24.12.17
23.12.17
A question on R. Tam in Bava Batra 45 and an answer
בבא בתרא מ''ה ע''א וע''ב. The משנה says an artisan can not say about a certain object that he bought it. רבה says that is only when witnesses were present when the object was given to him to fix. But if there are no witnesses he is believed because he could have said it never came to him as an object to fix, but rather he bought it outright in the first place. אביי asks then even with witnesses [but we do not see the object with him now] he should be believed that he bought it, because he could have said "I gave it back to you." רבה answered this. If he received it in front of witness he has to have had to give it back in front of witnesses. So there is no מיגו That he could have said החזרתי לך. And then ר' תם asked this. אביי should have asked after that answer of רבה even with witnesses [but not seeing it right now] he still should be believed because he could say the object was stolen or lost in some other was that was not his fault. [like lost or stolen for a non paid guard or stolen at gun point for a paid guard.]
My question is this seems difficult to say. Why should we should believe him that he bought the object because the מיגו he could have said it was stolen and then have to take an oath. The oath part of it makes the thing that מיגו "he could have said" to be not desirable to say.
After I wrote this it occurred to me that the second answer in תוספות is exactly that. The second answer of the יש מפרשים says that the intention of רבה is to say this. The משנה says an artisan can not say he bought the object. רבה says that is only if he wants to be believed without an oath, but with an oath he is believed. This is when there are witnesses, but the object is not seen with him right now. Thus in fact there is this idea he could have said the object was stolen and be believed with an oath. So now also we believe him with an oath. I think that you have to say for ר' תם that the oath in the case where the object was stolen is only from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. And therefore the fact that a plea of stolen will require an oath from the words of the scribes will not affect the law of the Holy Torah which considers both, (1) the case of the artisan that says he bought the object and (2) the case of his saying it was stolen both to be without an oath. So the oath requirement will not affect the fact that the Torah believes him because of "he could have said."
The idea here is that to ר' תם for there to be an oath in the case of a שומר there has to be two objects. One that he says was stolen and another that he admits to. Since that is not the case here, the oath he has to take in the case of אונס is מדברי סופרים
בבא בתרא מ''ה ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול לומר על חפץ מסוים שהוא קנה אתו. רבה אומר כי זה רק כאשר עדים היו נוכחים כאשר האובייקט ניתן לו לתקן. אבל אם אין עדים הוא נאמן בגלל מיגו כי הוא יכול היה להגיד את זה אף פעם לא הגיע אליו כאובייקט לתקן, אלא שהוא קנה אותו על הסף מלכתחילה. אביי שואל אז אפילו עם עדים [אבל אנחנו לא רואים את האובייקט איתו עכשיו] הוא צריך להאמין שהוא קנה אתו, כי הוא יכול היה לומר "נתתי אותו בחזרה אליך." רבה ענה זה. אם הוא קיבל את זה מול עדים הוא צריך להחזיר אותו מול עדים. אז אין מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר החזרתי לך. ואז ר' תם שאל את זו. אביי צריך לשאול אחרי התשובה של רבה אפילו עם עדים [אבל לא רואים את זה עכשיו] הוא עדיין צריך להאמין כי הוא יכול לומר את האובייקט נגנב או אבד לא באשמתו. [כמו אובדן או גניבה של שומר לא בתשלום (שומר חינם) או נגנבו באיומי נשק עבור שומר שכר.] השאלה שלי היא זו נראית קשה לומר. למה אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו כי הוא קנה את האובייקט משום מיגו, שהיה יכול לומר שזה נגנב ואז צריך להישבע. הצורך של השבועה עושה את המיגו "הוא יכול היה לומר" להיות לא רצוי לומר בשבילו. עלה בדעתי כי התשובה השנייה של תוספות אומרת בדיוק את זה. התשובה השנייה של יש מפרשים אומרת כי כוונת רבה היא זאת. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול להגיד שהוא קנה את האובייקט. רבה אומר כי זה רק אם הוא רוצה להיאמין בלי שבועה, אך עם שבועה הוא אמין. זהו כשיש עדים אך האובייקט לא ראה איתו עכשיו. כך שלמעשה יש רעיון זה של מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר את האובייקט היה נגנב שיאמין בשבועה. אז עכשיו גם אנחנו מאמינים לו בשבועה. אני חושב שיש לך להגיד על ר' תם כי השבועה במקרה שבו האובייקט נגנב היא רק מדברי הסופרים, לא מן התורה. ולכן העובדה שטיעון של גנוב ידרש שבועה מדברי הסופרים לא תשפיע על החוק של התורה הקדושה שרואה במקרה של אומן שאומר שהוא קנה את האובייקט לבין המקרה שהוא אומר שזה היה נגנב שניהם להיות בלי שבועה. אז דרישת השבועה לא תשפיע על העובדה שהתורה מאמינה לו. הרעיון כאן הוא שלר' תם כדי שתהיה שבועה במקרה של שומר חייב להיות שני אובייקטים. אחד שהוא אומר נגנב ועוד אחד שהוא מודה. כיוון שזה אינו המקרה כאן, השבועה שהוא צריך לקחת (במקרה של אונס) היא מדברי סופרים
So I am thinking that the answer of R. Tam only works if you hold טענת אונס צריכה הודאה במק. This R. Tam comes up also Bava Metzia also. And in my notes over there on page 98 I discuss him in the context of Tosphot.
I should mention that I myself was totally unaware of this opinion of R. Tam until it came up in Bava Metzia pg 98.
The idea here is that to ר' תם for there to be an oath in the case of a שומר there has to be two objects. One that he says was stolen and another that he admits to. Since that is not the case here, the oath he has to take in the case of אונס is מדברי סופרים
בבא בתרא מ''ה ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול לומר על חפץ מסוים שהוא קנה אתו. רבה אומר כי זה רק כאשר עדים היו נוכחים כאשר האובייקט ניתן לו לתקן. אבל אם אין עדים הוא נאמן בגלל מיגו כי הוא יכול היה להגיד את זה אף פעם לא הגיע אליו כאובייקט לתקן, אלא שהוא קנה אותו על הסף מלכתחילה. אביי שואל אז אפילו עם עדים [אבל אנחנו לא רואים את האובייקט איתו עכשיו] הוא צריך להאמין שהוא קנה אתו, כי הוא יכול היה לומר "נתתי אותו בחזרה אליך." רבה ענה זה. אם הוא קיבל את זה מול עדים הוא צריך להחזיר אותו מול עדים. אז אין מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר החזרתי לך. ואז ר' תם שאל את זו. אביי צריך לשאול אחרי התשובה של רבה אפילו עם עדים [אבל לא רואים את זה עכשיו] הוא עדיין צריך להאמין כי הוא יכול לומר את האובייקט נגנב או אבד לא באשמתו. [כמו אובדן או גניבה של שומר לא בתשלום (שומר חינם) או נגנבו באיומי נשק עבור שומר שכר.] השאלה שלי היא זו נראית קשה לומר. למה אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו כי הוא קנה את האובייקט משום מיגו, שהיה יכול לומר שזה נגנב ואז צריך להישבע. הצורך של השבועה עושה את המיגו "הוא יכול היה לומר" להיות לא רצוי לומר בשבילו. עלה בדעתי כי התשובה השנייה של תוספות אומרת בדיוק את זה. התשובה השנייה של יש מפרשים אומרת כי כוונת רבה היא זאת. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול להגיד שהוא קנה את האובייקט. רבה אומר כי זה רק אם הוא רוצה להיאמין בלי שבועה, אך עם שבועה הוא אמין. זהו כשיש עדים אך האובייקט לא ראה איתו עכשיו. כך שלמעשה יש רעיון זה של מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר את האובייקט היה נגנב שיאמין בשבועה. אז עכשיו גם אנחנו מאמינים לו בשבועה. אני חושב שיש לך להגיד על ר' תם כי השבועה במקרה שבו האובייקט נגנב היא רק מדברי הסופרים, לא מן התורה. ולכן העובדה שטיעון של גנוב ידרש שבועה מדברי הסופרים לא תשפיע על החוק של התורה הקדושה שרואה במקרה של אומן שאומר שהוא קנה את האובייקט לבין המקרה שהוא אומר שזה היה נגנב שניהם להיות בלי שבועה. אז דרישת השבועה לא תשפיע על העובדה שהתורה מאמינה לו. הרעיון כאן הוא שלר' תם כדי שתהיה שבועה במקרה של שומר חייב להיות שני אובייקטים. אחד שהוא אומר נגנב ועוד אחד שהוא מודה. כיוון שזה אינו המקרה כאן, השבועה שהוא צריך לקחת (במקרה של אונס) היא מדברי סופרים
So I am thinking that the answer of R. Tam only works if you hold טענת אונס צריכה הודאה במק. This R. Tam comes up also Bava Metzia also. And in my notes over there on page 98 I discuss him in the context of Tosphot.
I should mention that I myself was totally unaware of this opinion of R. Tam until it came up in Bava Metzia pg 98.
Tractate Bava Batra pg 45b.
. The mishna says an artisan can not say about a certain object that he bought it. Rabah says that is only when witnesses were present when the object was given to him to fix. But if there are no witnesses, he is believed - because he could have said it never came to him as an object to fix, but rather he bought it outright in the first place. Abyee asks then even with witnesses [but we do not see the object with him now] he should be believed that he bought it, because he could have said "I gave it back to you." Rabah answered he would then have had to give it back in front of witnesses. [If he received it in front of witnesses, he has to give it back in front of witnesses]
R. Tam asked Abyee should have answered even with witnesses [but not seeing it right now] he still should be believed because he could say the object was stolen or lost in some other way that was not his fault [like lost or stolen for a non paid guard or stolen at gun point for a paid guard].
My question is this seems difficult to say. Why should we should believe him that he bought the object because he could have said "It was stolen" and then have to take an oath. The oath part of it makes the thing that "He could have said" to be not desirable to say.
After I wrote this it occurred to me that the second answer in Tosphot is exactly that. He says that the intention of Rabah is to say this. The Mishna says an artisan can not say he bought the object. Rabah says that is only if he wants to be believed without an oath, but with an oath he is believed. This is when there are witnesses but the object is not seen with him right now. Thus in fact there is this idea he could have said the object was stolen an be believed with an oath. So now also we believe him with an oath. [Still it is hard to understand why this is a question in the first place to the other Rishonim.]
"He could have said thus and thus and be believed so we should believe him when he says a weaker plea." actually came up with me in a case before the Israel Supreme Court when that was the exact reason they acquitted me of wrongdoing in a certain case.
I think that you have to say for R. Tam that the oath in the case where the object was stolen is only from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. And therefore the fact that a plea of stolen will require an oath from the words of the scribes will not affect the law of the Holy Torah which considers both the case of the artisan that says he bought the object and the case of his saying it was stolen both to be without an oath. So the oath requirement will not affect the fact that the Torah believes him because of "he could have said"
The reason the oath of a stolen object is from the words of the scribes is that to R. Tam, in order for an oath (that something was stolen) to be from the Torah it is needed that there be two objects. One that he admits to and the other the object that he claims was stolen. This you can see in Bava Batra page 70b in Tosphot and also in Bava Metzia page 98a
R. Tam asked Abyee should have answered even with witnesses [but not seeing it right now] he still should be believed because he could say the object was stolen or lost in some other way that was not his fault [like lost or stolen for a non paid guard or stolen at gun point for a paid guard].
My question is this seems difficult to say. Why should we should believe him that he bought the object because he could have said "It was stolen" and then have to take an oath. The oath part of it makes the thing that "He could have said" to be not desirable to say.
After I wrote this it occurred to me that the second answer in Tosphot is exactly that. He says that the intention of Rabah is to say this. The Mishna says an artisan can not say he bought the object. Rabah says that is only if he wants to be believed without an oath, but with an oath he is believed. This is when there are witnesses but the object is not seen with him right now. Thus in fact there is this idea he could have said the object was stolen an be believed with an oath. So now also we believe him with an oath. [Still it is hard to understand why this is a question in the first place to the other Rishonim.]
"He could have said thus and thus and be believed so we should believe him when he says a weaker plea." actually came up with me in a case before the Israel Supreme Court when that was the exact reason they acquitted me of wrongdoing in a certain case.
I think that you have to say for R. Tam that the oath in the case where the object was stolen is only from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. And therefore the fact that a plea of stolen will require an oath from the words of the scribes will not affect the law of the Holy Torah which considers both the case of the artisan that says he bought the object and the case of his saying it was stolen both to be without an oath. So the oath requirement will not affect the fact that the Torah believes him because of "he could have said"
The reason the oath of a stolen object is from the words of the scribes is that to R. Tam, in order for an oath (that something was stolen) to be from the Torah it is needed that there be two objects. One that he admits to and the other the object that he claims was stolen. This you can see in Bava Batra page 70b in Tosphot and also in Bava Metzia page 98a
22.12.17
The subject of demons that pretend to teach Torah
The subject of demons that pretend to teach Torah is in fact a rather big subject which comes up in the writings of Rav Isaac Luria. Without really saying so, this is the reason that the Reform and Conservative movements got started in the first place. Not that I agree with the Reform and Conservative on every detail, but the basic idea is that they were reacting to a certain kind of situation.
In any case, both the Reform and Conservative are right about a good deal of major points --for example the primary importance of laws between man and his fellow man. Clearly the Musar movement of Reb Israel Salanter also tried to emphasize that area of obligation --but with limited success.
I have to admit that I think Reb Israel and the Gra were right about the basic approach of the Holy Torah, but I think that in practice the Reform and Conservative people come closer to the ideals of Torah.
[There are however areas where the Reform and Conservative movements tend to be weak and t is in those areas that I go with the Gra.]
In any case, both the Reform and Conservative are right about a good deal of major points --for example the primary importance of laws between man and his fellow man. Clearly the Musar movement of Reb Israel Salanter also tried to emphasize that area of obligation --but with limited success.
I have to admit that I think Reb Israel and the Gra were right about the basic approach of the Holy Torah, but I think that in practice the Reform and Conservative people come closer to the ideals of Torah.
[There are however areas where the Reform and Conservative movements tend to be weak and t is in those areas that I go with the Gra.]
divorce laws
The trouble in divorce laws is there is something about them that goes against natural law. In natural law, a woman depends on a man. In the Law of Moses also a woman can leave her husband, but she gets no support from him for doing so. The Torah says to the woman, "If you feel you not longer need him, then you can leave [that divorce is allowed, but it has to be that the husband desires it], but then do not suppose you can bankrupt him in desire for revenge that you did not get Superman." That is in plain language, there is no such thing as alimony.
[In Ketuboth there is for a widow alimony until she remarries. Not a divorcee. In any case, it seems to me proper to write this down as I have noticed a large degree of misunderstandings about this issue. It all comes from the simple fact that people do not learn tractate Ketuboth as thoroughly as they ought.
Not that I learned it so well either. But in Shar Yashuv [Rav Friefeld's Yeshiva] that was the tractate they were learning during my second year there, so I did try to do it as well as I could with the Tosphot, Tosphot HaRosh, Pnei Yehoshua and the Tur and other achronim. Still that was just my second year, so I did not learn it very thoroughly since I was more or less a beginner.
In any case, there is no reason to reward women for doing evil.
[Furthermore there is no reason to think that the government can just make up laws at random that goes against natural law. This is spelled out in the 9th and 10th amendment to the Constitution that people retain whatever rights they naturally have. That includes rights to their private property. The government can not just make up laws at random which benefit one part of the population at the expense of another. The "General Welfare" clause means the general welfare of all the states--not one state at the expense of another.]
[In Ketuboth there is for a widow alimony until she remarries. Not a divorcee. In any case, it seems to me proper to write this down as I have noticed a large degree of misunderstandings about this issue. It all comes from the simple fact that people do not learn tractate Ketuboth as thoroughly as they ought.
Not that I learned it so well either. But in Shar Yashuv [Rav Friefeld's Yeshiva] that was the tractate they were learning during my second year there, so I did try to do it as well as I could with the Tosphot, Tosphot HaRosh, Pnei Yehoshua and the Tur and other achronim. Still that was just my second year, so I did not learn it very thoroughly since I was more or less a beginner.
In any case, there is no reason to reward women for doing evil.
[Furthermore there is no reason to think that the government can just make up laws at random that goes against natural law. This is spelled out in the 9th and 10th amendment to the Constitution that people retain whatever rights they naturally have. That includes rights to their private property. The government can not just make up laws at random which benefit one part of the population at the expense of another. The "General Welfare" clause means the general welfare of all the states--not one state at the expense of another.]
21.12.17
Aquinas was bringing down Avicenna's note on complex substance.
I was able to look at Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle and then I realized substance does not have to be simple.
Aquinas was bringing down Avicenna's note on complex substance.
[In any case it seems to me that to reward women for doing evil, is not the best kind of law to have on the books.]
There are laws on the books that allow women to get rid of their husband and get his money and support for the rest of her life. There is also a law in the Gemara דינא דמלכותא דינא [the law of the State is the law.]. So I ask can a woman depend on this? Or does she have to go by the Law of Moses which does not give her that right?
[The basic law in tracate Ketubot is there are three divisions of a woman's property. נכסי מלוג, נכסי צאן ברזל, מה שקנה אישה קנה בעלה] Property that she brings into the marriage that she owned before the marriage she still owns but the husband can use the profits. Then there is property she acquires after she is married and that is owned fully by the husband.
Thus she has no right to her husband's property after she is divorced.
Also in terms of "the law of the state is the law" I would say that is not the case where the law of the state contradicts a Torah law. The main issues in terms of the law of the state are not clear to me but the major sources are the Rashbam and Maimonides in terms of how it is applied.
I have been thinking of mentioning that there is a school of thought among Christians that they themselves believe they are required to keep the Law of Moses. That is called the Theonomic Position See that essay by Gregory Bahnsen.
The Theonomic postion does take into account that some laws of the Holy Torah apply to the Land of Israel, But other laws are general. And I should mention that Gregory Bahnsen says that this Theonomic Position corresponds with Paul, and that was kind of a surprise to me.
[In any case it seems to me that to reward women for doing evil, is not the best kind of law to have on the books.]
[The basic law in tracate Ketubot is there are three divisions of a woman's property. נכסי מלוג, נכסי צאן ברזל, מה שקנה אישה קנה בעלה] Property that she brings into the marriage that she owned before the marriage she still owns but the husband can use the profits. Then there is property she acquires after she is married and that is owned fully by the husband.
Thus she has no right to her husband's property after she is divorced.
Also in terms of "the law of the state is the law" I would say that is not the case where the law of the state contradicts a Torah law. The main issues in terms of the law of the state are not clear to me but the major sources are the Rashbam and Maimonides in terms of how it is applied.
I have been thinking of mentioning that there is a school of thought among Christians that they themselves believe they are required to keep the Law of Moses. That is called the Theonomic Position See that essay by Gregory Bahnsen.
The Theonomic postion does take into account that some laws of the Holy Torah apply to the Land of Israel, But other laws are general. And I should mention that Gregory Bahnsen says that this Theonomic Position corresponds with Paul, and that was kind of a surprise to me.
[In any case it seems to me that to reward women for doing evil, is not the best kind of law to have on the books.]
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