיין מותרת.
רק אם הייתה לה ביאה אחרי אירוסין ברצון עם מישהו אחר. היא אסרה. כלומר, אישה
נשואה שיש לה ביאה עם מישהו ברצון מלבד בעלה, נאסרת על בעלה. זה נלמד מסוטה "והיא נטמאה" אחד לבעל אחד לבועל אז
מה הופך את האישה לאסורה על כהן? העובדה שאונס אף גורם לה להיות אסורה. אז תוספות
בכתובות דף ט' ע''ב שואל למה לא לומר שמותרת לו בגלל חזקת כשרות שלה. כלומר יש רק
ספק אחד. ספק אחד עשוי לאסור אותה, אולם כאן יש לנו מקרה שיש חזקת כשרות שצריכה
לפתור את הספק. תוספות עונה שיש חזקה אחרת הפועלת נגד חזקת כשרות. זה חזקת הגוף
שהיא הייתה בתולה ולכן ממשיכים להניח שהיא כזו עד השנייה שאנחנו יודעים שזה לא כך.
חזקא מעיקרא. כלומר אנו דוחפים את מעשה הביאה עד לרגע האחרון עד שהתברר שהיא לא
בתולה. אז זה היה צריך להיות בתקופת אירוסין. רב אקיבא איגר שואל מה לגבי חזקת
השתא שזה מעמד של הדברים של עכשיו. וכך אנו דוחפים את זה אחורה בזמן ככל האפשר. אז
חזקת השתא צריכה לעבוד עם חזקת כשרות כדי להתיר לה. זה כמו המקרה בנידה ב' ע''ב.
שם חזקת השתא לא הייתה עובדת נגד חזקא מעיקרא אלא אם כן יש חזקה אחרת שעובדת יחד
איתה. היינו כשלעצמו זה לא יחזיק, אבל עם אחר זה היה כן. רב אקיבא איגר עונה בנידה
דף ב' ע''ב החזקות עובדות יחד, וניתן לחבר אותם מאחר ושניהם מציינים את אותו הדבר.
אולם במקרה שלנו עם אשתו של כהן חזקת השתא לא עוזרת לחזקת כשרות שכן הם מצביעים על
דברים שונים. האחת היא שהביאה הייתה לפני אירוסין. האחרת מעידה על שלא היה קיום
יחסי מין כלל. כך ששני החזקות לא מצטרפים. הדבר היחיד שאני רוצה לציין כאן הוא על
תשובתו של רב אקיבא איגר. אני רוצה לשאול שאלה פשוטה. מדוע שני החזקות אינם מציינות
את אותו הדבר? אחת אומרת שהיא בסדר. זה אומר שלא היה ביאה לפני אירוסין, או שהיה.
זה לא משנה. כל מה שמשנה הוא שלא הייתה ביאה אחרי אירוסין. זה הכול. זה חזקת
כשרות. השנייה דוחפת את הביאה אחורה בזמן לפני האירוסין. כך ששני החזקות אינן סותרות.
הן גם לא צריכות להיות מציינות דברים שונים. זה כמו מקרה "זה או אחר"
יחד עם "זה". אז אתה יודע את זה
11.4.20
I have gained a lot by the idea's Kant, Fries, and Leonard Nelson. That is a branch of Kant's thought that answers Kant's question about, "How is synthetic a prior knowledge possible?" [That means adjectives that can apply to many things.[Synthetic means knowledge that is so but it might not be so like "there is a continent between Europe and Asia. A priori means not based on observations nor dependent on such. ] And in a different way can apply to laws. [As Danny Frederick points out.]
Fries and Leonard Nelson answered this by a kind of knowing that is not by reason and not by sense perception. [immediate non intuitive.] Kant's answers was different. It is that we know the synthetic a priori by logic and reason but that reason has to fit within the confines of conditions of possible experience. [Hegel thought that this imposes conditions of reason that really do not exist. It all starts with Hume saying all that Reason can do is show contradictions. That was based on his being a teacher of Euclidean Geometry. But in fact Reason can do a lot more. It recognizes the synthetic a priori. It was up to Hume to prove his point before assuming it, and then messing up Western Philosophy ever since then.]
Yet I do not see the way that this is thought to be totally different than Hegel.
To me it seems both Hegel and Kant have lots of important points.
[I am no expert in this, but still I find these issues to be of great importance.]
One area that I think this is important is faith. That seems to be a kind of synthetic a priori knowledge that is different that logic or sensory evidence.
However when you try to apply these great thinkers to politics things seems to fall apart. But is that all that different from Plato himself! When he gets into politics, that is where things to go haywire. [In the Republic and the Laws.]
I have no idea why this is, but I can suggest that these are different areas of value. When it comes to politics, the founding fathers of the USA Constitution got things right.
But come to think about it, you find great thinkers that get just one thing right and everything else wrong. It is just the second level of talented people that see what is right, and see what is wrong.
An example would be Max Plank (the one who discovered that matter is quanta). It was said he wrote so much that eventually he had to hit on one right thing.
[I want to mention Dr Kelley Ross of the Kant Fries field of thought who has a lot more of "system" than either Kant or Fries. Kant is mainly limiting Reason and Fries modifies that. Dr Ross builds on that.]
Fries and Leonard Nelson answered this by a kind of knowing that is not by reason and not by sense perception. [immediate non intuitive.] Kant's answers was different. It is that we know the synthetic a priori by logic and reason but that reason has to fit within the confines of conditions of possible experience. [Hegel thought that this imposes conditions of reason that really do not exist. It all starts with Hume saying all that Reason can do is show contradictions. That was based on his being a teacher of Euclidean Geometry. But in fact Reason can do a lot more. It recognizes the synthetic a priori. It was up to Hume to prove his point before assuming it, and then messing up Western Philosophy ever since then.]
Yet I do not see the way that this is thought to be totally different than Hegel.
To me it seems both Hegel and Kant have lots of important points.
[I am no expert in this, but still I find these issues to be of great importance.]
One area that I think this is important is faith. That seems to be a kind of synthetic a priori knowledge that is different that logic or sensory evidence.
However when you try to apply these great thinkers to politics things seems to fall apart. But is that all that different from Plato himself! When he gets into politics, that is where things to go haywire. [In the Republic and the Laws.]
I have no idea why this is, but I can suggest that these are different areas of value. When it comes to politics, the founding fathers of the USA Constitution got things right.
But come to think about it, you find great thinkers that get just one thing right and everything else wrong. It is just the second level of talented people that see what is right, and see what is wrong.
An example would be Max Plank (the one who discovered that matter is quanta). It was said he wrote so much that eventually he had to hit on one right thing.
[I want to mention Dr Kelley Ross of the Kant Fries field of thought who has a lot more of "system" than either Kant or Fries. Kant is mainly limiting Reason and Fries modifies that. Dr Ross builds on that.]
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