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30.9.15

My learning partner suggested Rav Shach as a proper introduction to how to learn Talmud. And to some degree this makes a lot of sense to me. What makes his book, the Avi Ezri, so remarkable is hard to say.  Rav Shach have the ability to make the complicated simple. And he is complete. There is no major subject of interest in Talmud Babylonian of Jerusalem Talmud that he does not bring light on. I used to think that the Litvaks were just talking about him because they had no one else to replace the Stipleler Rav. But now I realize that Rav Shach was light years beyond anyone.

But since the Hebrew might be hard for some people I suggest making an annotated edition of just a few of the essays.  

His focus is on settling hard problems in the Rambam but by doing so he sheds amazing light on almost every hard problem in the Talmud. It is like no other book I have ever seen.
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Take human רצון "will". Nowadays you have popular writers that proclaim anything you want is good, and claim to be able to help you get what you want, and manipulate others into helping you. Or you have some approaches that invalidate anything that you want. You have to shape up to that particular system or leave.
An idea originating with Isaac Luria is all desires stem from רצון העליון the higher "Will." But people's will while coming from a place of holiness and good can fall away from that. People's will need to be raised up to its source in the Higher "Will".






The fact that there were great tzadikim like Gra does provide an excuse for copycats. It is sadly all too easy to play on peoples naivety and credulity. And it is impossible to warn anyone about the frauds charismatic fakers because  of the prohibition of Lashon Hara (slander). Besides that, it is hard to tell the difference between miracles from the realm of holiness, and the exact same kinds of miracles from the realm of darkness. It is not worth the time to warn people. If someone of the stature of the Gra was ignored by his own disciples, then what good would my warnings do? 

28.9.15

It is hard to judge the yeshiva world. The truth is it is very confusing. For example the tendency of Lithuanian yeshivas is to carefully protect what they are and what they are doing and to throw off and throw out anyone that does not seem to be a part of the program. I think this is  a good thing except when they throw out people that are in fact learning Torah for its own sake.
The general rule is they present themselves are elite geniuses when that is not usually the case.

On the other hand there are places in the Lithuanian yeshiva world that are of the highest quality like Ponovitch in Bnei Brak.

But the advantage of all Lithuanian yeshivas is there tends to be a minimum amount of pseudo Kabalah and lunatics which are so prevalent today in the world of the religious.

One thing about the pseudo Kabalah that is taught nowadays  is that it warps people's world view.
Pseudo Kabalah of course claims its lineage from Isaac Luria (the Ari), but in fact it teaches the Kabalah of the Shatz {Shabatai Tzvi} in disguise.


One fellow was telling me today his experience in some yeshivas when he was fourteen years old and was horrified how teaching young kids all kinds of pseudo Kabalah  would warp and mess up their minds permanently.

This came up with another fellow who was telling me about the Shuvu Banim Breslov crowd and some of the Shabatai Tzvi kinds of Kabalah that got to be central to their teachings.


27.9.15

In Reb Chaim from Voloshin  the main service of God is to sit and learn Torah--all day. I tried this for some time and it is an amazing thing.


Normally since I found learning Torah is such an amazing thing I would have to recommend it to others. But one difficulty is that if one tries to learn Torah for its own sake there are lots of obstacles.



There is a lot to discuss here because I did not find all yeshivas to be equal. Many are cults. They have the aura of respectability but are covering a rotten core. So when I say a legitimate yeshiva I mean to distinguish it from non legitimate.

[I should mention  that learning Torah the whole day is a noble goal, but I think at minimum at least an hour a day of in depth learning is important.--especially at the ages from 18 until about 24. There is something about learning Torah in depth that really needs to be absorbed at an early age. People that don't get it then in general don't ever get it.] 

Bava Metzia 14 Bava Batra 157

(1) We have a lender, borrower, one buyer of a field from the borrower after the loan; and then a second buyer. If there is default the lender gets the field and the first buyer gets the second field for the price of the field and for his improvement to the field he gets free property of the borrower.. גובה את הקרן ממשועבדים ואת השבח ממחוררין Tosphot asks in Bava Batra 157 why is there free property?  In Bava Metzia he asks why is there a second field?
I want to claim the question of Tosphot why is there a second field can be divided into two meanings.
One is the order of collection. That is we know his שיעבוד came first so he can get either field. So why specifically does he go after the first field? The other way is the second field was bought after the first field was collected and so Tosphot is asking what stops the lender from getting the second field.

(2) I tried to write a few paragraphs on what the Rambam would hold here. I tied this law to the law of לווה ולווה וקנה [borrowed and borrowed and bought] based on an idea of Chaim Soloveitchik. But this ideas needs to be explored based on an idea of Rav Eleazar Menachem Shach.

First of all there are two scenarios in Tosphot. One is where the second field was bought after the collection. If this is our case then there is a clear parallel to the law of לווה ולווה וקנה. In our case there is a lender and a buyer and the lender obviously has first rights. But if the second field was bought after the collection then the rights of both come at the same time. It is almost  the same case But we know what the Rambam says in לווה ולווה וקנה. That they split the field. If this is the same principle at work then why would the law here not be the same?

But there is another scenario in Tosphot. That is when the second field was owned at the time of the collection  by either the borrower or the second buyer. Here it is possible the Rambam holds like either opinion of Tosphot that the lender must go after the first field or the second. We don't really know from the language of the Rambam. All we know is the Rambam does not hold it is a case of an אפותיקי guarantee for the loan.
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 We have a מלווה, לווה, one לוקח of a field from the לווה after the הלוואה and then a second buyer. If there is default the lender gets the שדה and the first buyer gets the second field for the price of the field and for his improvement to the שדה he gets free property מחוררים of the borrower.. גובה את הקרן ממשועבדים ואת השבח ממחוררין. תוספות asks in בבא בתרא 157 why is there free property?  In בבא מציעא he asks why is there a second שדה?
I want to claim the question of תוספות why is there a second שדה can be divided into two meanings.
One is the order of collection. That is we know his שיעבוד came first so he can get either field. So why specifically does he go after the first שדה? The other way is the second שדה was bought after the גבייה and so תוספות is asking what stops the מלווה from getting the second שדה.

 I tried to write a few paragraphs on what the רמב''ם would hold here. I tied this law to the law of לווה ולווה וקנה based on an idea of רב חיים הלוי. But this idea needs to be explored based on an idea of רב שך.

First of all there are two scenarios in תוספות. One is where the second שדה was bought after the גבייה. If this is our case then there is a clear parallel to the law of לווה ולווה וקנה. In our case there is a lender and a buyer and the מלווה obviously has first שיעבוד. But if the second field was bought after the collection then the שיעבוד of both come at the same time. It is almost  the same case. But we know what the רמב''ם says in לווה ולווה וקנה. That they split the field. If this is the same principle at work then why would the law here not be the same?

But there is another scenario in תוספות. That is when the second field was owned at the time of the collection  by either the לווה or the לוקח שני. Here it is possible the רמב''ם holds like either opinion of תוספות that the מלווה must go after the first field or the second. We don't really know from the language of the רמב''ם. All we know is the רמב''ם does not hold it is a case of an אפותיקי guarantee משכון for the loan.











Music for the glory of God

26.9.15

I was looking at my notes on Bava Metzia 14 and right now I am not sure my I thiught there is a difference between the answer of Tosphot about apotiki and the version of the older Tosphot that says there is a second field because the lender already took his "shiabud". The second answer is that there is a second filed because there was only one field at the time the loan was collected. Then the lender bought another field. Then the first buyer collects from the second field. According to this if there had been a second field that was bought later the lender would have had to have gone after it. That is the exact same idea as the second answer of Tosphot about the apotiki. There also the only reason the lender went after the first field was because it was made a guarantee for the loan.
THEREFORE IN TERMS OF LAW THE SECOND ANSWER OF TOSPHOT AND THE OLDER TOSPHOT HOLD THE EXACT SAME THING.

Actually not exactly. How can I put this? Perhaps thus: They hold the same in that the lender must go after the second field, if he can. But the second answer of Tosphot and the older Tosphot will differ in the case that the lender has already collected part of his loan. The Old Tosphot holds once he has collected any part of his loan according to the circumstances at the time, then he can not collect again. The second answer of Tosphot about the apotiki holds he could continue to collect









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Tosphot Bava Metzia 14 and Bava Batra 157.
You have a lender, borrower and a buyer of a field from the borrower who bought the field after the loan.  Then you have another buyer of a field  that the borrower bought after the loan.
There is default. The lender gets the first field.
The first buyer goes after the second.
Tosphot asks why is there a second field?



I am not sure why Tosphot is asking about why the second field is left. The braita can't be talking about the reverse case, because then it would not be possible to say the second buyer goes after the first one. The first field was already sold at the time the second buyer bought the second field from the borrower.  And according to the answer of Tosphot about the אפותיקי the fact is in a normal case the lender would in fact go after the second buyer and there would be nothing for the second buyer to do.
But in the first answer of Tosphot in Bava Batra in fact the question is rhetorical because it just gives an opening for Tosphot to say the law is the lender in fact has to go after the first buyer in all cases.

In any case I do not think Tosphot is asking in a case where the loan was not totally paid by the first field --because Then the second field would in fact also be collected. It is only in a case where the second field was left and Tosphot is asking about the order of collection of the loan.
Or perhaps Tosphot is thinking that the second buyer could still go after the first buyer if it happened that his field was taken by the lender because of the loan?











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תוספות בבא מציעא 14 and בבא בתרא 157.
You have a מלווה לווה  and a buyer of a field from the לווה who bought the field after the loan.  Then you have another לוקח of a field  that the לווה bought after the הלוואה.
There is default. The lender gets the first field.
The first buyer goes after the second.
תוספות asks why is there a second field?



I am not sure why תוספות is asking about why the second שדה is left. The ברייתא can't be talking about the reverse case, because then it would not be possible to say the second לוקח goes after the first לוקח. The first שדה was already sold at the time the second לוקח bought the second שדה from the לווה.  And according to the answer of תוספות about the אפותיקי the fact is in a normal case the מלווה would in fact go after the second לוקח and there would be nothing for the second buyer to do.
But in the first answer of תוספות in בבא בתרא in fact the question is rhetorical because it just gives an opening for תוספות to say the law is the מלווה in fact has to go after the first לוקח in all cases.

In any case I do not think תוספות is asking in a case where the loan was not totally paid by the first שדה, because then the second שדה would in fact also be נגבה. It is only in a case where the second שדה was left and תוספות is asking about the order of collection of the loan.

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Or perhaps תוספות is thinking that the second לוקח could still go after the first לוקח if it happened that שדה השני was taken by the מלווה because of the הלוואה?


 תוספות בבא מציעא 14 ובתרא בבא 157. יש לך מלווה לווה וקונה של שדה מלווה ש קנה את השדה לאחר ההלוואה. אז יש לך לוקח אחר של שדה שלהווה קנה לאחר ההלוואה. יש ברירת מחדל. המלווה מקבל את השדה הראשון. הקונה הראשון הולך אחרי השני. תוספות שואלים מדוע יש שדה שני? אני לא בטוח למה תוספות שואלים מדוע שדה השני נשאר. לא יכולה להיות  שהברייתא מדברת על המקרה ההפוך שהמלווה גבה מן שדה השני, כי אז זה לא יהיה אפשרי לומר לוקח השני הולך אחרי לוקח הראשון. השדה הראשון כבר נמכר בזמן שלוקח השני קנה שדה השני מהלווה. ולפי התשובה של תוספות על אפותיקי הדין במקרה רגיל הוא שהמלווה היה גובה מן לוקח השני ולא יהיה שום דבר ללוקח השני לעשות. אבל בתשובה הראשונה של תוספות בבא בתרא השאלה היא רטורית, כי השאלה פשוט נותנת פתח לתוספות לומר החוק הוא מלווה בעובדה שיש ללכת אחרי לוקח הראשון בכל המקרים. בכל מקרה אני לא חושב שתוספות שואלים במקרה שבו ההלוואה הייתה לא לגמרי שולם על ידי השדה הראשון, כי אז השדה השני היה למעשה גם נגבה. זה רק במקרה שבו השדה השני נשאר ותוספות שואל על סדר הגבייה של ההלוואה









What is wrong with giving money to places that make learning Torah  into a business is that when you pay people to learn Torah for money, there is no room for people that learn Torah for  its own sake. This is a well known and documented phenomenon. I have heard and seen this plenty of times. If some one wants just to sit down and learn Torah without getting paid for it but just for its own sake there is almost no yeshiva that will not throw him out. It is a outrage but it is a fact and woe to the individual who brings attention to this.

I am not trying to make a halachic kind of decision here. This was dealt with by The Rambam and Beit Joseph and later on people. To the Halacha side of this issue I have nothing to add. But to the practical side of this I have a tremendous amount of facts that show that surprising people that use the Torah for money only hurts Torah. Support for the frauds makes things hard for sincere people.

When Reb Chaim from Voloshin started the yeshiva movement the way things were that the synagogue was used as a study hall during the day and was connected with the local Rav. Reb Chaim changed that to the new paradigm of a yeshiva as an independent institution. This was a good thing but people started seeing that it is a good business. And that ruined it.


25.9.15

What was the excommunication of the Gra for? It was to prevent idolatry.


Today we have idolatry.Glamour.

Glamour is an illusion, originally a magical spell of concealment.

Glamour, in most of its modern applications, conceals the ordinariness of someone and makes them appear, in turn, godlike . This is the clue here. We probably have never met any gods.

 However, the Gra was aware of what some groups are doing.
 Their leaders appear with a glamour that makes them appear like gods. We cannot, of course, get too close, or the illusion will break; but the glamour itself bespeaks some kind of knowledge of the gods would be like.


Glamour offers us a glimpse into another world, more perfect than this one, and for that moment, enchantment swirls around us. And then it is gone again. 
This experience does not carry us out of the world, like mystical transport, but it involves its own kind of ecstasy and exaltation nevertheless -- the "leaping up" origin of the latter term even fits, precisely, the behavior that was evident, for instance, during the first tour of the Beatles in the United States, when fans, mainly female, bounced up and down in their excitement, eager for the darshan, the numinous appearance and magical charisma (, "grace".




That is it seems idolatry is more common today than is usually thought. When people give to other people the honor due to the gods and attribute powers to them that belong to the gods --that is a kind of idolatry.


You have a lender, borrower who sells a field after the loan and a buyer. The borrower defaults. The lender gets the field. The buyer gets a second field that borrower sold after the loan and after he bought the field. Tosphot asks, "Why is there a second field?"


The case is when the debt was paid by the first field. The question of Tosphot is on the order of collection.


I wanted today to discuss the Maharsha in Bava Batra 157. תוספות ד''ה גובה
He found an old Tosphot which had the version כבר לקח בעל חוב כל שיעבודו. The lender already received all of his שיעבוד. This is he says is the right version of our Tosphot. But I want to suggest this is simply an argument between our Tosphot and the regular old Tosphot. This is quite common in Yevamot. Our Tosphot says כבר שיעבודו על הלוקח


But in any case to get back to the point. The Mahrasha also says the borrower had no property at the time the loan was collected.

That means this the way the Maharsha understands our Tosphot there are only two answers on the question why is there a second field? But the first answer is not like the answer we have in our version. In our version the lender had to go collect from the first buyer because his שיעבוד was already on that first field.

But in our version there was already the second field משועבדים. And that is in fact what out Tosphot says openly. It is just the Maharsha says that there was no second field nor free property either at the time of the גבייה.

I have nothing new to add here but I just wanted to make things clear and to put what I had written to make this argument dependent on an idea of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik in another place

I used Reb Chaim to get this argument to be the same as another one between the Rambam and the Raavad.-If that is the case it ends up the Rambam going like the first answer in our Tosphot. That in the first place the lender was required to go after the first field.
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You have a מלווה, לווה who sells a field after the loan and a לוקח. The borrower defaults. The lender gets the field. The לוקח gets a שדה שני that לווה sold after the הלוואה and after he bought the field. Why is there a second field?

I wanted to make it clear that if the מלווה had gotten all of his debt paid then we would not be having this discussion. We are only talking about when the חוב was beyond what could be collected from the שדה הראשון.


I wanted today to discuss the מהרש''א in בבא בתרא קנז: תוספות ד''ה גובה
He found an old תוספות which had the גרסה כבר לקח בעל חוב כל שיעבודו. The lender already received all of his שיעבוד. This is he says is the right גרסה of our תוספות. But I want to suggest this is simply an argument between our תוספות and the regular old תוספות. This is quite common in יבמות. Our תוספות says כבר שיעבודו על הלוקח

But in any case to get back to the point. The מהרש''א also says the borrower had no property at the time the loan was collected.

That means this the way the מהרש''א understands our תוספות there are only two answers on the question why is there a שדה שני? But the first answer is not like the answer we have in our גרסה. In our גרסה the מלווה had to go collect from the לוקח ראשון because his שיעבוד was already on that first field.

But in our version there was already the second field משועבדים. And that is in fact what out תוספות says openly. It is just the מהרש''א says that there was no שדה שני nor מחוררין either at the time of the גבייה. Everything besides the first field was bought after the גבייה/

בבא בתרא קנז: ב''מ יד: ב''מ קי: יש לך מלווה, לווה שמכר שדה לאחר ההלוואה, ולוקח. ויש המחדל של הלווה בתשלום. המלווה מקבל את השדה. הלוקח מקבל שדה שני שהלווה מכר לאחר ההלוואה ואחרי שהוא קנה את השדה הראשון. תוספות שואל מדוע יש שדה שני? אני רוצה להבהיר שאם המלווה קיבל את כל חובו אז לא היה צורך של דיון בזה.  אנחנו רק מדברים כאשר החוב היה מעבר למה שיכול להיות נגבה מהשדה הראשון. אני רוצה  לדון במהרש''א בבא בתרא קנז: תוספות ד''ה גובה הוא מצא  תוספות ישנים שהייתה להם הגרסה "כבר לקח בעל חוב כל שיעבודו." המלווה כבר קיבל את כל שיעבוד.  (אבל אני רוצה להציע שזה פשוט ויכוח בין התוספות שלנו והתוספות הישנים הרגילות. זה די נפוץ ביבמות.) התוספות שלנו אומרים "כבר שיעבודו על לוקח."
 מהרש''א גם אומר  ללווה אין רכוש בעת שההלוואה נגבה גם לא משועבדים. זה אומר שזה הדרך שהמהרש''א מבין תוספות שלנו. יש רק שתי תשובות לשאלה מדוע יש שדה שני? אבל התשובה הראשונה היא לא כמו התשובה שיש לנו בגרסה שלנו. בגרסה שלנו המלווה היה צריך ללכת לגבות מלוקח ראשון משום שהשיעבוד כבר היה השדה הראשון. אבל בגרסה שלנו היה כבר השדה השני היינו משועבדים שניים כבר היו בזמן הגבייה. וזה למעשה מה שתוספות אומרים בגלוי.  רק מהרש''א אומר שאין שדה שני (משועבדים) ולא מחוררין  בעת הגבייה. הכל חוץ מהשדה הראשון נקנה לאחר הגבייה.
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I should mention that the basic answer of Tosphot in Bava Metzia and Bava Batra goes with the idea that the lender must always go after the second field if it is available.  And that is the answer of Tosphot in both places, that is  that the first field was made an apotiki [guarantee ] for the loan. But then the Tosphot asks there in Bava Metzia if that is the case that the lender must always go after the second field then why not say simply that the reason there is a second field is because it was bought after the first field was collected. This is not the same as the answer of the Older Tosphot that the Maharsha brings. This answer still goes with the idea that even if bought after the first field was collected still if there is anything left of the debt the lender could go after the second field. The answer Tosphot gives whys not to say that is the scenario is that then the first buyer could go after the second field also for the improvement that he had done on the first field.

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I should mention that the basic answer of תוספות in בבא מציעא and בבא בתרא goes with the idea that the lender must always go after the second field if it is available.  And that is the answer of תוספות in both places, that is  that the first field was made an אפותיקי for the הלוואה. But then the תוספות asks there in בבא מציעא if that is the case that the מלווה must always go after the שדה השני then why not say simply that the reason there is a second שדה is because it was bought after the first שדה was נגבה. This is not the same as the answer of the older תוספות that the מהרש''א brings. This answer still goes with the idea that even if שדה השני  was bought after the first שדה was נגבה still if there is anything left of the debt the lender could go after the second field. The answer תוספות gives why not to say that is the scenario is that then the first buyer could go after the second field also for the improvement that he had done on the first field. This is because the only reason he does not in general collect for his loss of the שבח is that it has no limit. But here it has a limit after the field was נגבה.









24.9.15

Music for the glory of the God of Israel

  q37   q35   CHS q20    q45 edited version
Authentic Torah values are mainly found in Musar Ethical books from the Middle Ages.
The reasons for this are two. One is the Middle Ages was the time when the greatest of Torah sages hammered out the exact philosophical and moral principles of Torah with painstaking rigorous logic.
The second reason is that after that period, so called Torah books pervert the Torah into what they want it to say.

The exceptions were the direct disciples of Israel Salanter who did try to work out the principles of Torah as they apply today. But even the Musar movement itself after that became "Frumkeit." That is: the more superficially strict ones looks, the better. Norms of behavior of the community became determinant--not Torah. That is even Musar became a "movement."

The truth be told, Torah morality is largely personal morality that the Torah hopes will be extended into a larger community. But the Torah itself is directed towards only one individual -you. And it does not accept an intermediate.

So as far as the Torah is concerned there is no community except as an epi-phenomenon of individuals.
It is common to find people that think when the Talmud says we know the  קביעא דירחא the accurate time for the new moon that that means the present day calendar. (note 1) It is not however the same thing. The time of the new moon could be calculated but it has nothing to do with the calendar. The calendar does not tell the time for the new moon. There is nothing in the Talmud that indicates that they were using the present day calendar. However it was known to the Greeks. And they were using it. But there is no indication that Hillel II set it up. Rather at the time of the later Geonim the calendar that was being used by the Greeks was adopted. In fact we know the calendar was not used in the time of the early geonim because dates given in their letters do not correspond to the calendar.


(note 1) קביעא דירחא  is the same in Hebrew as קביעות הירח the  time of the new moon. It does not mean they had a calendar. It means they had a way of calculating the time of the actual conjunction.


I should mention that if there was a Sanhedrin or a Beit Din or anyone with legitimate Semicha (ordination) then they would have  the ability to sanctify any day they wanted to as the new moon. But there is no such thing. And no record that any Beit Din did in fact sanctify all future new moons. So all we have to depend on is Tosphot in Sanhedrin pg 10 that the day of the conjunction is the day of the new moon.
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It is common to find people that think when the תלמוד says we know the  קביעא דירחא the accurate time for the new moon that that means the present day לוח.  It is not however the same thing. The time of the מולד could be calculated but it has nothing to do with the לוח. The לוח does not tell the time for the new moon. There is nothing in the תלמוד that indicates that they were using the present day לוח. However it was known to the יוונים. And they were using it. But there is no indication that הלל השני set it up. Rather at the time of the later  גאונים the לוח that was being used by the יוונים was adopted. In fact we know the לוח was not used in the time of the early גאונים because תאריכים given in their letters do not correspond to the לוח.


 קביעא דירחא  is the same in Hebrew as קביעות הירח the  time of the new moon. It does not mean they had a לוח. It means they had a way of calculating the time of the actual conjunction.


I should mention that if there was a סנהדרין or a בית דין or anyone with legitimate סמיכה  then they would have  the ability to sanctify any day they wanted to as the ראש חודש. But there is no such thing. And no record that any בית דין did in fact sanctify all future ראשי חדשים. So all we have to depend on is תוספות in סנהדרין דף י' ע''ב that the day of the מולד is the day of the ראש חודש.
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זה נפוץ למצוא אנשים שחושבים כאשר התלמוד אומר שאנחנו יודעים קביעא דירחא הזמן מדויק לירח החדש שזה אומר  הלוח של היום. זה לא אולם אותו הדבר. הזמן של במולד היו יכולים  לחשבן אבל אין לזה קשר עם הלוח. הלוח אינו מספר את הזמן לירח החדש. אין שום דבר בתלמוד שמצביע על כך שהם היו משתמשים בהלוח. עם זאת, היה ידוע ליוונים. והם היו משתמשים בו. אבל אין שום אינדיקציה שהלל השנייה התקין את זה. אבל בזמן  הגאונים האחרונים הלוח היה בשימוש. למעשה אנו יודעים הלוח לא היה בשימוש בזמן של תחילת גאונים כי התאריכים שניתנו במכתבים שלהם לא מתאימים ללוח.  קביעא דירחא הוא אותו דבר בעברית כקביעות ירח הזמן של הירח החדש. זה לא אומר שהיה להם לוח. זה אומר שהיה להם דרך של חישוב הזמן של המולד. אני צריך להזכיר שאם היה סנהדרין או בית דין עם סמיכה לגיטימי אז  להם  היכולת לקדש בכל יום שהם רוצים כראש החודש . אבל אין דבר כזה. ואין תיעוד שכל בית הדין אכן קידשו את כל  הראשי חדשים העתידים. אז כל מה שאנחנו צריכים לסמוך עליו הוא תוספות בסנהדרין דף י 'ע''ב שיום המולד הוא היום של ראש החודש.





Bava Metzia 14b 110 b Bava Batra 157


You have a case of a lender borrower and a buyer from the borrower. The borrower defaults and the lender gets the field from the  buyer. Then the buyer recoups the price of the field and his expenses from the next buyer.



I wanted to mention what I think is an important point. To Tosphot in Bava Batra there are only two possible reasons why there is a second field. Tospphot does ask in a fact how is there a  second field? And in fact he does says at the time the lender got the first field there was no second field. The borrower at the time had no field nor did had he bought and sold any other field. That is what Tosphot says. But it is not the reason why the lender could not collect from the second field. I can't emphasize this enough. There are only two reason why there could be a second field one is that the lender was required to go after the first field. That is the first answer of Tosphot. The other reason is that the first field was an אפותיקי. The fact that the second field was bought after part of the loan was collected is not a reason why the lender could not go after it after it had been bought  or bought and sold.


There is another תוספות that says a possible reason the lender did not go after the second field. כלה שיעבודו. This clearly shows that that Tosphot held that after the lender collected once he can't collect anymore. But that is clearly not like the Tosphot in Bava Batra where Tosphot gives two reasons why he did not collect from the second field and even though it was bought after the first collection Tosphot does not suggest that that could be  a reason not to collect.





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Bava Metzia 14b 110 b Bava Batra 157

You have a case of a מלווה לווה ולוקח  from the לווה. The לווה does not have money to repay the loan and the lender gets the field from the  לוקח. Then the לוקח גובה the price of the field and his שבח from the  לוקח שני.



I wanted to mention what I think is an important point. To תוספות in בבא בתרא קנז ע''ב there are only two possible reasons why there is a second field. תוספות does ask in a fact how is there a  second field? And in fact he does says at the time the מלווה got the שדה ראשון there was no second field. The לווה at the time had no field nor did had he bought and sold any other field. That is what תוספות says. But it is not the reason why the lender could not collect from the second field. I can't emphasize this enough. There are only two סיבות why there could be a שדה שני. One is that the מלווה was required to go after the first field. That is the first answer of תוספות. The other reason is that the שדה ראשון was an אפותיקי. The fact that the second field was bought after part of the loan was collected is not a reason why the lender could not go after it after it had been bought  or bought and sold.

There is another תוספות somewhere that says a possible reason the מלווה did not go after the שדה השני that is כלה שיעבודו. This clearly shows that that תוספות held that after the מלווה  once was גובה he can not be גובה anymore. But that is clearly not like the תוספות in בבא בתרא where תוספות gives two reasons why he did not collect from the second field and even though it was bought after the first גבייה תוספות does not suggest that that could be  a reason not to collect.









בבא מציעא 14 ב 110 בבבא בתרא 157 יש לך מקרה של מלווה לווה ולוקח מן הלווה. ללווה אין כסף כדי להחזיר את ההלוואה והמלווה מקבל את השדה מן הלוקח. אז הלוקח גובה המחיר של השדה והשבח מלוקח השני. אני רוצה לדבר על מה שאני חושב שזוהי נקודה חשובה. לתוספות בבא בתרא קנז ע''ב יש רק שתי סיבות אפשריות לכך שיש שדה שני. תוספות שואל איך יש שדה שני? ולמעשה הוא אומר בזמן מלווה גבה שדה הראשון לא היה שדה שני. הלווה בזמן בגבייה לא היה וגם לא היה  שדה שקנה ומכר בכל אופן. זה מה שאומר תוספות. אבל זה לא הסיבה למלווה לא יכול לאסוף מהשדה השני. אני לא יכול להדגיש את זה מספיק. יש רק שתי סיבות למה יכול להיות שיש שדה שני. אחת מהן הוא שנדרש למלווה ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון. זו התשובה הראשונה של תוספות. סיבה אחרת היא ששדה ראשון היה אפותיקי. העובדה שהשדה השני נקנה אחרי חלק מההלוואה נאסף היא לא סיבה למלווה לא יכול ללכת אחריו לאחר שכבר הלווה קנה או קנה ומכר עוד שדה.










23.9.15

Trust in God

The subject of trust really should be studied from the Duties of the Heart and the מדרגת האדם by the Alter of Navardok --Joseph Horwitz.
It is highly relevant.


In Quantum Mechanic sight makes  a bounda


I should mention that there is an idea about trust in God without effort in Duties of the Heart and מדרגת האדם  and the Gra even though it seems not to be a requirement. That is one can work all day and come home with exactly the same thing as if he had sat and learned Torah all day. But one can work all day if he really wants to. But it will not get him anything more than if he had sat and learned Torah.

I am not sure what to say about this except that I did this for  few years and it does work.


I am pretty sure that many people have never even heard of this idea of trust with no effort. But it is right in Proverbs 3:5 in the commentary of the Gra

In any case I have an expanded idea of what it means to learn Torah based on the Rambam who considers מעשה בראשית and מעשה מרכבה to be one part of learning Talmud. Some think that means mystic things but I don't think that is how the Rambam intended it. He defines what these terms mean in the beginning of the Mishna Torah and in the Guide.




In any case I had a great and important subject to discuss today. But it is so vast and my small mind has a great deal of trouble understanding it. But at least I wanted to share what little I may merit to understand of the Talmud.


I think Chaim Soloveitchik has an idea about obligations that are on land of a borrower that provide the basis for the argument on "borrowed and borrowed and then bought."
Also I think his idea provides the basis for the argument between the two answers of Tosphot in Bava Metzia page 157 and the Tosphot in Bava Metzia page 14b. And if I am right then we can also say thus there is a relation between the sugia in Bava Metzia and borrowed and borrowed and then bought.

If I would have energy I would present the idea of Reb Chaim. Then the idea of לווה ולווה וקנה and show their relation, and then the Tosphot in Bava Batra.


But before I can do that I wanted to discuss one answer of Tosphot in Bava Batra. The Talmud gives a case  where you have a lender and borrower and a first buyer and a second buyer from the lender. The borrower defaulted on the loan. The lender goes to the first buyer and gets as much of the field needed to cover the loan. Then the first buyer goes to the second buyer to collect his loss. But he also put work into the field. for that he can only collect from the seller, not the second buyer.
"Why is there a second field?", Tosphot asks. In Bava Metzia Tosphot has only one answer. The first field was designated to pay for the loan. In Bava Batra the first answer of Tosphot is that the lender was required to go after the first field. That shows once obligation is on something it get first attention even if later obligations come on it subsequently.
)  ב''מ קי: ב''מ י''ד: בבא בתרא קנז: הסוגיה פה הוא בב''מ יד: ובבבא בתרא קנז: יש מחלוקת בין תוספות בב''מ ותוספות בבא בתרא. המחלוקת תלויה בסברת רב חיים הלוי מבריסק. הסברא היא זאת: לפי דעת הרמב''ם, המלווה והלוקח חולקים את השבח בגלל ששיעבוד שניהם עובר דרך הלווה. אבל המלווה גובה את כול השבח שגדל ממילא בגלל ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמו ישיר, ולא דרך הלווה [שהוא המוכר]. (זאת אומרת שאחר שהשיעבוד חל על השדה, הוא נשאר שם, ואינו שם בגלל המשכה של כח המוכר.) זאת היא סברת תירוץ הראשון בתוספות בבא בתרא קמז: במצב שלנו איפה שהמלווה גובה את הקרקע מן הלוקח, אף על פי שיש קרקע אחרת ללוקח השני. הסיבה היא ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. מצד השני, תירוץ השני ותוספות ב''מ יד: אוחזים שאם יש לוקח שני, המלווה צריך לגבות ממנו בגלל ששיעבודו הולך דרך המוכר, ואינו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. ועכשיו מחלוקת שני שתירוצים היא מחלוקת ראשונים. שהסברא של תירוץ הראשון היא שיטת הרמב''ם לפי פירושו של רב חיים ברמב''ם. והרמב''ן והראב''ד חולקים על הרמב''ם.  ותירוץ השני ותוספות בב''מ יד: הולכים לפי שיטת הראב''ד והרמב''ן.
ואין להקשות על זה מדברי הרמב''ן שכתב שהמלווה אומר: "ארעאי [הקרקע שלי] השביח", בגלל שכוונת הרמב''ן היא שבגלל שיעבודו על הלווה הקרקע נחשב שלו [של המלווה]. [והשיעבוד בא דרך הלווה.]


תוספות ב''מ יד: תוספות  בבא בתרא קנ''ז יש דיון של מלווה לווה ולוקח. הלווה אינו משלם והמלווה גובה מלוקח הראשון ולוקח הראשון גובה מלוקח השני. תוספות שואלים איך זה יכול להיות שלוקח הראשון יכול לגבות את הקרן משועבדים? למה יש משועבדים ללוקח שני.זאת אומרת אחר ההלוואה הלווה קנה עוד שדה ומכרו ומשם לוקח הראשון גובה קרנו. תירוץ הראשון של תוספות שלמרות שיש לוקח שני, המלווה גובה מלוקח הראשון. תירוץ השני הוא ששדה הראשון הוא אפותיקי. זאת אומרת שאם הוא היה משועבד, המלווה היה צריך לגבות מלוקח השני. נראה  לבסס את הטענות בין  בוויכוח על "לווה וללוה וקנה".  בדין של "לווה ולווה וקנה" יש סיבה טובה  לומר שיעבוד הראשון נופל על השדה ושיעבוד השני אינו יכול לבטלו. זה בגלל ששיעבוד הראשון חל על הלווה ראשון ומן הלווה הוא חל על השדה ושיעבוד השני צריך להמתין בתור. בדין שלנו בבבא בתרא קנ''ז,  שיש שני שדות שנמכרו. ואחד נמכר לפני האחר. יש סיבה דומה לומר שהוא צריך ללכת אחרי שדה הראשון שנמכר בגלל שנשתעבוד ראשון. תוספות ב''מ יד: ותירוץ השני של תוספות בבא בתרא מחזיקים שיותר מסתבר שכל השיעבוד חל על שדה השני כל זמן שלא נמכר. וגם אם נמכר אין סיבה ידועה שהשיעבוד היה צריך לחזור לשדה הראשון. והדין דומה לגביית כתובה שגובים ממה שנמכר אחרון.

Somehow I think I might have made it clearer but that is the best I can do right now.

What I am trying to do is to make a triangle. I was to show Reb Chaim gives a יסוד foundation principle that underlies the two different subjects and by that to show bot subjects are related.





22.9.15

I believe the USA surrendered its freedoms to a socialist dictatorship of a Muslim, 8 years ago. But it did not start then. It occurred to me that the problem was not the administration. Rather it is that there is a sizable number of Americans that simply despise everything that the USA stands for.


 I have another reason to think that the USA administration at this time is not very good. Let me ask you. Are you prepared for war? Are you prepared for nuclear destruction? We are actively arming improving Iran's nuclear capabilities under the present agreement. Would Ronald Reagan have agreed to arm our enemies in exchange for a piece of paper? Would a Republican president agree to arm people that are shouting for our destruction every day? Do you really think that Iran is just bluffing when they call for the destruction of the USA ever day? And best of all the USA has encouraged at every turn the rise of a hostile Islamic Empire that is just as much set of the destruction of the USA as Iran. To top that off the Muslim USA president has engaged in actively bringing radical Muslims to the USA to undermine the very fabric of America.


Are you willing to bet your life that people whose very religion demands your destruction are merely bluffing?

And how many American would die in an Iranian first strike? About 80 million. Think about that while you remember these are not people that the fear of retaliation can bother. They look forward to it.  All the better to get their 70 virgins.



The major thing that makes me upset with the government in the USA really did not start with the present administration. And it not the fact that it was so different from when I was growing up.
 Sure it was a wholesome and decent world back then. What makes me upset about the USA is a erosion of Freedom. Socialism got inside of everything. Now to some degree I understand why this happened. It takes a kind of special kind of people to be able to function as a democracy. When the influx of barbarians and savages made democracy and freedom impossible the USA government and police responded in kind to start to control things.

To some degree it has been a the successful  attempt by the Democrats to turn the USA to socialism and away from freedom. But if the people themselves had stood up against it it never would have happened. [And it was not all the fault of the Democrats either. There is enough guilt to go around]

But it is not too late to turn the clock back.

So to expand on this a little more. The issue is not that I am so against Socialism. It is rather the corroding of the Jewish-Christian Values values upon which the USA was founded I think made socialism inevitable.
And the cure is simple. People need to learn Torah values. Simple as pie. That would be a two pronged approach. First Jews need to learn Torah the Oral and Written Torah.  Next is Christians to get back to traditional Christian Values. Now I am not Christian. But just off hand the first step I would think would be for Christian people to start learning Augustine and Aquinas. But that is just a guess. There might be better things out there for Christians but I am not sure what they might be. I for one have never heard of anything better. The end result of this double approach would be hopeful that people would get back to good wholesome values. Things that politics can't change then would change internally.

For Jewish people learning the whole Talmud might seem hard at first. But in fact all you need to do is to do a half page a day with Tosphot and the Maharsha. That in itself should not take more than about 40 minutes per day.  It gives you plenty of time to go surfing and skiing.






Tosphot bava metzia 14 bava batra 157

What I wanted to discuss today was Tosphot. Also to draw a diagram about the situation. And then to discuss something that is hard to understand--that is to ask a question.We have a lender a borrower who is also the seller and a the first buyer and the second buyer. Also two fields. The first field was bought by the first buyer and the second by the second buyer. The lender collects from the first buyer because the borrower did not have any money. And the first buyer collects from the second buyer.
Tosphot in Bava Metzia says let us prove from this that "What I will buy" is not obligated.
This proves that nothing else will account for the existence of the second field to this Tosphot until he comes up with a different reason אפותיקי. This shows that since we know what I will buy is obligated then the lender would have had to gone to the second field. There are many possible reasons why there might be a second field. (1) The lender had to go to the first field. (2) The lender had a choice. (3) The second field was bought after the loan was collected. It is this last one which I want to concentrate on. Tosphot holds none of these reasons are valid. So neither is the last one. This shows Tosphot in Bava Metzia must hold that the lender must always go after which ever field was sold last.
This all is what the Maharshal says. The reason I think that Tosphot holds this is because of Tractate Ketubot in which the regular way  a Ketubah is collected is that we go after what was sold last.

What is bothering me here is we are assuming the first field was owned by the borrower at the time of the loan and the second was bought by the borrower after the loan. The reason for this seems clear. The second one is only collected because of what is written in the document so its obligation is weaker. But this seems to contradict what we just said that the normal way of collected  a loan is to go after what was sold last.

Or you could say the entire braita means the opposite. That is, that the lender goes after the second field and the second buyer goes after the first field. You could answer that perhaps the first was collected before the second buyer bought his field. But what if it was owned at the time the second buyer bought his field? Maybe it would not change anything?
But this last two paragraphs are a side issue for the moment. I think they are important issues but I don't know how to deal with them. And they are at any rate not the reason for this essay.


What I wanted to mention which I think is important is that in Bava Batra Tosphot clearly says that even if the "what I will buy is obligated" still there is a reason why there could be  a second field. That is the second one was bought after the original loan was collected. This is the idea of the Maharsha about what Tosphot says there and it seems to me to be implicit in Tosphot. But this is directly opposed to Tosphot in Bava Metza where we just got done saying that even if the loan had been collected and then the second field was bought still the lender would have had to have gone after the second field for any more debt.
The Maharshal I think wants to say that the Tosphot in Bava Batra agrees with the Tosphot in Bava Metzia but the Mahrasha says that was only because his version of Tosphot was not accurate.
In plain English I want to say this is an argument between the two Tosphot and not just between the Maharsha and the Maharshal.
 I mean no matter what you think is going on in Bava Batra but for sure the Maharshal is right about what Tospot is saying in Bava Metzia.





















What I wanted to discuss today was תוספות. Also to draw a ציור about the situation. And then to discuss something that is hard to understand, that is to ask a question. יש מלווה and a לווה who is also the מוכר and  the first לוקח and the second לוקח. Also two שדות. The first שדה was bought by the first לוקח and the second by the second לוקח. The מלווה collects from the first buyer because the borrower did not have any money. And the first buyer collects from the second buyer.
תוספות in בבא מציעא says let us prove from this that מה שאקנה אינו משועבד.
This proves that nothing else will account why the lender did not collect from the second field  in the opinion this תוספות until he comes up with a different reason אפותיקי. This shows that since we know what מה שאקנה is משועבד then the lender would have had to gone to the שדה השני. There are many possible reasons why there might be a second שדה. Maybe the מלווה had to go to the first שדה.  The lender had a choice of which field to go to.  Maybe the שדה השני was bought after the גביית החוב. It is this last one which I want to concentrate on. תוספות holds none of these reasons are valid. So neither is the last one. This shows תוספות in בבא מציעא must hold that the מלווה must always go after whichever field was sold last.
This all is what the מהרש''ל says. The reason I think that תוספות holds this is because of מסכת כתובות in which the regular way  a כתובה is collected is that we go after what was sold last.

What is bothering me here is we are assuming the שדה הראשון was owned by the לווה at the time of the loan and the שדה השני was bought by the לווה after the הלוואה. The reason for this seems clear. The second one is only נגבה because of what is written in the document so its שיעבוד is weaker. But this seems to contradict what we just said that the normal way of גביית חוב is to go after what was sold last.

Or you could say the entire ברייתא means the opposite. That is, that the מלווה goes after the second field and the second buyer goes after the first field. You could answer that perhaps the first was collected before the second לוקח bought his field. But what if it was owned at the time the second buyer bought his שדה? Maybe it would not change anything?
But this last two paragraphs are a side issue for the moment. What I wanted to mention which I think is important is that in תוספות בבא בתרא clearly says that even if the מה שאקנה משועבד still there is a reason why there could be  a second field. That is the second one was bought after the original loan was collected. This is the idea of the מהרש''א  about what תוספות says there and it seems to me to be implicit in תוספות. But this is directly opposed to תוספות in בבא מציעא where we just got done saying that even if the loan had been collected and then the second field was bought still the lender would have had to have gone after the second שדה for any more debt.
The מהרש''ל I think wants to say that the תוספות in בבא בתרא agrees with the תוספות in בבא מציעא but the מהרש''א  says that was only because his version of תוספות was not accurate.
In plain English I want to say this is an argument between the two תוספות and not just between the מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל.
















 יש מלווה ולווה שהוא גם מוכר ולוקח הראשון ולוקח השני. גם שני שדות. השדה הראשון נקנה על ידי לוקח הראשון  והשני על ידי לוקח השני. המלווה גובה מקונה הראשון, כי ללווה לא היה כסף. והקונה הראשון גובה מהקונה השני.
תוספות בבא מציעא אומר תנו לנו להוכיח מזה שמה שהאקנה אינו משועבד
זה מוכיח ששום דבר אחר לא יהווה סיבה מדוע המלווה לא יגבה מהשדה השני לדעת זו של תוספות עד שהוא מגיע לסיבה שונה, היינו אפותיקי. זה מראה כי מאחר שאנו יודעים מה שאקנה הוא משועבד, אז המלווה היה צריך ללכת לשדה השני. יש הרבה סיבות אפשריות שאולי יש שדה שני. אולי המלווה היה צריך ללכת לשדה הראשון. אולי היה למלווה בחירת לאיזה השדה ללכת . אולי השדה השני נקנה לאחר גביית החוב. זו האחרון שאני רוצה להתרכז בה. תוספות מחזיקה לא  אף אחת מהסיבות הללו תקפים. אז גם לא האחרון. זה מראה תוספות בבא מציעא חייב להחזיק שמלווה חייב תמיד ללכת אחרי  השדה שנמכר אחרון.
זה כל מה שאומר מהרש''ל. הסיבה שאני חושב שתוספות מחזיק זה בגלל מסכת הכתובות שבו הדרך הרגילה שכתובה נגבה היא שאנחנו הולכים אחרי מה  שנמכר אחרון. מה שמטריד אותי כאן אנו מניחים שהשדה הראשון היה בבעלות של הלווה בו בזמן של ההלוואה והשדה השני נרכש על ידי הלווה לאחר ההלוואה. הסיבה לכך נראית ברורה. השני הוא רק נגבה בגלל מה שכתוב במסמך כך שהשיעבוד שלו הוא חלש יותר. אבל זה נראה סותר את מה שאנחנו אמרנו שהדרך הרגילה של גביית החוב היא ללכת אחרי מה שנמכר אחרון. או שאתה יכול לומר כל ברייתא אומרת את ההפך. כלומר, שמלווה הולך אחרי השדה השני והקונה השני הולך אחרי השדה הראשון. אתה יכול לענות על זה אולי הראשון נאסף לפני לוקח השני קנה שדהו. אבל מה אם זה היה בבעלות של לוקח בראשון בזמן הקונה השני קנה השדה שלו? אולי זה לא היה משנה משהו? אבל שתי הפסקאות האחרונות זה הן בעיה בצד לרגע. מה אני רוצה להזכיר שאני חושב שחשוב הוא שבתוספות בבא בתרא אומר בבירור שגם אם מה שאקנה משועבד עדיין יש סיבה למה יכול להיות שיש שדה שני. זה השני נקנה לאחר ההלוואה המקורית נגבה. זהו הרעיון של מהרש''א על מה תוספות אומרים שם.  אבל זה עומד בסתירה ישירה לתוספות בבא מציעא שבו  אמרו כי גם אם ההלוואה שנאסף ולאחר מכן בשדה השני נקנה עדיין המלווה היה צריך ללכת אחרי השדה השני בשביל מה שנשאר מן החוב . מהרש''ל רוצה לומר שהתוספות בבא בתרא חולקים עם תוספות בבא מציעא אבל מהרש''א אומר שהיה רק בגלל הגרסה של תוספות שלו לא הייתה מדויקת. בעברית פשוטה שאני רוצה להגיד זה ויכוח בין שני תוספות ולא רק בין מהרש''א ומהרש''ל















21.9.15

Rav Elazar Menachem Shach gives an answer to the Rambam in Shabat that I think I must have considered at some point on my own but  for some reason I did not pursue the idea to the end.
I have known that some kinds of work on Shabat have intention as part of their definition. That you see in writing and erasing. [Writing does not depend on intention, but erasing does.] Also in tearing. So when I saw in a mishna in Tractate Shabat that catching animals requires intention as part of the definition of the work, I thought I had an easy "ready to go" answer for the Rambam in Laws of Shabat 10:17. But I forgot about it because I got sidetracked by other issues.

And in fact I did! But I did not know that I did. I was just today that my learning partner opened up the book of Rav Shach [the Avi Ezri]and told me how Rav Shach answers that Rambam that I realized that I had [past tense] a great answer for the Rambam but was too dumb to realize it at the time.

To some degree I have an excuse. I was interested in Tosphot and I am still trying to figure out what Tosphot is thinking about this whole thing. Also I was looking at Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and trying to figure out how he answers the Rambam and it is definitely not what Rav Shach says.[The Chazon Ish wrote that  question the answer of Reb Chaim in his emendations at the end of the Chidushei HaRambam that my learning partner was also wondering about..]

In any case  I might as well just tell you the bare facts of the situation.
Tracate Shabat 107 on side a has the statement of Shmuel that pressing a boil to get out the pus and catching a snake so that it does not bite are permitted on Shabat.  It is that famous statement of his that everywhere where the mishna says not liable it means not liable but still forbidden except in three cases where it means permitted.

That is side a. On side b we have three different versions of some statement by Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav. One is pressing a boil is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda would say it is liable because of work done not for its own sake.

Shmuel goes like Rabbi Yehuda and still says pressing a boil is permitted. And so is the case to the Rambam. This seems like a direct contraction. Tosphot {Shabat 103} says Shmuel was reporting the opinion of Rabbi Shimon but he himself did not hold that way. The Rambam however says work done not for its own sake is liable and pressing a boil and catching a snake so it does not bite are allowed on Shabat.

Rav Shach brings the statement of Raba in Shabat page 146 that making an opening is liable only if it is to bring in and take out. So we have a simple answer for the Rambam. Certain kinds of work have intention as part of their definition. Making an opening is one and catching an animal is another. Without that intention you don't have work at all. Doing them without that intention is not the same as other kinds of work that intention is not part of the definition. So pressing the boil without intention of bring in and out and catching a snake so it does not bite are not work at all.They are not simply work with an alternative intention but nothing at all.
And that means even Rabbi Yehuda would say they are permitted. And this explains why on page 107 b in Shabat that there are different versions of what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav--that is because each version does not agree with the other one.

However the version that says pressing a boil is only the opinion of Rabbi Shimon obviously holds that intention is not a part of that particular kind of work.

The Rambam's statement itself is this: piercing a boil in the way of doctors is forbidden and liable. But not in that way is permitted. 10:17 Laws of Shabat.

I have to say that I am impressed with Rav Shach. And though it was Reb Chaim Soloveitchik who started the revolution in understanding of the Rambam, I think Rav Shach was the tip of the sword.

In any case I can't claim credit for this idea. I had all the pieces and I definitely had the answer when it came to piercing the boil. And I also suspected the capturing of the snake so it should not bite is not a work at all. But to put the pieces together to answer the Rambam, Rav Shach  gets the credit.












20.9.15

Music For the Glory of the God Of Israel

Divine Simplicity. I thought to give a brief account of this, along with Creation ex Nihilo.

The שכליים העליונים [the higher intellects]  came up in conversation with my learning partner and so I thought to repeat here some of the ideas. He had seen this in the Ramban [Nachmanides]. Of course this is common in the Middle Ages. That is a medieval adaption of Plato's higher ideas that is referring to angels.
Mainly the Ramban [Nachmanides] and most medieval thought  is Neo Platonic. That is until the Rambam [Maimonides] and then Aquinas.  The reason for the switch was I think a lot due to Divine Simplicity. Medieval thought could deal with higher intellects, but not intellect in God. Plotinus himself  had no problem with this, but from Jewish and Christian perspective this introduced a plurality in God that was unacceptable.
And the neo Platonic perspective also easily slipped into Pantheism.

What happened was people got tired of trying to account for the Torah based on Plotinus. Finally the Rambam [Maimonides] simply made a break for it and went straight to Aristotle. Aquinas followed.

Along with this Creation something from nothing had been a problem from a Neo-Platonic perspective also. Again the Rambam held it was best accounted for by Aristotle's' First Cause. The Ari side steps the issue by starting everything from the אור אין סוף Infinite Light. I noticed this right at the beginning of my study of the Eitz Chaim. [The light is a creation. Then everything emanates from the light. That is what the verse refers to in "Let there be light." That according to Saadia Gaon and the Rambam is creation from nothing.]

 The Guide itself is kind of a codification of the faith of the Torah --monotheism. And I think it is impressive because it presents the Faith of the Torah as one coherent compact structure. Nothing  compares with the Guide in giving a rigorous and logically sound structure for the Torah world view.

So just to recap. The faith of the Torah is that God is one. There is no plurality in Him. He is not a composite. He has no ingredients. And He made the world from nothing.

Now Creation something from nothing was always an important aspect of Torah. The first to state it in this way was Augustine. But the Rambam [Maimonides] said it was the foundation of the entire Torah. And he devoted Vol II of the Guide to showing this.

[The Guide itself I have to admit is a hard read. In a practical sense what I do and recommend to others is the books of Medieval Ethics, Musar which give the best account I know of about how to live as a decent human being.] Musar has an advantage of being understandable more so than the Guide, and also it does not have the sort of modernist, feel-good, psychologized versions of Torah that are so common today.
In the morning prayers we have a section describing the  Incense in the Temple in Jerusalem. It says if they had put a certain ingredient in it it would have been irresistible. But they did not put it is because the Torah said not to. Attempts to make the Torah more attractive only bastardize it.
The way people bastardize the Torah is by adding ingredients that the Torah says not to add.
It is a true principle that Achronim [authorities after the Shulchan Aruch] are lightweights compared to the Rishonim [Mediaeval Authorities]. But even among the Rishonim there are few that compare with the Rambam.  Maybe none. In any case, to dismiss the Guide as misguided requires a good degree of incompetence and stupidity. But that is not as bad as ignoring, it as if it is irrelevant to Torah thought. That takes more than stupidity. That takes downright intentional deception.]









Music for the Glory of God



My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.

The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To  make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.
That is to say the Torah has two areas of obligation. One is between Man and God and the other between Man and his fellow Man. The peak of human perfection is fulfilling both areas.
My parents were the closest I ever saw anyone come to fulfill this balanced approach.

[In a practical sense, Reform Judaism is right for the emphasis on obligations between man and his fellow Man. That is clear in all books of Musar. And see the Nahar Shalom by the Yemenite Mystic Shalom Sharabi who gives a deep explanation for this. In any case however obligation between Man and God are also obligations. But there is no reason to be searching for extra things to be strict about that the Torah does not require. It is a fact that there are people who just can't get enough strictness. That however is not the approach of the Torah. One can serve God though anything.  Hillel went to a bathhouse and his disciples asked him what he was doing. He explained he was doing a mitzvah. Similarly with others things he was doing.

The danger of ריבוי אור. Too much light.  Too much excitement in the service of God can  be from the evil inclination. As it says in the Torah that God told Moses to warn the people not to go up on Mount Sinai.

גם בעבודת השם יש יצר הרע גדול דהיינו התלהבות יותר מדאי וזה בחינת מה שהשם אמר למשה הזהרתה את העם מלעלות על הר סיני

There is another way in which Reform and Conservative Judasim are admirable. They don't do idolatry. That is they don't worship people nor try to get others to worship people.





19.9.15



I should mention that the way I learned Torah was mainly influenced by the two yeshivas I went to in NY. One place was for in depth learning that was mainly interested in what was going on on that page. The next place--the Mir in N.Y. was  more about how what was going on on the page fit in with the rest of the Talmud. I benefited from both approaches and I think that both approaches are implicit in what God has granted to me to write in these two booklets.

My background in California was Temple Israel in Hollywood. I had learned some Torah in Newport Beach before we moved to Beverly Hills, but I don't remember where or who. It was certainly Reform, but I don't remember what was the name.  But I gained a great deal at Temple Israel. I think the rabbi's name was Nussbaum.
[Later my family had a different rabbi,  Rabbi Roth, who is Reconstructionist. I don't know him very well because I was in NY, and later went to Israel. But he has been the family rabbi for my family for a long time.] [I should mention that I think Reform Temples are good, but we should learn more Torah.]
Incidentally, I see I wrote on my blog a lot of ideas about Shabat that never got into the Hebrew book. Most of the essays I found by typing Chaim Soloveitchik Shabat. But I have to look over them to see what I was saying.
______________________________________________________________________________
Ok Here is what I wrote in English that I was looking for:

"The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner, I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc.
I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident."


What I seem to be saying is that in the Gemara we have R Yehuda and R Shimon. R Shimon is says מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not liable. R Yehuda says they are both liable. Shmuel goes by R Yehuda in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like R Shimon in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the Rambam goes. What I seem to be asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all sin offerings that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing--but not too much.
But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 
_________________________________________________________________________________



The question on this is that דבר שאינו מתכווין is not at all the same thing as being מחויב חטאת. But there is a connection between דבר שאינו מתכווין and normal חויב חטאת. My idea is that חטאות need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on שבת that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to אביי. So some knowledge is needed to be liable, but not too much. And that is what makes something an שוגג.


In the גמרא we have רבי יהודה and רבי שמעון. The opinion of  רבי שמעון is  מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not מחויב. But רבי יהודה says they are both liable. שמואל goes by רבי יהודה in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like רבי שמעון in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the רמב''ם goes. What I am asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all קרבן חטאת that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing, but not too much.
But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 
השאלה: דבר שאינו מתכווין הוא בכלל לא אותו הדבר כמו להיות מחויב חטאה. אבל יש לומר שישקשר בין הדבר שאינו מתכווין וחויב חטאת. הרעיון שלי הוא שצריך בחטאות מידה מסוימת של ידע, אלא שלא להיות בפועל מתכוון. למשל להרים צנון בשבת שבמחשבתו   הוא כבר הורם אבל התברר להיות מחובר לאדמה אינו מחויב חטאת, אלא לחתוך אותו  מחויב חטאת לאביי. אז יש צורך בקצת ידע להיות מחויב, אבל לא יותר מדי ידע. וזה מה שעושה משהו שוגג. בגמרא יש לנו  רבי שמעון ורבי יהודה. דעתו של רבי שמעון היא מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה ודבר שאינו מתכווין שניהם לא מחויבים. אבל רבי יהודה אומר שניהם מחויבים. שמואל סובר כרבי יהודה במלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וכמו רבי שמעון בדבר שאינו מתכווין וכך לרמב''ם . מה שאני שואל הוא שהדבר שאינו מתכווין גם אם הוא פסיק רישא עדיין לא צריך להיות מחויב. תירוץ: מדוע היא מחויב? בגלל שזה דבר הנורמלי בכל קרבן חטאת שאנחנו צריכים שהבן אדם קצת ידע על מה שהוא עושה, אבל לא יותר מדי

I should mention that to be obligated in a sin offering one needs one of two lacks of knowledge. He might not know that the action is forbidden. But he knows what he is doing. The other thing is he did something by accident. See the Mishna LeMelech at chapter two of the Rambam's Hilchot Shegagot.
It is this second kind of accident that I am referring to in the above essay.

 If one serves an idol from love thinking that that is allowed then he brings a sin offering. If on purpose then that is the death penalty. If he makes a mistake in material facts like if the statue is in fact an idol, then we see right in the Talmud itself that Abyee says, "that is nothing."



Now we find in tractate Shabat that there is an argument between Abyee and Rava about cutting a radish and it turns out that it was attached. Abyee says he is liable a sin offering. Rava says no.[Shabat 72b]. But in the case where he picked up a radish and it tuned out that it was attached then both agree he is not liable. So what do we have from this? This: if one picks up a radish on shabat thinking that it is allowed to do so then he brings a sin offering. If he did not know it was attached it is nothing. Exactly like idolatry.--except it is not exact. What is the difference between this and cutting the radish?


What I suggest is to look at Shmuel in Kritut where he discusses the Mishna about what kind of accidents are liable and what kind not. [circa pages 19, 20]. The fact is he requires both intention and thought, to be liable. And though it is hard to see how this can help us right now, still I think it is an important area to keep in ind because of the essential fact that the Rambam's opinion about work not intended and work not needed for its own sake comes directly from Shmuel.  So whatever Shmuel thinks is going to be directly related to anything the Rambam says.




I did not know the date of my mother's death. I had always observed it on the Hebrew calender. But my younger brother wrote and mentioned at it was today on the English calendar.

My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.

The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To  make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.




18.9.15

I have been looking at Musar (Ethics) books for a while and at some point I started to notice that they  divide a persons obligations into two parts. בין אדם לחיברו and בין אדם למקום- Between man and his fellow man and between man and God.

You find some people stress one area over the other. But from what I can tell the books of Musar have the viewpoint that both areas are important.

What that means in a practical vein is that if you want to repent, you would have to look at each different area individually. That is probably so hard that you can see why some people stress one area over the other. And there might not be any choice but to take that approach. Still it is important to realize that at least in theory ones' obligations are divided evenly between these two areas.

Though the source of obligation is Divine the approach in Musar that the obligations between man and man precede those between man an God.  See Nahar Shalaom of Shalom Sharabi where he gives a mystic reason for this.

The evil inclination is also divided into two parts. One physical and the other spiritual. The spiritual is the tricky one. That is the one that gets and impersonates a Torah scholar and gets people to sin as they think they are doing a great mitzvah.

 "The evil inclination is dressed in Mitzvot." That is the evil inclination does not try to seduce people with "Let's go and do a sin."  It says rather, "Let's go and do a mitzvah."







17.9.15

Tracate Yoma about work on Shabat


  יומא ל''ד ע''ב


האם זה אפשרי שמשהו יהיה דבר שאינו מתכווין ועדיין להיות מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
  אני מציע שזה יכול להיות. תן לי להסביר. אפשר שמלאכה שצריכה לגופה אין שום קשר עם כוונה. אחרי הכל אין שום דבר האמור בזה על כוונה.  הדבר היחיד שחשוב הוא האם  נצרך  או לא. אבל בתוספות ביומא ל''ד וכריתות נראה כי תוספות חושבים שלא מדובר במשתנים בלתי תלויים. יכול להיות מתכווין ועדיין מלאכה שאינה צריך לגופה, אבל לא להפך. הדוגמא הקלסית היא לחפור בור למטרה אחרת מאשר למטרת שלשם חפירה שנעשתה במשכן. כלומר הוא צריך העפר, לא בור. אבל כפי שניתן לראות בתוספות בכריתות, תוספות שם מחזיק אלה הם עצמאיים. יכול להיות דבר שאינו מתכווין אבל הוא עדיין צריך לגופה. אז מה הוא שיש לנו שלושה רעיונות בסיסיים של מה היא מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה. בשבת יש לנו רבינו יצחק, תוספות בכריתות, ותוספות בתחילת בבא קמא. אני רוצה להזכיר שאלות על תוספות זה בגמרא הכריתות יש לנו המקרה של הפיכה של גחלים 

Is it possible for something to be דבר שאינו מתכווין  and still be a מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
 But I suggest there can be. Let us say we understand a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה has nothing to do with כוונה. After all there is nothing mentioned in it about כוונה. Rather the only thing that matters is whether it is נצרך or not.


In the תוספות  in יומא ל''ד  and כריתות it seems  that תוספות thinking that these are not independent variables. Rather something can be מתכווין and yet מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. But not להפך. The classical example is digging a hole for a purpose other than the purpose for which digging was done in the משכן. That is he needs the עפר, not the בור.

But as we can see in the תוספות in כריתות, the תוספות there holds these are independent. One can have a דבר שאינו מתכווין but it is still צריכה לגופה


So what we have in is three basic ideas of what is a מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה.  In שבת we have רבינו יצחק, the תוספות in כריתות that I am dealing with in this next essay, and the תוספות in the beginning of בבא קמא


\

I wanted to mention questions on this תוספות

In גמרא כריתות we have the case of turning over coals. For turning over the bottom coals רבי שמעון says he is not obligated. תוספות says there are three reasons to say he is ought to be obligated in a sin offering. It is מלאכת מחשבת and it is  damaging by fire which רבי שמעון says is obligated, and it is a case of   דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא. So why is he not obligated ? Answer תוספות. A מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
Then why, תוספות asks, does not the גמרא say this? Why does it say the case is דבר שינו מתכווין? Answer to show the strength of רבי יהודה who says even though it is דבר שינו מתכווין, he is still obligated in a sin offering.

תוספות then approaches the גמרא in גמרא שבת דף ק''ג ע''א. There he is picking עולשים that can be eaten. If he does it to eat, then to רבי שמעון he is obligated only once and not for the additional obligation of making his field look nicer. But we ask is it not דבר שאינו מתכווין אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא?
 Answer: It is someone else's field.
That is just the straight גמרא.
The two questions on תוספות concerns the way he treats this later גמרא.
Question one: תוספות is satisfied with his being not obligated in someone else's field since it is אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא . This is in direct contradiction to what he said in כריתות concerning the parallel case of coals.
Think about it. The Gemara said R Shimon should have said it is liable and then answered it פסיק רישא ודבר שאינו מתכווין. But back in Kritut we said some thing can be that exact case and be liable. In fact it was listed by Tosphot as a reason to be liable!!!! The only reason in Kritut it is not is because מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה

Actually I just looked at my notes in Hebrew and I saw that I wrote there that this is in fact the intention of Tosphot--that is to ask on the previous idea in Kritut.




Question Two. In his own field, we should also make a distinction if it is  מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה or not.

The second question is really just a note, but not really a קושיה.


תוספות says the reason in כריתות that the גמרא said it is a case of דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא is because it wanted to show the strength of רבי יהודה. So why, תוספות asks, then in a later on case when he draws the coals closer to himself, the גמרא does not say the same thing? Why does it say it is a case of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה?

Answer: In drawing coals it could be that he does not mind if they get hotter. So the גמרא can't say it is not intended. Only in the case of turning over coals in which case he is against the idea of the bottom coals getting hotter. He would rather they would not . But he simply has no choice since he has to get the top ones to the bottom of the pile where they will cool down and  become usable coals. My point here is that תוספות says that even so, רבי שמעון would say he is obligated to bring a sin offering except for the fact that it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה .

So why then in גמרא שבת is תוספות satisfied with the fact that it being דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא  makes him not obligated even thought it is simply a case of his not caring whether the field gets improvement in value.

I probably should mention here that I do not mind if he is not obligated in שבת ק''ג because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. I only wish that that would be the reason that the גמרא or תוספות would use over there.

My learning partner made a suggestion that perhaps תוספות meant for the original three means of being obligated to רבי שמעון  were meant to work together. I.e.  that the idea דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא with the idea of מקלקל by fire.  Maybe תוספות meant for those three original means to be obligated to work together. But if you look at the actual language of תוספות you can see that is not what he says. But at least it might save תוספות in a conceptual manner, even if it is not exactly what he said.



[1] Work done not for its own sake. Classical example. Digging a pit for the dirt, not for the hole to plant in.
Work not intended: Classical example. He does something permitted but something forbidden might result.
פסיק רישא is he does something permitted, but something forbidden must result.

[3] There is a third question also on the same תוספות. It concerns the issue of how תוספות treats the גמרא in כריתות. In that גמרא there is a case where someone pulls burning coals closer to himself. the גמרא itself says it is not obligated in a  sin offering because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה

Now to some degree we can accept this. We already are understanding that the only time lighting a fire is חייב is when he needs the coals. I might like to argue about this here but I am anxious to get to a much more glaring difficulty. Before תוספות says one of the three reasons רבי שמעון would say tuning over the bottom coals is חייב is that even though it is אינו מתכווין it would be חייב for even מקלקל by אש is obligated. I mean to say that תוספות. That is, you do not need intention to be חייב for lighting a fire. So even if he thinks he is pulling apples closer to him, he would be obligated in a קרבן חטאת. how then do we say he is not obligated because of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה? That is for רבי שמעון you do not need מלאכת מחשבת for fire.

I saw a small booklet with a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira on it. [You know the one. It is all over the place.] I have to admit whenever I see a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira or his grandson Bava Sali  I get the shivers. The Fear of God gets into me. You might ask well then why not go for it? Find some descendant of that family? The reason for my hesitation is several fold.

First of all I am trying to combine for myself several aspects of the service of God. That is I try to divide my day into small sessions so that I can accomplish a small amount in every field that I feel is important. That means learning Torah and prayer and also involvement in the natural sciences.

In any case the Abuchatzaira thing I should say is for Sephardi people mainly. There is a great deal of tension when an Ashkenazic Jew shows up in a Sephardi neighborhood. Inevitably there is some hot head who makes it his business to get rid of the Ashkenazic guy no matter how nice he tries to be.
But the actual family of  Abuchatzaira tend to be pretty holy people. So to go to them for  a blessing certainly makes sense.

In fact if you are near Netivot I recommend going to Shimon Buso for a blessing. He is a grandson of Bava Sali from the side of one of Bava Sali's daughters.

Also I have to say the basic path of Bava Sali was straight forward. What he did and what he recommended to others was nothing more that learn and keep Torah in the most basic and simple fashion possible with no side dishes.


Each group of Sephardi and Ashkenazim seems to have its pluses and minuses. But for an Ashkenazi fellow to meander into a Sephardi areas is a guaranteed invitation for disaster. On the other hand whenever there is some Ashkenazic Rav that wants a following around him, and lacks the right amount of talent for that, he goes to some Sephardic community and recruits them and he gets his own cult of followers.
In fact, almost every well known Ashkenazic group you can think of was made in exactly this way.





16.9.15

insane religious "frum" world.

How to improve one's character?  Musar.


It might not be the best way to work on ones character. It might not even be that effective. But Israel Salanter thought learning books that were written to instill good character is the best type of way of going about thus that he saw. I mean you could ask what good does it do to learn about good character? Still compared to whatever else he saw this was the most effective means. You could say the Boy Scouts of the USA had the same purpose in mind. But you see where they have fallen to.


From what I can tell Musar has very limited effectiveness.


Musar  can lead to fanaticism. And today it seems to have in fact become associated with being extra frum. That seems like an aberration from its intended purpose.

The main problem I think there is with the way Musar is practiced today is the idea of social norms. People assume the message of Musar is to be frum (religious) as defined by the generally insane religious "frum" world.  Musar after all does say to keep all the commandments of the Oral and Written Law. But where they are wrong is they think Musar says to keep the social norms of the  religious world. I should say I am completely against being frum and against trying to get people to be frum. Being frum (religious) and keeping Torah are two exact opposites.
In what way can you see this? In the area of social norms. Torah itself has no concern or interest in any one's opinions or conventions.

Let me see if I can make this clear. The religious  world is accustomed to going off in certain directions crusading for one cause or the other. These are most often against the Torah. But they present their crusade as being a part and parcel of keeping Torah.

That is the most obvious area. But there are many others --more subtle things. How it comes out in the end is if you want to keep Torah, stay away from the frum as far as you can possibly get. However Lithuanian yeshivas do  make an effort in keeping the Torah like it says in the most basic and simple way. So even if they may seem frum their center of attention is in fact the Torah so that makes them OK. [But the kelipa of frumkeit does seems to have infiltrated them to some degree.]

In almost every major Torah principle that I can think of the frum are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Examples.
Learning Torah is one area for example. Their major concern is to make money off of the Torah.
Honor of one's parents.
Settling in Israel or at least support for Israel.
Monotheism.
Kindness for its own sake. I.e where do you go in a time of emergency? Who will help you in a time of emergency. Not the frum. If you find yourself out of luck they will do their best to push you down further.

Conservative or Reform are good places but the frum are a trap.

Though I can't compare myself to Rav Shach in any way, but I should mention that he was not afraid to voice criticisms in public. And when he was asked about it he quoted a Mishna: "Any argument that is for the sake of Heaven will be established."
Of course he did not exact win any popularity contests. But he certainly wrote the most important Torah book to come out in the last hundred years.











Bava Metzia page 14
 A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the improvements. Rav said the buyer gets the amount of the improvements from the thief along with the money he paid for it. Shmuel said he does not get the improvements.
Tosphot says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page 101 where someone goes into  a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.

I wanted today to say what is bothering Tosphot. I did not put that in my essay yesterday since I thought it was enough that at least I said what Tosphot was thinking. But today I wanted to say why he is thinking what he is thinking. He is bothered by several questions.  Lets say the case is the improvement is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the improvement directly to Rav? And it seems strange that on page 101 a  someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on pg 14  gets nothing to Samuel. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering Tosphot. Thus Tosphot comes up with an elegant solution.--He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did--but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.

__________________________________________________________________


 A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the שבח. The law is this.  רב said the buyer gets the amount of the שבח from the thief along with the money he paid for it. שמואל said he does not get the שבח.
On page 14 תוספות says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page ק''א where someone goes into  a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.

I wanted today to say what is bothering תוספות.  He is bothered by several questions.  Let us say the case is the שבח is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the שבח directly in the opinion of רב? And it seems strange that on page ק''א a  someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on page י''ד  gets nothing to שמואל. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering תוספות. Thus תוספות comes up with an elegant solution. He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did, but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.

פה אני מסביר למה תוספות אומר מה שהוא אומר. שדה נגנב. הגנב מכר אותו והקונה עבד עליו. אז השדה חוזר לבעלים עם השבח. החוק הוא זה. רב אמר הקונה מקבל את סכום השבח מהגנב יחד עם הכסף שהוא שילם על זה. שמואל אמר שהוא אינו מקבל את השבח. בעמוד י''ד תוספות אומר שזה אותו העיקרון שחל כמוחל על דף ק''א שבו מישהו נכנס לשדה של מי שהוא ונטע עצי שדה וצמחים. שם הבעלים משלמים או השבח או ההוצאה לפי הנמוך מביניהם. אני רוצה לומר היום מה מטריד את התוספות. תן לי לומר המקרה הוא השבח הוא פחות. אז מדוע הבעלים לא נותנים לקונה את סכום השבח ישירות בדעתו של רב? עוד שאלה: זה נראה מוזר שעל דף ק''א מישהו שהולך ישירות לתוך שדה מישהו  שהוא מקבל תשלום הסכום שהוא שיפר את השדה בעוד הקונה על י''ד הדף אינו מקבל שום דבר לשמואל. זה אולי הדבר העיקרי שמטריד את תוספות. כך תוספות מגיע עם פתרון אלגנטי. הוא אומר שזה אותו העיקרון בשני המקומות. כלומר הוא חושב שהקונה מהגנב גם מקבל תשלום עבור העבודה שהוא עשה, אלא שהוא מקבל את הסכום ישירות מהבעלים.