the child of a Jewess and a gentile

Tosphot holds in at least three places in Shas that the child of a Jewess and a gentile is not Jewish. [for example Kidushin 75 Tosphot first words ור''י סבר לה כר''ע וכו נינהו. 
Also יבמות ט''ו ע''ב תוס' ד''ה  אמוראי 
This is obviously not like the Rambam.

This is obviously relevant nowadays to groups that pride themselves on being Jewish when in fact it can be shown historically they are descended from mixtures like this. If people's sense of pride and identity was rather their effort to learn and keep the holy Torah --that would a lot better. This whole idea of Jewish pride seems vacant to me. 


Sephardim have a private approach to Ashkenazim. They say Ashkenazim are not Jewish, but they feel they have to pretend. But they definitely feel they are not the same tribe nor kosher.[Any Ashkenazim in  Sephardi community will experience an enormous amount of pressure to leave. There will always be at least one Sephardi determined to get rid of the Ashkenazim at all cost.] Still in all history books about the original conquest of Islam, the general rule was Muslims took Jewish wives as spoils of war. Therefore Spanish Jewry when exiled to North Africa always made a point to write ס''ט  ספרדי טהור in cases when they could trace their lineage father from father back to people that were certainly Jewish. That is why ס''ט is how the Rambam signed his name and Bava Sali also.
Outside of a few amazing people like Bava Sali the general problem in the Sefardi world stems from their origins from Muslims. This seems to create a kind of problem that still exists. If they would simply be committed to keeping Torah then I would have nothing to say, but instead their commitment in Israel seems to be to find fault in Ashkenazic Jew and then to try to kick them out. 
As one fellow mentioned to me they have the trait of Sedom and Amora [That fellow I believe is from the family of Bava Sali--at least I know his wife is a granddaughter of Bava Sali's older brother David. The one that was martyred.]

T-18 A Major   T18 in midi format  the reason for offering this in midi beside the mp3 is in case anyone wants to see or copy the notes, they can download the notes in midi. these were written in nwc which i would also share if people had access to it but it is a private compony.  

But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards?

There are unique individuals that  may not have any talent, but stand in some kind of test.נסיון. The archetype example  is Avraham [Abraham the patriarch]. And by that they merit to some kind of Divine light, or revaluation, or Divine Spirit. One recent example  would be Bava Sali. 

  But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards? You can not undo the damage because if you already know your mistake then the same issue can not be a test. You can not give a student after after he has glance at the answers.

In my opinion the best thing to do is to work on correcting the areas you made  a mistake

Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant, -but other times i think the emphasis ought to be on Kant and the Friesian School. But seem complementary.

Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant, but I think they really have to be learned together. Kind of Like Plato and Aristotle. There are aspects of things that Kant brings out which to me seem very important that you can miss in Hegel
The most obvious example is the limits of reason--even pure reason. Now to Kant  "pure reason" merely means not based on observation. But to me it seems the implication is clear that he was saying even pure reason in itself, not just human reason.


Red used to be thought of as in the object. Descartes noticed there are things that are not really in the object itself but depend on the subject observing. Kant noticed all  characteristics depend on the subject. So what is left? The thing in itself. 
Also universality and necessity as abstract ideas can not be derived by induction, no matter how many times you see them.
 Kant  argues against  universality and necessity are not  in objects, while  universality and necessity are true, as in mathematics and natural science. 
As Hegel puts it:  "But if universality and necessity do not exist in external things, the question arises “Where are they to be found?” Kant maintains that they must be  that they must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, “I”. This, simply expressed, is the main point in the Kantian philosophy. What makes them valid is that the object depends on the subject for its character."
Thus reason can not enter into "unconditioned reality" (things in themselves) that in no way is connected with physical objects.
To Hegel the kind of dialectical method used by Socrates is the very nature of reason in itself and allows reason to progress clearly and definitely into un-conditioned reality. 

.
The way the Stanford Encyclopedia puts it:  Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “things in themselves”  Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it, shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself.

[In any case I should mention I learned at lot from Dr. Kelly Ross and his particular approach to Kantian philosophy. And I see Kant as being a kind of umbrella and bringing out important points.]

So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law?

That is we know the American Constitution is valid from the basic standpoint of: (1) a contract which is binding. (2)  The law of the country is the law. [Bava Batra ch 3. This is brought in the Rambam as being applicable much more than you would expect.](3) It embodies natural law as understood by the Rambam {Maimonides} and Saadia Gaon.

So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law? What kind of perspective would this bring? [ Probably an emphasis on traditional values and private property and limited power of the state]
In yeshiva I always considered Talmud law to the same thing as objective morality. And the civil laws of the state I thought of as more or less irrelevant.  I am pretty sure this was the general attitude. And I still consider that Talmud law to be basically Revelation--but not exactly. After all it is Revelation combined with human reasoning trying to figure out how keep the written law.
Still the whole concept of a State and its laws is morally relevant even on the personal level. Richard Epstein makes a very strong case against libertarians in regard to the State.

[A lot of Israeli judges have the Talmud in their private chambers.]

One thing about this is false  and demonic teachers of Talmud sprout up all the time like mushrooms after a rain. Unless you can really tell the difference between the real authentic holy teachers of Torah from Litvak places like Ponovitch or Brisk, and the Sitra Achra/Dark Side teachers, it is just not worth it to get involved. The religious world is basically mentally ill and therefore choose their leaders according to the higher degree of mental illness.

panic of the Left

What adds to the panic of the Left is that their intellectual support collapsed. I still remember how Socialism was considered the only intellectual wave of the future. It was like Ayn Rand said--the people follow where the thinkers lead. 

The weight of reason no longer leads towards socialism. Post Modernism is dead. Classical education, free market, STEM, traditional Torah and Biblical values are thankfully on the rise. 

When people stop believing in a system it collapses.
It is the same basic thing that happened in the USSR, --people stopped believing in the system.

I am very grateful to God that in my high school classics were learned. And what was not officially learned was still considered important. Job, Chaucer, etc. Even in music the teacher, Mr. Smart was very much into classical music. But not just him. It was the same in elementary school and even in Idyllwild Music Camp. So I am a big fan the the Trivium and Quadrivium.

Bava Metzia 14b

There is some connection between what I wrote in Bava Metzia 14 and Rav Shach concerning a Ketubah. [Rav Shach's essay is found in the Avi Ezri on אישות laws of marriage]

In short the Rambam says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies they all have equal right to מזונות [cakes] even if he married them one after the other because they are getting מזונות [cake and staples] from מטלטלים (movable property). The Raavad said even if the situation would be such that they get mezonot (cake) from land (non movable property). [The idea here is that in the Ketubah (marriage contract) the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries. There is no such stipulation in case of divorce however. This rule is sadly ignored today in most courts of law.]

At any rate, the ראב''ד (Raavad) brings from לווה ולווה וקנה (someone borrowed and then borrowed again from someone else and then bought property which is considred collateral for the loan) to show that the שיעבוד (right to collect cake and staples from the movable property) of all the wives is equal. And the Magid Mishna (commentary on the Rambam) disagrees with the Raavad. He adds if the Raavad would be right then the same would apply to the Ketubah itself



Rav Elazar Shach says that the Raavad is right because the obligation of the ketubah is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the ketubah is because they were married. The obligation of mezonot is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a lender borrower and the borrower buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the lender would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the lender go after?

If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first.It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of Tosphot in Bava Metzia.
But what does the  Rambam hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting mezonot [their meals] from movable property that there is no order of who gets what first. But in case of land there is an order. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.





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There is some connection between what I wrote in בבא מציעא י''ד:ב and רב שך concerning the כתובה.

In short the רמב''ם says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies, they all have equal right to מזונות  even if he married them one after the other, because they are getting מזונות from מטלטלים. Movable property. The ראב''ד said even if the situation would be such that they get מזונות from land. The idea here is that in the כתובה the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries.

At any rate, the ראב''ד brings from לווה ולווה וקנה to show that the שיעבודof all the wives is equal. And the מגיד משנה disagrees with the ראב''ד. He adds if the ראב''ד would be right then the same would apply to the כתובה itself



רב שך says that the ראב''דmakes sense  because the obligation of the כתובה is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the כתובה is because they were married. The obligation of מזונות is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a מלווה לווה and the לווה buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the מלווה would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the מלווה go after?

If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first. It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of תוספות in בבא מציעא.
But what does the רמב''ם hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting מזונות  from מיטלטלים that there is no סדר גבייה. But in case of קרקע there is an סדר. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.





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 הקשר בין בבא מציעא י''ד: ורב שך בדבר הכתובה. בקיצור רמב''ם אומר שאם יש לך אדם שיש לו כמה נשים ולאחר מכן מת, יש להן את כל הזכות השווה במזונות אפילו אם הוא היתחתן אתן אחת אחרי השניה, משום שהן מקבלות מזונות מן מטלטלים. הראב''ד אמר גם אם המצב יהיה כזה כי הן מקבלות מזונות מקרקע. הרעיון כאן הוא כי בכתובה הבעל מחייב את רכושו לתמוך בה במקרה שהוא מת עד שהיא נישאת מחדש. בכל מקרה, את ראב''ד מביא מן הדין "לווה ולווה וקנה" להראות כי שיעבוד של כל הנשים שווה. והמגיד משנה חולק על ראב''ד. הוא מוסיף אם ראב''ד יהיה תקין, אז אותו חוק יחול על הכתובה עצמה. רב שך אומר כי הראב''ד הגיוני, כי חובתה של הכתובה היא לא אותו הדבר כמו מזונות. חובתה של הכתובה משום שהם (הוא והן) היו נשואים. חובת מזונות היא כי הוא מת. החובות מתחילות בתקופות זמן שונות. 
כך במקרה (בבבא מציעא יד:) של מלווה ולווה והלווה קונה שדה ומוכר אותו ולאחר מכן קונה אחר. בשלב זה מלווה ילך אחרי השדה השני. אבל אז הלווה מוכר את שדה השני. לאחר איזה מהם עושי המלווה ללכת? אם נלך לפי זמן שהחובה מתחילה, אז ברור החובה על השדה הראשון באה קודם. זה היה בבעלות הלווה לפני שהוא קנה את השדה השני. זוהי התשובה הראשונה של תוספות בבבא מציעא יד:. אבל מה הרמב''ם מחזיק? הוא אומר רק במקרה שבו הנשים מקבלות מזונות מן המיטלטלים שאין סדר גבייה. אבל במקרה של קרקע קיים סדר. לפיכך נראה שהוא גם הולך לפי הרעיון הזה שאנחנו מסתכלים במי הייתה נשואה ראשונה וכך נסתכל כאשר ההתחייבות נכתבה