the work my Dad did on the infrared satellite systems

I wanted to mention the work my Dad did on the infrared satellite systems that were made at TRW and the launched in 1970. The basic story was that he created the infrared camera in the 1950's. Then
he went into private business with another invention [the Copy Mate x-ray machine]. So when the USA government wanted to create a early warning satellite system using infra red the logical place to go was to the actual inventor of the system that is Phil Rosenblum [Rosten]. Then after that system was created he went on to create laser communication also at TRW for SDI. But that system was not launched until many years later since in the meantime there was a spy for the KGB at TRW, so the whole space program was closed down for some years until it reopened in the 1990's. [That whole sad incident was made into a movie with Steven McQueen called The Falcon and the Snowman named after the two traitors that gave American secrets  including my dad's work to the KGB.]]

[My dad was considered very highly even before that. During WWII he was responsible for the smooth running of six B-29's.]






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תוספות בבא מציעא צט ע''א וקידושין נ''ה ע''א

The משנה says מועל with בדק הבית goes out to חולין. That is אין מועל אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. The תוספתא פרק ב says יש cases when בדק הבית also stays הקדש. This is the question of תוספות in קידושין נ''ה ע''א. The answer  looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to ר' מאיר  that מזיד it goes out to חולין. This seems to be open and plain in the words of תוספות even though he does not mention ר' מאיר. The second answer looks to be straight like ר' יהודה that only if he שוגג that it goes out to חולין. The actual division that תוספות says there is whether he thinks it is his or not. And besides that I think this is possible to be what תוספות means in Bava Mezia page 99a also. However the משנה למלך on רמב''ם laws of 'מעילה פרק ו' הלכות ד' וה says the difference is whether he gives the ax to another person or not. It looks like the מהרש''א understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek. However the Maharshal divides the answers of Tosphot into two parts. So to me it looks like the marshal understands Tosphot as I said.


במשנה כתוב אין מעול אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. היינו שמעילה בבדק הבית יוצאת לחולין. אבל בתוספתא כתוב מצבים שיש מועל אחר מועל בבדק הבית. זו שאלת התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א. נראה לי שתירוץ התוספות הוא שזה תלוי רק באם הוא חושב שכלי שלו. אם הוא חושב שהוא שלו אז לר' מאיר הוא יוצא לחולון  ולר' יהודה רק אם הוא יושב שהכלי של אחר.
אבל לפי המשנה למלך התירוץ של תוספות הוא שהכל תלוי באם הוא נתן את הכלי למי שהוא אחר או אם הוא משתמש בו בעצמו. הדבר שקשה להבין במשנה למלך הוא שאם הוא נותן את החפצא שמי שהוא אחר הוא יוצא לחולין בהכרח אז מה אפשר לעשות עם המחלוקת בין ר' מאיר לר' יהודה

the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55

If you have some object that you want to give to the Temple in Jerusalem and you say something that indicates this, then the object becomes sanctified. If it is one of those things that can be offered on the altar that is one kind of holiness. If not then it is just given to the Temple for its money value. In the meantime if someone uses it before it gets to the Temple and is redeemed then that person has to pay the amount he causes the vessel to lose value. If he just gives the object to someone then this is an argument between R Meir and R Yehuda. To R Meir if he knew it is holy then it became unconsecrated when it changed hands.But if he did not know then not.  To R Yehuda it is just the opposite.



The Mishna says moel [one who uses] with bedek habait [something consecrated for the Temple] goes out to hulin [to be not any more consecrated]. The Tosefta says There are cases when bedek habait [consecrated ]also stays holy [kodesh]. This is the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55. The answer there looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to R. Meier that on purpose it goes out to hulin [secular]. [That is: R M says if one uses a sanctified object to marry a woman if he knew it is consecrated then she is married. If he did not know then she is not. The idea here is that one usually marries a woman by means of giving her some object that is worth some amount of money. But here the object does not belong to him. But still when he gives it to her it becomes not consecrated and she can use it].This seems to be open and plain in the words of Tosphot even though he does not mention R Meier. The second answer looks to be straight like R Yehuda that only if he thinks it is his that it goes out to hulin [secular].  The actual division that Tosfot says there is whether he thinks it is his or not.
And besides that I think this is possible to be what Tosphot means in Bava Mezia page 99a also.
However the Mishna Lamelek on Rambam laws of Meila perek 6 halachas 4 to 5 says the difference is whether he gives the ax [which was consecrated towards use in the Temple] to another person or not.
I learned this subject in Uman with David Bronson and for some reason I do not recall that we discussed this problem.
I have been troubled by the Mishna LaMelek for over a week and am also upset that I do not have my old learning partner to straighten out this issue for me. I mean the basic issues look clear--even if I do not understand the Mishna Lamelek. But where David Bronson excels is in deciphering the actual words of Tosphot when Tosphot is unclear and to me the words of Tospfot in Kidushin do look unclear.

And in partcular I have to admit that it looks like the Maharsha understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek


The problem that has bothered me with the Mishna laMelek is if you say that when he gives the object to his friend it goes out to hulin then what do you do with the argument between R Mei and R yehuda [in kidushin page 52b]?

Gender wage gap

Thousands of cases were brought and the number keeps rising. But less than one percent of the cases are won. [Actually less than one percent but I forget the exact number.] Just because you can accuse someone of something does not mean they did anything wrong. The wag gap is like that. I am sitting in a library where girls are writing a paper that assumes the wag gap is true and suggest solutions. But why bring solutions to a problem before you know there is a problem.

I was in Netivot with the same problem. They assumed in the public schools that global warming is a fact without verifying the facts.





Thomas Sowell makes this point :

If the 77 percent statistic was for real, employers would be paying 30 percent more than they had to, every time they hired a man to do a job that a woman could do just as well. Would employers be such fools with their own money? If you think employers don't care about paying 30 percent more than they have to, just go ask your boss for a 30 percent raise!

Rambam nedarim has one law that comes from the Mishna: "'Not Hulin I will eat of yours,' is forbidden."The reason is that it means, "a karban I will eat of yours."  That is like R. Yehuda that from a "no" we can understand a "yes." Then in two laws later he says, "'hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."  That is like R Meir that we do not know a "yes" from a "no." Because if we would learn from the implication of "no" to "yes" it would mean, "Hulin I will not eat of yours, but a karban |I will eat of yours."

The Raavad asks this question. The Raavad asks this question on the Rambam. The Radvaz says the Rambam in  fact holds like R Yehuda and so the only question is the later law. The Radvaz points out that Rav Ashi makes a difference between To hulin and to not Hulin. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. Hulin I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the Radvaz means in that in the later law the no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler.
So in the first law of the Ramabm we know that there is only one thing that is not hulin. It is  a karban. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any hulin of yours does not mean I will eat a pkarban of yours. I might not eat not hulin nor a karban.

________________________________________________________________________________


רמב''ם נדרים has one law that comes from the משנה. This is it. "Not חולין I will eat of yours is forbidden." The reason is that it means a קרבן I will eat of yours.  That is like ר' יהודה that from a no we can understand a yes. Then in two laws later he says חולין i will not eat of yours is מותר.  That is like ר' מאיר that we do not know a yes from a no. Because if we would learn from the implication of no to yes it would mean חולין I will not eat of yours but a קרבן |I will eat of yours.

The ראב''ד asks this question.  The רדב''ז says the רמב''ם in  fact holds like ר' יהודה and so the only question is the later law. The רדב''ז points out that רב אשי makes a difference between  לחולין and to  לא חולין. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. היינו שלא אוכל לך חולין I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the רדב''ז means in that in the later law. The no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler. So in the first law of the רמב''ם we know that there is only one thing that is not חולין. It is  a קרבן. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any חולין of yours does not mean I will eat a קרבן of yours. I might not eat not חולין nor a קרבן.

ברמב''ם הלכות נדרים יש הלכה. האומר לא חולין שאני אוכל לך אסור. כלומר שזה דומה שמי שאומר קרבן שאני אוכל לך. זו דעת ר' יהודה שמכלל לאו אתה יכול להבין כן. אבל אחר כך הרמב''ם פסק  חולין שלא אוכל לך מותר. זו שאלת הראב''ד. הרדב''ז עונה ממה שהגמרא מביא רב אשי שיש חילוק בין לחולין ללא חולין. אבל בחוק השני יש גם לא. היינו חולין שלא אוכל לך. תירוץ. אם יש התכתבות אחת לאחת בין סיבה למסובב אז מכלל לאו אתה יודע כן. אבל אם אין התכתבות כזה אז לא. למשל אם יש גשם אנחנו יודעים שבחוץ הוא רטוב. אבל אם הוא רטוב בחוץ אין אנו יודעים שהוא יבש בחוץ בגלל שיכול להיות שמי שהוא פתח את הממטרה שלו. לכל בעניין שלנו לא חולין יש לו רק פירוד אחד היינו קרבן. לכן לא חולין שאוכל לך פירודו קרבן שאוכל לך. אבל זה שלא אוכל לך חולין אין מזה מובן שכן אוכל לך קרבן אלא שיכול שלהיות שלא אוכל לך לא חולין ולא קרבן.

The religious in general give me the creeps.

I think the best approach to passover is to stay home and do as much as one can do without going to any religious people. I think people make too much of a problem out of Passover in such a way that people get the idea the can not stay home and do it themselves. I think in general is the best to not go to any religious place except if you have a Reform or Conservative place nearby. The religious in general give me the creeps. [However I do like the Breslov Na Nach Groups and also I like the Litvaks [i.e., Lithuanian yeshiva type people.]  
I should add that not just Breslov but some other groups I think are OK like Vishnitz and Ger.] 

It occurs to me that you only find strong old trees where the wind and rain blow hard. In the sunny valleys where a tree encounters little resistance, it does not grow strong.
So it is in life that the problems are often opportunities for growth and to learn from one's mistakes.

When sailing also it is a rule that you do not want the wind right behind you. That causes one to lose control of the boat. You want to go to the side of the wind where it is coming at an angle--for the same reason as ditto. You need a bit of resistance.

Musar movement of R. Salanter

It is possible that the Musar movement of R. Salanter and his ideas do not work as well as one would hope. But when I was in the Yeshiva world I found that combination of intense learning of Gemara and Musar [Ethics] [the ethical works of the rishonim [medieval authors]] to be a potent combination that works for self improvement. And from what I can see -it does work to a high degree.. [The only thing is that I felt I needed the imput of idea from Rav Nahman also.]

I mean to say that the way of the Litvak yeshivot is good in which the morning is devoted to in depth Gemara learning and fast in the afternoon, while Musar is only given a short amount of time. Still the Musar periods I think should be expanded. 

Shaari Teshuva by R. Yona

Why it is important to remember the past is to learn lessons for the present.The idea here is what it says the the Gemara in Shabat אין יסורים בלי עוון  "There are no problems without sin." That is all problems that one has are either directly from some sin or indirectly. [The Gemara over there had a question about death also, but it concludes that death can come without sin- but not other kinds of problems.]

The idea is furthermore that Repentance involves remembering what one has done wrong in the past and trying to change for the better.

In any case the book Shaari Teshuva by R. Yona is one of the canonical books of Musar which are a core part of the Musar Movement. And I definitely was into that book when I was at the Mir.

I also can not see how it is possible to improve oneself without learning from the past. Maybe in theory it is possible to simply find the right path--the truth- and stick with it. But in fact unless one is a god-and has infallible knowledge--then it always makes sense to recheck your homework.

In fact from what I recall String Theory started out by the fact that one of its founders went back to recheck his work and by that discovered one of the first equations of String Theory.

I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge.

I was in the Breslov Beit Midrash today [the Na Nach group] and listened a few minutes to a book written by Rav Natan [a disciple of Rav Nahman]. [I mean to say that the general approach is to read of books of Rav Nahman and Rav Natan aloud--and I listened a few minutes.
The statement of Rav Natan was basically about "חכמות חיצוניות" [secular wisdom].
 This seems to be an argument between rishonim. There are those that go along the lines of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam that see certain secular subjects as important. There are others that say no.

I am not really sure how to deal with this issue. To me the whole emphasis on not learning secular wisdom seems to be with intention to create a kind of alternative society. --The idea is to create a kind of insulation from the outside world.
 The same thing seems to be the emphasis on dress and the skull cap and women's dress. It all seems to be geared towards creating a separate society where the religious are in charge.

I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge. Enough said for the wise.

On the other hand I can how a great deal of secular subjects are rotten--like anything that has the word "studies".

My own approach is more or less based on the Rambam in Mishne Torah in the part that deal with learning Torah and the part in particular that says to divide one's time into three parts. There the Ramabm says one part goes for the written law. Another third for the Oral Law. And the third for Gemara. Then the Rambam adds, "The subjects discussed in the first four chapter of Mishna Torah which are called Pardes are in the category of the Gemara."
Those subjects are what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Meta-physics. [The Ramabm repeats this in the Guide.] You can see this in the Hovot Levavot also[Obligations of the Heart by Ibn Pakuda].

I can see how the world changed from when I was growing up. The world I grew up in was optimistic and open. Southern California. Things were a little different in the two yeshivas I went to  in NY Shar Yashuv and the Mir but the same atmosphere or classic American optimism was there. Then I kind of wne into a period of hibernation. I was in the Vishniz community in Meor Haim in Safed for a few years and totally lost contact with the outside world. I spent most of my time in the basic path path of Rav Nahman from Breslov of Hitbodadut.[[Talking with God in the forest]. And there was a kind of Divine light that filled the atmosphere in those days. Then it all fell through. So when I awoke the world had changed drastically. I think a lot had to do with crimes that had changed people's perspective. The world was filled with suspicion one for the other. Maybe it is justified suspicion. But it seems to me it is usually misplaced. There are lots of deviants and sadistic monstors. But they are never the people that are usually suspected.

As Rav Nahman himself made a point of this in his critique of Torah Scholars that are demons.

Today I would probably have taken Rav Nahman's teachings in a more balanced way. My center of gravity would be along the lines of the Gra and Rav Shach, while at the same time I would try to follow what is valuable and important in Rav Nahman's teachings.

Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.

I have a question in the Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.
The question that I have is one that it looks like Rav Joseph Karo and the Radvaz answer but their answers look to me to be hard to understand.


The basic issue is this. There is a teaching in the Gemara that says hulin the hulin like hulin whether \I will eat of yours or will not is permitted. "'Hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden. 'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."

The Rambam says, "'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden." [Nedarim 1:19]

Now with the Radvaz, the Rambam holds like R Yehuda that from a negative we can understand what would result in a positive. So it makes sense why the Rambam would disagree with the end of that teaching. However the question I have is that, "How does it make sense?" Should not two negatives result in a positive?

Rav Joseph Karo holds the Rambam holds like R Meir that from a negative one can not derive a positive. So I am not sure how to deal with this issue. I saw a few days ago that Rav Shach has some ideas on this subject but I still have not gotten a chance to get over to the Litvak Beit Midrash where the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach is located to study carefully what he says.

I just wanted to give a short idea of who I am for those that are wondering. I was born into an amazing family. My parents loved each other and us [their children very much]. I went to public school until it became time to choose a university and instead i decided to go to Shar Yashuv [a Litvak Yeshiva in NY] and then the Mir in NY. And then to Israel.
The experience I had in the Mir was formative of my attitudes about the importance of learning Torah and trust in God.
I have not been able to continue on that path very well and so I also went to Polytechnic Institute of NYU for Physics.

the existence of time

McTaggart argues against the existence of time. I forget the argument. I was not like Kant's. But locality is well established. as in Special Relativity. Which means cause and effect have to be close to each other and in sequence. The only way I can see Kant's point is if time is circular like Godel wanted to show.


The way you can see that causality [or locality is correct is by GPS [Global Positioning System]. Both Special Relativity and General Relativity have to be right for the system to work at all.
However there is a  set up that Einstein Podolsky Rosen thought up that Bell showed that Quantum Mechanics is  right. So you can  show from the inequality of Bell that either locality is not right or that particles do not have classical values until measured. So since we know locality is right therefore we have to take the second choice. Particles do not have classical values until measured.

I one time wrote to Dr Kelley Ross asking about this result which looks a  lot like Kant. I asked him that de-coherence is well known phenomenon. That means the wave function of particles collapses even just because a particle interacts with another particle. That is what makes Quantum computing hard to set up. He answered that some people argue that if your look at the big picture in which the lab itself is a part of the system we still have the result that things do not have classical values until measured.

Just to be a little more clear about the issues I raised in my blog from yesterday I want to explain a little as best I can.

The idea of R.   Meier is this. You can not derive a plus from a minus, a yes from a no. That means let us says you have a sentence, "If it is raining it must be wet outside." To R. Meier you can not derive "If it is not raining it is dry outside." And this came up in one of my little books on Shas. But I had forgotten this whole issue about R Meir.

This comes up in the Talumd tractate "Nedarim" page 11 side A. and in the book of Rav Shach on the Rambam laws of nedarim vows chapter 1 law 18 [actually 18 through 20].

The problem in the Rambam is in law 18 he says, '"That which I will eat of yours is not secular" and then he is forbidden to eat of anything that belongs to the other person.' That is like the Sages against R Meir.. Then in law 20 he says, "That which I will eat of yours is secular or that which I will not eat of yours is secular and that is allowed to eat from the other fellow,' and that is like R Meir. So everyone wants to answer how can the Rambam decide the law in two contradictory ways? The Radvaz [Rav David ben Zimrah], the Migdal Oz [Rav Shem Tov from Spain], and Rav Elazar Shach  and Rav Yoseph Karo each try to answer this question.


I have nothing new to add here except that I can see that I really must have been a real ignoramus (am haaretz) when I was at the Mir, because this exact chapter in Nedarim is what the whole yeshiva was learning in my first six months there and I can see now that I was completely unaware of the issues that ought to be obvious to anyone learning Nedarim--but I missed all these issues.

daughter of an"am Haaretz" -ignoramus

I was surprised to see in the commentary of the Rambam on the Mishna  that one is not allowed to marry the daughter of an"am haaretz"[that is a ignoramus]. That is it is not just good advice but actual a law. Then I noticed the same thing in Mishne Torah of the Rambam. This goes to show what they used to say in the Mir Yeshiva [during the short period I was there] concerning the choice of whom to marry: "If your wife wants you to learn Torah,- you will. If she does not want it,- then you won't."

This is an important point to consider when thinking about marriage.
 When at the Mir, I was hoping for this kind of shiduch. In the meantime, the girl [whom I knew from high school] who had been writing and calling me for years to get me, just seemed to not want to give up. I tried to explain to her nicely, and not nicely, that I was not interested in her. Yet, she just did not  give up. So one day, on the phone trying to find a place for her for the Sabbath meals, I was on the phone with Arye Kaplan. He asked why I did not marry her? I said, I wished for a daughter of a person that was into learning Torah{as in the path of the Mir}. His reaction to that was that it was not possible that I would be offered anyone else in the religious world except for a baalat mum [a person with a hidden defect]. [That is to say, I should marry her since she is a good girl that I know very well. That is preferable to someone I do not know, and would find later problems with.] So I talked afterwards to Rav Getz, a good Torah scholar who learned at the Mir. He also suggested that I marry her.[I did. Soon after we went on the normal 6 dates--every motzai Shabat. And for a while I stayed at the Mir [I forget how long. Maybe two years I think. Then Israel. So for a good long time se stuck with me as I was learning Torah and she deserves credit for that,]  


I ought to add that these issues are not all that clear, since it is possible to have a girl that wants you to learn Torah even though her background might be not religious at all. And on the opposite side of things you might have  a girl from a religious background that wants one to work. But in any case, I suggest that if one is into learning Torah in the way of the Gra and the Litvak Yeshiva World. I suggest  that this issue ought to be  a first priority. For it is hard for most people to realize what the issue is all about. It is not that it is "good idea" to learn Torah. It is more or less that learning Torah is the purpose of life and of the creation of the universe. It is the first priority beyond anything else imaginable. It is hard to see this. For I myself having fallen from this ideal find it hard to describe. But in fact there is a profound truth in this that is more or less impossible to communicate to anyone who does not already feel it deep inside of him or her.
[In later times I got involved in Physics and Mathematics, yet I feel that even though these are also important, still I wish I had been able to contunue in Torah.] The thing is --it is hard to find the right balance.

Talmud Nedarim page 11

From "no" you hear "yes". That is the sages. However R. Meier hold not. This comes up in the Talmud Nedarim page 11 and in Rav Shach's Avi Ezriin laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 18.

I had forgotten this whole issue and because of this I would like to add a comment on my little books on Bava Mezia and Shas. But I can not because the police have my computer.
There are probably tons of things going on in this chapter in the Avi Ezri -- but the first thing that occurs to me is how this relates to a comment made my my learning partner David Bronson a few years ago.

The basic idea is this.Rashi in Bava Mezia had some comment If A then B therefore if not A then not B. I objected to this because of Aristotelian logic Even if it is true that it is raining it is wet outside but there might be other reasons for it to be wet. Therefore if it is wet that does not mean it is raining. Someone might have turned on their sprinklers.
Then David noticed in laws of sacrifices this same argument came up between Rava and the gemara.

This I wrote down in my notes. But at the time I was not aware of this disagreement between the sages and R Meier. So now it looks like Rava was going like the sages and the Gemara was going like R. Meier.
And from what I can tell that is how Rav Joseph Karo answers the problem in the Rambam himself who on the surface looks like he contradicts himself between law 18 and law 20 in laws of Nedarim chapter 1.
But I was in a Lithuanian Beit Midrash today where they have a copy of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and from my brief glance I could see that he has a different way of answering for the Rambam.
He makes a distinction beween "hatfasa" התפסה and prohibition. But I still have not had a chance to learn what Rav Shach says thoroughly.

In any case the basic idea is this לא חולין שאוכל לך אסור כחכמים. הלכה י''ח. חולין שאוכל לך מותר כר' מאיר. הלכה כ

There is something in laws of Truma of the Rambam [chapter  1] that I have a hard time with. It comes from a well known statement of Reish Lakish that if one takes the first tithe before he takes truma from sheaves of wheat that have not yet been separated and grounded then the Levi does not have to take truma but only maasar. In that the Rambam is going like the Babylonian Talmud [Abyee], not like the Jerusalem Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud holds that the Levi gives truma only if the tithe was taken after the crops became obligated. The thing that I find confusing is that in the first case the crops are tevel [obligated after the grinding] and the maasar is not even maasar. So why would the maasar be anything but a present/gift? The tithe was given before the crops even became obligated, so the maasar is not even maasar. In the case of the Jerusalem Talmud, the crops are actual tevel and still there is no obligation to give truma.

These are not really hard questions once you have verses which state that that is just the way it is. But what is odd is the Rambam says the reason in the first case is that the crops have not yet been obligated in truma. How is that a reason? In both cases you have real tevel that is not going to have truma taken from it. So on either Gemara I really have no question. It is rather the reason the Rambam gives that I find hard to understand.

The new idolatry is worship of religious leaders. Israel is so full of this that it is almost impossible to go anywhere without encountering it. This was one of the major reasons I did not want to return to Israel. As you can see in tractate Avoda Zara to go anywhere where there is avoda zara [idolatry] is a problem.
I knew there might be  probvlem but I was not aware of how extensive it is. If only Rav Shach and the Gra had been listened to, this would nopt be an issue. But for some reason even in the Litvak wolrd they are ignored for the most part.

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors is the people that go into social work. And they are the people that decide whether you can keep your children? And interview children to see if they have been hurt by an adult? As in "did so and so hurt you".[That is they ask leading questions to get the children to say what they want to hear.] You must be kidding. social workers ought to be put away in some insane asylum so they can stop hurting people themselves. Asking a social worker to interview kids is like asking a monkey to do the same.
Psychologists are almost as stupid as social workers--but not quite. But they certainly think they are superior beings.

The Hegelian State is not so absurd in my eyes. I think Communism is in its very core based on serious mistake like the Labor Theory of Value--even thought that was accepted as fact in the time of Marx--still it is not true that they value of any thing depends on how much labor went into making it. Rather it depends on how much people want to buy it.

And Hegel's model was in any case meant to help avoid the insane chaos that was the French Revolution.
And what then is up with China?
Dr Michael Huemer and Kelley Ross are against Communism in any and all forms for very good reasons and yet how else can one take control of chaos before it gets out of hand? Anyone who has been to Ukraine knows there is some kind of elements in the population that are simply crimnal and there is  alarge percent. They are not WASPS [White Anglo Saxon Protestants]. And then good elemenst are either in fact Russian DNA or Russia leaning.

In the Talmud in Nazir you have a case around page 32 or so where two people see someone coming. One thinks it is George and the other says it is Simon. The one that said it is George says "if it is Simon I will be a nazirite." The one that says it is Simon says "if it is George I will be  a Nazirite" If it is Simon the first one who thought it is George is a nazirite.

Why is this any different from nidrei zeruzim of other kinds of vow where one really does not intend the vow to actually become obligated?

I always had a kind of conflict between learning fast as I wanted to do{as I saw in a few books] in Shar Yashuv and the fact that Rav Friefeld and his son Moti were always recommending review.

So what I did was this kind of compromise that I would do the actual paragraph of the gemara twice with Rashi and also one time the English translation in the Soncino.

The idea of a sort of minimal review seemed to help me then and later on also when I was in university learning Physics I also had this kind of minimal review approach. That is one time to review the page or paragraph and go on.

This is not exactly the way of Rav Nahman that was to read the words i.e. say them in a whisper or out loud, and go on without review until you reach the end of the book and then review. But neither was it was Rav Freifeld was.


In Shar Yashuv [a Litvak yeshiva that went more or less along the path of the Gra.] They were doing Gemara in a deep way that was different from the Mir where I went later on. In Shar Yashuv the way was kind of what is called in Israel" To calculate the sugia" that is intense analysis ofg the actual words of the Gemara and Tosphot. Later in the Mir and especially with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum I saw a different approach that was based on Rav Haim Soloveichik which was global--and not concentrated on that one page in front of you. I benefited from both approaches but again as I mentioned up above when it came to personal; learning I found this kind of method of review of the paragraph twice and going on to be the thing that worked for me best. 

The basic background in Bava Mezia 101a as far as I can recall is this:
The Mishna brings the law that a renter of a field in Israel from an non Jew, takes maasar (tithe) and then pays the non Jew (probably Arab). The reason is that you can not pay your debts with tevel (produce that has not had tithes taken from it). R. Yehuda adds "also a sharecropper must take tithes and then pay." The Gemara says at first it looks like a gentile has no possesion in such a way that the crops are not obligated in tithe and a sharecropper is like a renter.

Then the Gemara brings a braita that says that R Yehuda said his law only in the case of a gentile that took the ground without paying for it. That is he stole it.  So the Gemara concludes that there is possesion and a sharecropper is not like a renter.


Sharecropping is when the worker shares some percent of the crops like Frank Hamer used to do before he became a Texas Ranger and brought down Bonnie and Clyde. 

Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

__________________________________________________________________________________




The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.