Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
17.10.25
On page 67 in Gitin the Mishna says that if one says to two people to give a get (document of divorce) to his wife or to three people to write and give it, they cannot ask someone else to do so, they must do so themselves. But if he says to three to give a get to his wife, R. Meir says he intends to make them into a court, and so they can appoint someone else to do so. R Jose says even in that case they must do it themselves. Then Shmuel said if one said to two to write and give a get, and they told a scribe to write it, and they signed it is invalid and if she remarried under the assumption that it was valid, she must leave the second husband. However, this still requires study. The Gemara asks on this from another statement of Shmuel where he said the reason for R. Jose is, “Words are not given over to a messenger,” and that is the law. On page 29 there is a Mishna that a person appointed to bring a getand got sick, he can give it to another to do so. The Gemara asks does this not contradict the Mishna on page 67 where he cannot make a messenger. Abaye answered our question: the reason for page 67 is embarrassment of the husband. Rava say the reason for page 67 is words cannot be handed over to a messenger. And the Gemara concludes, that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same principles for in terms of a document of a gift, Rav said it is unlike a get and Shmuel said it is like a get. On page 29 Tosphot asks why the Gemara on page 67 does not ask also from R Meir who also holds in a case of two people that if given to others to do the get, it is invalid. The question is this. Shmuel said in his first statement the get is invalid yet this still needs study. The second statement of Shmuel says the get is invalid period. Therefore, we have a question on the first statement also from R Meir who said the they must write the get and not give the job to anyone else, period. The answer is that the need of study part might be in accord with R Meir. (So we do not ask from him on Shmuel.) It could be the reason of R Meir is embarrassment of the husband, and that would be a gezera and so be in accord with Shmuel's doubt. If this approach is right, the law would be if she remarried she would not have to leave her second husband since the get was valid from the law of the Torah. So even in the world view of R Meir, even though he agrees with the beginning of the Mishna , the reason and outcome might be different (so this requires study).
________________________________Now at this point Tosphot does not tell us what Shmuel holds about the opinion of R Meir. He just says the reason for R Meir embarrassment of the husband and that Shmuel might hold that only concern is about the signing of the get, not the writing of it. However, we are forced to say that Shmuel must hold that about R Meir that what ever opinion he holds, that Shmuel himself could agree with for otherwise there would be a question from R Meir on Shmuel, and we do not want that. However, the result of this is that when Tosphot says Shmuel might hold the only worry is the signing of the get, but if the two people tell a scribe to write it, that is ok even to R Meir. However, the problem with this is that the Gemara at this point makes no distinction between the writing and the signing of the get. That only comes up next. So, at this point that cannot provide an answer why the Gemara does not ask from R Meir on Shmuel. Furthermore, it is unclear to me what the opinion of Shmuel is concerning R Meir. For at this point Shmuel holds with R Jose, and so the next doubt is if the worry is about the signing of the get alone or also the writing of the get. But that at first glance ought to be a question only to the opinion of that the problem with two people telling anyone else to write the get is only about the embarrassment of the husband an that could be to R Meir. But to Shmuel this is hard to see. If he can not tell another to write it, then that ought to apply across the board both on the writing and the signing. The answer to this problem in Tosphot is that while it is true that the Gemara does not make any distinction between the writing and signing at this point, but that is only because we are going according to R Jose. To R Meir, it is more likely for this to be a distinction, and therefore both R Meir and Shmuel might agree with it on the side of there at least being a doubt about it. So that the Gemara cannot ask on Shmuel from R Meir. To both, the get might be just pasul or maybe completely valid if the witnesses only told the scrive to write it but they themselves signed it.
----------------------------------On page דף ס''ו in גיטין the משנה says that if one says to two people to give a גט (document of divorce) to his wife or to three people to write and give it, they cannot ask someone else to do so. They must do so themselves. But if he says to three to give a גט to his wife, ר' מאיר says he intends to make them into a court, and so they can appoint someone else to do so. ר' יוסי says even in that case they must do it themselves. Then שמואל said if one said to two to write and give a get, and they told a scribe to write it, and they signed it is invalid and if she remarried under the assumption that it was valid, she must leave the second husband. However, this still requires study. The גמרא asks on this from another statement of שמואל where he said the reason for ר' יוסי is, מילי לא נמסרין לשליח “Words are not given over to a messenger,” and that is the law. On דף כ''ט there is a משנה that a person appointed to bring a גט and got sick, he can give it to another to do so. The גמרא asks, "Does this not contradict the משנה on דף ס''ו where he cannot make a messenger? אביי answered our question: the reason for page ס''ו דףis embarrassment of the husband. רבא say the reason for דף ס''ו is words cannot be handed over to a messenger. And the גמרא concludes, that רב and שמואל disagree about the same principles for in terms of a document of a gift, רב said it is unlike a גט and שמואל said it is like a גט. On דף כ''ט תוספות asks why the גמרא on דף ס''ו does not ask also from ר' מאיר who also holds in a case of two people that if given to others to do the גט, it is invalid. The question is this. שמואל said in his first statement the גט is invalid, yet this still needs study. The second statement of שמואל says the גט is invalid. Period. Therefore, we have a question on the first statement also from ר' מאיר who said they must write the גט and not give the job to anyone else, period. The answer is that the need of study part might be in accord with ר' מאיר. (So, we do not ask from him on שמואל.) It could be the reason of ר' מאיר is embarrassment of the husband, and that would be a גזרה and so be in accord with שמואל doubt. If this approach is right, the law would be if she remarried she would not have to leave her second husband since the גט was valid from the law of the תורה. So even in the world view of ר' מאיר even though he agrees with the beginning of the משנה , the reason and outcome might be different (so this requires study). Also, שמואל might agree with ר מאיר in part about the embarrassment of the husband, but disagree and say that this applies only to the signing of the גט (not the writing of it), and therefore in the case of שמואל, the גט would be totally valid. Therefore, again there is a reason to say this requires study.
Now at this point תוספות does not tell us what שמואל holds about the opinion of ר’ מאיר. He just says the reason for ר’ מאיר embarrassment of the husband and that שמואל might hold that only concern is about the signing of the גט, not the writing of it. However, we are forced to say that שמואל must hold that about ר’ מאיר that what ever opinion he holds, that שמואל himself could agree with for otherwise there would be a question from ר’ מאיר on שמואל, and we do not want that. However, the result of this is that when תוספות says שמואל might hold the only worry is the signing of the גט, but if the two people tell a scribe to write it, that is ok even to ר’ מאיר. However, the problem with this is that the גמרא at this point makes no distinction between the writing and the signing of the גט. That only comes up next. So, at this point that cannot provide an answer why the גמרא does not ask from ר’ מאיר on שמואל. Furthermore, it is unclear to me what the opinion of שמואל is concerning ר’ מאיר. For at this point שמואל holds with ר' יוסי, and so the next doubt is if the worry is about the signing of the גט alone or also the writing of the גט. But that at firsT glance ought to be a question only to the opinion of that the problem with two people telling anyone else to write the גט is only about the embarrassment of the husband an that could be to ר’ מאיר. But to שמואל this is hard to see. If he can not tell another to write it, then that ought to apply across the board both on the writing and the signing.------The answer to this problem in תוספות is that while it is true that the גמרא does not make any distinction between the writing and signing at this point, but that is only because we are going according to ר' יוסי. To ר' מאיר, it is more likely for this to be a distinction, and therefore both ר' מאיר and שמואל might agree with it on the side of there at least being a doubt about it. So that the גמרא cannot ask on שמואל from ר' מאיר. To both, the get might be just pasul or maybe completely valid if the witnesses only told the scribe to write it, but they themselves signed it.
15.10.25
נדרים דף ב' ע''א. רב שך ברמב''ם הלכות נדרים פרק א' הלכה א'. עיין בר''ן [רבינו ניסים בן ראובן]
אני רואה שכבר כתבתי על זה, אבל אני חושב שאני צריך לחזור על הנקודות הבסיסיות בהסבר ברור יותר. לכל הראשונים מלבד הרמב"ם, הנדר העיקרי הוא על ידי צירוף הנדר לקורבן. כלומר, הוא אומר "זה אסור לי כקורבן". אם הוא משמיט את המילים "כקורבן", זה עדיין אסור בגלל יד לנדר. (נדר שלא נאמר בבירור ועדיין תקף בגלל הארכת הנדר). עם זאת, דעת הר"ן נראית במבט ראשון סותרת לגבי הנקודה האם יש צורך לצרף נדר לקורבן. רב שך מסביר שלר"ן, הנדר העיקרי הוא ללא התפסה [כמו הרמב"ם], אבל כדי שיהיה תקף צריך את המילים "כקורבן". בלי המילים האלה, נשמע שהוא אומר משהו לא נכון, לא שהוא באופן פעיל הופך משהו מותר להיות אסור לעצמו. עם זאת, יש כאן משהו שנראה קשה בתשובתו של רב שך. הוא אומר לר''ן שהמילים "כמו קורבן" הן להבהרה, לא בגלל יד לנדר. אבל נדמה לי שאני זוכר שבאחד המקומות שבהם הר''ן מביא את דעתו, הוא אכן מביא את הרעיון של יד לנדר. [המקומות נמצאים בדף ב' ע''א של נדרים, בראש ובתחתית העמוד, דף י''ד י''ד ובשבועות]. ועכשיו לנקודה אחרת. הנקודה של רב שך היא שהאמירה "זה אסור לי" אינה מרמזת על נדר אלא על אמירה שנראית לא נכונה. כך הוא מסביר את הר''ן. עם זאת, אותה נקודה צריכה להיות מיושמת גם לרמב''ם. הרמב"ם אומר "הנדר העיקרי הוא האמירה 'זה אסור לי'". זה תקף לא בגלל יד לנדר (לשם הבהרה), (אלא אם הוא אומר "כמו קרבן" יש מידה נוספת של חומרה כי אז מעילה חלה). עם זאת, גם בלי זה, עדיין הנדר העיקרי הוא האמירה הפשוטה. אבל האם אין צורך "לבטא בשפתיים"? כיצד יכול הרמב"ם להימלט מחידה זו.
[לאחר זמן ראיתי שהר''ן בסוף דף ב' ע''א מביא את הצורך של יד ]
Nedarim page 2. See Rav Shach Laws of Vows chapter 1. halacha 1.
To all Rishonim [authorities from the Middle Ages] except the Rambam, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of Yad leNeder (a handle on a vow). (A vow that wass not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the Ran however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. Rav Shach explains that to the Ran (Rabainu Nisim ben Reuven), the main vow is without hatfasa (extension) [like the Rambam], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of Rav Shach. he says to the Ran the words like a sacrifice are for clarification, not because of a yad leneder. but I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the Ran brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a Yad leNeder. [The places are in Nedraim page 2, top and bottom of the page, page 14 and in Shavuot. Later I saw that the place the Ran brings the idea of yad neder (lit. hand of a vow)]. Now onto a different point. The point of Rav Shach is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a neder but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the Ran. However the same point ought to be applied to the Rambam. The Rambam says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a yad, but for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then meila applies). However even without that still the main neder is the simple statement. but don’t we need to pronounce with one lips"? How could the Rambam escape from this conundrum>?
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I see I wrote about this already but I think I ought to repeat the basic points in a clearer exposition. To all ראשונים except the רמב’’ם, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of יד לנדר (a handle on a vow). (A vow that was not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the ר''ן however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. רב שך explains that to the ר''ן, the main vow is without התפסה (extension) [like the רמב’’ם], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of רב שך. He says to the ר''ן the words "like a sacrifice" are for clarification, not because of a יד לנדר. But I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the ר''ן brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a יד לנדר. [The places are in נדרים page 2, top and bottom of the page, דף י''ד 14 and in שבועות]. Now onto a different point. The point of רב שך is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a נדר but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the ר''ן. However the same point ought to be applied to the רמב’’ם. The רמב’’ם says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a יד לנדר for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then מעילה applies). However, even without that, still the main נדר is the simple statement. but don’t we need to לבטא בשפתיים? How could the רמב’’ם escape from this conundrum?
14.10.25
13.10.25
ישנה מה שנראה כמו סתירה בחוק בסוכה דף ד' ובעירובין דף פ''ט. בסוכה, רב נחמן אמר שאנו רואים את הקירות כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה במקרה של ארבעה מוטות המונחים על צידי הגג. (גוד אסיק מחיצתא.) והרמב"ם פסק זאת כדין כפי שהוא כותב שתקע ארבעה מוטות בפינות הגג, ושם עליהם כיסוי של עלים, הסוכה תקפה, ואנו רואים את הקירות התחתונים כאילו הם משתרעים כלפי מעלה עד לפינות כיסוי העלים (סיכוך). אולם בעירובין, אמרו חכמים שכאשר יש גגות מחוברים, כולם נחשבים כרשות אחת. הגמרא אומרת שזהו הדין. אך שם איננו אומרים שקירות הבניינים שמתחת לגגות המחוברים נחשבים כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה. אני חושב שההבדל ברור ורמוז גם בתוספות. במקרה של גגות, הקירות התחתונים של הבניינים מוסתרים לחלוטין על ידי גגות והם בהחלט לא נראים. אבל בסוכה, לפחות קיר הבית נראה מבחוץ
Suka page 4 and Eruvin page 89b. there is what looks like a contradiction in law. In Suka Rav Nachman said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the Rambam decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put sa covering of leaves over them, the suka is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves. However in Eruvin, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The Gemara says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in Tosphot. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the suka the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside._______________________________________________There is what looks like a contradiction in law סוכה page 4 and עירובין page 89b. In סוכה,רב נחמן said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the רמב''ם decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put a covering of leaves over them, the סוכה is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves (סיכוך) . However in עירובין, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The גמרא says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in תוספות. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the סוכה the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside.
12.10.25
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