One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph I would repeat twice and then go on forward.

 One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph  I would repeat twice and then go on forward. To my mind this combined what I saw in the books of Rav Nahman about learning fast (that is to say the words in order and then to go on) and the way of learning in Litvak yeshivas which was to stress in depth learning with review. In this way of repeating each paragraph twice I felt I was making progress and also doing review. This seemed to help a lot when it came to learning Gemara and later I used this same method for Mathematics and Physics.

[The thing is that in Shar Yashuv there was an emphasis on in depth learning that almost seemed to negate the value of "bekius" fast learning. And in the book of Rav Nahman [Conversations of Rav Nahman 76] the emphasis is the exact opposite. So this sort of compromise was the only way I could make sense of this. And this method definitely helped  me.]

[That was for Gemara and Tosphot. But when it came to the Pnei Yehoshua I used to repeat very paragraph more than 10 times--or at least that much. That was based on Rav Freifel's emphasis on repeating every chapter of Gemara 10 times.]](Rav Freifeld was the rosh yeshiva of Shar Yashuv)

גמרא פסחים דף צ''ה

 

רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם מחזיק כמו החכמים נגד ר' יהודה בכך שהוא מחזיק שאפשר להיפטר מחמץ  בכל אופן, לא רק על ידי שריפה. והוא מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אז הוא חייב לקבוע שגמרא פסחים דף צ''ה לא מתנהל לפי הדרך בה החוק הוחלט כחכמים אלא לר' יהודה. שגמרא שם אומרת שהבעלות על חמץ בפסח היא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית. זה אומר שהוא חייב לחשוב שלר' יהודה האיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית. אם הפקודה החיובית תבוא לפני הפקודה הנגדית, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה. כך שהסיבה שמישהו יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ תהיה משום שלפי החכמים, הפקודה החיובית להיפטר מהחמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בה. רמב''ם זה שונה אם כן מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בעמוד צ''ה יהיה כמו החכמים שהאיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית ורק לר' יהודה מצווה התשביתו (לבטל את החמץ באמצעות שריפה) מחויב לקרות לפני הזמן של האיסור. לתוספות שניהם מגיעים בו זמנית. מה אני תוהה לגבי זה: יכול להיות הבדל בין להחזיק חמץ לרכוש חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא בדף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך בה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה  של איסור שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית (לאו הניתק לעשה) הוא כאשר שניהם פעולות. לפיכך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה פירושה שהמצב הפסיבי של בעלות על חמץ הוא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית מכיוון שביטול  של חמץ אינו מעשה. זה יכול להיות על ידי הפיכתו לרכוש נטוש "הפקר". אך לא ניתן לבטל פעולה חיובית של קניית חמץ על ידי מצב פסיבי של אמירתו שהיא הפקר בלבד. רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את הרמב''ם הזה אחרת. לדבריו, חובתו של חמץ היא גם פקודה שלילית וגם חיובית, אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה ולכן הוא גם יצטרך לומר כי הגמרא הולכת כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא שהבעלות על חמץ תהיה רק איסור

Here is a link to the small booklet I wrote on different areas in Shas where I included this idea 

חידושי הש''ס

Also I should mention that I should run this idea by David Bronson  to get some feedback or criticism.  But since that does not seem possible right now, I will have to think about this a little more. I am mean, after all what is the category of "spread to the winds" of the sages? Probably not the same as bitul as the Ran [in the beginning of Pesachim goes into]. Still it seems worthwhile at least writing this idea down for future reference and to see if this is perhaps what the Rambam was getting at. [That is besides the obvious question that there ought to be some proof of this hiluk. ]

Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim] Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11]

Rav Shach explains that the Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11] holds like the sages against R. Yehuda [tractate Pesachim 23] in that he holds getting rid of hametz [leavened bread] is by any means, not just by burning.  And he holds that one who buys hametz on Passover gets lashes. So he must hold that the Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim]is not going according to the way the law was decided as the sages but rather to R Yehuda. That Gemara says owning hametz on Pesach is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command.

 That must mean that he must be thinking that to R. Yehuda the prohibition and the positive command come simultaneously.[If the positive command would come before the negative command it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה].

So the reason one would get lashes for buying hametz would be because to the sages, the positive command to get rid of hametz comes before the prohibition of owning it.

[This Rambam is thus different than Rashi or Tosphot. To Rashi that Gemara on pg 95 would be like the sages that the prohibition and positive command come simultaneously  and only to R. Yehuda does the command תשביתו [to make the hametz rest by means of burning happen before the time of the prohibition..

To Tosphot both come simultaneously.

What I am wondering about i this: could there be a difference between owning hametz and buying hametz? If there was such a difference, perhaps the Rambam could say that Gemara on page 95 could be to the sages also.

The way this could work would be  that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command is when both are actions. Thus the gemara on pg 95 would mean the passive state of owning hametz is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command  because the "bitul" nullification of the hametz is not any act. It could be just by making it "hefker" abandoned property. But a positive act of buying hametz could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is hefker. [But if I was in Uman, I would have to run this by my learning partner David Bronson to see if there are counter examples. ]

[Rav Haim of Brisk explains this Rambam differently. He says owing hametz is both a negative and positive command but then that would not be like the gemara on page 95 so he also would have to say that that gemara is going like R. Yehuda. and to that gemara owning hametz would only be a prohibition.]

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רב שך explains that the רמב''ם  holds like the חכמים against ר' יהודה  in that he holds getting rid of חמץ  is by any means, not just by burning.  And he holds that one who buys חמץ on פסח gets מלקות. So he must hold that the גמרא פסחים דף צ''ה is not going according to the way the law was decided as the sages but rather to ר' יהודה. That גמרא says owning חמץ on פסח is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command. That must mean that he must be thinking that to ר' יהודה the prohibition and the positive command come simultaneously. If the positive command would come before the ne  gative command it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה. So the reason one would get מלקות for buying חמץ would be because to the חכמים, the positive command to get rid of חמץ comes before the prohibition of owning it. This רמב''ם is thus different than רש''י or תוספות. To  רש''י that גמרא on דף צ''ה would be like the sages that the prohibition and positive command come simultaneously  and only to ר' יהודה does the command תשביתו to make the חמץ rest by means of burning happen before the time of the prohibition. To תוספות both come simultaneously. What I am wondering about this: could there be a difference between owning חמץ and buying חמץ? If there was such a difference, perhaps the רמב''ם could say that גמרא on דף צ''ה could be to the חכמים also. The way this could work would be  that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command לאו הניתק לעשה is when both are actions. Thus the גמרא on דף צ''ה would mean the passive state of owning חמץ is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command because the ביטול nullification of the חמץ is not an act. It could be just by making it "הפקר" abandoned property. But a positive act of buying חמץ could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is הפקר.  רב חיים מבריסק explains this  רמב''ם differently. He says owing חמץ is both a negative and positive command but then that would not be like the גמרא בדף צ''ה so he also would have to say that that גמרא is going like ר' יהודה and to that גמרא owning חמץ would only be a prohibition.]

רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם מחזיק כמו החכמים נגד ר' יהודה בכך שהוא מחזיק שאפשר להיפטר מחמץ  בכל אופן, לא רק על ידי שריפה. והוא מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אז הוא חייב לקבוע שגמרא פסחים דף צ''ה לא מתנהל לפי הדרך בה החוק הוחלט כחכמים אלא לר' יהודה. שגמרא שם אומרת שהבעלות על חמץ בפסח היא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית. זה אומר שהוא חייב לחשוב שלר' יהודה האיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית. אם הפקודה החיובית תבוא לפני הפקודה הנגדית, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה. כך שהסיבה שמישהו יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ תהיה משום שלפי החכמים, הפקודה החיובית להיפטר מהחמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בה. רמב''ם זה שונה אם כן מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בעמוד צ''ה יהיה כמו החכמים שהאיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית ורק לר 'יהודה מצווה התשביתו להניח את החמץ באמצעות שריפה מחויב לקרות לפני הזמן של האיסור. לתוספות שניהם מגיעים בו זמנית. מה אני תוהה לגבי זה: יכול להיות הבדל בין להחזיק חמץ לרכוש חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא בדף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך בה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה  של איסור שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית לאו הניתק לעשה הוא כאשר שניהם פעולות. לפיכך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה פירושה שהמצב הפסיבי של בעלות על חמץ הוא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית מכיוון שביטול  של חמץ אינו מעשה. זה יכול להיות על ידי הפיכתו לרכוש נטוש "הפקר". אך לא ניתן לבטל פעולה חיובית של קניית חמץ על ידי מצב פסיבי של אמירתו שהיא הפקר בלבד. רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את הרמב''ם הזה אחרת. לדבריו, חובתו של חמץ היא גם פקודה שלילית וגם חיובית, אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה ולכן הוא גם יצטרך לומר כי הגמרא הולכת כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא שהבעלות על חמץ תהיה רק איסור

Here is a link to the small booklet I wrote on different areas in Shas where I included this idea 

חידושי הש''ס

I should add that I do not think I am worthy in any sense to write ideas in Torah. Rather what happened was I was in Uman and a fellow I had met in Israel showed up one day and we started learning Torah at his suggestion. Then I began to see he would casually say over amazing insights in the Gemara without even trying-- just obvious points to him. But I realized that these were points on the level of the greatest e.g. like Rav Shmuel Berenbaum the rosh yeshiva of the Mir who I had leaned under. So I started writing down  ideas that came up in our learning sessions.

Jesus is a sore topic

 The subject of Jesus is a sore topic. Especially when combined with the history of the church.  The opinions vary. On one hand, you have the Rambam who thought that Christianity is idolatry. And Rav Abulafia does not seem to disagree with that at all. But the opinion of Rav Avraham Abulafia is that Jesus was the messiah son of Joseph,  --even though his opinion about the church was highly negative.

[The issue of  Christianity however is approached differently in Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara. By sitting and trying to learn that Tosphot with my learning partner, helped me see that Tosphot seems to have several different approaches.] My own opinion is that I go with Rav Abulafia.

Messiah son of Joseph is brought in the end of tractate Suka and in the Zohar and the Kol HaTor of the Gra and the Tikunim Hadashim of the Ramchal. What it means is simple. It refers to a preliminary stage before messiah son of David. [Rav Nahman also refers to this . Just today I was in the Na Nach place and opened up the LeM of Rav Nahman and saw that sometimes the same tzadik can contain both aspects in himself.]

I should add that there are souls of the world of Emanation in the Ari [The Arizal, Rav Isaac Luria]. These are souls that are Divine, in that they receive the light of God without any division in between God and them. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron Joseph, David. So when it comes to the subject of the messiah son of Joseph or son of David, we are talking about a spark of the soul of David or Joseph.

[I might add here that I think the idea of Emanation is the approach that Hegel took to this same issue--that is how I tend to read Hegel. [See the debates about Hegel between McTaggart and Cunningham (Logos is everything or penetrates everything?). At any rate, this idea of over flowing or Emanation seems to me to be what Hegel was saying concerning Logos and Jesus. And we know that Hegel was aware of the Ari and borrows from him concerning Adam Kadmon. So it is not to far to imagine that Hegel was thinking along these lines concerning more central issues in his system. So I am not claiming that this answers all the issues in Hegel. Certainly McTaggart and Cunningham would argue that the idea of overflow along with condensation might not answer the issues they were raising. Still this seems to me to be what Hegel was saying.]

[So what would McTaggart say? He would answer that my arguing that condensation of the light or flow of Logos does not answer the issues --because of the same problem--it is the same or it is not.[The law of the excluded middle.] So I am not saying I could answer this question. But rather that I think that this is what Hegel was saying.

So the question would be can incremental change cause a complete change in essence or some other variable.\This is answered in Chaos Theory and in fact is a suggestion of Kelley Ross on how evolution happens.

[Just to make myself clear I want to mention that I can see important points in Kant, Leonard Nelson Kelley Ross, Huemer and Hegel.  ]

it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot"

 Rav Nahman wrote in the LeM that when one needs compassion from Heaven the way thing to do is to have compassion on others. the difficulty of course is that it is not always so clear how to have compassion on others. But it is clear that when someone asks for help, it ought to be offered as the law is on Purim, "One must give to whom so ever asks."

My approach to having compassion is to try to give to whom so ever asks, but not to seek things to do. The disciple of the Gra, Rav Chaim of Voloshin said it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot". As Rav Nahman said "the evil inclination is dressed in mizvot."

A certain amount of the extra added restrictions that often one finds people doing for Passover seem to me to be not all that necessary. After all what is matza? Just flour and water. Heat it up and eat it within 18 minutes and it can not be leavened, bread. The only way something an be leavened bread is by sitting. In any case, the restrictions I think are a power grab by religious authorities to make people think that we need their great wisdom.

Personally, I think the whole religious world has an aspect of being a cult. I would not go anywhere near them --with two exceptions. One would be  straight Litvak yeshiva. There the Torah is learned for its own sake. Another exception would be a Na Nach group of Breslov. Though these are very different kinds of groups, still they both seem fine to me. 

The best way to keep Passover is to do the seder at home.to make ones' own maza by making a thick batter of dough and to either put it into an oven or in a frying pan [or empty can of fish. if one does not have a frying pan.] with just enough oil so as to not stick. [a thin batter would be mezonot--cake and not considered as bread. even though one can eat it, it still is not maza.]

See the LeM of Rav Nahman volume II, chapter 44   not to add extra restrictions to the commandments of the Torah. Just to keep it plain and simple.

[I got the idea of not adding extra restrictions from the LeM of Rav Nahman. Since then I have tried to stick to what the Torah says: "Do not add nor subtract from the mizvot that I have commanded." However the religious thrive on adding restrictions. So I recommend staying away from them.]

 I think human affairs often go as a pendulum. You see the situation in Russia under the czars and it was quite natural that people would be upset and see the monarchy as a problem. [Especially you can imagine that when the monarch got a little too out of touch with the people, that would have exasperated the situation. Like going into WWI.] So then you get the Bolsheviks going in the opposite direction. And that that turns out to be not all that better.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach

Hametz of a gentile who uses force that a Israeli has to guard or pay for. To the Rambam one is required to get rid of it. To the Raavad he does not. \

Rav Shach ties this with a different argument. That is the issue of Haametz of a regular gentile that a Israeli has accepted to guard. There he certainly does need to get rid of it. But the question is how much responsibility does he accept for the Hametz? Like a paid guard or a guard that guards for nothing.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach before I went to sleep last night. And it occurred to me that you could argue one way of the other. On one hand the Raavad is only saying that a case where the Israeli accepts no responsibility at all that he does not trespass the prohibition of "בל יראה ובל ימצא"  ["Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary."] That is unlike an unpaid guard. However what in fact is the unpaid guard obligated in? Only willful neglect. That would be as if one was walking alone the street in Yerushalaim and saw Arabs selling leaven bread on Passover and overturned their stand. Certainly he has to pay for the damage, but would not transgress the prohibition of "Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary,"--even though he is incurring a financial obligation to pay for hametz on Passover.  

So you can see this argument of Rav Shach as possibly holding.

Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able.

What is considered a part of "learning Torah" is extremely important because of the sin of "bitul Torah".[Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able. ]

So when some rishonim [mediaeval authorities]like Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam include Physics and Metaphysics in the category of learning Torah, the significance is great. What I mean is that one is obligated to learn Torah all the time. And if Physics was not a part of Torah, then it would be possibly bitul Torah. [Unless one was doing it for the sake of making a living.] 

The significance of the concept of bitul Torah is not just to make one guilty if e is not learning when he could. Rather it is to point out the awesome sweetness of Torah that one would not give up after having tasted it even once. The only thing is thatt I am saying that to some rishonim, math and physics come under the heading of "Learning Torah"

To so degree you can see this in Psalms 77, 105 and other places where it says to speak of God's wisdom in his creations.

picture of my Dad with the U-2 camera.

 

That was after he invented the Infra Red telescope. Then he was offered a job at to make a camera to put on the U-2 airplane to see if the Soviets were about to launch a military strike against the USA. [That is, to see if there was any indication anywhere inside the USSR if they were planning on a strike of any sort against the USA. No one in the USA had any info, and President Eisenhauer had been advised to launch a preemptive strike against the USSR. Instead, he exercised caution, and decided to create the U-2 project. 

[In fact, the U-2 camera showed that the USSR was not planning any sort of attack on the USA. So the U-2 had the great merit of avoiding WWIII.]

 One is not allowed to mention the name of an idol and certainly not to swear an oath by an idol. Now for a regular prohibition of the Torah one gets lashes. [That is the punishment unless something else is stated openly.] But here things are a little different. One who swears by an idol has not done an act. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 63 side A says the opinion that one gets lashes for swearing by an idol is coming like R Yehuda who holds one can get lashes even for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

The Rambam brings that one does get lashes for this and the Raavad asks that that is only like R. Yehuda. But the law is not like R. Yehuda but rather R Yose who held one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

Rav Shach answers that Rabin who stated the original version of the law before the Gemara made its corrections to his statement said simply one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act except swearing and vowing. [And that original statement was said according to the law which is like R Yose. And the way that original statement was said involved not just swearing a false oath but also swearing in the name of an idol.]

I am trying to figure out what possible reason the Rambam would have had to ignore the correction of the Gemara.

x97 music file

 x97mp3 D minor  x97 midi   x97 nwc

 "The evil inclination is dressed in mitzvot". [This is from the LeM of R.Nahman of Breslov. vol I. perek 1. ] The Satan never comes to  a person and says come and do a sin. Rather it is always "come and do a mitzvah." But hidden in the mitzvah is some poison that is unseen. You you this same idea in the commentary of the Gra on Mishlei in the beginning where the evil inclination comes and says: "Come and bring peace offerings."

So my approach is to avoid anything and everything that has any connection with the religious world unless it is straight from the Gra  according to the approach of Rav Shach and Rav Kinyesvsky. [The trouble is the aspect of the trojan horse that has seeped and infiltrated everything in the religious world] 

Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone

 I see sometimes in the books of Rav Nahman statements that need to be taken with a grain of salt. His approach is basically to get to the core essence of Torah. But that is not to say that his approach is the whole shebang. Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone [the structure]. It would be like a a person with no bones. 

the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach.

 Rav Nahman has in one Torah lesson the idea that when one finds that he learns but does not understand the advice is to shout  the words. On occasion I have tried that myself and it works, but it seems to be advice for occasions that present the opportunity to do so. Because in general, I find it simpler to take the basic path of learning of Rav Nahman of just saying the words and going on more practical.

Also Rav Nahman did bring the idea of review both in the LeM and Sefer HaMidot. But clearly according to the Conversations of Rav Nahman 76, that is only a part time affair. Still I want to bring one way of review that I have tried and seems to work for me. As I progress through a book, I go one page forward and then keep my place and then review all the way back to the beginning. Then I go one more page forward and then from that new place also review back to the beginning. 

[But I should add that there were different ideas of how to learn in depth in Shar Yashuv in NY and the Mir in NY. But in any case, the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach. [That is a more global approach than the previous achronim later authorities [like the Pnei Yehoshua and Maharsha] that concentrate more on local issues.]

Slander [lashon hara]

Slander [lashon hara] is causing damage. That is the main issue. This fact can get obscured within all the details you find in the Hafez Haim. In lesser degrees of severity comes the points of the Hafez Haim that speaking even truth  that results in damage that would not happen if judged in court is lashon hara pliss all the other conditions. [There are 7 condition altogether to be able to say something negative about someone else. In issues of between man and his fellow man. In issues of between man and God the conditions are not the same but seem to be related.]

Rehilut is different. That is causing hatred between people. That is not the same thing as lashon hara.

In any case, the point of the Hafez Haim that lashon hara is dived into between man and fellow man and man and God does not come out of this principle-of causing damage. [Causing damage to one's reputation is also causing damage.]

[There however is a sort of balance in that to warn others of to stay away from evil people is a positive command. And the prohibition of lashon hara does not forbid that. Thus the letter of excommunication of the Gra is important to abide with since it in fact warns us of danger that we would not know otherwise. In fact it would be hard to know without the warning of the Gra and Rav Shach.]

When at the Mir there was a sort of emphasis on not speaking lashon hara [slander]. I noticed this in a few ways. One was that right after the morning prayers there were people that had a small session in learning two laws per day in the book about the laws of slander [Hafez Haim]. Also I noticed a general emphasis on this particular law in the daily conduct of most people pus the roshei yeshiva. 

There was another specific emphasis on laws about monetary matters.

And these two points were in addition to the general atmosphere of emphasis on learning Torah.

So looking back on that period I think it is clear why I and so many others look back on our time at the Mir as a golden age.

Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

 Rav Shach brings two arguments of Rav Akiva Eiger and and asks on both arguments. This is in the  Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

[The issue is also brought in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in the commentaries].

The case is this. Hamez [yeast or leavened bread]  belongs to a gentile that is in the domain of a Israeli, and the Israeli has accepted responsibility and an obligation to pay for it if it is lost or stolen. He can not keep it on Passover. But let's say he did not get rid of it and kept it on Passover. After Passover is it allowed or not to derive benefit from it?

The Yerushalmi [The Jerusalem Talmud] brings two opinions about this. One forbids and the other allows.

The Rambam states the law as the opinion that it is forbidden. Why? It is a law of the sages and any law of the sages we always go by the lenient opinion. Rav Akiva Eiger wants to answer this.

One answer if based on the Mishna:  One stole hamez and it was still in his possession on Passover. After Passover he wants to return it to the owner. He can say (הרי שלך לפניך) "What you own, you can now take."

One way to explain this is that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from the hamez. [The reason is on whom would the law of the sages apply to? Not the person that was the victim of the theft. But not the thief either since even if it would be forbidden he could still say "what you onw now you can take."]

So the law that hamez that Passover has passed over on is forbidden would not apply. This explanation of the Mishna would be like the opinion in the Yerushalmi that hamez of a gentile in the domain of a Israeli is permitted after Passover. But since we see that our Gemara [Pesachim 105] holds the explanation of the Mishna is that even though the hamez is forbidden in use so we do not go with the lenient opinion of the Yerushalmi.

One question I have on Rav Akiva Eigger. is the very idea in itself { even if it would be forbidden the thief could still say "what you onw now you can take."] This is sort of hard to see since the whole question in the first place is is it forbidden?  Presumably this opinion would hold that if teh hamez is forbidden in use then the thief could not say this. 

But that is not the question of Rav Shach. Rav Shach simply brings two Gemaras in Pesachim that show that the explanation of the Mishna is not in question. The hamez is forbidden.

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Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon.

 Since the conjunction of sun and moon was on the 13th I think Passover comes out on the 27 of March. That is Friday night, the night of the 26. That would be like R. Elazar in Sanhedrin page 10 that the new moon does not depend on the court on earth. Rather if the court on earth sanctifies the  new moon at the right time then fine,-but if not, then the heavenly court does so anyway.

Everyone seems to think that the new moon depends on the lower court according to all opinions, but you certainly do not see that in Sanhedrin. Just the opposite. The later opinions of Rav Ashi and Rava go with the idea of R. Elazar. And even if the new moon would depend on the lower court, there has not been a lower court to sanctify it since the middle of the Talmudic period when the authentic semicha died out.

And the idea of Hillel II sanctifying the later new moons is a myth never mentioned anywhere in the Gemara.

Since semicha disappeared during the time of the amoraim [Talmudic sages] the dates were in doubt. Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon. During the time of the geonim at some point they accepted the calendar of Meton. But there is no indication that Hillel II sanctified it. 

letters from the early geonim have the dates of their writing to not be in accord with the present calendar, but sometime around the time of saadia gaon you see the present day calendar being accepted. but at least we knw the present day calendar is not from the talmud. 

at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics).

I wanted to mention that at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics). Or at least that was one thing that attracted me to the place. Even though Shar Yashuv is also a very great yeshiva, still the lack of Musar left me feeling somewhat empty. Although I am looking at this from hindsight which can be faulty, still it is clear to me that this small drop of Musar made a world of difference for me. So I would like to suggest in fact the idea of having two Musar sessions per day just like at the Mir. 

Musar has three separate aspects. The books of the rishonim [mediaeval]. Books of the achronim which are also thought to be part of the Musar movement.  Then the books of the actual disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Obligations of the Hearts of Ibn Pakuda is the best of the books of the Rishonim. As for the later authors, the books of Rav Isaac Blazer are the best. The main one, Or Israel is known. The other was a collection of his writings and only printed once. I saw it in Netivot. But I should mention that the books of all the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter are great in terms of getting an idea of Musar is all about.]

"with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

 

That is based on the statement of Rav Nahman that "with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is  a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

And Rav Natan takes this idea  a bit further and claims that as much as one forgets his past, all the better.

You see this also in the LeM about starting new every day.

This shows the deep insight of Rav Nahman into human nature. It is a profound insight how important forgetting all ones' past is.

maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context.

 maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context. The idea comes from the Gemara that dough that is made for dogs is Ok for Passover even to fulfill the obligation of eating maza the first night of Passover if the shepherds eat also from it . that is called "shumra" {guarded}.

You can not imagine they guarded the dough so that the dogs could fulfill the mitzvah!

This all comes down to an important idea of Rav Nahman: not to add extra restrictions.

[I thought to add here that all the restrictions about maza are sometimes exaggerated. All maza is is flour and water baked or fried before 18 minutes is up from the time the flour touched the water and put into  a frying pan with oil at the bottom so it doesn't stick. [not any more oil than that.] The thing is that you have to remember is the it should be בלילה עבה thick dough, not easily poured like you would be making a pancake. Of course the pancake is also ok in terms except that to be "bread" (Hamotzie) the dough has to be thick. A think dough is "mezonot".

The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari.

 The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari. [That Tosphot is fairly well known because it is the source of the idea that gentiles are not commanded on the prohibition of "shituf". ["joining"]. However I forgot the page  number. But it should be easy to find for anyone who is interested. You just look up the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in laws of oaths and the Beer HaGola will bring the page number of that Tosphot.]

Rav Saadia Gaon brings two problems. That of identifying God and Jesus. Plus nullification of the commandments.  Both of these points are correct.

Rav Avraham Abulafia has a very positive opinion about Jesus, but a highly negative opinion about the Catholic Church. That is more of less the same as Rav Yaakov Emden. The Ari has the same opinion as Rav Abulafia as you can see in the writings of the Ari on the end of Genesis, concerning the burial of Joseph in Egypt.   [That is the idea of the Ari is identical to that of Rav Avraham Abulafia.]

[My own opinion is that I have no opinion except what these sages say. However there are some other opinions that disagree with the above, and when there is a difference of opinion among the rishonim I say אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים אבל הלכה  כהרוב These and those are the words of the Living God, but the law goes by these that I have quoted since they are the majority.]

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If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

 The point of Rav Nahman that Satan is dressed in mitzvot [as it says in the first Torah lesson in the LeM] is this: The mitzvot are not goals in themselves. They are to bring to natural law. Laws that are recognized by means of Reason. This is the opinion of all rishonim. This is also  clear in the Gemara itself. In the Gemara we find [Bava metziah page 119 side a] the sages do not disagree with R Shimon ben Yochai about the fact that the mitzvot were given with certain goals as their purpose and these goals are known. That is not the disagreement. Rather-the disagreement is if there is conflict between the reason for the law or the letter of the law,-- which one do you go by? But we do know the reason for the law according to both opinions. But almost no where in the mishna or Gemara are the reasons stated. That is left to the rishonim [mediaeval authorities].

So now we can see how the evil inclination can be disguised in mitzvot. For sometimes keeping a mitzvah results in the opposite of the intension of the law.   [reasons: (1) to gain good character traits, compassion, mercy, kindness, honesty, not to slander; honor of one's parents (2) peace of the state; (3) to avoid idolatry.] [And for the religious, the result of the façade of keeping mitzvot usually results in the exact opposite of the actual reasons for them. However this ought to be qualified a bit. After all the Litvak world that follows the Gra is actually pretty close to keeping the Torah and the reasons for the commandments as well as possible. If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

Placebo Religion and Philosophy

 The ... problem with placebo religion is this: imagine a patient with a serious illness is given a placebo pill as treatment. Since there is no substantive therapeutic medication in it, the patient will continue to suffer from the illness and perhaps even die. The same danger exists in placebo religion: it has no real substance other than the placebo effect. The believer will continue to be vulnerable to the ill effects of everyday life while he is convinced his belief in the placebo religion is having a positive effect on a negative reality.

http://philosophos.sdf.org/feature_articles/philosophy_article_161.html

[See the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov. This problem is discussed in a somewhat different kind of way in his discussions of Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chaps 12 and 28. Even the very first lesson in the LeM discusses the fact that the evil inclination [Satan] disguises himself in mitzvot.]

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Musar --the learning of the books of the rishonim [mediaeval authors] that deal with ethical issues is helpful in terms of orientation. It gives an idea of the big picture of Torah. But the idea that learning lots of Musar in order to correct character traits, seems a bit far fetched. That is why I think almost all Litvak yeshivas based in the Gra limited the amount of time of learning Musar to only 20 minutes before mincha and 15 min. before maariv. But I am not sure if there really is any  formulas that can help one come to good character. So learning Musar certainly seems like the best approach in that there simply does not seem to be any other approach at all.

 I can see that without Musar people tend to understand Torah in ways that are idolatry in the guise of Torah. 

So for those with resources, the best idea is that original idea of Rav Israel Salanter to spend a lot of one's spare time in learning Musar.

Rav Nahman also noticed the issue that people can get the wrong idea easily about what really constitutes a "mitzvah". The is the very first Torah lesson in his LeM that היצר הרע מתלבש במצוות the evil inclinations disguises itself in mitzvot -

There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82

 There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82. However I thought to at least jot down the basic issues.

The Mishna there says one can make a eruv for boundaries the day before Shabat and the person has to accept it while still day. The Gemara asks that that sounds like there is "no choice that works in reverse", for if there would be choice, then one could make the eruv in the day and at night the person that it is made for can accept it and it would be known in reverse that it was ok with him even during the day. Rav Ashi answers and says really there is choice and here we are talking about when they let the person know  that the eruv is being made but he did not accept it until night.

The problem is that אין חבין לאדם שלא מדעתו. One can not make an acquisition for another that causes him harm unless it is with his knowledge. [And an eruv is in that category since he loses the right to walk on Shabat in all directions except 2000 amot from the eruv.]

Now since from the Torah there is "no choice in reverse", the answer of Rav Ashi is only going according to the opinion "there is choice". The issue is not if there is choice when it comes to a eruv. Rather the question is can it be revealed after the fact that the direction chosen to place the eruv was good for the person--i.e. the direction he wanted to walk it on Shabat. It is not a question if the eruv is valid in one direction or another Rather if this direction is a good thing for that person.

Thus the Rif and Rosh both leave out the answer of Rav Ashi. That is how Rav Shach explains the Raavad over in laws of eruv. [chapter 6:23]

The  question in Eruvin 82  is about if that direction is good. That is different than  the issue of a person that makes his own eruv and says, "If the wise man comes in that direction, then my eruv is in that direction. And if in the other direction, then my eruv is in that other direction." Now in this last case, there is no doubt that one can make his own eruv even in a direction he does not want to go. So the only question is "retrograde choice " in eruv which we know is ok. That is different from one making an eruv for someone else, and that someone else deciding later on shabat that that is the direction he wants to go. 

The Raavad is brought in the Rashba and Ritva on page 82b. The Rambam seems to be going with Rashi. The issue is this: retrograde choice is valid for laws from the sages but not for laws from the Torah. So the way Rashi and the Rambam look at this is that the one for whom the eruv was made can decide later which direction he wants to walk in and that in reverse means that the eruv that was made from him was good. To the Rif, Rosh and Raavad this would only work for the the law of eruv. Not for something which is a liability for which the law of retrograde choice is that it would not work.

In the approach of Rav Natan, the disciple of Rav Nahman there is an emphasis to stay away from all secular learning, I think you can see in the LeM of Rav Nahman itself a somewhat different approach. This you can see in the first Torah lesson to להסתכל בהשכל שיש בכל דבר ולהתקשר להשם  על ידי השכל שיש בכל דבר to look at the wisdom that is in all things and to become attached to God by means of the wisdom that is in all things. But a vast majority of secular learning is pseudo science and so you can see why Rav Natan was taking the approach to avoid all secular learning all together. 

But since the Ran [Rav Nahman] himself had the approach of seeing the wisdom that is in each thing, it seem to me that this corresponds to the rishonim [medieval authorities] that held one ought to learn Physics [which meant at that time the book Physics of Aristotle and the related subject matter]. 

The approach of the rishonim however was not simply that book of Aristotle, but rather the subject matter. Even during the middle ages the subject was developing.

The switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people

 There is a sort of switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people in the religious world. And this is to be expected since the nature of the evil inclination changes according to the times. Even in ancient Greece the nature of the different gods of Olympus changed in time. [Especially Hera.] Drastically. So idolatry is definitely not stationary. Just that the religious world ought to be more careful about this issue than is found currently. In the case of a עיר הנידחת [a city that has gone after idolatry] there is no need to see if every person is guilty of worshipping an idol. All you need is a majority of the people. That is enough to determine that the whole city must be destroyed. Thus with the religious world that worships dead people. You do no need to weigh the beliefs of every person. It is enough to see that "if it looks like a duck, and wobbles like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is  a duck." That means in a practical sense that one ought to stay away from the religious world, least he or she be caught up in the punishment that will eventually follow them. [As the Gemara says about those people in the city that has gone after idolatry.]

 The Gra  signed the letter of excommunication and was ignored and so this problem has just grown larger and larger over time. Maybe it is time to stop all the pictures of so called tzadikim. It it had merely been a matter of  a few pictures of the Gra or Rav Shach to remind one to learn Torah. But once you let pictures of true tzadikim like the Gra then that makes room for all the frauds. But now the worship of dead people has gotten way out of hand. Maybe it is time to get back to straight monotheism. Worship of God alone. And the problem is exasperated by the fact that is it is the people that wear of the religious clothes that are supposed to make us think that they are learning and keeping Torah. They are the ones worshipping dead people. 

What I think is that getting back to straight worship of God alone.

[However I should make clear that Rav Nahman's teachings I find invaluable and important and this critique on the religious world is not meant to be extended to Rav Nahman.]

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[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar, ]

Even though I had  a lot of benefit by learning the particular path of Musar (Ethics) of Navardok (which is trust in God), I have to mention that there were  few different schools of thought that came from Rav Israel Salanter like Slobodka (which is about the greatness of Man). Each of his disciples had a different approach. And from what I learned, each has something important to add. [The main ones were Rav Isaac Blazer (fear of God), and Rav Simcha Zisel of Kelm.] There was a different emphasis in each school.  With Isaac Blazer there was the emphasis on Fear of God. Simcha Zisel's emphasis was on order.  But the core and essence of Musar was always good character traits. And the idea there is that good character is the essence and goal of Torah.  And how to define good character is the clarity of the medieval books of Musar. 

What I found most beneficial (for me ) was to go through all the basic books of Musar of the Middle Ages along with the books of the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar. And when I say "side tracked", I mean that as an understatement. For some reason God, blessed me with great parents and teachers, But I realize that not everyone has that, so all the more so is Musar important. [אורחות צדיקים, שערי תשובה, מסילת ישרים ,מעלות המידות, חובות הלבבות]  [Obligations of the Heart. Gates of Repentance, Ways of the Righteous, ...]

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עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א

 חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת את זה רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומרת מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל, ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם, ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. An das for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of תוספות is that these two גמרות do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be ר' אלעזר that an  עכו''ם does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of תרומה and מעשר. That is the only way I can see that the גמרא in  ראש השנה can make sense. But if so then what is the question in  עבודה זרה? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. Just like תוספות answers for the גמרא in  ראש השנה. So you must say instead that תוספות is going like רבה that the עכו''ם has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the גמרא in עבודה זרה. And as for the גמרא in ראש השנה the answer is the  עכו''ם has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of תרומה. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the עכו''ם could own land.

עם זאת אני עדיין תוהה את השאלה הזו. התשובה של תוספות היא ששתי הגמרות הללו אינן חולקות. בסדר. אבל אז לפי איזו דעה התשובה הזו הולכת? זה חייב להיות ר' אלעזר כי לעובד אלילים יש יכולת להחזיק אדמות בישראל  כדי לסלק את חובת תרומה ומעשר. זו הדרך אחת שיכולים לראות שהגמרא בראש השנה יכולה להיות הגיונית. אבל אם כן אז מה השאלה בעבודה זרה? איך הגויים יכולים לגרום לאיסור על העצים בארץ ישראל? התשובה צריכה להיות פשוטה. יש להם רכוש חלקי. בדיוק כמו שתוספות עונה לגמרא בראש השנה. אז אתה חייב לומר במקום זאת שתוספות מתנהלות כמו רבה שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק קרקעות בישראל עד כדי נטילת חובת המעשר. זה עונה לגמרא בעבודה זרה. ובאשר לגמרא בראש השנה התשובה היא שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק אדמות בכדי להסיר את חובת תרומה. אבל האדמה בזמן כניסתה של ישראל לארץ כנען, הארץ הייתה בבעלות קולקטיבית בלבד, ולא בבעלותו של אדם אחד. ובמקרה זה יכול האכו''ם להחזיק אדמה באופן שמסולק חיוב תרומה ומעשר.

Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a.

 I was thinking about those two Gemaras in Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a. While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other Gemara holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly Tosphot [in Rosh Hashana 13a] does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. Raba who holds אין קניין לעבו''ם בארץ ישראל (there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel) holds that only with regard to Truma and Maasar [tithes], not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact Raba holds that  monetary ownership even stronger than Rav Elazar. So the the Gemara in Avoda Zara can not simply be said to be of Raba.

The actual Gemara in Avoda Zara 23 says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to Avraham, and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the Gemara answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden.

Now the way Rav Shach understands the Rambam in laws of idolatry 8:3, that Gemara in fact is like Raba that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to Avraham. But that answer is hard to see since even Raba holds a gentile can have monetary ownership, and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So Tosphot explains that that Gemara is referring to trees that existed already in the time of Avraham, and its question refers to them.

[But I can see the answer to Rav Shach also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as truma and maasar would go.]

[The other Gemara in Rosh Hashana asks how could Israel bring the omer from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the omer from grain that was owned by gentiles.

The contradiction between these two Gemaras is answered by Tosphot thus: The gemara in Rosh Hashana is ok because even though Israel owned the land still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in Avoda Zara is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees]--that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees even those that were around from the time of Avraham

[There is still a lot to think about here --in terms of in fact how these two gemaras relate to the issue between Raba and Rav Elazar. I recall that I wrote something about this in my little booklet on Bava Metzia.] [page 101]

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It seems that it must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. And so why does the Gemara there not simply answer the question in that way? So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. An das for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land.

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 I was thinking about those two גמרות in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב and ראש השנה י''ג ע''א . While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other גמרא holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly תוספות does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. רבה who holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel holds that only with regard to תרומה and מעשר, not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact רבה holds that in terms of monetary ownership even stronger than רב אלעזר. So the the גמרא in עבודה זרה  can not simply be said to be of רבה. The actual גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to אברהם and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the גמרא answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden. Now the way רב שך understands the רמב''ם in laws of idolatry 8:3 that גמרא in fact is like רבה that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to אברהם. But that answer is hard to see since even רבה holds a gentile can have monetary ownership and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So תוספות explains that that גמרא is referring to trees that existed already in the time of אברהם and its question refers to them.  But I can see the answer  של רב שך  also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as תרומה and מעשר would go. The other גמרא in ראש השנה asks how could Israel bring the עומר from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the עומר from grain that was owned by gentiles. The contradiction between these two גמרות is answered by תוספות thus: The גמרא in ראש השנה י''ג ע''א  is ok because even though Israel owned the land, still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in עבודה זרה is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees?] that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees, even those that were around from the time of אברהם.

[I am thinking that that is what Tosphot means over there in Rosh Hashana.]

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חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת כי רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. גמרא בפועל בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומר מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

 x87 D minor mp3

x87 midi file

 In Breslov today, I was speaking with a fellow that is in the paratroopers units of IDF and the subject the religious world sucking money out of the state ( a well known sore spot) came up. [I suggested that the parliamentary system is at fault.]  At any rate, I think it ought to be clear that people ought to learn Torah; but to use Torah to make money is  different subject. The ideal way of learning Torah is to sit and learn and trust in God for parnasah [making a living]. But the trouble begins when people begin to see Torah as a means of making money. 

There is an argument if it is permitted it accept charity in order to learn Torah, but to use Torah to suck the state is not the same thing. But that is not just in Israel. There is a general problem in the religious world of using Torah for money and power.

See the Guide for the Perplexed: the parable about the king in his country

 In the approach of the Rambam you place Physics and Metaphysics on a higher plane than learning Gemara. You can see this in the Guide where his parable about the king in his country says this openly. [In that parable there are different levels of closeness to the king. Those outside the palace but inside the capitol city are closer than almost everyone else--except for those that are inside the palace. Those outside the palace are the Torah scholars. Those inside the palace are the Physicists. 

[The Rambam is depending on the Gemara about ר' יוחנן בן זכאי שלמד דבר גדול ודבר קטן מאי דבר גדול? מעשה מרכבה. ומאי דבר קטן ? מעשה בראשית]

But even closer to the king are the "philosophers and prophets." OK about the prophets. But philosophers? I have trouble seeing that. Philosophy today is in deep trouble. There seems to be something about philosophy that has a sort of Achilles heel. Physics I think the best way of learning this mainly saying the words and going on. But also some time one should do review.

God is not the same as the world.The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him," means there are no other gods besides Him.

In Torah, God is not thought to be the same as the world. I do not know from where people get the opposite idea from. The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him,"  means there are no other gods besides Him. But on a deeper level it means that  everything besides God can not exist without Him. This is clear in all Rishonim when they discuss the basic core beliefs of Torah. You can see this in all Musar books of the Rishonim. In the first seven laws of Mishna Torah you can see this also. There the Rambam explains "there is none besides Him" to mean the existence of everything besides God is dependent on God. 

None of that implies that God is the same as the world.