Translate

Powered By Blogger

10.9.14

Two day ago I wrote on my blog here a question on the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin page 61a.

At the time I had not looked up the Maharam from Lublin. [which is printed together with the Maharsha].
While I was waiting for my learning partner today I glanced at the Maharam and saw he asks exactly my question. Sorry about that.

On one hand as far as the Internet goes it is nice I can show that my thinking is accurate. But if this was a chidush [idea] in my notebooks, this would be an embarrassment that I did not even look up the Marharam.

Of course it is interesting also that no one else noticed this. It seems that such a simple fact that my question had already been asked by the Maharam might have been noticed by someone. This probably shows that people that there are not very many people that learn Talmud that looks at my blog. Maybe they are too busy learning. Good for them.

8.9.14

One thing you do see with idolatry --that it depends on intention. It says in the Mishna [Sanhedrin 60b], "These people are liable for idolatry: one who sacrifices or serves it according to its usual way, or one who accepts it as his god and says to it 'You are my god.' This is simple if intention is not involved. (I mean to say that case one is different from case two.) But to answer a contradiction with a later Mishna, Rav Hamenuna says [on the next page--Sanhedrin 61a] it means even the first cases a have intention-but the intention is not until they are served.
Logistically this makes sense but it certainly is not the simple way of looking at the Mishna. that means this principle of intention is so important that the Gemara is willing to interpret the mishna in an very un-obvious way to make it work out right.--also because of the later Mishna.
This is like in Shabat where we require thought work ["melechet machshevet"] to be liable.

But at this point we have to ask, What kind of intention makes one liable? Clearly it can't be to consider the idol to be a creator. No ancient gods were creators. They all found some preexisting substance to form the world from. Rather they had spiritual powers. And this seems to be the most simple basic intention one needs to be liable for idolatry. To bring some kind of sacrifice, or to burn incense or to pour a libation or to bow or to serve according to his way to a person that one thinks has spiritual powers in order to gain some benefit or in order to get closer to God [as per the Rambam on Perek Chelek].
I would venture a guess that the Geon from Villna might have thought that the chasidm of his time had crossed the line from monotheism towards polytheism.


 So  however I can see many people  that get involved in Breslov seems to make a tzadik the center of their attention and this troubles me because of the idolatry problem



On the issue of idolatry Sanhedrin 61a.

On the issue of idolatry I have a great idea. It it concerns the Talmud [or as I prefer Gemara] in Sanhedrin 61a.  Just for background let me say that you can't do idolatry either according to the usual way of worship of the idol, or by one of four other ways: sacrifice, burning, pouring, bowing. Rav Acha juxtaposes a statement of Rava  and Rabbi Elazar in order to ask a question. And I would like to suggest a question on his answer that I think it is an amazingly obvious question that I think that someone else must have asked it before me.
The idea of Rava is to learn worship not according to the way of that idol from "he will bow" instead of "he will sacrifice", and that would tell us all kinds of service of honor would be forbidden--even not service according to the way of that idol.
Then Rav Acha asks on Rava from the statement of Rabbi Elazer who says: How do we know one can't sacrifice to Mercury? From the verse, "So that they shall no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats."
The question of Rav Acha is this: If we already know from "bowing" all kinds of service of honor, then why do we also need this other way of Rabbi Elezar to tell us less than what we already know?\ The Gemara answers: The statement of Rabbi Elezar refers to when one sacrifices in order to make G-d mad, not to serve idols. Now I think we can all agree that this answer sounds strained. If we look at the verse we can see that the idea is God says, "I am making this law that they bring their sacrifices to the tabernacle  in order that they should no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats (idols)." Surely they were not bringing their sacrifices to the goats (idols) in order to make God mad, but rather to worship idolatry. And since God is making this parallelism, it would have to mean: They should no longer bring their sacrifices to goats (idols)  in order to make me mad and rather bring their sacrifices to me to make me mad. [Of course, you could say its really is anti parallel--and God means rather: They should bring their sacrifices to me to make the goats (idols) mad.] It does not matter anyway because all I am doing is showing how the answer of the Gemara is anything but obvious in order to build up my question that the Gemara could have proposed an alternative answer.\So my question is this. Why did not the Gemara say simply that Rabbi Elazar refers to Mercury and other idols that are worshiped in ways of dishonor, and Rava was referring to idols that are worshiped in a way of honor? That is the same way the Gemara divides worship not according to it way into four parts -worship of dishonor and idols of dishonor and worship of honor and idols of honor so do the same here. One answer here is you need only Markulis [Mercury] and you know idolatry of honor by a  a-fortiori. But that can't work because we don't make prohibitions based on a fortiori.

__________________________________________________________________________


On the issue of idolatry.  סנהדרין ס''א ע''א.  Just for background let me say that it i forbidden do idolatry either according to the usual דרך of worship of the idol, or by any one of four other ways: sacrifice, burning, pouring, bowing. רב אחא juxtaposes a statement of רבא  and ר' אלעזר in order to ask a question. And I would like to suggest a question on his answer, The idea of רבא is to learn the prohibition of worship not according to the דרך of that idol from "he will bow" instead of  "he will sacrifice", and that would tell us all kinds of service דרך honor would be forbidden, even not service according to the דרך of that idol. Then רב אחא asks on רבא from the statement of ר' אלעזר who says: How do we know one can't sacrifice to מרקולית? From the verse, "So that they shall no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats."
The question of רב אחא is this: If we already know from "bowing" all kinds of service of honor, then why do we also need this other way of ר' אלעזר to tell us less than what we already know?\ The גמרא answers: The statement of ר' אלעזר refers to when one sacrifices in order to להכעיס השם, not to serve idols. This answer sounds strained. If we look at the verse we can see that the idea is השם says, "I am making this law that they bring their sacrifices to the tabernacle  in order that they should no longer bring their sacrifices to the goats (idols)." Surely they were not bringing their sacrifices to the goats (idols) in order להכעיס השם , but rather to worship idolatry. The answer of the גמרא is not  obvious.  My question is that the גמרא could have proposed an alternative answer. Why did not the גמרא say simply that ר' אלעזר refers to מרקולית and other idols that are worshiped in דרך  of חרפה, and רבא was referring to idols that are worshiped in a דרך  of honor? That is the same way the גמרא divides worship not according to it's דרך into four parts: worship דרך dishonor and idols of dishonor and worship דרך honor and idols of honor, so do the same here. One answer here is you need only מרקולית and you know idolatry of honor by a  קל וחומר. But that can't work because we don't make prohibitions based on a קל וחומר.בעניין עבודת האלילים. סנהדרין ס''א ע''א. רק לרקע אגיד שאסור לעבוד אלילים או לפי הדרך הרגילה של עבודת האליל, או בכל אחת מארבע דרכים אחרות: הקרבה, שריפה, מזיגה, השתחוות. רב אחא מצמיד הצהרה של רבא ור' אלעזר על מנת לשאול שאלה. ואני רוצה להציע שאלה על תשובתו, הרעיון של רבא הוא ללמוד את איסור הפולחן שלא לפי דרכו של אותו אליל מ"ישתחוה" במקום "יקריב", וזה היה אומר לנו כל מיני שירותים בדרך כבוד יהיו אסורים, אפילו לא שירות לפי דרכו של אותו אליל. ואז רב אחא שואל על רבא מדברי ר' אלעזר האומר: איך נדע שאי אפשר להקריב ולית? מהפסוק "כדי שלא יביאו עוד את זבחיהם לעזים".
השאלה של רב אחא היא זו: אם כבר יודעים מ"השתחוות" כל מיני שירות של כבוד, אז למה צריך גם את הדרך האחרת הזו של ר' אלעזר שיגיד לנו פחות ממה שאנחנו כבר יודעים? עונה הגמרא : ההצהרה של ר' אלעזר מתייחסת כאשר מקריבים על מנת להכעיס השם, לא לשרת אלילים. התשובה הזו נשמעת מתוחה. אם נתבונן בפסוק נוכל לראות שהרעיון הוא השם אומר "אני עושה את החוק הזה שהם יביאו את קרבנותיהם למשכן כדי שלא יביאו עוד את קרבנותיהם לעזים (האלילים)." ודאי לא היו מביאים את קורבנותיהם לעזים (אלילים) כדי להכעיס השם, אלא לעבוד עבודת אלילים. תשובת הגמרא אינה ברורה. השאלה שלי היא שהגמרא הייתה יכולה להציע תשובה חלופית. מדוע לא אמרה הגמרא בפשטות שר' אלעזר מתייחס למרקולית ושאר אלילים שעובדים בדרך חרפה, ורבא התכוון לאלילים שעובדים בדרך של כבוד? כך הגמרא מחלק את הפולחן שלא לפי דרכו לארבעה חלקים: דרך פולחן של קלון ואלילי קלון ודרך פולחן של כבוד ואלילי כבוד, אז יעשה גם כאן.  אולי תשובה אחת כאן היא שאתה צריך רק מרקולית ואתה יודע עבודת אלילים של כבוד על ידי קל וחומר. אבל זה לא יכול לעבוד כי אנחנו לא עושים איסורים על סמך קל וחומר. אין מזהירים מן הדין

7.9.14

As far as I know in Iran there is a "Hate America Day." The Great Satan they call it. And they are actively developing nuclear weapons to destroy the Great Satan. Then the ISIS (Sunni) comes along and now Iran (Shiite)  is asking American aid to help defeat the ISIS. Does this make sense to anyone?

Why would the USA help Iran? It is not like they are some kind of democratic ally. And it has been the policy of the USA to help democracies ever since Wilson. And to me this looks to be a good idea. Helping people whose every prayer is for the destruction of the USA makes little sense to me.


 The  Wilson  doctrine of self determination was seen right away as being incoherent by a close advisor [self determination for whom? cities? Counties? Nations? Communities> Religions in one nations? different nations in one community? . Wilson afterwards regretted the idea and said he did not expect there to be a new nation every single day that was claiming the right to self determination.] still the basic idea of  helping democracies makes a lot of sense to me. Not helping all kinds of self determination. But the kind that supports democratic values.

5.9.14

Evil in its forms

My feeling about the evil inclination is that it has several different aspects to it. One is physical desire. Nowadays it is not a popular concept, but  during the Middle Ages this was considered the major aspect of the evil inclination. See the Chovot Levavot {The Musar book called Duties of the Heart} for example. The other is a kind of evil inclination that  Israel Salanter talked about, the spiritual evil inclination. That is a inclination that comes to a person that is directed towards evil even when physical desires oppose it. The "Imp of the Perverse," as Edward Allen Poe called it.

 But I would like to suggest a third and forth evil inclination. One is bad worldviews. The other is bad attitudes.

Bad worldviews are easy to identify. For example a person can have very good characteristics. He can be kind, and clean, and considerate, and perfectly psychologically healthy, but believe that to get entrance into Gan Eden he must behead as many Christian or Jewish infidels as possible. That is, he is Muslim.

But some world view issues are more difficult to identify. Even things written in books of  ethics and morality like Musar books might not be applicable across the board.  Also there is the problem of conflicting values in Torah itself. I might mention the conflict between working and learning Torah for one thing. Or honoring ones parents as opposed to other activities that might or might not be required by Torah.


Other problem include the fact that learning Torah in fact does not give immunity from the evil inclination. .
 Now one way to solve conflicting values in Torah would seem to be to go to the Rambam. He divides mitzvot of the Torah according to their purpose. Many mitzvot are to prevent idolatry. Many others are for peace of the country. Some are for other purposes. And we know that the reason for mitzvot according to the Rambam does determine to some degree how they are applied. [as we see with the rich widow that the Rambam decides like R. Yehuda against R. Shimon but gives a reason for it that the reason of the Torah still applies to her.]That is in the view of the Rambam the Torah has certain commandments that it is the purpose of the Torah to bring one to. Telos-- "purpose" Ethics. So a command not to serve other gods would be purpose of many other mitzvot. For example not to wear  tattoo, or not to make an idol even if one does not worship it. etc. The purpose of many mitzvot is peace of the state. So in application the mitzvot that are to bring to that would have to be applied only in a way that in fact brings to peace of the State.

So I suggest to learn Musar. That is the classical books of Musar that R. Israel Salanter founded his movement upon. This is for the purpose of  gaining a Torah world view. Plus there are several books by the close disciples of R. Salanter. The main benefit of these books I believe is in fact in the area of world view. --not so much what people think it is supposed to do--correcting ones character.[It does not matter if you are religious or not or even if your are Jewish or not--these are important books for world view issues.]


\


Appendix: Musar means classical Musar e.g. Chovot Levavot, Orchot Tzadikim and the books of Moshe Chaim Lutzato and the student of  Gaon from Villna-- Reb Chaim from Voloshin.
 You can find things that you disagree with but it gives a basic framework for a Torah World view.









4.9.14

Breslov has a wide appeal to people because people are looking for a real tzadik. and this list of people includes me.The problem seems to be what is called in Breslov "mefursamim of sheker" (leaders that are considered to be tzadikm but are not).

The main thing that I think people find in Breslov is emotional appeal [power].  That is it is not just they are looking for a tzadik but they find some kind of inspiration.. I mean if you are like me you want a unified clear idea of Torah. Now you could just as well go to the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed for this reason. But the Guide has a bit too much medieval science in it to be compelling.


I might mention that leaders of Breslov tend to be unfamiliar with traditional Jewish writing. [Like The Guide for the Perplexed of Maimonides or the Emunot VeDeot of Saadia Geon.]


You have the opinion of Rava in the Talmud that one is liable for idolatry only when he accepts the idol  as his god. Abyee disagrees with this but the law is like Rava [as is always the case except in 6 specific cases where the Talmud says the law is like Abyee.][Sanhedrin 61b]

I had thought that perhaps the idea of "accepting as ones god," means to be initiated into the cult of that particular god. But my learning partner pointed out that this is unlikely. It would mean that doing downright straight forward idolatry would be not guilty as long as one has not become a devote. That is, one could walk into  the temple of Zeus, and bring a sacrifice with intension to gain some benefit [like rain (as was the original idea of Zeus before the Greeks elevated his status)], and still not be liable as long as one has not been initiated into the cult. This seems very unlikely.


So far as concerning idolatry I am still in the beginning stages of collecting information. But so far it looks to me that to be liable there is no need for a physical object. E.G. lets us say that some archangel comes down to earth  perhaps even the particular angel that the ancients associated with the name Zeus and this angel appears to a person and the person bows down to it. Would this be liable?

At this point it seems to me the most basic idea of idolatry is the worship of any being besides the First Cause in order to get closer to the First Cause or to gain some benefit. But this benefit has to be not in a natural way. There has to be some idea of this alternative being has some power over some aspect of the world or human life that is beyond normal physical reality.

And I should mention that you can tell what prohibitions in the Torah are more severe than others by the punishment. Idolatry is stoning. [Some of  the sexual relations in Leviticus also--and that includes homosexuality.]