To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse

 To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse that means when both are written, the reason and the isur [[prohibition] then we go by both. So when it says by a king not to have more than 18 wives because she might tilt his heart away from God -- that means we go by both the letter of the law and also the reason.

That is how Rav Shach explains the contradiction in the Rambam where in general he does not go by R Shimon. [Well, no one does because that is R Shimon against the sages. That is the reason the Tur does not decide like R Shimon either.] But in the debate if one can not marry any girl from the nations that worship idols [עכו''ם] or only a girl from the seven Canaanite nations-- it is R. Shimon who says all nations (that worship idols) are forbidden. So why does the Rambam decide the law like that against the sages? Answer (of Rav Shach): because the letter of the law means all nations, and there R Shimon forbids all nations because of the letter of the law.

On the way by from the sea, I thought about this and asked myself,  "What about a widow?" There we know R. Shimon says one can take a pledge from a rich widow. And then I realized what Rav Shach means. He means to say that when both the isur (prohibition) and the reason are written, then R Shimon goes by both. But if only one is written, then he goes by the reason. 

This is the opposite of R Yehuda. For to R Yehuda, if only the prohibition is written then he goes by the letter of the law,-- but if both are written, then he goes only by the reason for the verse. That is why he say a king can marry as many women as he likes as long as they do not turn his heart. 

[This is  a three way debate. It is R Shimon who goes by the reason for the verse always. Do we know the reasons for the verses? Yes. No one in the Gemara disagrees with that. If that would be in doubt, then the sages would bring that objection against R Shimon and ask him, "but we do not know the reasons for the verses." And in fact what are the reasons? they are spelled out in Sefer HaHinuch from a disciple of Nahmanides. Generally they are these: peace of the state, to lessen pleasures, to get rid of idolatry, to gain good character.]

 There is something very odd about judges in the USA. I would not be surprised if somehow the Frankfurt school had a hand in getting Marxist ideas into the legal system in the USA. I used to think it was from the KGB, but now I think that the infiltration was too vast and comprehensive for it to be from the KGB. It has to be from the inside. And from where else but the Frankfurt school in Columbia University? That is where the main policy makers of the the American education system were trained.

 I had a chance today to look at the last Torah lesson Rav Nahman of Breslov said in his lifetime the Le.M. vol. II, chapter 8, and I thought to bring here a few of the ideas he mentions there. 

One idea he says is not to give rebuke because unless one has great merit, because he can make things worse by giving rebuke in the wrong kind of way.\אף על פי שתוכחה היא דבר גדול ומוטל על כל אחד להוכיח את חברו כשרואה בו דבר שאינו הגון אף על פי כן לאו כל אחד ראוי להוכיח כמו שאמר ר. עקיבא תמה אני אם יש בדור הזה מי שראוי להוכיח כי כשהמוכיח אינו ראוי הוא יכול להביש את השומעים את תוכחתו  ["Even though rebuke is a great thing and it is incumbant on every person to rebuke his friend when he sees in him something not proper ,still not everyone is fit to rebuke as R. Akiva said, 'I would be surprized if there was anyone in this generation that is fit to give rebuke,' because when the one who gives rebuke is not fit, he can cause damage and make ugly the souls of those who hear his rebuke."

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"revival of the dead"

 I think about the issue of the "revival of the dead" that you see it very clearly in Ezekiel. You have there the valley of bones and then God telling Ezekiel that that whole event of reviving those people was a sort of preliminary example of what would be eventually with all Israel. That is, that He would bring about the revival of the dead for all Israel.

So that means when the Gemara asks How do we know revival of the dead from the Torah, it must mean how do we know it from the Five Books of Moses. They can not be asking how do we know it from teh Prophets. 

Leonard Nelson

The thing about Leonard Nelson that I think is a bit off putting to people is that his approach of non intuitive immediate knowledge is thought to be a  species of psychologism. That is that truths of logic or science depend on the human mind. Well Dr. Kelley Ross shows that that is not what Nelson was saying at all. But Husserl attacks that problem head on. He brings three proofs against it.[in the first part of Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Logical Investigations, Vol. 1)] 

The thing that I noticed  is Husserl's proof depends on there being absolute truth. That is, that there are truths that do not depend on the observer. And the best proof of that from what I have seen is John Searle's.  Searle shows that if all truth is relative it sinks into there being no truth at all by means of "dis-quotation." That is the "sentence snow is white", only if snow is white. (And  snow is white is true only if it is true with respect to a background in which things can be white or not white.) It is a short proof.  [It is good that Searle was attacked, since nowadays when universities attack someone, it just shows the greatness of that person.] 

I noticed there is a new Kant-Friesian on the horizon- Michael Cuffaro.   

The answer of Rav Shach for the Rambam Laws of Divorce chapter 3 law 9

[The idea here is that a divorce has to be written on a piece of paper that says "You are herby permitted to any man," and given into her hand or her courtyard. That is the basic essence of divorce. But I must add that it must be done in front of two witnesses. Also there is a decree of the scribes that the date should be on the document.]

 If  a husband gives a divorce  document to his wife and says that it will be valid after 30 days, and she puts it in an alley, and on the thirtieth it is still in the alley but after that it is stolen she is divorced.

This seems to be in contradiction to the Gemara in Ketuboth 86 which says the law of saying to one's wife, "This document of your divorce will be valid after 30 days," equals the law when one sells an animal and also says, "This sell will be valid after 30 days." In both cases if the object is in an alley on the thirtieth day, the transaction is valid. And the Gemara on page 82 says in the case of a sell that he must say "from now" and only then it is valid.

And in fact Tosphot says this exact fact. So the question is why does the Rambam ignore this and say "from now" only in the case of a sell, [but in the case of a divorce, he ignores this distinction.]

Rav Shach says because these are two different kinds of things. The divorce has to be in her domain or he hand and it is so on the thirtieth day. But the sell is valid by means of pulling the animal and that is no longer happening on the thirtieth day. The point of Rav Shach is clear. [The Magid Mishna says the difference is that the document in still around on the 30th day which is not the case with pulling. But it is not clear what that has to do with the need to say "from now."

[There is a possibility that this is what the Magid Mishna meant even though he did not say so openly.]