I was looking over my notes on Bava Batra 18b and I think I need to add some clarity to the basic idea. that is this: Tosphot had to explain the mishna like Abyee that the owner of the mustard can put his mustard by the boundary and that the owner of the bees can also put his bees there because that is the only way the question of the Gemara makes sense.

But after the Gemara reaches the conclusion of Rav Papa in Rava then the only way for the answer of the Gemara to makes sense is כל הקודם זוכה first come first served. That is who ever was first at the border can stay and the other has to move his object 6 hand breaths away.
In any case the way Tosphot understands the question of the Gemara is based on that fact that the question of the Gemara is thinking the Mishna is going like Abyee. then the Tosphot changes the assumption in the end of the Gemara because that is the only way the answer of Rav papa in Rava makes sense.

The reason the answer of the gemara has to be that since neither neighbor did anything wrong since it is a case when half the field was bought there is no reason to demand the bees to be put far from the border.


These are my original notes:


) בבא בתרא עמוד י''ח ע''ב. [בתוספות ד''ה מכלל] יש משהו בתוספות בבא בתרא עמוד י''ח ע''ב שהוא קצת קשה להבין. ביסודו של דבר הנושא הוא המשנה שבה החכמים אומרים אחד צריך לשמור על מרחק ממשרה המשמשת כדי להשרות כביסה רחוק  מירקות של שכינו. גם חרדל מדבורים. ר יוסי מאפשר את זה האחרון כי הבעלים של חרדל יכולים לומר לבעלים של הדבורים "למה להגיד לי להתרחק מן הדבורים שלך? אתה צריך להרחיק את הדבורים שלך מהחרדל שלי, כי הם גם עושים נזק." אביי אומר אם השכן לא שם שום דבר על יד הגבול עדיין אז אפשר למקם חרדל או כל דבר אחר על יד הגבול עד שהשכן שם מה שהוא שם. רבא אומר שצריך לשמור על מרחק מהגבול בכל דברים שיכולים לגרום נזק  גם אם השכן לא שם שום דבר בקרבת מקום. אז איך רבא מתאים עם ר' יוסי? בשלב זה תוספות אומר שהגמרא מחזיקה שאביי הוא בסדר כי בעל הדבורים שם את הדבורים שלו על הגבול ולאחר מכן כוונתו של ר' יוסי היא כי שבעל החרדל יכול גם לשים את זרעי החרדל שלו על הגבול. רב פפא אז עונה על השאלה על רבא וכותבת המקרה של המשנה הוא כאשר אחד מן השכנים מכר חצי שדהו לשכן השני. זה מתכוון כי חרדל היה שם ראשונה ואז הוא מכר חלק מן השדה לבעלים של הדבורים. ואז כאשר ר' יוסי אומר מותר הכוונה שהחרדל יכול להישאר במקומו  ובעל הדבורים חייב לשמור על דבורים שלו שישה טפחים הרחק מהגבול [הגם שהם הניזוקים]. ותוספות שמים דגש על זה לומר הבעלים של הדבורים לא יכולים לשים את הדבורים ליד החרדל. הדבר שקשה בשבילי לי להבין הוא אם זה איך תוספות לומד בסופו של דבר, אז למה לא כאשר הוא הסביר ר' יוסי לפי אביי, שהוא לא אומר "ר' יוסי מרשה לו" הכוונה שהוא מאפשר לדבורים להישאר במקומם שהם נמצאים, והוא חייב לשמור את החרדל ששה טפחים משם?[היינו לומר שהכוונה של רבי יוסי היא ראשון ראשון זכה?] תירוץ: תוספות משנה מה המשמעות של ר' יוסי. לפני המשפט של רב פפא, המצב בוא שהדבורים ליד הגבול ואת החרדל ניתן לשים לידם. אחרי המשפט של רב פפא המקרה של המשנה הוא כאשר חצי השדה נרכש, ותוספות כותב המקרה הוא שהחרדל הוא ליד הגבול, ובעל החרדל יכול להגיד לבעל הדבורים להרחיק את הדבורים ששה טפחים מן הגבול (לפי שיטת רבי יוסי). חלק מהסיבה היא שהוא מדייק בשפה שר' יוסי משתמש בה, וחלק אחר של הסיבה היא כמו שתוספות כותב כי לפני רב פפא זה חייב להיות ר' יוסי הוא מחזיק שהבעלים של הדבורים עשו משהו לא בסדר לשים את הדבורים ליד גבול. אחרי רב פפא אף אחד לא עשה משהו לא בסדר, כי השדה עדיין לא נמכר. שפת גמרא היא זו: בעל החרדל אומר לבעלים של הדבורים "למה תגידו לי להרחיק את החרדל שלי, הרחק את הדבורים!" אם החרדל היה שם קודם, זה מתכוון שהוא אומר למעשה להרחיק את הדבורים. אם הדבורים היו שם קודם, פירוש הדבר שבעלים של החרדל אומרים שגם הם יכולים לשים את חרדל ליד הגבול. לכן, אחרי שהגענו  לפירוש של רב פפא ברבא, חייב להיות כמו שתוספות כותב כל אחד שהיה בגבול בראשונה יכול לומר לשני לשמור על מרחק ששה טפחים מהגבול.

the religious world has sunken deeply into the worship of tzadikm -not all that different from the worship of sticks and stones.

The worship of tzadikim [saints]seems to me to be not a very good idea. One reason I say this is I notice in the Obligations of the Hearts חובות הלבבות this idea that not to make up new "עבודות"--services.
The problem seems to be that the religious world has sunken deeply into the worship of tzadikm, and that I think is really not all that different from the worship of sticks and stone.

[This comes up in the Obligations of the Hearts a few times but one place that really made the point clear to me was when he talks about sticking with the path of one's parents]. There is no question that my parents and their parents and their parents before them would have thought that this worship of tzadikim that is so prevalent in the religious world is absolutely ridiculous and not the straight path of Torah at all.

The only people apparently that were aware of this problem were the Gra and Rav Shach. Other than that it seems the religious world have replaced the worship of God.

Now if I am right about this it means that the general set of rules about idolatry apply.

That is to say that one is not allowed to derive pleasure from idols nor the worship of idols. And since the worship of tzadikim is in fact idolatry that whole set of rules would apply.

I saw that the Hafetz Haim goes into the problems involved with deriving any kind of benefit from idols in section 6 of the Hafetz Haim.

[What this means is that in general one can not get pleasure from looking at idolatry, nor any other kind of pleasure.]

Music for the Glory of God

V-15  V-4  V-5  V-7 V-8 V-9 V-19

 these are in midi because i had no access to a mp3 converter 

Reb Nahman being in fact a very great tzadik

In spite of Reb Nahman being in fact a very great tzadik, there is a tendency to get off track. That is as long as people remain in the straight Torah path --the Litvak yeshiva, they tend to gain a lot by the ideas and writing of Reb Nahman. But there is a point when they "become Breslov" that there is a pronounced tendency to leave off learning Gemara and to get involved in other stuff. And sometimes that other stuff leads one to get even more off track. I saw this actually happen with people countless of times.

I never heard of  a great Litvak Gadol beTorah ever even hint anything other than the fact that Reb Nahman was a very very great tzadik. But that is very different than "becoming Breslov". It is just not the same thing.

I did ask Leibel Berenbaum about this issue specifically.

John Searle has a powerful refutation of relativism [relativism about truth]

John Searle has a powerful refutation of relativism [relativism about truth] which is based on dis-quotation. And after the first step of dis-quotation he shows how relativism results in incoherence and an infinite regress.

[This does not work however to prove moral objectivism. That is why people like Kelley Ross and Plato and Michael Huemer go about proving that in different ways.]

[His essay used to be on his Stanford web site. I don't know if it is there anymore so here it is for reference:

Relativism
last date corrected: November 7, 2001
The Refutation of Relativism

There are many different versions of relativism: ethical relativism, conceptual relativism, and epistemic relativism are three.
In this paper, I will be concerned with only one version of relativism, relativism about truth.  As a preliminary formulation, I will define relativism about truth as follows: Relativism is the theory that the truth (or falsity) of any
proposition is always relative to certain sorts of psychological
attitudes on the part of the person who states, believes or otherwise judges the truth of the proposition. This is a bit vague but I think the idea is clear enough. A proposition which I state is true only relative to my interests or my point of view. Thus according to relativism so defined, a proposition might be true for me but false for you.

Relativism is thus more than a syntactical claim that statements of the  form "S is true" are disguised relational statements.
It might  be argued that such statements, though in their surface grammar they are in one place subject predicate form, are in fact two place relational statements.  They are not of the form "a is f" but of the form "aRb".  For example, this is claimed by  the correspondence theory of truth. According to the correspondence theory,  statement p is true iff p corresponds to a fact. This gives a  relational version of truth but it is not a version of relativism about truth,  as I am using that notion or as it is standardly understood by those who think of themselves as relativists.
Relativism about truth, so construed, is opposed to absolutism about truth. Absolutism, I will define as the view that there are a very large number of truth claims whose truth is in no way dependent on the feelings and attitudes of the people making or assessing the truth claim.
I deliberately use the word "absolutism", because it is so politically incorrect, suggesting as it does some terrible form of oppression.  I think this is, in a way, appropriate, because truth often is oppressive in the sense that there are many truths that we would rather not believe or accept, for
example, the truth that the people we most love are all going to die.

There is a standard, and I think powerful, refutation of relativism. Here is how it goes: You can't even state relativism without denying it. Suppose you say 1. All truth is relative to the interests and perspective of the person making the truth claim. or 2. There are no universally valid truths. or
3. There are no absolute truths. It looks like in each case you have to exempt the claim itself from the scope of its application.  But then you have given up the claim, for the claim was supposed to be universal in in its application.
1 is supposed to be interpreted in such a way that if I accept it then I need not accept any truth claim which it is not in my interest to accept. But then what is to prevent me from thinking it is not in my interest to accept 1?
The difficulty with 2 and 3 is even more obvious.
Is 2 supposed to be interpreted so that it applies to itself or not? Either way you get inconsistency. If you say there are no universally valid truths except the truth that there are no universally valid truths, then you have already allowed for an exception and no reason has been given why there will not be other exceptions. If you say there are no universally valid truths including the claim that there are no universally valid truths, then you have contradicted yourself. You have said the claim both is and is not universally valid. 

Such arguments seem powerful, and I do not see how a relativist could answer them. Until fairly recently relativism was mostly espoused by adolescents or other people inspired by Nietzsche or others outside of mainstream intellectual life. Recently it has reared its head as part of postmodernism.

Why are the relativists not worried by the incoherence of their position? I don't know, but I think it is because they think they are possessed of an important insight, which is not touched by these logical worries.
The insight has to do with the perspectival character of all knowledge claims.

The idea is that all claims are made from a point of view, from some perspective
or other and there is no superior or master perspective from which to judge all other perspectives. The relativity to perspectives is all the relativism they need and the fact that the judgment "all judgments are perspectival" is itself perspectival does not seem to them a decisive refutation.

I think the situation with relativism is much worse than they or anybody else has said.  The problem is not just that you can't coherently state relativism, the problem is that if you are a consistent relativist, you can't coherently state anything.

Suppose you want to say that "it is raining" or that "two plus two equals four" or that "Denver is the capital of Colorado" or pretty much anything.  How do you do it if you are a relativist? Suppose you say that it is raining (now, here). On a normal interpretation you are saying it is raining as opposed to It is not raining. That is, your utterance stakes out a territory in the space of possibilities, and thus excludes certain other territories. That is what you mean when you say it is raining. But how is it supposed to work if you are a relativist? You are supposed to intend you utterance "It's raining" in this way:   "It is true that it is raining, but that truth is relative to my point of view. So it is true for me, but it might not be true for you." And what is true of rain will be true of everything. So for example, if I say "2+2= 4", what I really means is, "It's true that 2+2=4, but that truth is relative to my own views.  So it's true for me, but it might not be true for you."  And so on with all other cases.

But now we immediately have a difficulty with the logical law that for any statement S, that statement is true if and only if P, where for the letter S you substitute an expression identifying the statement, and for P you substitute the statement itself.  Thus, to take a famous example, "Snow is white is true" if and only if snow is white.  This law
is sometimes called "disquotation" because the sentence or statement quoted on the left-hand side occurs on the right-hand side with the quotation marks dropped, hence disquoted.
The trouble is that disquotation makes not just truth but the rain itself, and everything else relative to me.  So now I have to say, "It is raining, but only relative to my point of view. (RMyPV).   And that is consistent with
   It is not raining, relative to your point of view (RYourPV)."
Once you grant that truth is relative to me then because of disquotation anything at all that can be ascribed \fIexists\fR only relative to me. Relativity about truth immediately implies relativity of all of reality.

There is no intermediate position of truth relativism or semantic relativism between absolutism and ontological relativism, the view that everything that exists only exists relative to my feelings and attitudes. The relativist has to give up on the idea that when he says it is raining he must mean that it is really raining as opposed to not raining, because it is only raining F His PV and maybe not raining FMyPV. The relativist began with the apparent insight that the real world can only be described from different points of view. The initial picture was that there is a real world, but our representation of it is always going to be relative to a point of view, because all representation is from some point of view or other, and this supposed to give him  a relativism of truth but not of reality. But now he has to give up on his original idea that there is a real world that can be described from this or that point of view, because if truth is relative to his point of view then disquotation makes the (existence of) the real world dependent on his point of view.  Well couldn't he just accept that? Isn't that what the relativist should really want--that all of reality only exists from his point of view? Is that a coherent position?
I don't think it is. Just as there was no coherent position of semantic or truth relativism between absolutism and ontological relativism, so there is no coherent position of ontological relativism short of total solipsism. And the reason is that the people with points of view and the points of view themselves now have to be relativized to points of view. If you go back and look at our original definition of relativism, the idea was to define truth only relative to people and their points of view. We then discovered that the relativity of truth implied the relativity of reality. But the original assumption behind our definition was that there really were people with different points of view, and that was an absolute assumption. Now we discover that relativism does not allow for the absolute existence of anything, not even people and points of view.
So when the relativist says, You and I both exist with our points of view and maybe from your point of view it is not raining, even though from my point of view it is raining, he must mean "You and your point of view can only exist from my point of view."
     What is going on here? I think it is this. The relativist would like to reduce all utterances to the expression of preferences. Thus the model is, for example, the statement
"chocolate tastes good," said by me, need not be inconsistent with the statement, "chocolate does not taste good" said by you. Because I might mean chocolate tastes good to me and you might
mean chocolate does not taste good to you; and these are consistent positions.  The good taste of chocolate only exists relative to tasters. Now why can't all utterances be like that? Why can't "it's raining" be read as "it's raining to me" and thus consistent with "it's not raining to you", just like the taste of chocolate? The answer is quite simple. The relativity of the goodness of the taste of chocolate only makes sense given the absolute existence of the tasters and the goodness or badness of their taste experiences. When you say "chocolate tastes good," that is relative (we are assuming that is how you intended it). But when you say chocolate tastes good to me, thus identifying the relativity of the first claim, the claim of relativity cannot itself be relative. If it is relative, it cannot ground the relativity of the first claim.  There is a deep point here that I want to make fully explicit: the relativity in question, relativity to preferences, attitudes, etc., is only intelligible if there is something that is not itself relative.  It makes sense to say that my utterance of "chocolate tastes good" is true relative to me, but that is only because my existence and the way that chocolate tastes to me are absolute.  There is nothing relative about either of them.

To see the slide of relativism into incoherence let us go through the steps. (1.) Assume all truth is relative to preferences of the asserters of the truth. If S asserts p then p is true only relative to the interests of S.  (2.) By disquotation, if truth is relative then reality is relative. (3.) If reality is relative it is relative to the existence of people and preferences   (4.) But if everything is relative, then existence of people and preferences must itself be relative. To what? There are two possibilities. Either we say (a)that people and preferences only exist relative to people and preferences or we say (b) that from my point of view, which is the only point of view to which I have access, people and preferences exist only relative to me.

Let us go through each of these:
Consider (a) first.
Proposition 1. It's raining has to be interpreted as Propostion 2: "Its raining but only relative to preference 1". -But of course proposition 2 is as relative as 1. It can only be interpreted as Proposition 3. "Proposition 2 is true but only relative to preference 2". That is, "It's raining relative to preference 1", but only relative to preference 2. -But Proposition 3, must itself be relative, as is stated by Proposition 4. "Proposition 3 is true but only relative to preference 3." -Thus its raining relative to preference 1, relative to preference 2, but only relative to preference 3.
The infinite regress follows automatically. Why is the regress vicious? Because it makes it impossible to give statement of anything. For any relativistic statement there must always be some other statement behind it which generates its relativistic interpretation, but that other statement is as much in need of a relativistic interpretation as was the original.


So let's try possibility b. If truth for me is relative to my preferences and thus everything that exists, exists only relative to my preferences, then you and your preferences exist only relative to my preferences. That is solipsism. My solipsism is coherent, but it makes it impossible to say anything to anybody else because there is nobody else and no public language to say anything. Your solipsism is immediately refuted by me, but that is because my existence is absolute and not relative to any preferences, mine or anybody else's. A consistent relativism makes it impossible to state anything because there is no end, there is indeed a vicious infinite regress of relativisms to relativisms.  The way out of this, that is an implicit in the first person point of view of the relativist, is to insist that the relativism terminates in his existence and preferences.  But then that is a form of solipsism, because everyone else exists only relative to his existence and preferences.
.PP
But then, why couldn't a relativist be more democratic?  Why couldn't he stop half way and say, "Well, what's true for me is true relative to my preferences and what's true for you is true relative to your preferences, but all of us are created equal, so all of us have an equal right to their preferences."  The trouble with that is that it is an  explicit denial of relativism.  It is a form of absolutism.  It says that people and preferences have an absolute non-relative existence.  But then, if people and preferences have an absolute existence, why not all the other things such as mountains and waterfalls, rainstorms and prime numbers.  If I grant that you have an absolute existence, then why not your clothing, your house, your car, your dog, and a whole lot of other things? 

Gates of Repentance of Rabbainu Yona and Lashon Hara [Slander]

In the Gates of Repentance of Rabbainu Yona you can see that lashon hara [slander] that is true is only forbidden because of collateral damage.  The Hafez Haim more or less agrees with this  as you can see in the seven conditions by which one can say lashon hara. [If the Hafez Haim would have decided like the Rambam then lashon hara that is true would be more strict]
It occurs to me this might be the reason for Tosphot in Bava Batra page 39B.
What I mean to say is that I saw in the Hafez Haim that he answers that Tosphot saying that it is talking about אבק לשון הרע the dust of lashon hara and in particular something that can be interpreted in a few ways. So Tosphot says it is OK to say it in front of three people because he knows it will get back to the person he was talking about so he will be careful to say it in a way that is clear he means it in the complementary way.
This always seemed to me to be forcing words into Tosphot that he does not say. To me it makes more sense to say he is speaking the truth and because it is in front of three he will be careful not to mix anything wrong in his words.

[If you go with this approach of R. Yona then the Gemaras that the Hafetz Haim brings in section 10 make a lot more sense. In those Gemaras it looks that different amoraim said things not very complimentary about other amoraim. The Hafetz Haim in each case has to find some reason why it was OK. But if you go with R Yona, it seems simple. You can say the truth as long as your intention is for some permissible practical benefit.]


[In any case, I think that I have been too lenient in terms of laws of lashon hara and I hope to review the Hafetz Haim to remind myself of the many details.]

I might mention that in the Mir Yeshiva in NY, the issue of lashon hara was a fairly big subject. One of the grandchildren of Rav Miller started a seder in which two laws of the Hafetz Haim were learnt every day after the morning prayers. Other things that were important there were being in the regular sessions.[that is learning Torah during the set times]. Another big issue was trust in God because that was the nature of the yeshiva. People were not going to university and so automatically the subject of trust came up.

Rav Avraham Abulafia

The whole subject of Rav Avraham Abulafia (note 1) is kind of complicated.  Professor Moshe Idel at Hebrew University wrote  few books about him but that is only touching on the surface.
Reb Haim Vital not only quotes him but in the fourth volume of Shaarai Hakedusha brings only the practices and unification of Rav Abulfia in terms of coming to the Divine Spirit.
[Rav Vital wrote a Musar book on Ethics. For a long time only the first three sections were printed because the last section was all about the idea that if one has fulfilled  everything in the first three sections then it was time to devote oneself to unifications. No  one printed that last section until recently. It turns out that that last section has mainly unifications from Rav Avraham Abulafia, not the Ari.
[Just for public knowledge  I ought to mention that Reb Haim Vital wrote all the writings of the Ari--i.e. the Tree of Life, Fruit of Tree of Life,  the other Eight Gates, plus a record of his visions and that above mentioned Musar sefer. The redaction was done by his son Rav Shmuel Vital.
The main people that continued this line were the Reshash [Shalom Sharabi], and Rav Yaakov Abuhazeira.[You might add Rav Moshe Haim Luzato also. ]

I myself did learn some of this to some degree but no longer.--However I would definitely like one day to get through the entire set of the Ari,  the Reshash, and Rav Yaakov Abukatzeira's books at least דרך גירסא [just saying the words fast and in order with no repeats. ] at least once.


(note 1) Rav Abulafia was born I think around 1240. He was a unusual  medieval mystic and wrote a set of books that were published only a few years ago. He was subject to severe criticism by the Rashba and others. He went to debate the pope at the time but that was because he had a negative view of the catholic church, not that he had a negative view about Yeshua himself. Since the Talmud itself brings this idea of a savior from the house of Joseph and another one from King David it was common in the Middle Ages to have that opinion.