Intuition in Kant is not just sense perception but also has a component of knowledge that that component of knowledge has to have already a prior organization [being in space and time] (in order to be able to be processed by the mind.)
(if all it is is sense perception then how can it have anything to do with the mind? It is like apples and oranges.) [Critique of Pure Reason A-99. page 300]
[Another problem is unity of consciousness is what makes the unity of the Universe. But there are many consciousnesses [You must have noticed that there are lots of people around.] So I think you have to come to the answer of Fries that there is a deeper kind of knowledge [non intuitive immediate] that i the knowledge of things in themselves.[This gets rid of the problem that if all we have access to are representations then what are they representations of?]
This is probably the most troublesome aspect in all of Kant and for that reason it makes sense to hold like Fries that there is a sort of knowledge that is non intuitive and not by reason in order for there to be any possibility of the mind processing any kind of sensory input.
I believe there is a mizvah in learning Mathematics and Physics. [ AS we can see in the Introduction to Euclid by Rav Baruch of Shkolev a disciple of the Gra.] Even though I recognize that not all rishonim [mediaeval authorities] agree with this. The most notable is the Ramban [Nahmanides] who in answer to the debate about the legitimacy of the Rambam wrote a very emotional pleas to the sages in France to defend the Rambam. But in all that powerful deep felt letter there is not a word claiming the Rambam was right. [As David Bronson pointed out to me.]
Just for some background there were three debates about the Rambam. The first was because of his comments on Pirkei Avot perek 4 on the mishna about not using Torah to make money. The second debate came because of the Guide for the Perplexed. [What was that all about? Well a lot of things. But probably the major issue was the positive approach to Aristotle.] The next one came up during the Renaissance.
I would in fact have preferred to sit and learn Gemara, but for reasons that are unclear to me today I eventually found that impossible and because of circumstances I found myself needing to go to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU to major in Physics. So I depend on the opinions of the Gra, Ibn Pakuda [the author of the Chovot Levavot] and Rambam.
I should add here that I am really not sure about what the Ramban [Nahmanides] holds exactly. All that is clear is that he was against Aristotle. But as far as the natural sciences go I do not know.
[And I am wondering if perhaps this makes the most sense--to hold by the natural sciences but to reject philosophy. Maybe that is what the Ramban [Nahmanides] is getting at? For after all he was a doctor who had certainly learned what the universities were requiring to come a doctor. But openly rejected Aristotle. And In fact Rav Nahman [Breslov] also had said not to learn philosophy. (Sandra Lehman once told me that there is something about philosophy which detracts from common sense.) Yet I have seen that a little bit of philosophy can be highly beneficial--but not too much.]
Children of this generation have a difficulty in fulfilling the commandment of "Honor thy father and thy mother." The reason is that the mother often is intent on getting her children to hate their father. The The best way to deal with this issue I think is to determine according to objective morality , who is actually good and who is not. [The children are not asking who is without flaws. Rather they ought to ask who is lying. That often is easy to find out. [People that lie about small things will lie about larger things.]] And once they know that bit of information, it is simple to decide which parent to honor and which one to ignore.]
For women or men with their own sorts of evil inclinations I have a recommendation. Since we all have large evil inclinations that we know are problematic and we really are not sure what to do. My recommendation is to work on little things that you do know--like not to speak lashon hara [slander] and not to lie. I think if you hold to these two things with exactitude then that will lead many other areas getting straightened out.
Slander is as is well known forbidden to say even for truth. Obviously to lie is much worse. But even to say something true that is negative about someone you need some conditions. To have seen it yourself. To be sure it was wrong according to the Law. To intend some benefit. To rebuke the person privately. To not exaggerate. That no worse thing will be the result that if it was tried in a true court of the Law.
In the book Gates of Repentance [by Rabbainu Yona of Grondi] is brought the idea that repentance fixes things in the past. That is to say you might have found yourself in a situation that you realize is a result of past mistakes. So according to Rabainu Yona, if one regrets the past mistakes and accepts on himself now to do better, that reaches back into the past. It makes those mistakes as if they never were. And thus the results of those mistakes disappears.
So it always is worthwhile to think about what one's mistakes were. This is not a way of getting downtrodden , but rather a way of getting rid of the effects of one's mistakes.
Robert Hanna is right about "Forward to Kant". I mean to say that Analytic School [starting from Frege] while thinking to improve on Kant, really missed the boat. They detracted, not improved. [Of course, it was not just Robert Hanna that noticed this. It started with a fellow by the name of Katz that I think was the first to see the gigantic holes in the Analytic School.]
But let's just say we would all go back to Kant. Would that not leave the same problems that existed in the first place that the people after Kant tried to deal with? My feeling about this is one important school is that of Kelley Ross [The Friesian School] who bases his approach on Fries and Leonard Nelson but is an advance on both. [His advance is think is largely based on Gretta Hermann.]
But on the side of this there is Michael Huemer [based on the Intuitionists--Prichard, Ross]. While based on the Analytic tradition , still it seems impossible to ignore Huemer.
And further the is still the elephant in the room which is impossible to ignore--Hegel. Though sadlly he does not seem to have any spokesman outside of the turn of the last century McTaggart and Cunningham.
[The Communists certainly love to take stuff and ideas from him to build up their totalitarian societies. But there does not seem to be any real engagement with Hegel per se. [I mean just try to listen to social studies professors that try to defend communisms as the peak of freedom and prosperity. I guess that is easy to do nowadays when the street long lines to buy a loaf of bread in the USSR are all forgotten.And the idea that the USSR stood for freedom beyond absurd.\
Robert E Lee said after the war that he could not think of that anyone could have been a better president of the South than Jefferson Davis. So you see that Robert E Lee was very careful about Lashon Hara. For it could not have gone unnoticed by him that the leadership of the South was disastrous. [Sam Hood made a general? And the fact that Jefferson Davis made a speech in which he laid out the military plans of the South--publicly --and which was published in Northern newspapers. General Sherman could not have been happier.]
So Robert E Lee was aware that Lashon Hara is also on truth. One must not say negative things about anyone unless there are fulfilled seven conditions. One of which is that there must be some benefit in saying so. So General Lee obviously reasoned to himself that if he would have stated his real opinion of Jefferson Davis what possible benefit could anyone gain from that?
A lot of times you hear that people that are religious ask for money because they are learning Torah. This seems odd. One reason is the source the Gra brings to the mishna in Avot "not to make a shovel of Torah to di with"--i.e to gain profit from. The source the Gra brings is from the prohibition of ""meila'. That is using something holy to make money from. For example someone says this ox I am going to bring as a fire offering. Well the ox then is forbidden in use. So if someone uses it--lets say they plow with it. They transgress this prohibition. This applies in three categories. Presents to the Temple. Animals dedicated as sacrifices. Oaths. [As the law is like R.Meir who says יש מעילה בקונמות.
To use something holy to gain personal benefit or profit is a sin
To use Torah to make money is the same as if one took the ox and plowed with it and say I am not really plowing. I am simply walking with this ox that just happens to have a plow attacked to its back--a dn I am just taking a walk in my field.
[TheRambam brings this same point in Pirkei Avot chapter 4.]
I think self identity with any group is a sort of idolatry. One is supposed to be a decent human being. That is to follow objective morality. While group identification seems to be very different from this. Every group has good and evil. Yet in some circles you hear all the time how their group is good by definition. Once I hear such talk, I make my exit as soon as possible. This is because this is highly wrong and immoral.
I am not saying my previous blog entry is a very complete answer for the Ran. Rav Shach wants to say that there is a way to explain the apparent ] problem in the words of the Ran. [Rabbainu Nisim]. On one hand that "This is forbidden " is forbidden because of an extension of "this is forbidden like a sacrifice" And that does seem impossible because of circular reasoning. "This is forbidden" because of extension [you add the words this is forbidden like a sacrifice. And yet "This is forbidden like a sacrifice" is forbidden because it is part of the law of neder which is simply "This is forbidden"
The answer of רב שך to explain the ר''ן would be to separate the law of extension from the main law. But if this can fit in the ר''ן seems doubtful. {Whether this could fit in the ר''ן or even the רמב''ם does not really seem to work.] However I have reached a state of "fallen mind" and am not really able to spend time learning.--though I should because of the command of the Torah.. Still I mull over this difficulty in the Ran and Rav Shach-hoping for some answer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------I am not saying my previous blog entry is a very complete answer for the ר''ן. The answer of רה שך is to say that there is a way to explain the apparent ] problem in the words of the ר''ן. On one hand that "This is forbidden " is forbidden because of an extension of "this is forbidden like a קרבן". And that does seem impossible because of circular reasoning. "This is forbidden" because of extension. [You add the words "this is forbidden like a קרבן." And yet,"This is forbidden like a קרבן" is forbidden because it is part of the law of נדרים which is simply "This is forbidden"ץ
"This loaf is forbidden to me" to the ר''ן and רמב''ם is the main נדר vow. So why אם he says, "This loaf is forbidden to me like נבלה," is permitted? Because when one says, "This is forbidden to me like such and such a thing" the "such and such a thing" has to be something that can be forbidden by a נדר or like someone who says, "This loaf is a מתנה for the בית המקדש". [Things presented to the בית המקדש are forbidden in use.] [This is a special law. For you might ask what is the difference between "This is forbidden to me" and "This is forbidden to me like נבלה"?] [This is not like the other ראשונים that hold the real נדר is when one says "This is forbidden like a קרבן" and the only reason, "This is forbidden to me" works is as a extension [יד]. However the very well known question on the ר''ן at the very beginning of נדרים מסכת is that at first glance he seems to contradict himself. At first going like the רמב''ם and then going like תוספות on the very same page. רב שך says that for the actual law of נדר is without attaching the prohibition to anything else [as the רמב''ם says] but for the language to make clear what he means [as is necessary for נדרים] he has to say 'like a קרבן. This to me seems like a very good answer to show that the ר''ן does not contradict himself. However the remaining question is that the actual language of the ר''ן does not seem to accept this explanation. What I mean is that the ר''ן says in מסכת שבועות the reason you need "like a קרבן" is because הקדש עושה חליפין if one says this animal is like that קרבן, that is valid.[זה תמורת זה חל ] The second animal becomes a קרבן also. This me this seems like a contradiction to the idea of רב שך [in the beginning of הלכות נדרים] [However a further point is that if the main נדר is ''This is אסור לי'' then it is hard to see that the very words ''this is אסור לי'' would be thought not to count as a נדרת, and only valid as a short way of saying ''this is forbidden as a קרבן'' when ''this is forbidden as a קרבן'' is only forbidden because it is thought of as an extension of the main concept of נדר.]
The way to answer this is thus: There is a difference between the description of something and the thing itself. The נדר itself is valid not because of התפסה בדבר הנדור. Rather, the oath is valid in itself. But the language has to mean directly that he is forbidding to himself something that is not forbidden. And he can not do that by saying, "This is forbidden to me "because that might as well mean he is saying something not true. It sounds as if he is saying it is already forbidden"
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/"הלחם הזה אסור לי" לר''ן ורמב''ם הוא נדר העיקרי. אז למה אם הוא אומר, "הלחם הזה אסור לי כמו נבלה", מותר? כי כשאומרים, "זה אסור לי כמו דבר כזה", "דבר כזה וכזה" חייב להיות משהו שאפשר לאסור אותו על ידי דיבור או כמו מישהו שאומר, "הלחם הזה הוא מתנה בשביל בית המקדש ". [דברים המוצגים לבית המקדש אסורים בשימוש.] [זהו חוק מיוחד. כי אתה עשוי לשאול מה ההבדל בין "זה אסור לי" לבין "זה אסור לי כמו נבלה"?] [זה לא כמו שאר הראשונים האחרים שמחזיקים את הנדר האמיתי הוא כאשר אומרים "זה אסור כמו קרבן ", והסיבה היחידה," זה אסור לי "פועלת כהרחבה [יד]. אולם השאלה הידועה בר''ן בתחילת נדרים היא שבמבט ראשון נראה שהוא סותר את עצמו. בהתחלה הולך כמו הרמב''ם ואחר כך הולך כמו תוספות על אותו דף. רב שך מתרץ את הר''ן כי החוק בפועל של נדר הוא מבלי לצרף את האיסור לשום דבר אחר [כפי שאומר הרמב''ם] אבל כדי שהשפה תבהיר למה הוא מתכוון [כפי שהוא הכרחי עבור נדרים] עליו לומר "כמו קרבן". זה תשובה טובה מאוד להראות שהר''ן אינו סותר את עצמו. אולם השאלה שנותרה היא כי נראה כי השפה בפועל של הר''ן אינה מקבלת הסבר זה כל כך. מה שאני מתכוון הוא שהר''ן אומר במסכת שבועות הסיבה שנדר צריך "כמו קרבן" היא כי הקדש עושה חליפין. [אם אחד אומר שהבהמה הזאת היא תמורת הקרבן הזה, זה תקף. [זה תמורת זה חל]. הבעל חי השני הופך גם לקרבן. זה נראה לי כמו סתירה לרעיון של רב שך [בתחילת הלכות נדרים] [אולם נקודה נוספת היא שאם נדר העיקרי הוא '' זה אסור לי'' אז קשה לראות שעצם מילים '' זה אסור לי '' נחשבות תקפות רק כדרך קצרה לומר '' זה אסור כקרבן'', כאשר '' זה אסור כמו קרבן '' הוא אסור רק כי הוא נחשב כהרחבה של הרעיון העיקרי שלנדר.]
The person that proved Fermat's last theorem [Wiles] gave a talk [published in Quanta Magazine] in which he claimed everyone can learn Mathematics. The way that I see this as possible is by the path of learning of Rav Nahman by saying the words and going on. [People are accustomed to this in Torah learning where it takes a lot or review until you understand. So people do not usually expect to understand the sugia (subject) at first. They simply say the words, and come back to it. I understood that the way one gets the idea after lots of review. I see this as applicable in Mathematics also. "Say the words and go on. Even if you do not understand at first , you will eventually understand. And if a few things remain hard to grasp, well so what? for the greatness of lots of learning goes above everything. [Conversations of Rav Nahman paragraph 76.]]
[But why learn Mathematics--you surely will ask. For me the answer is simple. My father encouraged my interests in Mathematics and Physics. So while I did no understand nor understand at present why this is important, I have the obligation of כבוד אב ואם Honor of one's father and mother. And Confucius said the very fact that you are not walking on the path of your parents means (by the very definition of that term) that you are not honoring you father and mother. [It does not matter if they said to do so.
But for others that have not had parents that encouraged this let me mention some of the Rishonim that held from this. One would be the Gra who said any lack of knowledge in any of the Seven Wisdoms creates a lack of Torah knowledge times 100. [That is the quotation in the Intro to Euclid in Hebrew by a disciple of the Gra.] Other Rishonim would be Ibn Pakuda, Binyamin the doctor and the Rambam.
It seems to me that the greatest invention of my father is the one he will never get credit for. [I mean the infrared telescope and super sharp "copymate machine" using x rays at least he got credit for. [The first was owned by the USA Army. The second he had a patent for. But laser communication seems to me to be the greatest thing of all [that he made at TRW. ] This is fantastic because it is something like a telephone. There is a current, and superimposed on that current you talk and that makes a signal that can be heard above that current. Or maybe better said- it is like an ocean wave that is large, but has small ripples on top of it. That is the same thing as laser communication. The signal you want to send is superimposed on the laser. This makes a band width that is vastly larger than with radio signals. [And obviously can be sent on much longer distances without worrying about the problem of radio waves that disperse.]
[This laser communication was done the height of the Cold War so that the Russians could not eavesdrop on American communications between satellites. But TRW went under because of the two moles that were discovered there that were selling USA technology to the USSR. So TRW lost all their contracts, and their newest projects were sold to other aerospace companies. So my dad's name [Philip Rosten] was lost in that mix up. But he was in fact the one who made that system.
You can see the idea of the Gra that lack of knowledge in the Seven Wisdoms causes a decrease in understanding of Torah a hundred fold. [Seven wisdoms was the Trivium and the Quadrennium.]
But these do include the classification of the Rambam that the categories of the work of Creation and Divine chariot refer to Physics and Metaphysics. [The Rambam says this openly in the introduction to the Guide.]
Most secular subjects are not at all in the categories of positive things but rather mind destroying. So one does need a certain degree of intuition and common sense in deciding into what to devote ones time. Myself I strive for the approach of my parents. Which was in action highly secular but they still had a sense of the need of balance between Torah and derech ertez [the way of the Earth.] So in my approach I went more into the Torah aspect. But still I realize the need for this kind of balance.
The problem with with religious fanaticism is that they always think they know more than what they know. The baali teshuva [newly religious]without having gone through Shas already think they can tell us what the Torah is all about because of their impression that they as already experts in Torah,. This is in start contrast to the world of university where is one thinks he is already a doctors because of his "vast knowledge "is not helpful in actually becoming a doctor.
The "baali teshuva" are the destroyers of the world of Torah because they think they already know Torah. {Though they skipped the verse about listening to one's parents.] If they had really been expert in Torah they might have noticed that verse.
[And they already try and in fact get certificates of ordination to get to to tell us what Torah all about Torah.-- the religious leaders are in fact baali teshuva that actually have no knowledge of Torah. They give certificates of ordination one to the other. One idiot to the other. If someone has not learned in the Mir or Brisk, then what they say about Torah is self delusion.]
In what Rav Nahman calls hisbodadut [private talking with God in one's own language] it is helpful to go ovr one's own past to get some orientation about where one went wrong. Over the course of time one can begin to see where things really went wrong. So you are no longer confined to deciding what your sins are based on books but rather actual experience. If you can tell where things started to go wrong, then you can reach some conclusion what was your actual sin. In this way you get beyond guess work about what perhaps you did wrong to actual knowledge. [An obvious choice could be the commandment to listen to one's parents except when they are obviously saying something that goes not in accord with Torah. Still in general one parents provides the best guidance to what one ought to be doing]
In the LeM of Rav Nachman [of Breslov] Vol I. chapter 22 is brought the idea that when the sound of holiness sounds further. against it is automatically the sounds of the Dark Side also come forth. From this you see why when you try especially hard in the service of God, you always find the Dark Side comes back at you especially strongly. From this I have found it better to take a lower profile.
[When learning Torah or doing some public service, it is always better to be as discreet as possible. However still when one learns Torah, at least one must says the words--at least as a whisper. Otherwise one does not fulfill the commandment to learn Torah. [And in fact saying the words helps in understanding as the sages say in Avot rather that read the Torah is a tree of life for those that find it read it is a tree of like for those that say the words [at least as a whisper] עץ חיים היא למוצאיהם אל תקרא למוצאיהם אלא למוציאיהם
"This loaf is forbidden to me" to the Ran and Rambam is the main neder vow. So why is he says, "This loaf is forbidden to me like meat that was not slaughtered properly [nevala]," is permitted? Because when one says, "This is forbidden to me like such and such a thing" the "such and such a thing" has to be something that can be forbidden by a neder [vow] or like someone who says, "This loaf is a present for the temple" [things presented to the temple are forbidden in use.] [This is a special law. For you might ask what is the difference between "This is forbidden to me" and "This is forbidden to me like nevala"?] [This is not like the other Rishonim that hold the real neder vow is when one says "This is forbidden like a sacrifice to the temple" and the only reason "This is forbidden to me" works is as a extension [yad]]
However the very well known question on the Ran at the very beginning of tractate Nederim is that at first glance he seems to contradict himself. At first going like the Rambam and then going like Tosphot on the very same page.
Rav Shach says that for the actual law of neder is without attaching the prohibition to anything else [as the Rambam says] but for the language to make clear what he means [as is necessary for nederim] he has to say 'like a sacrifice.
This to me seems like a very good answer to show that the Ran does not contradict himself. However the remaining question is that the actual language of the Ran does not seem to accept this explanation.
What I means is that the Ran [Rabbainu Nissim] says in tractate shavut the reason you need "like a sacrifice" is because הקדש עושה חליפין if one says this animal is like that sacrifice, that is valid. The second animal becomes a sacrifice also.
This me this seems like a contradiction to the idea of Rav Shach [in the beginning of Laws of Vows]
[However a further point is that if the main neder is ''This is forbidden'' then it is hard to see that the very words ''this is forbidden'' would be thought not to count as a neder--and only valid as a short way of saying ''this is forbidden as a sacrifice'' when ''this is forbidden as a sacrifice'' is only forbidden because it is thought of as an extension of the main concept of neder. ]
However one can answer this thus: in the way that Rav Shach explains the Rambam. I.e., that This is forbidden as a karban sacrifice is not valid as an extension of This is forbidden. Rather it is its own separate law. So This is forbidden is the main prohibition but still the language has to serve as a meaningful way of saying you are forbidding something to yourself or to another, Not as saying that is is already forbidden before you make that statement. And that would in fact be meaningless.
I have not been able to figure out why the religious world thinks we second class citizens ought to support them for their self proclaimed holiness. If they find a young native kid with rich American parents, they pull out all he stops to show how loving they are. [Love bombing ] . Until the time comes when he needs a favor. Not a large favor. Perhaps a simple word of support to his wife. Then all of a sudden they do not know him. They are these great astronauts.
The religious proclaim the value of kindness when they need it from secular Jews. When it is asked from them they suddenly become holy saints that can not be bothered by such trivialities.
[This of course is not meant to include the great Litvak yeshivot that in fact learn Torah for its own sake.]]
The religious world thinks that their keeping a few public rituals makes them defined as keeping Torah. Whatever the religious do is not not Torah.
The best approach to service of God as far as I can tell is the straight Litvak approach of learning Torah. Of course if one looks at the statements of the Chazal [sages] about this this is in fact what they say. [As brought in the mishna in Peah and the Yerushalmi there that every word of Torah is worth as much as all the other commandments combined. But also one can see the "image of God" in people that learn Torah for its own sake all day. It is clear there is a world of difference between those that learn Torah as opposed to the phony and plastic religious world.
Even though Torah involves laws that are for the public domain , it is mainly oriented towards personal morality. [And it is well known in Moral Philosophy that there is a very large difference between personal morality and public. I can not think of an example this minute since my thoughts are going in a different direction. (note 1)] So while public law is very important, still it is very different from Torah. (note 3) A good example in Henry II. His job after becoming king was to bring stability and peace to England after decades of chaos and anarchy. So he unified the laws. No more was each county going to have a different set. There was to be one set for all England. And circuit judges just as is done today in the USA. And trial by jury, not by physical combat.[כל דאלים גבר]. But on the other side of things, Torah is personal. even though many of the laws are in the public domain , but the center of gravity is the relationship between the individual and God.
So in Torah it matters not what goes on in the public domain. I might be living in a city that is an עיר הנדחית [a city that has gone astray after idolatry]. That does not absolve me of responsivity to Torah. Just think about Eliyahu the prophet and Elisha his disciple that lived in the Shomron area. [The center of Israel, not the Jerusalem area.] Though the state was officially serving idols, they certainly refused.
[The Northern kingdom of the ten tribes was officially serving the idols that had been set up by Yeravam ben Navat. So you can have Jewish idols. The fact that everyone is serving them does not make it okay. So I suggest that the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication is still valid, even if everyone refuses to pay any attention. (note 2) And this is easy to see as you can find a simple and understandable definition of idolatry in the commentary of the Rambam on Sanhedrin perek Helek. Worship of anything in heaven and earth except for God is idolatry. Not just physical statues.]
note 1. Here is a text from the Ethics textbook of Stephen O Sullivan and Philip A. Pecorino 2002. [published by CUNY] Here are some examples of actions that are illegal but are thought to be moral (for many)!
Drinking under age.
Driving over the speed limit on a desert highway with no cars or people anywhere around.
Smoking marijuana.
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People do not think of themselves or of others as being immoral for breaking these laws.
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Here are some examples of actions that are immoral (for many) but are not illegal.
Breaking a promise to a friend.
People can not be arrested or punished with imprisonment or fines for doing these things.
(note 2) The validity of a "herem" [excommunication] is from the laws of nedarim [vows]. [This I noticed in a commentary on the Rambam on the bottom of the page.] What is a vow? It is when one says, "This loaf of bread is forbidden to you like a sacrifice." If he owns that loaf, then that loaf becomes forbidden to the person he is talking to. Similarly a herem is valid, as long as the person making it is qualified.] Why does he say like a sacrifice. It is commonly accepted that this is a argument between the Rambam and Tosphot. However Rav Shach points out that just saying "this loaf is forbidden to me" instead of being a way of making avow by its simple meaning would simply be an untruth!
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(note 3) Peace of the state is one reason for many commandments, but that is not the central source of authority of Torah
People that parade their religiosity are not religious. This you know from the verse מה השם אלוהיך שואל ממך כי אם והצנע לכת עם אלוהיך What does the Lord your God ask from you but to do kindness and judgment and to walk modestly with the Lord your God. No matter how you want to interpret this verse, advertising how religious you are to get peoples donations and trust does not come under the heading of "walking modestly with God."
But even more compelling to me is that the religious talk a good talk. All lovey dovey--especially when they think or know you are a naïve American with rich parents. But when it comes to actual actions of sincere kindness, the religious have to take a back seat. They will do almost anything to get out of helping anyone in need except themselves. And to me this seems like a serious flaw in their character. And that is especially noticeable when you learn in Torah that the primary action that is needed is good character. Not religious rituals or identification with the religious. [See any of the Rishonim for verification on this point which should not need emphasis. No where in in the Torah or Gemara or Rishonim do you find any value attributed to identification, rather with objective right and wrong. So the wearing of the kipa as the first obligation is clearly a show of values quite opposed to Torah. The religious excel in bragging how kind they are. My experience shows the opposite to be the case. And woe to the person that thinks he can depend on them in time of need. [While to show off how wonderful they are is their main goal. And who falls for this? people of the same character. So there really is littlee reason to have sympathy. Those that are fooled are the same people that have a similar sort of wish to show off how wonderful they are.
Hennry I had a daughter Matilda who he named as the next ruler of England. But the crown was seized by Stephen her cousin. She fought to keep the crown. One day her son Henry II came of age and continued the fight. He came to relive the forces of Matilda at a castle. When the forces of Stephen and Henny II met they decided not to fight. [That is to say their commanders decided not to have this civil war any longer.] So Stephen and Henry had to meet and talk it over. The decision: Stephen would remain king and after him Henry would be the rightful king of England.
I have wondered for months what would have happened if in the American Civil War both sides had simply decided not to kill each other? [Maybe there are wars that must be fought. But doubtful wars -like the Civil War seem to me to have been better not to have been fought.]
People that are religious seem to think that they are morally superior to secular Jews. Though I do not know people inner thoughts or motivations, still this seems apparent in their speech and actions. [And experience generally show the opposite.] If you need a kindness, the last person that will help is religious. Thus to me, it seems the message of Torah of the prime importance midot tovot [good character] is lost. For me it reached the point that what ever damage the religious could do to me, they would do. [These same people asked me to get money for them from John Factor my neighbor because these people were supposedly learning Torah not for money--while asking me to get money from my neighbor John Factor for millions of dollars. Clearly they [and all the religious world ] want money, and especially for the fact of their learning Torah not for money. The hypocrisy shouts out to the heavens.]
Rav Israel Salanter tried to correct this fault, but I have not seen that people that learn Musar are all that more decent than anyone else.
But this is not possible to see or know by learning. In the religious world all the words are right. But the actual acts of kindness are lacking. [Except to themselves]. It is only the shock of reality, of how people actually act that shoes the religious illusions of moral superiority to be lacking in all substance.
What the lesson is this. There is something about the religious world that is off kilter. [Seethe LeM of Rav Nahman vol II chapter 8 That even the kindness of the religious is really cruelty. It is the same kindness of the fisherman that gives a worm on his hook free of charge to the fish. It is not really from the motivation of kindness that teh fisherman gibes a worm to the fish but rather to catch it in his hook. The kindness if of the religious is really cruelty as Rav Nahman puts it in the LeM vol II chapter 8.
The translation of Euclid [a small part of the actual massive volumes of Euclid] by a disciple of the Gra brings in the introduction that the Gra said "One will lack in understanding and knowledge of Torah a hundred times in proportion to one lack of knowledge in the seven widoms."
And this is the common opinion among the rishonim that built on Saadia Gaon. [like the Chovot Levavot.] However there are other rishonim and even geonim that disagree with this.
I take the first approach to be best, but I also recognize the validity and value of the second approach.
Right after writing the above I went over to the Breslov place and listened to someone reading the books of Rav Nathan [a disciple of Rav Nahman] on the subject of "outside wisdoms" he disparages those that learn or teach them. But that while going with Rav Hai Gaon and some rishonim like the Ramban that goes with that approach, I still prefer the Saadia Gaon, Chovot Levavot, Rambam approach, which is exactly opposite.
To my way of thinking it all depends on what one is learning. If we are talking about the social studies departments of universities, well Rav Nathan was 100% correct. [As Allan Bloom goes into great depth in his Closing of the American Mind]. But if we we would be talking about STEM fields then clearly Saadia gaon and the Hovot Levavot are correct.
People in the USSR at the end did not want to USSR to continue. However what they got after that was generally not to their liking either. When I would ask people [often the women selling their products at the local bazar how were things during the time of the USSR, they would always answer the same thing: "Better than now." And sometimes they would elaborate: "Everyone was working." Or sometimes even more extensive elaborations. What I generally take that to mean is that you have to take things in perspective. To try and make the USA into a socialist state is to try and take it down. But to compare the USSR to the kinds of chaos that things sank to after the fall of the USSR --well obviously the USSR was better.
i was thinking about the advantages of having one's own space. But also thinking that the best idea is to accept things the way they are.as long as these things at least least to tolerable and lovable in some degree. To accept things the way they are is a important trait. There can be a point where one must act but it is best not to hurry that point along.
You see in Musar [books on ethics] an emphasis on correction of character traits. The reason I think is this. One might be aware of his own sins and try to correct them. But that leaves the root of the sin not fixed --the kind of fault that led to the sin. And also sins can be hard to identify, and sometimes even if one is aware of them, they might contradict each other. That is the very nature of the spirituality--It does not lend itself well being reasoned about. Thus it is best to work on one's character and by that uproot the source of ones faults.
I have tried to identify my sins by mean of experience. That is: to see what actions caused problems. This is often easy because one can see immediate results. Other times the results of certain actions can be a long time coming. But in any case, this is better than reasoning from books, for the mind is often highly misleading. One can find anything he wants in any books. This is unreliable.
I am not saying what kind of path one ought to take. My father as you can see was more along the lines of what you could call secular, while I went to Shar Yashuv and later the Mir in NY. So what seems best to me is along the lines of Dr Kelley Ross's modification of the Kant Fries school where he shows an array of values. That is to say: I think every person is or can be connected to a certain area of value. Clearly that area is what ought to spend his or her time perfecting. [I do not think Mozart ought to have tried to become a Physicist. Nor do I think he would have been a great one even if he had. Rather he found or was guided by his dad into the area of value that was right for him.]
However I also think every area of value has an opposite area that one can get pulled into if he or she is not careful. E.g., one who has talent in music must be careful not to be pulled into anti-music.
[{Also, I think one ought to be balanced. Even if one concentrates on one area, he should also have some balanced with the other areas of positive value.]
I just wanted to make clear why my dad {Philip Rosten}doesn't get credit for laser communication between satellites. The reason is not due to anyone's malice. It is simply that the company TRW more or less became a car manufacturing company after the mole was found who was selling all the advances in technology to the KGB. So what ever was developed at TRW was simply sold to the other aerospace companies [like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, etc. ]. And that is the cause that the paper records of who developed the technology was lost.
[No one foresaw that TRW would eventually be rehabilitated and get back into the action in the 1990's]
I was hoping to have an answer for this question before I write it down. But so far nothing has occurred to me. So I might as well write it and hope that someday I might merit to some answer.
Simply put it is this. There is an argument between the Raavad and the Rambam concerning the case where a woman says to her husband "You have divorced me." She is believed. To the Raavad this means only that if she gets married to someone else, she can stay there. To the Rambam, she can go and get married and gets her ketubah. Rav Shach [Laws of marriage 16:26] brings the source of the Raavad. My question is that that source looks more along the lines of the Rambam.
The source is Nedarim 91. The mishna says at first there were three cases when a woman is divorced and gets her ketubah. One is a woman that says "I am forbidden to you." Then the sages changed their minds and said perhaps she has put her eyes on someone else. Rav Hamenuna said however a woman that says "You divorced me" is believed.
The parallel to the case of the mishna to me seems to imply when she says you divorced me she is allowed to remarry and gets her ketubah.
However Rav Shach I think is making a point here that in the case of "you divorced me", we do not make him give another divorce. We simply believe her. So this is in that sense a proof for the Raavad.
I mean to say that Rav Hamenuna's case is different anyway from the mishna--even the first mishna [before the sages changed their mind.] In the mishna we force him to divorce her. In the case of Rav Hamenuna we simply believe that she was divorced.
[The point is that to the mishna a woman who is the wife of a priest that has been raped must be divorced because she is forbidden to her husband. She is forbidden to him. And since the rape was against her will, she gets her ketubah. The parallel of Rav hamenunah is when she says you divorc]ed me is not exact. To the Rambam She is believed and gets her ketubah. To the Raavad she does not. The aspect where the Rambam makes sense is getting the ketubah. The point of the Raavad is that she gets the ketubah because she was raped and thus did nothing wrong. This does not have a parallel to our case of when she says You divorced me.
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There is an argument between the ראב''ד and the רמב''ם concerning the case where a woman says to her husband, "You have divorced me." She is believed. To the ראב''ד this means only that if she gets married to someone else, she can stay there. To the רמב''ם, she can go and get married and gets her כתובה. And רב שך in בהלכות אישות ט''ז הלכה כ''ו brings the source of the ראב''ד. My question is that that source looks more along the lines of the רמב''ם. The source is נדרים צ''א. The משנה says at first there were three cases when a woman is divorced and gets her כתובה. One is a woman that says, "I am forbidden to you." Then the חכמים changed their minds and said perhaps she has put her eyes on someone else. רב המנונא said however a woman that says "You divorced me" is believed. The parallel to the case of the משנה to me seems to imply when she says you divorced me she is allowed to remarry and gets her כתובה. However רב שך is making a point here that in the case of "you divorced me", we do not make him give another divorce. We simply believe her. So this is in that sense a proof for the ראב''ד. I mean to say that רב המנונא case is different anyway from the משנה, even the first משנה [before the חכמים changed their mind.] In the משנה we force him to divorce her. In the case of רב המנונא we simply believe that she was divorced.
[The point is that to the משנה a woman who is the wife of a כהן that has been raped must be divorced because she is forbidden to her husband. And since the rape was against her will, she gets her כתובה. The parallel of רב המנונא is when she says you גירשת אותי is not exact. To the רמב''ם She is believed and gets her כתובה. To the ראב''ד she does not. The aspect where the רמב''ם makes sense is getting the ketubah. The point of the ראב''ד is that she gets the כתובה because she was raped and thus did nothing wrong. This does not have a parallel to our case of when she says You divorced me.
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יש ויכוח בין הראב''ד לרמב''ם בנוגע למקרה שבו אישה אומרת לבעלה "גרשתני". מאמינים לה. לראב''ד זה אומר רק שאם היא מתחתנת עם מישהו אחר, היא יכולה להישאר שם. לרמב''ם, היא יכולה ללכת להתחתן ולהשיג את הכתובה שלה. ורב שך בהלכות אישות ט''ז הלכה כ''ו מביא את מקור הרב''ד. השאלה שלי היא שמקור זה נראה יותר לצד הרמב''ם. המקור הוא נדרים צ''א. המשנה אומרת בהתחלה היו שלושה מקרים בהם אישה יוצאת ומקבלת את הכתובה שלה. אחת מהן היא אישה שאומרת: "אסור לי עליך". ואז החכמים שינו את דעתם ואמרו שאולי היא שמה עיניים למישהו אחר. רב המנונא אמר כי עם זאת מאמינים באישה שאומרת "התגרשתי ממך". נראה שההקבלה למקרה של המשנה מרמזת כשהיא אומרת ש"התגרשתי ממך", מותר לה להינשא מחדש ולקבל את הכתובה שלה. עם זאת רב שך מציין כאן שבמקרה של "התגרשתי ממך", אנו לא גורמים לו לתת גט נוסף. אנחנו פשוט מאמינים לה. אז זוהי במובן הזה הוכחה לראב''ד. אני מתכוון לומר שמקרה של רב המנונא בכל מקרה שונה מהמשנה, אפילו המשנה הראשונה [לפני שחכמים שינו את דעתם.] במשנה אנו מכריחים אותו לגרש אותה. במקרה של הרב המנונא אנחנו פשוט מאמינים שהיא גרושה
Rav Nahman has this great idea of talking with God as one talks with a good friend. But to him it was not a casual conversation. For example he would go out in the morning to some secluded spot in the forest and spend the whole day asking God to come close to His service. And I took this idea to heart when I first arrived in Safed. [This did not last long--but the basic idea has remained with me about the importance of this sort of conversation with God.] But I also realize it has to flow out of some deep level under the layer of normal consciousness.
[That is there is some surface level of consciousness. That is the stream of thoughts. Then there is the level under that--the one doing the thinking. Then under that there is some level that is even hidden from that level. This is commonly called the subconscious--discovered by Leibnitz. [Attributing to him by Nietzsche.]
I think China lost world respect by means of its actions in Hong Kong. Or put more clearly,- it lost its ability to make friends. It has lots economic power, but not friends. I mean just think about how many friends has in South East Asia? On the other hand, think about friends of the USA. Especially in that region. Australia and Japan and Taiwan. But in terms of just the simple fact of how many the sorts of liberal democracies are allies of the USA. So the fact that everyone saw what was done to Hong Kong, how many Western democracies would help China in any future conflicts?
This could be corrected by keeping their word as to respecting the rights of Hong Kong as they promised when Britain gave them control.
[Military allies are as important and even more so than economic power.,,,,, as you can see in the history of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens. It is not a matter of how many pencils China can produce. It is a matter of how may people have confidence in their word of honor. If they do not tell the truth, then the pencils do not matter.
I have been looking at the Civil War and it seems to me the South was right from a Constitutional point of view. "Perpetual union" was mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, but not the Constitution. The union of states in the Constitution is a voluntary union. Thus, the South could leave.
And as for the issue of slavery, lots of people have to work. I do not see that as some great evil. [Though it is better to learn Torah. --I mean to say that there is such a thing as one accepting on himself the yoke of Torah, and then there is removed from him the the yoke of work and government. There is also trust in God. But there is nothing wrong with work. Just the opposite. The fact that welfare recipients force work out of the working population to get free money seems to me to be wrong.--even if they can get the government to force the issue. That does not make it right. -( It goes against the "general welfare" clause about what taxes can be used for.) Even if the majority of the people want it, it still is unconstitutional. For welfare to be constitutional , you would have to change the Constitution, and leave out the general welfare clause.
[Just an added thought: the general welfare clause is for what Congress can make taxes for. One of them is the general welfare which means not to tax one segment of the population (like working people) to benefit a different segment. ( e.g., those who are not working.) It has to be "general welfare"- that which benefits all. This is just common place knowledge in Constitutional Law about what that clause is meant for.
Did it ever occur to you that the mishna ערוגה בת ששה טפחים על ששה טפחים seems a bit strained.
[Five types of vegetables can be planted in a plot of land 6 handbreadths by 6 handbreadths]
Why plant five types of beans or vegetables in a plot of land that is a square foot? Well, the answer is there were three tribes of Indians on the east part of Ohio. (Shawnee, Wyandot, Delaware) Their practice was to plant corn --their main stable. When it sprouted a little they would make a little mound around it and plant beans on that hill. That kept the soil in place [and added nitrogen to the soil afterwards)]. Then planted pumpkins over it--that gave shade and prevented weeds.
So these three crops ["the three sisters"] were in a sort of symbiotic relation. So you can see that planting certain kinds of beans or vegetables in close proximity can be a great help-so one does have to be able to do this without transgressing mixed kinds of vegetables. [So the geometric shapes discussed in that mishna become very practical. --The mishna says 5 types can be planted there but they have to conform to the restriction that each be not actually mixed with the other.
Simchat Torah in Shar Yashuv was a profound experience for me. You could feel the love of Torah just permeating the air. That of course was a result of the fact that he whole year the love of Torah permeated the whole place. It was not just for one day. And that same point I think could be said about most any Litvak yeshiva. However I am sure who ever is reading this must have some complaints about the Litvak yeshiva world. [I have my own list and I am sure everyone else must have a similar list.]
What sets the Litvak yeshiva apart are the ideas of the Gra. But we also know that these places do not follow the Gra in every respect. Thus, my suggestion is this: whatever you or I see as a lack in the Litvak yeshiva world is a direct result of their not following the Gra in every respect. [And I have in fact seen this. The problems I have seen are in fact related directed and result directly from the divergence from the Gra.] The answer thus is simple. They ought to follow the Gra in every respect, not just some respects.
Forcing people to work without recompense is slavery. So should not all the people that see slavery as the greatest of all evils object to welfare? Is not the whole idea of welfare is making people work for the non working part of the population in order to get their (of the non workers) votes? So former slaves do not object to slavery when they get to be the masters.
So when people criticize the USA for having had slaves, you might ask these same people if they object as strongly to welfare? i.e. giving money to people for not working. Why do they not lobby the Congress to abolish all welfare payments? [Maybe they like the money?]
[I thought to add that the General Welfare clause of the Constitution (i.e. for what the Congress can make taxes for) means the general welfare of all the people of the USA--not to take from one group to give to another. This is a common place fact in Constitutional Law]
There is another bit of advice I heard from my father--many times. The idea of self reliance. So when I went to Shar Yashuv and later the Mir in NY,I was thinking of Torah Lishma --[learning Torah for its own sake.]And the idea is more or less thus: that when one learns Torah for its own sake, then parnasah [a living] and all one's other needs come to him automatically. That is the ideal which I was striving for. And I still hold that is is a viable approach--that when one turns all his focus on learning Torah then everything else falls into place.
But there is an aspect of Avodat Hashem [service of God] that is working at an honest job. This is gone into in the LeM of Rav Nahman vol II perek 4 [I think].
There is a piece of advice I would like to share with others. My mother and father were highly suspicious of new medicines. They strongly advised against taking any new medicine that has not been on the market for at least fifty years. And this in fact corresponds to a large degree of the idea of Rav Nahman [Conversations of Rav Nahman paragraph 50] to be wary of doctors. However I realize that one might merit to have a good and honest doctor, and that seem to depend on Divine providence. [When I was in Uman in fact the medical care I received was amazing. It was always with great competence--but also with a complete and utter refusal to deal with anything that was not an immediate threat. They would never treat anything because of some new toy they had as you find all the time in the West.
The County hospital [near Uman but not connected with Uman but rather with the county called the raiyona bolnitza] had a great reputation and in fact I was there twice. What ever was wrong with me was cleared up within a minute of taking the medicines they prescribed. The doctors and nurses at the Trauma unit in Uman proper gave me such care when I was in need of their help that I was flabbergasted.
What is wrong with scientists? They came up with three criterion for something to be planet? The three is it has to be massive enough to clear all the dust and particles surrounding it. Thus Pluto they do not count as a planet. Well they ought to take out Saturn also that has vast dust clouds called "rings". From where do they come up with stuff? [Though I admit that besides Physicists and Mathematicians, they are all pseudo scientists-especially doctors. They think they know what they do not know.]
[However I saw in the former USSR that doctors were aware of their limitations and did held by the idea "Do nor fix that which is not broken". I was very impressed by the doctors in Uman -both in the local nd also the regional hospital.
But on the other hand -what is it with the "religious"? They even more so believe they know that which they do not know. They get a little bit of religion and all of a sudden wearing\ a kipa is the foremost commandment [Forget about parents.] [Even though there is no requirement to wear a kipa not from the Torah nor from the sages.] And about that Gemara where wearing a head covering is thought to bring to fear of God00well that is not why people wear a kipa.. Rather they ear a kipa in order t show how religious they are. And that in itself prohibition--הצנע לכת עם אלהיך to walk modestly with God --that is not to show off how religious you are.
You can see in Book of Hoshea 12 verse 3 that the being that wrestled with Yaakov Avinu {Jacob}was God himself. [That incident is recounted in Genesis 32]. This leaves room for some questions. Could not God have won? Why did He find it so hard to wrestle with Yaakov who after all was only a man? And when the morning came God said "Let me go because the morning has come." ("I have got things to do?" Or maybe He has to work in the dark where his actions are hidden?). And He could not leave until Yaakov let Him go? You would imagine that God could leave any time he wanted--even if Yaakov did not let Him go.
And you can see that that being was God in the verses themselves where Yakov calls the place "pnuel" [the Face of God]. for I have seen God face to face and my soul was saved. [There is a danger in seeing the Face of God as the verse says "no man can see me and live."
What I am getting at is the idea of of the Kant -Fries School of thought that there is some area beyond what is accessible to human or even pure reason. That is the "dinge an sich." That is, there are two kinds of knowledge: (a) what can be checked--empirical and (b) what can not--a priori. Also two kinds of fact. Synthetic and Analytic. Analytic proven true by definition, and synthetic true but does not have to be true by definition. So what about Synthetic a priori like a figure can be formed by less than three lines. You can not make a figure with two lines. So how can u know if synthetic a priori is true? to Kant that is by structures in the mind. To Fries that is by immediate non intuitive. Hegel disagreed that this could be a true source of knowledge, but to me this makes sense--that Reason has limits.
This area of reasoning about God is one of those areas that is beyond reason--but still possible to know. See Kelley Ross's web site on the Kant Fries approach.
Witnesses on a doc is an argument between Rav Shach and the Chazon Ish--if they are considered to have made their testimony before or after the plea.
I mean to say that Rav Shach is trying to prove that the obligation of an oath in the case of a woman says to her ex husband that he owes 100 zuzim. He says he paid fifty.--that case he is obligated an oath. Rav Shach says this is a case here there is no document [Ketubah], for if there was, he would not be required an oath since the admission in half happened in such a way that he could not deny and also there would be witnesses on the doc their testimony would be considered as coming before the claims. Thus also he would be not obligated in taking an oath. The Chazon Ish holds in this last case witnesses are thought to be coming after the plea so it is like admission in half and he would be obligated to take an oath.
On the way back from the sea I was thinking about this and it seems to me clear. The Chazon Ish is thinking about witnesses. If you have two witnesses that come to court and say he is obligated in half the sum that is demanded he is required to take an oath.--even if they say that they already testified to this ion a previous occasion. And that is true. But Rav Shach's point is witnesses on the document is not the same thing. They only signed it once and that was before the plaintiff came to make his plea.
Thus the only case that the law in the Rambam in laws of marriage 16 is possible is in a place where it is not the custom to write a ketubah.